ORDER Pandey, J. 1. This petition under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution is directed against the election of Shankerlal (respondent 2) as the president of the Municipal Council of Jora, a township in Morena district having a Class IV Municipality constituted under the Madhya Pradesh Municipalities Act, 1961 (hereinafter called the Act). For the election of the 'President and the two Vice-Presidents, the Sub-Divisional Officer, Jora (respondent 12), had convened a meeting for 24 June 1968. The petitioner, who is a voter registered in the electoral rolls of the Municipality, mainly called in question the legality of the meeting held on that date. 2. The facts giving rise to this petition may be shortly stated. The general elections took place in April 1964 when the respondents 4 to 10 were duly elected as councilors. In their first meeting held on 30 June 1966, Sukhdayal (respondent 3) was elected as the President. That election was notified in the Madhya Pradesh Rajpatra on 22 July 1966, when the respondent 3 entered upon his office as enacted in section 45 of the Act. He held office for a period of two years, as provided by section 43 (2) (a) of the Act. But even before the expiry of that period of two years, on 21 July 1968, the respondent 12 called the impugned meeting for 24 June 1968, when as already indicated the respondent 2 was elected as the President of the Municipal Council. That election has been challenged on several grounds set out in paragraph 14 of the petition, but it is not necessary to notice them because the only ground pressed in support of this petition is that it was illegal and contrary to the provisions of section 43 (2) (b) of the Act to call a meeting for electing a new President before the expiry of term of office of the out-going President. 3. 3. The provisions of the Act relevant for consideration of the point raised are contained in section 43 of the Act which reads: "43 (1) A Council shall elect- (a) a President from its members or from other persons residing in the Municipality possession the qualification of a candidate for election under section 34 and not disqualified under section 35 or any other provision of this Act; (b) two Vice-Presidents to be designated as Senior Vice-President and Junior Vice-President from amongst its members; Provided that no person shall be eligible for being elected as a President or Vice-President of a Council if he holds such or similar office in any other local authority. (2) (a) After every general election, the Council shall elect the President and Vice-President at its first meeting held under sub-section (2) of section 55 and the President and the Vice-President so elected shall hold office for a period of two years from the date on which they enter upon their offices. (b) On the expiry of the term of the office of the President and the Vice-President elected under clause (a), the Council shall, at a meeting convened for the purpose within one month thereof, elect new President and Vice-Presidents who shall hold office for the unexpired term of the Council. (c) The provisions of sub-sections (2) and (3) of section 55 shall so far as may be, apply to the meetings under clause (b), as they apply to the first meeting of a Council: Provided that the President and the Vice-Presidents shall continue in office until their successors enter upon their respective offices in accordance with the provisions of this Act. (3) If the Council fails to elect a President or Vice-President in accordance with this section, the State Government may, by order, direct the Council to elect the President or Vice-Presidents within the period specified therein and on failure of the Council to do so appoint any person eligible under subsection (1) to fill the vacancy. (4) The State Government may make rules for regulating the mode and time of election of the President and the Vice-Presidents. (5) The President, who is not a Councilor shall unless otherwise expressly provided, be deemed to be a Councilor for all purposes of this Act." 4. (4) The State Government may make rules for regulating the mode and time of election of the President and the Vice-Presidents. (5) The President, who is not a Councilor shall unless otherwise expressly provided, be deemed to be a Councilor for all purposes of this Act." 4. The precise contention is that, since clause (b) of section 43 (2) of the Act requires the meeting to be convened "on the expiry of the term of the office of the President ... ... elected under clause (a) … ... within one month thereof", it was not open to the Sub-Divisional Officer to call any meeting before the expiry of that term. This is sought to be met by arguing that the expression" within one month thereof" means and requires that the meeting must be convened for a date within one month anterior to the date of expiry of the two years' term of office of the first President, In our opinion, that construction is contra-indicated by the opening expression "On the expiry of the term of the office of the President". Even so, a~ we would show immediately, the provisions relating to time for calling the meeting and the limitation prescribed therefore are merely directory and it is sufficient if they are substantially complied with. 5. It is well settled that an absolute enacment must be fulfilled exactly and that the act permitted by such an enactment is lawful only if it is done in accordance therewith without any departure therefrom. On the other hand, it is enough if a directory enactment is fulfilled substantially and the act so done is not rendered invalid for that reason. The question whether a provision of law is mandatory or directory was considered by the Supreme Court in several cases including Banarsi Das v. Cane Commissioner, U.P. [ AIR 1963 SC 1417 ] in which their Lordships recalled the statement of Maxwell and its application to earlier cases. They stated at page 1424 as follows:- "The general rule as to which provision of law can be regarded as mandatory and which directory is stated in Maxwell on the Interpretation on Statutes at page 364. They stated at page 1424 as follows:- "The general rule as to which provision of law can be regarded as mandatory and which directory is stated in Maxwell on the Interpretation on Statutes at page 364. 'It has been said that no rule call be laid down for determining whether the command (of the statute) is to be considered as a mere direction or instruction involving no invalidating consequence in its disregard, or as imperative with an implied nullification for disobedience, beyond the fundamental one that it depends on the scope and object of the enactment, It may, perhaps, be found generally correct to say that nullification is the natural and usual consequence of disobedience, but the question is in the main governed by consideration of convenience and justice [R.V. Ingall ((1876) 2 QBD 199 at P. 208) per Lush J.] and when that result would involve general inconvenience or injustice to innocent persons, or advantage of those guilty of the neglect, with out promoting the real aim and object of the enactment, such an intention is not to be attributed to the Legislature. The whole scope and purpose of the statute under consideration must be regarded. The general rule is that an absolute en1ctment must be obeyed or fulfilled exactly, but it is sufficient if a directory enactment be obeyed or fulfilled substantially. This rule has been applied in many cases both in India and in England. In State of U.P. v. Manbodhan Lal [ 1958 SCR 533 ], this Court observed that no general rule can be laid down but the object of the statute must be looked at and even if the provision be worded in a mandatory form, if its neglect would work serious general inconvenience or injustice to persons who have no control over those entrusted with the duty and at the same time would not promote the main object of the Legislature it is to be treated only as directory and the neglect of it though permissible would not affect the validity of the acts done. These observations have been followed in other cases and recently in Bhikraj v. Union of India [ AIR 1962 SC 113 at p.119] it was observed that where a statute requires that a thing shall be done in a particular manner or form but does not itself setout the consequences of noncompliance the questions whether the prescription of law shall be treated as mandatory or directory could only be solved by regarding the object, purpose and scope of that law. If the statute is found to be directory a penalty may be incurred for non-compliance but the act or thing done is regarded as good. It is unnecessary to muttiply these cases which are based upon the statement in Maxwell which quoted over and over again." The same question came up for consideration in R.B. Sugar Co. v. Rampur Municipality [ AIR 1965 SC 895 ]. Their Lordships observed. "The question whether a particular provision of a statute which on the face of it appears mandatory - In as much as it uses the word 'shall' as in the present case-or is merely directory cannot be resolved by laying down any general rule and depends upon the facts of each case and for that purpose the object of the statute in making the provision is the determining factor the purpose for which the provision has been made and its nature, the intention of the Legislature in making the provision, the serions general inconvenience or injustice to persons resulting from whether the provision is read one way or the other, the relation of the particular provision to other provisions dealing with the same subject and other considerations which may arise on the facts of a particular case including the language of the provision, have all to be taken into account in arriving at the conclusion whether a particular provision is mandatory or directory." [Page 899] 6. In the case before us, the question is whether the time for performing an official act, from which rights and duties of others flow as contained in clause (b) of section 43 (2) of the Act is mandatory or directory only. In the case before us, the question is whether the time for performing an official act, from which rights and duties of others flow as contained in clause (b) of section 43 (2) of the Act is mandatory or directory only. The rule of construction in regard to such specification of time in a statute is stated in Corpus Juris, Volume 59, page 1075, as follows:- "As statute specifying a time within which a public officer is to perform an official act regarding the rights and duties of others, and made with a view to the proper, orderly and prompt conduct of business, is usually directory, unless the phraseology of the statute, or the nature of the act to be performed and the consequences of doing or failing to do it at such time, is such that the designation of time must be considered a limitation on the power of the officer". In this case, we do not find anything in the phraseology of the statute or the nature of the act to be performed as indicating an intention of the Legislature to require exact or literal fulfillment in regard to time. The legislative command is not couched in negative: words which are usually regarded as a device to make a statute imperative M. Pentiah v. Veeramallappa [ AIR 1961 SC 1107 ], Nor does the statute provide that the omission to observe the time specified therein will either be punishable or result in nullification of act done. On the other hand, this is an official act involving a public duty, over which the general public his no control and it is not shown to us if any injurious consequences would flow from not invalidating the act done for failing to observe the time for doing it as specified in the statute. On the other hand, this is an official act involving a public duty, over which the general public his no control and it is not shown to us if any injurious consequences would flow from not invalidating the act done for failing to observe the time for doing it as specified in the statute. In our opinion, the principle applicable to this case is the one stated by the Privy Council in Montreal Street Railway Company v. Narmandin [AIR 1917 PC 142] “When the provisions of a statute relate to the performance of a public duty and the case is such that to hold null and void acts done in neglect of this duty would work serious general inconvenience or injustice to persons who have no control over those entrusted with the duty and at the same time would not promote the main object of the Legislature, it has been the practice to hold such provisions to be directory only:” Page 144 7. In the course of arguments, reference was made to the decision of a Division Bench of this Court, namely, Raghuvans Prasad v. Mahendra Singh [ 1968 JLJ 125 =1967 MPLJ 941] in regard to the construction of clause (b) of section 43 (2) of the Act and our attention was particularly drawn to the following sentence:- "Therefore, even if the time-limit condition is regarded as imperative, its non-compliance can be excused when the authority competent to convene a meeting for the purpose of electing new President and Vice-Presidents does not convene the meeting within the prescribed time," We agree with the conclusion that the failure to observe the time specified in the Act is excusable but, with respect, we think the true reason to be, not that the non-performance of a mandatory provision is excusable, but that the provision as to time is, as we have shown, directory. 8. In this case, although the meeting was convened for 24th June 1968, the elections held on that date have not yet been notified under section 45 of the Act. 8. In this case, although the meeting was convened for 24th June 1968, the elections held on that date have not yet been notified under section 45 of the Act. III our opinion, even if the elections take place a slightly before the expiry of the term of the outgoing office-bearers and such elections are notified under section 45 of the Act after the expiry of that time, there will be substantial compliance with the directory provisions of clause (b) of section 43 (2) of the Act in regard to the time for holding the elections. 9. Since no other point was argued, this petition fails and is dismissed. The petitioner shall bear his own costs and payout of the security amount those incurred by the contesting Respondent 2. The remaining amount of security shall be refunded. Hearing fee Rs.100.