JUDGMENT : Shelat, J. 1. On December 24, 1961, the respondent, who was the Food Inspector, appointed by Cannanore Municipality, purchased from the appellant one bottle of milk meant for sale after giving notice that the purchase by him was for analysis. After sampling the same, he sent the sample milk to the Public Analyst whose report showed that the sample milk contained 55% of added water. On this analysis, the appellant was charged under S. 16 (1) read with S. 7 of the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act, XXXVII of 1954. 2. The District Magistrate who tried him, convicted the appellant and sentenced him to one year's simple imprisonment and a fine of Rs. 2,000/-. In appeal, the Sessions Judge set aside the conviction and acquitted the appellant holding that there was contravention of S. 10 (7) of the Act inasmuch as at the time of sampling the milk the Inspector had not kept present any independent witness, that the provisions of S. 10 (7) were mandatory and, therefore, contravention thereof vitiated the trial. The Food Inspector filed an appeal, being Criminal Appeal No. 322 of 1964, in the High Court against the said order of acquittal. He also filed an application for condonation of delay, such delay, according to him, being of two days. In para II of that application, the respondent after explaining how the delay occurred stated as follows: "There is a delay of 2 days in preferring this appeal to the court. The delay is not intentional and it has happened in the circumstances mentioned above." In the order dated July 25, 1964, the High Court remarked that sufficient reasons had been made out for excusing the delay and that delay was condoned. In the appeal, the High Court held that S. 10 (7) of the Act was not mandatory but directory and on that footing, it set aside the order of acquittal and reminded the case to Sessions Court to decide on merits the question whether the Food Inspector had duly sampled the said milk as required by S.10 (7). On the said remand, the Sessions Judge heard the appeal afresh. By his order dated September 16, 1964, he once again set aside the order of conviction and sentence passed by the District Magistrate and acquitted the appellant on the ground that there was no proof of compliance of rr. On the said remand, the Sessions Judge heard the appeal afresh. By his order dated September 16, 1964, he once again set aside the order of conviction and sentence passed by the District Magistrate and acquitted the appellant on the ground that there was no proof of compliance of rr. 7 and 18 of the Rules made under the Act. The respondent thereupon filed an appeal in the High Court. The High Court set aside the said order of acquittal and restored the order of conviction and sentence passed by the District Magistrate. The appellant applied for certificate and on its being refused, obtained special leave from this Court and filed this appeal challenging the High Court's said judgment and order. 3. Counsel contended that the respondent Municipality, not being either the State Government or the Central Government, was a private complainant and, therefore, an -appeal against the order of acquittal filed by the respondent was governed by S. 417 (3) and (4) of the Code of Criminal Procedure. The appeal was filed not by the Public Prosecutor upon a direction either by the State or the Central Government but by counsel of the respondent Municipality. The appeal, therefore, was under S 417 (3). Since such an appeal has to be filed within sixty days from the date of the order of acquittal and S. 417 (4) was a special law, S. 5 of the Limitation Act, 1908 did not apply, and the High Court was neither competent to condone the delay nor to entertain the said appeal. In our view, the contention is correct and has to be upheld. 4. S. 417 runs in the following terms: 'S. 417 (1). Subject to the provisions of sub-section (5), the State Government may, in any case, direct the Public Prosecutor to present an appeal, to the High Court, from an original or appellate order of acquittal passed by any Court other than a High Court. (2) If such an order of acquittal is passed in any case in which the offence has been investigated by the Delhi Special Police Establishment constituted under the Delhi Special Police Establishment Act, 1946 (XXXV of 1946), the Central Government may also direct the Public Prosecutor to present an appeal to the High Court from the order of acquittal. (2) If such an order of acquittal is passed in any case in which the offence has been investigated by the Delhi Special Police Establishment constituted under the Delhi Special Police Establishment Act, 1946 (XXXV of 1946), the Central Government may also direct the Public Prosecutor to present an appeal to the High Court from the order of acquittal. (3) If such an order of acquittal is passed in any case instituted upon complaint and the High Court, on an application made to it by the complainant in this behalf grants special leave to appeal from the order of acquittal, the complainant may present such an appeal to the High Court. (4) No such application under sub-section (3) for the grant of special leave to appeal from the order of acquittal shall be entertained by the High Court after the expiry of sixty days from the date of that order of acquittal." 5. It is clear that appeal No. 322 of 1964 was not filed under either sub-Section (1) or sub-section (2) of S. 417 as it was not filed by the Public Prosecutor either at the direction of the State or the Central Government. In fact it was filed at the instance of the respondent Municipality and, therefore, would fall under and must be held to have been filed under sub-section (3) of that section. Sub-section (4) clearly provides that no application under sub-section (3) for the grant of special leave to appeal from an order of acquittal can be entertained by the High Court after the expiry of sixty days from the date of the order of acquittal. 6. The question whether delay in such a case can be condoned under S. 5 of the Limitation Act is covered by the decision in Kaushalya Rani v. Gopal Singh, (1964) 3 SCR 982 where this Court held that the special rule of limitation laid down in S. 417 (4) of the Code of Criminal Procedure is a special law of limitation governing appeals by private prosecutors & S. 5 of the Limitation Act cannot apply is view of S. 29 (2) (b) of that Act. As held there, a special law means a law enacted for special cases, in special circumstances and in contradistinction to the general rule of law laid down as applicable generally to all cases with which the general law deals. As held there, a special law means a law enacted for special cases, in special circumstances and in contradistinction to the general rule of law laid down as applicable generally to all cases with which the general law deals. In that sense the Code of Criminal Procedure is a general law regulating the procedure for the trial of criminal cases generally. When it lays down the bar of time in respect of special cases, in special circumstances, like those contemplated by S. 417 [3] and [4], it is a special law contained within the general law. Likewise the Limitation Act is a general law laying down general rules of limitation applicable to all cases dealt with by the Act, but there may be instances of a special law of limitation laid down in other statutes, though not dealing generally with the law of limitation. S. 5 of the Limitation Act being thus not applicable, the High Court was not competent to entertain the said appeal No. 322 of 1964 which admittedly had been filed beyond the period of limitation of sixty days. That being so, the order of remand passed by the High Court therein was incompetent and the subsequent judgment and order passed by the Sessions Judge and on appeal against his order of acquittal by the High Court were also incompetent. The result was that the order of acquittal passed by the Sessions Judge on December 3, 1962 became final, there being no competent appeal which could be entertained by the High Court against it. 7. The appeal is, therefore, allowed and the order of conviction and sentence passed against the appellant are set aside. Allowed.