ORDER Shivdayal, J.- 1. The respondents, Kailash Chandra and Narendra Kumar, and two others (Sushir Kumar and Ratnam) were arrested on 16th March 1968 on the accusation that they had committed the murder of one Basant Kumar in the night intervening the 14th and 15th March 1968. 2. Case for the prosecution appears to be that Keshav, Sajandas, Hasmat Rai and Jadhav, while they were sitting and talking together, heard some sound as if some articles were being thrown from the terrace of their house where they had stocked fuel. Jadhav went to the terrace. He saw two persons there. They jumped away from the terrace on seeing him. He raised an alarm, Keshav, Sajandas and Hasmat Rai rushed to the public lane in front of their house. Jadhav also came down to join them. They found that some of their fuel had been thrown in the lane from the terrace and Sushir and Ratnam were trying to take it for being used in the “Holi” pyre nearabout. Sajandas forbade them and also threatened them to report the matter. They did not listen to him and retorted that they did not care for any report. Saj1ndas proceeded to make a report to the Police. Meanwhile, Basant Kumar arrived at the scene followed by Kiran and Madhav. Basant Kumar prevented Sushir Kumar, Ratnam and others from lifting the fuel. This resulted in grappling between Basant Kumar and Sushir Kumar. The latter picked up a log of wood which was lying nearby and dealt some blows on the head of Basant Kumar, who fell down unconscious. Kiran went to the rescue of Basant Kumar but was beaten by Sushir Kumar. Madhav was also assaulted when he tried to intervene. He also fell down unconcious. In order to save Kiran, Hiralal, who reached the spot, assaulted Sushir Kumar with another piece of wood lying there. 3. Further allegation of the prosecution appears to be that Kailash Chandra and Narendra, who were present on the scene during the above incident, also actively participated in the marpit from the side of Sushir Kumar. Kailash Chandra caught hold of Hasmat Rai and Keshav, and assaulted them by fists and slaps. Ratnam, Kailashchandra and Narendra went on shouting maro maro throughout the melee. Narendra also assaulted Madhav by fists blows, when the latter wanted to intervene. 4. Basant Kumar, Madhav and Kiran were removed to the hospital. Kailash Chandra caught hold of Hasmat Rai and Keshav, and assaulted them by fists and slaps. Ratnam, Kailashchandra and Narendra went on shouting maro maro throughout the melee. Narendra also assaulted Madhav by fists blows, when the latter wanted to intervene. 4. Basant Kumar, Madhav and Kiran were removed to the hospital. Basant Kumar succumbed to his injuries. 5. On 16th March 1968, Kailashchandra applied for bail. The Additional District Magistrate (Judicial), Bilaspur, allowed that application on 19th March 1968 and released him on bait Likewise, by his order dated 22nd March 1968, the said learned Magistrate released Narendra on bail. 6. The State made an application under section 497 (5), Criminal Procedure Code, for cancellation of the bail but the learned 2nd Additional Sessions Judge, Bilaspur, rejected it on 5th April 1968. Applications made by Sushir Kumar and Ratnam for bail were rejected by the 3rd Additional Sessions Judge Bilaspur, to whom the case had been transferred. That order was upheld by this Court. 7. Aggrieved by the order dated 5th April 1968 passed by the 2nd Additional Sessions Judge, Bilaspur, refusing to cancel the bail, which had been granted to Kailashchandra and Narendra by the Additional District Magistrate this revision was filed by the State. A separate application has been filed by Keshavdas for cancellation of the bail granted to Kailashchandra and Narendra. The prayer being the same, both the matters were heard together. It is un necessary to enter into the question whether a private party is entitled to move this Court for cancellation of bail granted in a challan case. This order will govern Miscellaneous Criminal Case No. 162 of 1968 as well. 8. It is contended for the petitioner-State and for Keshavdas petitioner that the Additional District Magistrate had no jurisdiction to grant bail. 9. The language of section 497, Criminal Procedure Code. admits of no doubt that where the offence is one punishable with death or imprisonment for life, the accused cannot b¢: released on bail, if there appear reasonable grounds for believing that he has been guilty of such offence. The words "reasonable grounds" are significant. The section does not speak of "evidence". It is equally partinent to note that the section does not say: "but he shall not be so released, if he is accused of an offence punishable with death or imprisonment for life". The words "reasonable grounds" are significant. The section does not speak of "evidence". It is equally partinent to note that the section does not say: "but he shall not be so released, if he is accused of an offence punishable with death or imprisonment for life". That expression was bound to be used, if the law completely deprived a Magistrate of the jurisdiction to consider an application for bail where the accusation against the accused is that he has committed an offence punishable with death or imprisonment for life. The very language "If there appear reasonable grounds for believing" is eloquent enough to invest the Magistrate with jurisdiction to apply his mind to the material before him, as in any other case, when an application for bail is made under section 497. Criminal Procedure Code, in a non-bailable case. 10. Under the Code of Criminal Procedure, an offence is either bailable or non-bailable. Non-bailable offences can further be sub-classified as : (1) those offences which are punishable with death or imprisonment for life; and (2) those offences for which neither death can be awarded as sentence, nor imprisonment for life can be awarded as sentence. While dealing with an application under section 497, Criminal Procedure Code, whether under the first category or the second, the Court has to exercise its discretion judicially, as any other discretion. It is neither possible nor expedient to categorise the classes of cases in which the discretion of the Court is properly exercised by refusing bail; the only safe rule for exercise of the discretionary power is that each case must be considered on its own merits with the sole view of the public interest and to securing the ends of justice. Abuse on liberation, by absconding, is only one of a number of ways in which the ends of justice may be defeated. Another ground would be the apprehension that the accused would, if liberated, intend to defeat the ends of justice by tampering with the evidence. Thirdly, in cases such as brutal domestic assault, there may be apprehension of grave consequences to ensue from the return of the accused to his home pending trial. Another ground would be the apprehension that the accused would, if liberated, intend to defeat the ends of justice by tampering with the evidence. Thirdly, in cases such as brutal domestic assault, there may be apprehension of grave consequences to ensue from the return of the accused to his home pending trial. Fourthly, the accused may not be acting alone but may be in association with others, and his liberation may leave him free to continue in association and co-operation with those persons for the very same criminal objects, participation in which has brought him to justice. The last one is by far an important class of cases. 11. On the other hand, there are certain considerations which are in favour of avoiding pre-trial detention, such as, (1) the presumption of innocence; (2) the accused is unable to pursue is normal vocation or to earn his living and this affects not only himself but also his dependents, which may entail serious economic consequences; (3) detention, while awaiting trial, may adversely affect the accused's chances of acquittal; and (4) pre-trial custody may, in some cases, decrease the chances of the accused receiving jail sentence on conviction, or he may be awarded unwittingly lesser sentence. 12. It was held in State v. Captain Jagjit Singh, that the Court must take into account various considerations, such as, nature and seriousness of the offence, the character of the evidence, circumstances which are peculiar to the accused, a reasonable possibility of the presence of the accused not being secured at the trial, reasonable apprehension of witnesses being tampered with the larger interests of the public or State, and similar other considerations which arise when a Court is asked for bail in a non-bailable offence. 13. In addition to these considerations, and before the Court applies its mind to them, where the accusation is of an offence punishable with death or imprisonment for life, it is bound to consider the entire material placed before it at that stage and see whether there appear reasonable grounds for believing that the accused has been guilty of an offence punishable with death or imprisonment for life. If the Magistrate comes to the conclusion that there are such grounds, he must reject that application on the ground that he has no jurisdiction to grant bail; otherwise, he must proceed to consider the application on merits by applying the above tests. If the Magistrate comes to the conclusion that there are such grounds, he must reject that application on the ground that he has no jurisdiction to grant bail; otherwise, he must proceed to consider the application on merits by applying the above tests. 14. This analysis makes it abundantly clear that the Magistrate has got to form an opinion whether there are or there are not reasonable grounds for believing that the accused has been guilty of an offence punishable with death or imprisonment for life. Whether there are such reasonable grounds for believing or not is a question which must be decided judicially and on the basis of the tangible material offered by the prosecution on which, if unrebutted the Court would come to the conclusion that the accused is guilty of such offence. However, it is not possible for the Magistrate to expect at that stage such cogent evidence, or nearing it, as would be sufficient for the conviction of the accused of such offence. 15. It follows from this discussion that the Magistrate cannot grant bail on the ground that the material placed by the prosecution before him is not sufficient to establish the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt. To put it differently, all that be ,an see at the initial stage is whether the prosecution satisfied him that it will be able to produce good prima facie evidence in support of the charge; but at the same time, the mere fact that a charge sheet for murder or any other offence punishable with death or imprisonment for life has been filed against the accused, does not divest the Magistrate of his jurisdiction to consider the application for bail; his jurisdiction is taken away only if there appear to him reasonable grounds for believing that he has been guilty of such offence. He cannot validly reach prima facie conclusions which are relevant to section 497. Criminal Procedure Code, unless and until he applies his mind to the material available at that particular stage and makes a serious effort to analyse the evidence which is available and will be forthcoming. This was also the view taken in Keshav Vasudeo v. Emperor, AIR 1933 Bom. 492, State v. Mehboob Ali, AIR 1956 Rom 548, and Newand Ram v. Krishna, AIR 1952 Raj. 149 . This was also the view taken in Keshav Vasudeo v. Emperor, AIR 1933 Bom. 492, State v. Mehboob Ali, AIR 1956 Rom 548, and Newand Ram v. Krishna, AIR 1952 Raj. 149 . Also see Gobrya and others v. State, Criminal Revision No. 263 of 1954; decided on the 21st April 1955 = 1956 NLJ Note 93. Although no rigid test can be laid down, the Court should see whether the material placed by the prosecution, if not rebutted; will prima facie establish that the accused is guilty of an offence punishable with death or imprisonment for life. It is only a prima facie opinion that is required; the Court should not go into details. 16. Shri Dabir, learned counsel for Keshavdas, strongly relies on State of Madhya Pradesh v. Laxminarayan, 1967 JLJ-SN 66, in support of his proposition that where the accusation against the accused is of an offence punishable with death or imprisonment for life, the Magistrate has no jurisdiction to grant bail. The only question in hat case was whether the proviso to section 497, excluding the jurisdiction of the Court, relates only to an offence punishment for which is "death or imprisonment for life" (by reading "or" as conjunctive), or It refers also to an offence which is punishable merely with imprisonment for life (that is, the word "or" is disjunctive), so that an offence which is punishable with imprisonment for life, but not with death, is also covered by it. The latter interpretation was accepted. That alone is the ratio decidendi of that case. 17. Reliance is then placed on State of M.P. v. Rohit Kumar, Miscellaneous Criminal Case No. 337 of 1965; In that case, bail was granted by the Sessions Judge on "entering into the merits of the case at this stage and granting bail to the non-applicants on the ground that their case might fall under section 304 (Part 11) or section 325 of the Penal Code." The accused had been committed to stand their trial for an offence under section 302, read with section 34, Penal Code. It was held by Mr. It was held by Mr. Justice Bhargava that the learned Sessions Judge should not have proceeded "on the basis that on trial of the case, the offence made out against them could be or would be a lesser offence under section 304 (Part II) or under section 325 of the Penal Code." Moreover, it was observed that the Sessions Judge should have refrained from granting bail to the accused, when the High Court had refused to enlarge them on bail and nothing had transpired during the intervening period. It was held in that case that merely because a charge has been filed under section 302, Penal Code, the Magistrate is debarred from applying his mind where there are reasonable grounds for believing that the accused has been guilty of such an offence. 18. It would be an abuse of the powers of the Magistrate under section 497, Criminal Procedure Code, if he enters into niceties of legal position that might arise on the conclusion of the trial. To emphasize this, I would illustrate it by a reported decision, State v. Velappan, AIR 1952 Travan, Cochhin 227. In that case, the accused, a Police Constable, while going to take his meals, was informed that gambling was going on in the house of K. He straightway went there, entered the house and demanded of the persons present to place the money they had before him. Two of the persons present there believed him to be a thief and raised an alarm. K who was taking his evening meals inside, rushed to the place and caught bold of the accused. The accused unsheathed his dagger and stabbed K twice on the left chest and once on the left arm-pit. He also stabbed two others who tried to intervene and then left the place. As a result of the injuries K died the same night. The committing Magistrate granted bail saying that although the accused was not within his rights to go to the house without a warrant issued by a proper authority, yet he could be deemed to have been acting in good faith; that he bad inflicted the stabs without premeditation; that he might have the plea of self-defence; that such plea was not to be weighed in golden balance; and that the offence might not come under section 281, Cochin Penal Code. It was held that the attitude taken by the Magistrate in that case was deplorable and that he had not taken a detached view of the materials placed before him. 19. The above discussion leads to these conclusions :-(1) While dealing with any application under section 497, Penal Code, the Court must bring its mind to bear upon the various considerations stated above, and on that basis grant or refuse bail. (2) When a Magistrate deals with such an application he has first of all to see whether it appears that there are reasonable grounds for believing that the accused has been guilty of an offence punishable with death or imprisonment for life; and, if it so appears, he bas no jurisdiction to grant bail. (3) For that purpose, the Magistrate has to apply his mind to the material made available by the prosecution to satisfy him prima facie that it will be able to produce good evidence, which may establish the guilt of the accused of such an offence. (4) At that stage, the Magistrate cannot enter into niceties nor into the details. Prima facie satisfaction is the only test. (5) He cannot go at a tangent in order to find out possible excuses for granting bail. (6) The mere fact that the charge sheet is for an offence punishable with death or imprisonment for life does not take away the jurisdiction of the Magistrate to grant bail. 20. When this case is judged by the above tests, I find that the learned Additional District Magistrate did not exceed his jurisdiction in granting bail. Evidently it was present to his mind that unless there appeared reasonable grounds for believing that the petitioners had committed an offence punishable with death or imprisonment for life, he had the power to grant bail, although the challan was going to be put up under section 302, Penal Code. In my opinion, he was right in his approach. From the facts stated at the outset it appears to me, prima facie, that on the occassion of "Holi" the revellers stealthily took away some logs of wood from Keshav's godown, but all of a sudden there was an unpleasant turn. On the prosecution allegations, it was Sushir Kumar who dealt blows to Basant Kumar with a log of wood. From the facts stated at the outset it appears to me, prima facie, that on the occassion of "Holi" the revellers stealthily took away some logs of wood from Keshav's godown, but all of a sudden there was an unpleasant turn. On the prosecution allegations, it was Sushir Kumar who dealt blows to Basant Kumar with a log of wood. From the material placed by the prosecution before the Magistrate it does not appear that there was any preconceived plan or that the marpit was premeditated, or that the petitioners had entertained any intention to assault anybody. I would guard myself against saying any more, because I am of the view that in an order of bail there should be no observations as are likely to influence the further trial of the case and also the mind of the trying Magistrate or judge. But I am satisfied that in the peculiar circumstances of this particular case, the learned Additional District Magistrate was right in granting bail if it did not appear to him that there were reasonable grounds for believing that Kailashchandra or Narendra had been guilty of an offence punishable with death or imprisonment for life. That being so, it was within the powers of the Additional District Magistrate to grant bail, if he was satisfied that the case satisfied the other condition as well. 21. While dealing with the application for cancellation of the bail, the learned Sessions Judge himself went through the case diary. He found that as against Kailashchandra the evidence which would be forthcoming was that he caught hold of Hasmat Rai and slapped him; as against Narendra that be gave slaps and fist blows to Madhav; and that both of them were shouting maro maro. It was not unreasonable to construe, primafacie, and in the absence of any material to the contrary, the words "maro mara" as a mere noisy expression on such an occassion, but not denoting that violence was actually instigated. 22. It was not contended before me that there was any apprehension of absconsion of the accused or that they would tamper with the evidence. 23. I am constrained to observe that matters would have been simplified if the accused had made an application under section 498, Criminal Procedure Code, before the Session Court, when the application for cancellation of bail was made before him. 24. 23. I am constrained to observe that matters would have been simplified if the accused had made an application under section 498, Criminal Procedure Code, before the Session Court, when the application for cancellation of bail was made before him. 24. For all these reasons, I see no ground for cancelling the bail granted by the Additional District Magistrate to Kailaishchandra or Narendra. It is hardly necessary to add that it will be open to the prosecution to apply for cancellation of bail on the basis of any fresh material, or any other circumstance, which would disentitle the respondents to bail. 25. This revision is dismissed.