JUDGMENT Narasimham, C.J. - These two writ applications under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution have been filed by the employer against the award given by the Labour Court, Chota Nagpur Division, Ranchi, on the 30th September, 1966 in two cases under Section 33C (2) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (hereinafter referred to as the Act) sent to the said Court by the State Government in two notifications, dated the 22nd June, 1965, and the 28th August, 1965. The cases were heard together, and disposed of by one award as the points in controversy were identical. These two writ applications also were heard together, and are disposed of in this judgment. 2. The petitioner-employer is the Ekra Engineering Works, Bansjora (hereinafter referred to as the factory). It is situated in the midst of the colliery area in Dhanbad. It is not denied that it is somewhat in the nature of a feeder industry to the collieries, and its main function is to overhaul repair and refit the machineries and other equipments used in the collieries. The management intimated to the workers' union of the factory on the 7th August, 1964 that it would be closed with effect from the 10th August, 1964. In the notice to the workers' union, no special reason was given for the closure of the factory, and, as is to be expected, there was acute controversy between the management and the workers as regards the retrenchment benefits payable to them in consequence of such closure. The management contended that the closure was due to unavoidable circumstances beyond its control, and that, consequently, the workmen were entitled to retrenchment compensation only under the proviso to Sub-section (i) of Section 25FFF of the Act. The workmen and their union, however, challenged the correctness of this reason for closure, and urged that they were entitled to full retrenchment compensation under Section 25F of the Act and that the management was not entitled to avail of the proviso to Sub-section (i) of Section 25FFF. The State Government then issued two notifications, dated the 22nd June, 1965 and the 28th August, 1965 which were practically identical in terms. I am quoting below one of the said notifications: "Government of Bihar, Department of Labour & Employment. NOTIFICATION Patna, the 22nd June, 1965. No. III/D1-606/65 L & E-5080. The State Government then issued two notifications, dated the 22nd June, 1965 and the 28th August, 1965 which were practically identical in terms. I am quoting below one of the said notifications: "Government of Bihar, Department of Labour & Employment. NOTIFICATION Patna, the 22nd June, 1965. No. III/D1-606/65 L & E-5080. Whereas the Workmen named in the Schedule annexed hereto are entitled to receive from their employer, namely, Ekra Engineering Works, Bansjora, Dhanbad, the benefit of retrenchment compensation as provided under Section 25F of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, which are capable of being computed in terms of money; And whereas it is necessary to determine the amount at which such benefits should be computed and recovered from the said employer: Now, therefore, in exercise of the powers conferred by Sub-section (2) of Section 33C of the said Act, the Governor of Bihar is pleased to specify the Labour Court at Ranchi constituted by the State Government under Section 7 of the said Act as the Labour Court for determining the amount in money value to which the workmen are entitled. Schedule By order of the Governor of Bihar, Sd. J. N. Sahay, 19.6.65. Under Secretary to Government". In the Schedule attached to the notification, the names of the various workers, their designation, the date of their appointment and the amount of retrenchment compensation, including the notice, pay, were all specified. In the notification of the 28th August, 1965, also, the same particulars were given. 3. On the basis of the aforesaid two notifications, the Labour Court started two cases under Section 33C(2) of the Act, received the written statements of the employer and the workmen (through their trade union leaders), and, after taking oral and documentary evidence, held that the main reasons for the closure were the financial difficulties of the employer, and that, even if there were some other reasons, they were all due to the fault of the management. Hence, it held that the proviso to Sub-section (i) of Section 25FFF was not attracted, and that the management was bound to pay full compensation under Section 25F of the Act. It was stated before the Labour Court that some of the workmen had accepted the retrenchment compensation offered by the management, and had also filed applications before the Labour Court, stating that they were no longer interested in the case. It was stated before the Labour Court that some of the workmen had accepted the retrenchment compensation offered by the management, and had also filed applications before the Labour Court, stating that they were no longer interested in the case. In spite of this conduct of these workmen, the Labour Court held that they were entitled to full compensation, and hence directed that every workman should be paid compensation under Section 25 F after deducting the sum already received by him. 4. Mr. Tara Kishore Prasad, Counsel for the employer, urged the following grounds in support of these two applications : (i) The notifications issued by the Government suffered from several infirmities which rendered them invalid. (ii) As there was no proper application to the Labour Court by the workmen concerned, that Court had no jurisdiction to give its decision under Section 33 C (2) of the Act. (iii) The finding of the Labour Court to the effect that the proviso to Sub-section (i) of Section 25FFF would apply is based on an error of law apparent on the face of the record. (iv) The Labour Court committed an error of law in awarding retrenchment benefits to those workers who had already received full compensation from the employer, and had also filed applications before the Labour Court to the effect that they were no longer interested in this case. (v) There were several clerical and arithmetical errors in the calculation of the exact quantum of retrenchment benefits due to individual workmen. In my opinion, none of these contentions can prevail. 5. Ground No. (i) The main difference Sub-section (1) and Sub-section (2) of Section 33C of the Act has been noticed in the several judgments of their Lordships of the Supreme Court and also in a recent judgment of a Bench of this Court in (1) Messrs The Fertilizer Corporation of India Ltd., Sindri Unit, Sindri, V. The Presiding Officer, Labour Court, Ranchi (Civil Writ Jurisdiction Case No. 611 of 1967, disposed of on the 19th March, 1968). I may also refer to the recent judgment of their Lordships of the Supreme Court in (2) Chief Mining Engineer, Messrs East India Coal Co. Ltd. Bararee Colliery, Dhanbad, V. Rameshwar (A.I.R 1968 Supreme Court 218). I may also refer to the recent judgment of their Lordships of the Supreme Court in (2) Chief Mining Engineer, Messrs East India Coal Co. Ltd. Bararee Colliery, Dhanbad, V. Rameshwar (A.I.R 1968 Supreme Court 218). Sub-section (2) of Section 33C is wider than Sub-section (1), and the Labour Court's jurisdiction under that sub-section will arise when that Court is specified by the Government [see (3) Treogi Nath V. Indian Iron and Steel Co. Ltd.-A.I.R. 1968 Supreme Court 205]. Once such Court is specified, the workman concerned may apply to that Court under that sub-section for computing the benefits due to him in terms of money. Sub-section (1) of Section 33C is, however, limited to those cases where there is no controversy about the amount of money due, and, in such instances, an application may be made direct to the appropriate Government for recovery of the money due to the workman. It does not necessarily follow that, even in those cases which fall within the scope of Sub-section (2), if an application is made direct to the Government by the workman, the Government cannot send it to the Labour Court after specifying the Court under Sub-section (2) of Section 33C. In such cases, the Government acts somewhat like a transmitting agency. So long as the notification specified the Labour Court concerned for the purpose of Sub-section (2) of Section 33C of the Court, it will, at best, be an irregularity, if the State Government directly receives the application of the workman and transmits the same to the Labour Court concerned. 6. It was then urged that, in the two notifications, reference was made only to Section 25F of the Act, whereas here the real controversy was as regards the application of the proviso to Sub-section (1) of Section 25FFF because it is admitted that there was closure of the factory and not mere retrenchment. There is undoubtedly some force in this contention because the appropriate section to be quoted in the notifications is Section 25FFF; but that section itself refers to the retrenchment compensation payable to the workmen under Section 25F, subject, of course, to the proviso to Sub-Section (1). Hence, though it would have been more accurate if the Government had referred to Section 25FFF read with Section 25P, it cannot be said that the notifications are wholly inaccurate in referring to Section 25F only. Hence, though it would have been more accurate if the Government had referred to Section 25FFF read with Section 25P, it cannot be said that the notifications are wholly inaccurate in referring to Section 25F only. It has not been shown to us that the employer was prejudiced in any way by the omission to refer to Section 25FFF. On the other hand, the award shows that the parties were fully aware of the main question in controversy, viz., whether the proviso to Sub-section (1) of Section 25FFF would apply, and led evidence accordingly. In my opinion, therefore, this is a mere curable irregularity. 7. It was further urged that, in the Schedule to the notifications, the Government specified the retrenchment compensation payable to the workmen, and thereby decided the very question which the Labour Court was required to determine. According to Mr. T. K. Prasad, this decision of the Government must necessarily have caused much embarrassment to the Labour Court which might have got the impression that it could not go against the decision of the Government as regards the amount of compensation payable to the workmen. This argument must be rejected. The Government have nowhere stated in the notifications that, in their opinion, the retrenchment compensation as specified in Column 5 of the Schedule was payable to the workmen. They have merely included in the Schedule the actual claims of the workmen, though, by an unfortunate omission, they have not said so expressly in the notifications; but a fair reading of the notifications, especially of the last portion of the same, where the Government have stated that it was for the Labour Court to determine "the amount in money value to which the workmen are entitled", shows clearly that the Government have not even tentatively decided the quantum of compensation payable to the workmen. It would have been much better if they had merely mentioned the names of the workmen without mentioning the amounts of compensation; but, in the context, the amounts mentioned in the schedule of the notifications must be construed to be merely the claims of the workmen. 8. It would have been much better if they had merely mentioned the names of the workmen without mentioning the amounts of compensation; but, in the context, the amounts mentioned in the schedule of the notifications must be construed to be merely the claims of the workmen. 8. Ground No. (ii)--It is true that Sub-section (2) of Section 33C contemplates that, once the appropriate Labour Court is specified, an application should be made to that Court by the workman concerned for computation of the money value of the benefits to which he claims himself to be entitled. It is also true that the claim is an individual claim, and it will be open to every workman to file separate applications. But, as already pointed out, there is no bar to the Government receiving the applications and transmitting them to the Court concerned. In the written statement filed by the workers before the Labour Court (a copy of which was filed before us by the Counsel for the workers with the consent of the Counsel for the other side), it is clearly stated that the individual workers had filed their applications before the Government. The notifications, however, do not show that those applications were actually forwarded by the Government to the Labour Court. There is no such endorsement in the copies of the notifications filed before us. The schedule attached to the contents of notifications is nothing else but a reproduction of the contents of the applications because, as already observed, the schedule gives the names of the various workers, their designation, the date of their appointment and the amount of retrenchment compensation, including the notice pay claimed by them. Hence, it may be reasonably claimed that the substance of the contents of the applications of the individual workmen filed before the Government was transmitted to the Labour Court. Apart from this reason, a careful scrutiny of the written statement of the workmen filed before the Labour Court shows that, in essence, it is an application. Hence, it may be reasonably claimed that the substance of the contents of the applications of the individual workmen filed before the Government was transmitted to the Labour Court. Apart from this reason, a careful scrutiny of the written statement of the workmen filed before the Labour Court shows that, in essence, it is an application. It contains all the particulars required for action under Section 33 C (2), and there is also a specific prayer at the end as follows: "Under the circumstances this learned Labour Court may be pleased to hold that the claim made against each worker mentioned in the reference is legally due to him and the same be computed in his favour and the same be sent to the Government for recovery in accordance with law." As is well known, in these matters, the Court must look into the substance and not the mere form, and, though this document has been described as a written statement, it can be reasonably construed to be nothing but an application to the Labour Court for relief as required under Section 33 C (2). 9. It was then urged that the Vice-President of the workers' union had no jurisdiction to file such an application, and that individual workmen should have filed the same. I have already shown that individual workmen had filed their applications before the Government, and the Government merely acted as a transmitting agency. Apart from this reason, Section 36 (i) (a) of the Act allows an officer of a registered trade union, of which the workman is a member, to represent the workman in any proceeding under the Act. It is not denied that all the workmen involved in the present dispute are members of the Ekra Engineering Workers' Union. The written statement has been signed by the Vice-President of that Union. Hence, I think the workers were properly represented before the Labour Court both at the stage of filing the application under Section 33C (2) and also at all subsequent stages. 10. Ground No. (iii)--I now take up the main question involved in these writ applications, viz., whether the proviso to Sub-section (i) of Section 25FFF would apply on the facts of this case. For this purpose, it is necessary to quote the subsection, including the Explanation : "25FFF. 10. Ground No. (iii)--I now take up the main question involved in these writ applications, viz., whether the proviso to Sub-section (i) of Section 25FFF would apply on the facts of this case. For this purpose, it is necessary to quote the subsection, including the Explanation : "25FFF. (i) Where an undertaking is closed down for any reason whatsoever, every workman who has been in continuous service for not less than one year in that undertaking immediately before such closure shall, subject to the provisions of Sub-section (2), be entitled to notice and compensation in accordance with the provisions of Section 25F, as if the workman had been retrenched : "Provided that where the undertaking is closed down on account of unavoidable circumstances beyond the control of the employer, the compensation to be paid to the workman under Clause (b) of Section 25F shall not exceed his average pay for three months. "Explanation.--An undertaking which is closed down by reason merely of financial difficulties (including financial losses) or accumulation of undisposed of stocks shall not be deemed to have been closed down on account of unavoidable circumstances beyond the control of the employer within the meaning of the proviso to this sub-section." It will be noticed that, ordinarily, where an undertaking is closed for any reason whatsoever, the workmen will be entitled to compensation and notice as provided in Section 25F. The proviso, however, says that, if the closure is due to unavoidable circumstances beyond the control of the employer, the retrenchment compensation payable shall not exceed the average pay of the workmen for three months. The burden will undoubtedly be on the employer to show that the closure is due to unavoidable circumstances beyond its control so as to attract the said proviso; but the Explanation says that, where the closure is due merely to financial difficulties or accumulation of undisposed of stocks, such closure shall not be deemed to have been due to unavoidable circumstances beyond the control of the employer within the meaning of the proviso. The object of this Explanation seems to be to shut out any investigation as to whether the closure was due to unavoidable circumstances beyond the control of the employer where the closure was due merely to financial difficulties or accumulation of undisposed of stocks. The object of this Explanation seems to be to shut out any investigation as to whether the closure was due to unavoidable circumstances beyond the control of the employer where the closure was due merely to financial difficulties or accumulation of undisposed of stocks. In such cases, the Court is bound to apply the part of the Explanation and to hold that the closure was not due to unavoidable circumstances beyond the control of the employer, and that the proviso to Sub-section (i) of that section had no application. It is true that, by using the word "merely" in the Explanation, the Legislature made it clear that, if the financial difficulties or accumulation of undisposed of stocks was only one of the several contributory causes to the closure, the Explanation may not apply. It is only when it can be said that the financial difficulties or accumulation of undisposed of stocks was the sole cause of the closure that the Explanation would be attracted. This seems to be the principle laid down by their Lordships of the Supreme Court in the well-known (4) Hathising's case (1960-II L.L.J. 1). I may quote their Lordships' observation at page 10 : "Closure of an undertaking attributable merely to financial difficulties or accumulation of undisposed of stocks is, by the explanation, excluded from the benefit of restricted liability; but coupled with other circumstances, financial difficulties or accumulation of undisposed of stocks may justify the view that the closure is due to unavoidable circumstances beyond the control of the employer, and attract the application of the proviso notwithstanding the explanation. "...... But it is not provided that in no case of financial difficulty or accumulation of stocks coupled with other circumstances, the closure is to be regarded as due to unavoidable circumstances beyond the control of the employer." The words underlined in the said quotation should be given due importance. If the employer could show that, apart from financial difficulties or accumulation of undisposed of stocks, there were other circumstances which brought about the closure of the undertaking, it may avail of the proviso to Sub-section (1) of Section 25FFF, and the explanation to that sub-section will not be a bar. 11. Mr. If the employer could show that, apart from financial difficulties or accumulation of undisposed of stocks, there were other circumstances which brought about the closure of the undertaking, it may avail of the proviso to Sub-section (1) of Section 25FFF, and the explanation to that sub-section will not be a bar. 11. Mr. T. K. Prasad, therefore, urged that, on the findings of the Labour Court, it must be held that, apart from financial difficulties, trouble created by the workmen and the closure of two of the important collieries, to which the factory, was a feeder, all brought about the closure of the factory, and that, consequently, the Court was not justified in applying the proviso to Sub-section (1) of Section 25FFF. This argument, however, is not supported by the findings of the Labour Court. The contention of the management before the Labour Court as given in its written statement was that, due to labour troubles, acts of indiscipline, abrupt stoppage of work and go-slow tactics, the employer suffered heavy losses, and the factory gained notoriety for bad workmanship and delayed deliveries. The management tried its best to persuade the workers to desist from their objectionable activities, by writing to the Vice-President of the Union, seeking his co-operation, and also by taking suitable disciplinary measures to restore normalcy; but all these failed due to the action of the workmen. The result was that the customers of the factory gradually dwindled down, and the stage was reached when there was no other alternative except to close down the factory. The result was that the customers of the factory gradually dwindled down, and the stage was reached when there was no other alternative except to close down the factory. The finding of the Labour Court on this point is as follows (Paragraph 21) : "There cannot be slightest doubt that the stand of both sides is to some extent correct and, in my opinion, it is a case where the Ekra Engineering Works was closed down primarily on account of financial considerations and the intransigence of some of the workers was merely an insignificant cause." In Paragraph 25, the Labour Court has observed : "There cannot be any doubt whatsoever that the main reason for closing the Ekra Engineering Works given is financial difficulties." In Paragraph 30, while summing up the entire evidence, the learned Labour Court observes: "On the contrary, it is a case where the closure must be deemed to have been brought about because of financial difficulties and which under the explanation to the proviso to Section 25FFF(1) is not to be deemed to have been closed down on account of unavoidable circumstances beyond the control of the employer." Again, in Paragraph 31, the learned Labour Court observes: "I have shown from the evidence, however, that the main reason which prompted the management to close down the works was due to financial difficulties and, if there was labour unrest or bad workmanship, it was certainly due to the fault of the management itself in either not suppressing labour unrest or checking the finished products carefully." 12. Mr. T. K Prasad has emphasised very much the words "main reason" and "primarily", occurring in some of the passages quoted above, and urged that these words themselves show that the Labour Court was conscious that there were other reasons also. According to him, therefore, financial difficulties were not the sole reason for closure, and that, consequently, the Labour Court committed an error of law in relying on the Explanation to Section 25FFF(1). 13. There are two answers to this argument. Firstly, even if it be assumed that the Labour Court came to a finding that, though financial difficulties were the main reason for the closure, there were other reasons also, nevertheless the Court further held as a fact that none of these reasons was beyond the control of the management. 13. There are two answers to this argument. Firstly, even if it be assumed that the Labour Court came to a finding that, though financial difficulties were the main reason for the closure, there were other reasons also, nevertheless the Court further held as a fact that none of these reasons was beyond the control of the management. The Court observed that the labour unrest was due to the fault of the management in not suppressing indiscipline at the proper time, and, similarly, as regards bad workmanship, the Court thought that the management did not check the finished products carefully. The finding of fact of the Labour Court, therefore, seems to be that, independent of the Explanation, there was ample evidence to show that the management was mainly to blame for the series of difficulties which brought about the closure. This is a pure finding of fact which cannot be disturbed by this Court in writ jurisdiction. 14. Secondly, on the management's own case, the other reasons for the closure were not independent reasons, but they were contributory causes which led to the financial difficulties. Thus, in the employer's letter dated the 16th September, 1964, addressed to the Chief Inspector of Factories (Annexure D), it has given the following reasons for the closure : "In reply we have to state that the reasons which compelled us to declare a closure were the continued shortage of remunerative orders due to the notoriety the workshop had earned for delayed deliveries and defective workmanship, which in turn was due to perpetual indiscipline of the workers. All these resulted in systematic losses for the last few years in consequence whereof we were faced with a situation that we had no funds to continue to run this workshop. The workshop became not only unremunerative but was a constant drainage on our financial resources and we had no funds to run the same. So it became beyond our control to run the workshop any further, all our sincere efforts to bring a sense of responsibility in the workers have proved futile." The contents of this letter are very revealing. They show unmistakably that financial difficulties were the sole reason for the closure. But the management further pointed out that these difficulties were caused by the labour trouble, defective workmanship, indiscipline, etc. They show unmistakably that financial difficulties were the sole reason for the closure. But the management further pointed out that these difficulties were caused by the labour trouble, defective workmanship, indiscipline, etc. They were not reasons which directly led to the closure; but they only resulted in causing acute financial difficulties which directly led to the closure. It will be a wrong interpretation of the proviso to Section 25FFF (1) to hold that, where the closure is solely due to financial difficulties and those difficulties were brought about by several contributory causes, the deeming provisions of that Explanation would not apply. When their Lordships of the Supreme Court referred to "other circumstances" in (4) 1960-II L.L.J. 1 at page 10 (as quoted above), they were obviously referring to circumstances wholly independent of the financial difficulties and not those circumstances which contributed to the financial difficulties themselves or to the accumulation of stocks. In my opinion, on the very case as made out by the employer, the various contributory causes referred to in detail, ultimately, led to the financial difficulties which brought about the closure. No circumstance independent of financial difficulties was even alleged as having brought about the closure. Hence, no error of law was committed by the Labour Court in applying the Explanation. 15. Ground No. (iv)--The Labour Court rightly observed that, even if some of the labourers had accepted the retrenchment compensation paid by the management, they would still be entitled to the additional compensation payable according to law. Their Lordships of the Supreme Court have concluded this matter in (5) Workmen of Subong Tea Estate V. Subong Tea Estate (1964 I L.L.J. 333 at 341) by saying, "such technical pleas are not generally entertained in industrial adjudication". No principle of estoppel or waiver can be so rigorously applied against the workmen, especially when it is not clear that they accepted the compensation given by the management in full satisfaction of their claim after having been made aware that they were entitled to higher compensation under Section 25 F. 16. Ground No. (v)--Lastly, it was contended that there were several arithmetical and clerical mistakes in the calculation of the amount of compensation payable to the workmen. This is, however, a point which need not be discussed by this Court in exercise of writ jurisdiction. Ground No. (v)--Lastly, it was contended that there were several arithmetical and clerical mistakes in the calculation of the amount of compensation payable to the workmen. This is, however, a point which need not be discussed by this Court in exercise of writ jurisdiction. It is always open to any Court to correct any clerical or arithmetical mistake, and, if there are such mistakes, it will be open to the management to apply to the Court concerned for making the necessary corrections. 17. For these reasons, I see no ground for interference. These two writ applications are dismissed with costs. There will be one consolidated hearing fee of Rs. 200/- payable to the workmen represented by the Ekra Engineering Workers' Union. B. N. JHA, J. I agree. Applications dismissed.