ORDER Satish Chandra, J. - The U. P. Electric Supply Company limited, the petitioner carried on the business of generation and distribution of electricity. With effect from the midnight of 15th/ 16th September, 1964, the State Electricity Board acquired the petitioner Company and continued to carry on that business. For running the electricity undertaking, the petitioner alleged, it had engaged the services of a coal contractor who had in its turn employed various workmen now arrayed as respondents. The 73 respondents, who were called coal coolies and hopper feeders, made a joint application on 22nd March, 1964, before the Labour Court under S. 6-H (2) of the U. P. Industrial Disputes Act claiming that each one of them was entitled to payment of bonus for the years 1955-1956 to 1958-1959 on the basis of the awards given in Cases Nos. 5'7 of 1958 and 20 of 1960. The grievance was that though they were workmen of the Company and entitled to get bonus the Company had failed to pay bonus to them. They requested the Court for computation of the benefit and for directing its recovery from the employers. 2. The petitioner Company contested it on various grounds. It raised several preliminary objections including that the application ought to have been made to the State Government under sub.s. (1) of S. 6-H. It was not maintainable under sub-s. (2) thereof. It was also pleaded that the respondents were not entitled to claim bonus for the years 1955-1956 to 1958.1959. It was also urged that the respondents claim to bonus for those years had been specifically made the subject of a reference under S. 4.K of the U. P. Industrial Disputes Act which demand of the respondents was refused by the State Government which declined to make a reference in respect of the respondents. 3. It appears that the petitioners further preliminary objection that a joint application by 73 workmen was not maintainable was heard and decided by the Labour Court by its order dated 22nd April, 1965. By that order the objection was repelled. The application was held maintainable. That order does not appear to have been challenged and is not the subject matter of the present petitions. By that order the objection was repelled. The application was held maintainable. That order does not appear to have been challenged and is not the subject matter of the present petitions. The Labour Court held that the applicant workmen did raise the dispute demanding bonus for the years 1955-1956 to 1859-1960 but the State Government referred the question for the year 1959-1960 only to the Industrial Tribunal. It observed that "The fact that the State Government did not refer the demand for past years is, however, in no way destructive of the right of the applicants to claim computation of benefit, if they had been entitled under awards in oases Nos. 57 of 1958 related to the years 1955. 1956 to 1957-1953 whereas Case No. 20 of 1960 related to the year 1958-1959. It was held that on the basis of this awards the respondents were entitled to computation of bonus. The Labour Court proceeded to examine the question whether the respondents were workmen and held that even though the respondents were employees of the contractor they would be deemed to be employees of the Company in view of the definition of the term employer" under S. 2 (i) of the Act. They would not be exempted from the definition of the "employer" even though the respondents were employed a3 coal coolies by the contractor. It held that the awards which were published in the official gazette did not exempt the petitioner from the liability to pay bonus to any particular category of the workmen. The awards merely prescribed a scale of bonu3 for all the workmen and when the respondents were also covered by the definition of 'workmen," they would be entitled to bonus on the basis of those awards. By its order dated 8th May, 1965, the Labour Court after giving its findings constituted a commission to make an enquiry into the individual cases of th8 respondents after going into the accounts and evidence. The order was challenged by Writ Petition No. 2042 of 1965. 4. Thereafter the commissioner made a report on 7th December, 1965. The matter then came back before the Labour Court which allowed time for objections and ultimately by its order dated 25th February, 1967, re. polled the various objections raised by the petitioner Company and accepted the recommendations of the commissioner. 4. Thereafter the commissioner made a report on 7th December, 1965. The matter then came back before the Labour Court which allowed time for objections and ultimately by its order dated 25th February, 1967, re. polled the various objections raised by the petitioner Company and accepted the recommendations of the commissioner. It directed that the respondents would be entitled to the bonus for the year 1955-1956 to 1958-1959 as worked out by the commissioner on the basis of the above-mentioned awards. This subsequent order dated 25th February, 1967, has been challenged in Writ Petition No. 1497 of 1967. 5. At the threshold it was urged for the petitioner that the petition would lie under sub-s. (1) of S. 6-H and not under sub-s. (2). It would hence be entertain able by the State Government alone and not by the Labour Court. The claim was based on a pre-existing award. The petitioner was disputing the right of the workmen to the entitlement of bonus on the basis of those awards on many grounds The case, therefore, was not merely of arithmetical verification which alone could properly fall within the purview of sub-s. (l) of S. 6.H. This would be the position in accordance with the decision of a Division Bench of this Court in British India Corporation Ltd. v. State of U.P., (1967) 14 Fac LR 380 (All). This case was followed by me in U.P. Electric Supply Co. v. H.V. Bowen, AIR 1968 Allahabad 95. This point cannot, therefore, be accepted. 6. It was then urged that a joint application by 73 workmen could not be maintainable under S. 6-H ('2) because an application moved jointly by so many persons would make the dispute an industrial dispute and would properly fall under S. 4K of the Act. In my opinion it is not open to the petitioner to raise this point at this stage. The objection based upon joint application not being maintainable was raised and decided by the Labour Court by its order dated 22nd April, 1965. That order is not the subject-matter of challenge in the present petitions. 7. In my opinion it is not open to the petitioner to raise this point at this stage. The objection based upon joint application not being maintainable was raised and decided by the Labour Court by its order dated 22nd April, 1965. That order is not the subject-matter of challenge in the present petitions. 7. It was then urged that one of the pleas taken up by the petitioner company was that the respondents being the employees of a coal contractor they were cot the workmen of the Company and hence not entitled to take benefit of the awards given in the previous case3 which were confined to those who were workmen of the Company. The Labour Court has not specifically gene into the question and found whether the respondents were held to be workmen of the Company in the previous awards relied on by them. The Labour Court has held that the respondents would be workmen of the Company in view of the definition of the word "employer". It has to be noticed that the definition of the term "employer" was amended by the U. P. Industrial Disputes (Amendment and Miscellaneous Provisions) Act of 1957 which came into force on 16th April, 1957. For the first time a contractors employee also became the workman of the Company in view of the amendment introduced by the Amending Act of 1957. Learned counsel for both the parties are agreed that the legal position was that prior to 16th April, 1957, those who were employed by a contractor could not be deemed to be the workmen of the Company. But after that date they would be the workmen of the Company. The dispute in the present case relates to periods both prior to and after 16th April, 1957. It was, therefore, incumbent upon the Labour Court to have gone into the question and found whether the respondents were employees of the Company or that they were the employees of the coal contractor. If they were the employees of the coal contractor, they could not be the workmen of the Company prior to 16th April, 1957, and hence could not on that basis claim any bonus for the period prior to that date. The learned counsel for the respondents urged that their case was that they had always been the workmen of the Company. The learned counsel for the respondents urged that their case was that they had always been the workmen of the Company. The Labour Court was, therefore, in error is proceeding on the assumption that the respondents were employees of the coal contractor. A clear-cut finding ought to have been given on that question of fact. 8. The next point urged by Mr. Jagdish Swarup, appearing for the petitioner, was that in view of the decisions of the Supreme Court in Central Bank of India v. Rajagopalan, A.I.R. 1964 SC 743 and Chief Mining Engineer v. Rameshwar, A.I.R. 1968 SC 218 the settled position is that cases which could appropriately be adjudicated under S. 4.K of the U. P. Industrial Disputes Act (which corresponds to S. 10 (1) of the Central Industrial Disputes Act) would not appropriately fall under sub s. (2) of 8. 6-H of the U. P. Industrial Disputes Act (which corresponds to sub.s. (2) of S. 83-0 of the Central Industrial Disputes Act). The decisions relied upon by the learned counsel fully bear out the submission. In the present case it appears that the respondents made a demand for bonus for the years now in dispute under 8.4-K of the U.P. Industrial Disputes Act, but the State Government refused to refer that dispute for adjudication. The Labour Court had the conciliation file before it, but it had not indicated on what ground was the refusal based. For the petitioner it was urged that the State Government refused to make the reference because it considered it inexpedient to do so. Learned counsel for the respondents on the other hand claimed that the claim by the respondents was refused because a claim for bonus covering all the employees of the Company had already been made and was pending and, therefore, the State Government refused to commit two references in respect of the same dispute. If the reason was as contended for by the petitioner it would be clear that the dispute did fall appropriately under S. 4.K of the Industrial Disputes Act and, in view of the decisions of the Supreme Court mentioned above. If the reason was as contended for by the petitioner it would be clear that the dispute did fall appropriately under S. 4.K of the Industrial Disputes Act and, in view of the decisions of the Supreme Court mentioned above. It would be outside the purview of S. 6-H (2); because a dispute or claim which was an industrial dispute and was capable of being dealt with by an adjudication under S. 4-K would not be a class of claims or dispute within S. 6-H (2b But if the submission made on behalf of the respondents as to the reason of the refusal was correct the objection raised on behalf of the petitioner that the claim was not maintainable would fall to the ground. Then it would be a clear case of computation of benefits on the basis of preexisting awards. The Labour Court has not gone into this aspect nor has it given any findings. 9. Therefore, in order to appropriately adjudicate the points it was necessary for the Labour Court to have given a finding whether the respondents were employees of the Company or were employees of the coal contractor upto 16th April, 1867, or not. It also ought to have gone into the reason for refusal to refer the claim of the respondents for bonus for the years now in dispute. Since no findings have been recorded on these points the case has to go back. Learned counsel for the petitioner did not raise any point challenging the report of the commissioner. If the entitlement of the respondents is upheld the report of the commissioner will be deemed correct and not liable to be re adjudicated and the questions decided therein will not be liable to be gone into again. 10. The petitions, therefore, succeed and are allowed. The impugned orders are set aside. The matter is cent back for decision in accordance with law and in the light of the observations made above. The petitioner will be entitled to costs.