JUDGMENT : Anwar Ahmad, J. 1. This appeal by defendant No. 1 arises out of a suit for ejectment of the tenants from holding No. 395A of Darbhanga Municipality, situate in Mohalla Benta, Hospital Road, Laheriasarai, and also for recovery of Rs. 204.33 on account of arrears of house rent with latrine tax. 2. The case of respondent No. 1 (plaintiff) was that he let out the holding in suit to the appellant and respondents 2 and 3 on a monthly rent of Rs. 60 for eleven months beginning from the 1st March 1959, for which they executed a kiravanama dated the 3rd March 1959. The tenancy was for a fixed period and, if the tenants wanted to continue after the expiry of the tenancy, they were to execute a fresh kirayanama with the consent of the landlord (respondent No. 1), and, in case of disagreement, the tenants had to vacate the holding on the termination of the lease. The tenants were to pay rent according to the English Calendar on the 5th of the month next following that for which the rent was payable and they were not entitled to make any alteration. The period of tenancy expired on the 31st January 1960; but the tenants did not execute a fresh kirayanama, although they were asked to do so by respondent No. 1. Notices asking the tenants to vacate the holding or to execute a fresh kirayanama were sent to them by respondent No. 1 on the 11th November 1960 and the 26th January 1961. But the tenants neither executed a fresh kirayanama nor vacated the premises. They, however, continued to pay the rent up to January 1961 which respondent No. 1 accepted without prejudice to his claim for eviction. The tenants did not pay rent for the months of February and March 1961. The case of respondent No. 1 further was that the appellant and respondents 2 and 3 took electric connection in the premises in suit in violation of the agreement. 3. The defence, as disclosed in the written statement filed by the appellant, was that there was no cause of action for the suit and it was not maintainable, that, on the expiry of the period fixed under the Kirayanama, a month to month tenancy was created in favour of the tenants, as respondent No. 1 went on realising rent from month to month thereafter. Respondent No. 1 never asked the tenants to execute a fresh kirayanama immediately after the termination of the tenancy under the Kirayanama. The appellant approached respondent No. 1 after the notice dated the 26th January 1961 for getting a fresh kirayanama executed, but respondent No. 1 arbitrarily asked him to execute a kirayanama the terms of which were not in accordance with the kirayanama dated the 3rd March 1959 and so he did not agree to that suggestion. So far as the question of non-payment of rent for the months of February and March 1961 was concerned, the case of the appellant was that he offered the same to respondent No. 1 and further that a sum of Rs. 300 was in deposit with respondent No. 1 to the credit of the tenants as security advance and as such he could set off his dues for February and March 1961 against that advance. No condition of the Kirayanama dated the 3rd March 1959 had been violated by taking electric connection in the premises. 4. The Courts below have decided the other points in favour of the appellant but have decreed the suit of respondent No. 1 on the ground that the tenancy had terminated and no fresh tenancy was created in favour of the appellant and respondents 2 and 3. 5. It was contended by Mr. Shreenath Singh, learned Counsel for the appellant, that, although the period fixed under the Kirayanama had expired, respondent No. 1 accepted rent for the months of December 1960 and January 1961 and, therefore, a fresh tenancy was created. There is no substance in this contention, because the case is governed by the Bihar Buildings (Lease, Rent and Eviction) Control Act, 1947, hereafter called the Act, A reference may be made to the case of Ganga Dutt Murarka v. Karlik Chandra Das and Ors. [1961]3SCR813 . The relevant observations of their Lordships of the Supreme Court in that case are as follows; It is, however, well settled that where a contractual tenancy to which the rent control legislation applies has expired by efflux of time or by determination by notice to quit and the tenant continues in possession of the premises, acceptance of rent from the tenant by the landlord will not afford ground for holding that the landlord has assented to a new contractual tenancy. 6. 6. It was next contended that, in spite of the findings of the Courts below that the tenancy had come to an end by efflux of time and there was no fresh agreement, no decree for eviction could be passed against the tenants, as they were entitled to the protection of the provisions of law contained in Clauses (a) to (d) of Sub-section (i) of Section 11 of the Act. In other words, if a landlord wants to eject a tenant for a specified period, no decree for his eviction can be passed unless the tenant has also made himself liable for eviction under Clauses (a) to (d) of Sub-section (1) of Section 11. This argument has no force and is against the clear provisions of Section 11 which runs as follows: Notwithstanding anything contained in any contract or law to the contrary...where a tenant is in possession of any building, he shall not be liable to eviction therefrom except in execution of a decree passed by the Court on one or more of the following grounds.... These lines make it perfectly clear that a decree can only be passed either on one ground or grounds more than one enumerated in this section. Clause (e) of Sub-section (1) of Section 11 lays down that a tenant holding on a lease for a specified period can be evicted on the expiry of the period of tenancy. The Courts below have decreed the suit of respondent No. 1 on the ground that the tenancy had terminated by the expiry of the time fixed under the kirayanama. The ORDER :of eviction is, therefore, based on one of the grounds mentioned in Section 11 of the Act and, as such, the decree for eviction passed by them is valid in the eye of law, 7. In the result, there is no merit in this appeal and it is dismissed with costs. Sambhu Prasad Singh, J. 1. I agree and would like to make a few observations of my own on the contention of Mr. In the result, there is no merit in this appeal and it is dismissed with costs. Sambhu Prasad Singh, J. 1. I agree and would like to make a few observations of my own on the contention of Mr. Shreenath Singh, learned Counsel for the appellant, that no tenant can be evicted merely on the ground mentioned in Clause (e) of Sub-section (1) of Section 11 of the Act which, prima facie, as observed by my learned brother Anwar Ahmad, J., is against the language of Sub-section (1) of Section 11 according to which a tenant makes himself liable to eviction on the grounds mentioned in any of the five clauses of the sub-section including Clause (e). But the contention of Mr. Singh was that it was not possible to construe Sub-section (1) in that way, because no tenant for a fixed term could be evicted until expiry of the term on any of the grounds mentioned in Clauses (a) to (d). According to Mr. Singh, if a tenant for a fixed term cannot be evicted before expiry of the term, on the grounds mentioned in Clauses (a) to (d), he cannot be evicted even after expiry of the term if he has not made himself liable for eviction on the grounds mentioned in Clauses (a) to (d). The submission of Mr. Singh was that the Bihar Buildings (Lease, Rent and Eviction) Control Act was passed for the benefit of the tenants and if a construction other than one submitted by him was put on Sub-section (1) of Section 11, a tenant for a fixed term would get no relief and would be liable to be evicted under the general law. In support of this contention he also placed reliance on Section 2(f)(i) of the Act which defines "tenant" as "any person by whom, or on whose account, rent is payable for a building and includes a person continuing in possession after the termination of the tenancy in his favour". He submitted that this definition also supported his contention, inasmuch as, the definition contemplated that a tenant for a fixed term would not cease to be a tenant on expiry of the term if he continued to be in possession. 2. Aforesaid submissions of Mr. Singh, at the first sight, no doubt, appear to be plausible, but on a closer scrutiny there appears no substance in them. 2. Aforesaid submissions of Mr. Singh, at the first sight, no doubt, appear to be plausible, but on a closer scrutiny there appears no substance in them. A tenant for a fixed term cannot be evicted under Clauses (a) to (d) of Sub-section (1) of Section 11 of the Act before expiry of the term not because of the provisions of this Act, but because of the provisions of the Transfer of Property Act. It is now well settled that this Act is not a self-contained Act and in absence of any conflict between the two, the provisions of the Transfer of Property Act ' would also apply to the tenancies, and that no tenant can be evicted unless the tenancy is determined according to the Transfer of Property Act. For instance, in cases of forfeiture of the tenancy, no eviction can be ORDER :ed unless a notice in writing as envisaged by Section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act conveying to the tenant the intertion of the landlord to determine the tenancy is served. In cases of leases for fixed term, the tenancy is determined only by efflux of time limited by the deed of lease (vide Clause (a) of Section 111 of the Transfer of Property Act), and before that the tenant cannot be evicted under Clauses (a) to (d) of Sub-section (1) of Section 11 of the Act. If the provisions of the Transfer of Property Act were not there and applicable, then a tenant for a fixed term also can be evicted even before expiry of the term on the grounds mentioned in Clauses (a) to (d) of Sub-section (1) of Section 11 of the Act. 3. Clause (e) of Sub-section (1) of Section 11 of the Act cannot be said to be redundant, because if it would not have been added to the sub-section, it can be very well contended that no tenant on fixed term can be evicted on expiry of the term, because that is not one of the grounds mentioned in the Act for eviction of a tenant. The contention of Mr. The contention of Mr. Singh that if a construction other than one submitted by him was put on Sub-section (1) of Section 11 of the Act, a tenant for a fixed term would not get any relief under the Act, is not justified in view of the provisions of Section 12 of the Act. Section 12 lays down that a tenant holding a lease for a specified period may, by A written notice to the landlord at least one month before the expiry of the period limited by the lease, get the lease extended by double the period covered by the original lease subject to a maximum of one year. Under the Transfer of Property Act, the tenant cannot get the term of his lease extended at his option alone. Section 12 (Sub-section (3) ) further lays down that if the tenant fails to vacate the building on the termination of the lease, the landlord can on an application obtain from the court an ORDER :for ejectment which shall be executed as a decree. It is manifest that though the tenant can get the lease extended by double the period covered by the original lease subject to a maximum of one year, after expiry of the extended term, he shall be liable to be evicted even if none of the grounds mentioned in Clauses (a) to (d) of Sub-section (1) of Section 11 do exist. If the contention of Mr. Singh is accepted, the tenant after expiry of the term of his lease can continue to be in possession even beyond one year after expiry of the term of his original lease unless he becomes liable to be evicted under Clauses (a) to (d) of Sub-section (1) of Section 11 and render the provisions of Section 12 nugatory. It is well established rule of construction of statutes that different provisions of the same Act are to be harmoniously construed as not to render any one of them nugatory. 4. The definition of "tenant" in Clause (f) of Section 2 including a person continuing in possession after termination of tenancy in his favour has got no relevancy in construing Section 11 of the Act and does not support the contention of Mr. Singh. 4. The definition of "tenant" in Clause (f) of Section 2 including a person continuing in possession after termination of tenancy in his favour has got no relevancy in construing Section 11 of the Act and does not support the contention of Mr. Singh. If it is to be held that a tenant for a fixed term cannot be evicted on expiry of the term because of this definition no tenant can ever be evicted on any of the grounds mentioned in Sub-section (1) of Section 11. Every time the tenancy in his favour is terminated either by efflux of time in case of tenants for fixed term or by a notice in cases of forfeiture of the tenancy for grounds mentioned in Clauses (a) to (d) of Sub-section (1) of Section 11, he will get advantage of a fresh tenancy under the definition, because he will continue in possession after that, inasmuch as, the termination of the tenancy and dispossession of the tenant cannot possibly be simultaneous. The consequences of this part of the definition are that a tenant does not make himself liable, to pay compensation to the landlord for his occupation of the building after the tenancy is determined but is liable: only to pay the rent and that the landlord too can, after he institutes a suit for recovery of possession, insist for deposit of the arrears of rent and month to month rent by the tenant and in case of failure, get his defence against ejectment struck out.