JUDGMENT 1. THIS appeal is directed against the judgment and order dated 21st July, 1966, passed by B. C. Mitra, j., discharging the Rule Nisi and dismissing the application of the appellant petitioner for inter alia issue of a writ of Mandamus or any other appropriate writ for quashing a Notice dated March 7, 1964, terminating the service of the appellant under the respondents. 2. ON September 1, 1944, the appellant-petitioner was appointed a clerk in the A. R. P. Unit under the respondents. On April 1, 1946 the appellant petitioner was transferred to the Traffic department of the respondents as a shed Clerk. The service of the appellant-petitioner was confirmed on August 1, 1947. The facts leading to the application before the trial court were as follows: 3. THE Commissioners for the Port of Cal. is a body corporate established by the Calcutta Port Act (Bengal Act III of 1890) entrusted with the powers and duties set out in the said act in respect of the Port of Calcutta. 4. UNDER Section 31 of the said act the Commissioners for the Port of Calcutta have power to frame rules in meeting, inter alia, for regulating the, period of service of the employees of the Commissioners subject to the approval of the Central Government in accordance with the provisions of subsection 3 of Section 31 of the said Act. In meetings held on December 12, 1921, May 29, 1939 and March 29, 1954, the commissioners for the Port of Calcutta framed and adopted fundamental and supplementary rules regulating the conditions of service of the employees of the Commissioners. The said fundamental and supplementary rules were confirmed and approved by the central Government in accordance with the provisions of Sub-section 3 of Section 31 of the said Act. By virtue of fundamental rule 58 adopted as mentioned above an employee of the category of the appellant-petitioner of the Commissioners for the port of Calcutta is entitled to continue in service until the age of superannuation, i.e. 58 years. 5. IN a meeting held on September 10, 1945 the Commissioners for the Port of Calcutta framed and adopted rules known as "further conditions of Service". The said Commissioners also adopted and framed rules at their meetings of September 24, 1945 and August 23, 1948. 5. IN a meeting held on September 10, 1945 the Commissioners for the Port of Calcutta framed and adopted rules known as "further conditions of Service". The said Commissioners also adopted and framed rules at their meetings of September 24, 1945 and August 23, 1948. Although the said rules were acted upon by the said Commissioners the same were not approved by the central Government in accordance with the provisions of Sub-section 3 of section 31 of the said Act. In the premises the said rules failed to have any effect and were not binding as statutory rules upon the employees of the Commissioners for the Port of Calcutta including the appellant-petitioner. 6. COPY of the said rules, of 1945 were served upon the appellant-petitioner on September 17, 1943. The appellant-petitioner subscribed to the same by affixing his signature. Subsequently at a meeting on 22nd June, 1959, the Commissioners adopted a fresh set of rules which were approved by the Central Government. The said rules have been annexed to the petition and marked with the letter "a". 7. BY a letter bearing No. E/tm dated, 7th March, 1064, the respondent no. 2, Deputy Chairman of the Port of calcutta, terminated the service of the appellant petitioner with immediate effect and offered a month's salary to the appellant-petitioner in lieu of notice. Thereupon the appellant moved the said application. 8. UPON the appellant's application, a Rule Nisi was issued directing the Respondents to show cause as to why a writ of mandamus would not issue for quashing the said notice dated march 7, 1964. The said Rule was ultimately heard and discharged, as mentioned above, by the aforesaid judgment and order dated, 21st July, 1966. Hence this appeal against the said judgment and order. In the appeal before us Mr. A. P. Sarkar, the learned Advocate contended that (1) under F. R. 56 the appellant-petitioner was entitled to continue in service under the respondents until he attained the age of 58 years. Hence this appeal against the said judgment and order. In the appeal before us Mr. A. P. Sarkar, the learned Advocate contended that (1) under F. R. 56 the appellant-petitioner was entitled to continue in service under the respondents until he attained the age of 58 years. In the premises the notice dated, 7th march, 1954, terminating the service of the appellant amounted to punishment and/or infliction of penalty upon the appellant by dismissal and the same having been done without giving any opportunity to the appellant to show cause against the said punishment, principles of natural justice had been violated and as such the said notice dated 7th March, 1964 is bad and should be quashed. (2) The rules of 1959 framed and adopted by the commissioners for the Port of Calcutta were not applicable to the appellant inasmuch as the appellant was appointed long prior to the adoption or framing of the said rules, although the said rules contain a provision for terminating the service of an employee by giving one month's notice or without notice by paying one month's salary in lieu of notice. The said rules also confer power upon the Commissioners for the Port Of Calcutta to dismiss an employee summarily without notice in case of misconduct. (3) The rules of 1945, although invalid as rules under section 31 of the Calcutta Port Act, cannot be taken to the terms and conditions of an agreement governing the contract of service between the appellant and the Commissioners for the port of Calcutta. 9. WE shall deal with the last point of Mr. Sarkar first, with regard to the rules of 1945, the pleadings of the parties are as follows: in the petition, the appellant stated- "8. That the Commissioners under their Resolution 1900 of 10th September, 1845 adopted a set of rules known as "further conditions of Service" relating to the conditions of service of their employees. Sarkar first, with regard to the rules of 1945, the pleadings of the parties are as follows: in the petition, the appellant stated- "8. That the Commissioners under their Resolution 1900 of 10th September, 1845 adopted a set of rules known as "further conditions of Service" relating to the conditions of service of their employees. These rules, hereinafter referred to as the said rules of 1945, together with other rules incorporated under Resolution No. 2109 of 24th September, 1945 and Resolution No. 1214 of 23rd August, 1948, had in practice been acted upon by the Commissioners although the same had not been approved by the Government under subsection (3) of Section 31 of the said Act, and to that extent the said rules of 1945 having no statutory force, were not valid and binding upon the employees of the Commissioners. "7. That a copy of the said rules of 1945 was served upon the petitioner on 17th September, 1948 to which the petitioner subscribed by affixing his signature. " 10. IN the affidavit in opposition the Respondents stated: "8. With reference to paragraph. 6 of the petition, I do not admit that the rules of 1945 were not valid or binding upon the employees of the commissioners as alleged or at all. Whether the said Rules have statutory force or not, the petitioner having subscribed to the said Rules and agreed to be bound by it, cannot be heard to say that he is not bound thereby. In any case, the said Rules of 1945 were part of the contract of service of the petitioner. The relevant clause I of the 1945 Rules also known as "further conditions of service" is set out hereunder: "the services of any officer or servant may be terminated with a month's notice or a month's pay in lieu of notice in any case and without notice in case of misconduct. For the purpose of this and the following conditions a "month" shall mean the period which runs from any date in any month of the English Calendar to the afternoon of the day preceding the same date of the following month of the calendar; Provided that the periods from the 30th or 31st January to the afternoon of the 28th February or in a leap year the 29th February shall each be taken as a "month". I crave leave to refer to the "further conditions of Service" (1945) as amended from time to time at the time of hearing "9. The statements in paragraph 7 of the petition are admitted. I, however, say that the validity and binding effect of the rules framed by the commissioners under powers conferred by section 31 of the said Act, including rules governing conditions of service of employees, do not depend upon the service thereof upon the employees concerned or their subscribing threfor. " In the affidavit in Reply the appellant stated : "5. In regard to paragraph 8 of the said affidavit I repeat and reiterate the statements contained in paragraph 6 of the petition, and deny that Rules of 1945 were part of the contract to my service or that I was bound by the said rules of 1945 for having subscribed to the said Rules of 1945 which, in any event, do not have any statutory force. Save as aforesaid I deny the allegations made in paragraph 8 of the said affidavit. " "6. In regard to paragraph 9 of the said affidavit, I deny the allegations made therein, and state that the rules governing conditions of service of employees must be served upon the employees concerned and /or subscribed thereto by the said employees to have validity and binding effect." 11. THUS it is the case of the appellant that the Commissioners acted upon the said rules of 1945. A copy of the said rules was served upon the appellant and appellant-petitioner subscribed thereto. It is the case of the commissioners for the Port of Calcutta that the said rules of 1945, although invalid as rules for want of approval of the central Government, were and are valid and binding upon the parties as terms and conditions of the contract of service between the appellant and the commissioners. In the case of (1) P. P. Bose, v. The Commissioners for the port of Calcutta, reported in A.I.R. (1957), Calcutta 720, decided by a Division bench of this Court consisting of chakravartti, C. J. and K. C. Das Gupta, j, the said rules of 1945 came to be considered, It was held : ". . . . . . . . . . . . . . . if the Commissioners had power to, appoint persons under them, which they undoubtedly had, they would necessarily have to appoint them on some terms or, other and, therefore, they had power to include among, the terms, of appointment, the; further conditions, of service which upon, being accepted; by the appointees, would become binding, on them,. . . . . . . . . . The further conditions of service, not, being conditions, having the force of statutory rules, could not apply to all employees generally and. of their own force; but the Commissioners could include them in the contract of service with individual employees. . . . . . . . . . . . " In the aforesaid case, it was held by Chakravartti, C. J. delivering the judgment of the Division Bench, that although the said "further conditions of service" framed in 1945 under, section 31 (1) of the Calcutta Port Act did not have, the effect, of statutory, rules for want of approval by the Central government, the same having been accepted by the appellant in the said case, were binding upon the appellant as terms and, conditions, of the contract of service, between,, the appellant in the said case and the, respondents Commissioners. Because of the following rule, amongst others, in the said 'further conditions, of service' adopted in 1945, the appellant was not entitled to the opportunity, to show cause against the termination, of, his service under the said rule. The said condition is as follows, to Wit. "the services of any officer or servant may be terminated with a month's notice or a, month's pay in lieu of notice in any case, end without notice in the case of misconduct * * *. " 12. IN the instant case the appellant-petitioner himself has stated in the petition that the 'further conditions of service' i.e. the rules of 1945 were acted upon by the Commissioners, copy of the said rules was served upon him and he subscribed thereto. In our view although the word "subscribe" may have different meaning in different; context, the said word "subscribe" means "to give assent to". In our view although the word "subscribe" may have different meaning in different; context, the said word "subscribe" means "to give assent to". We have no doubt in our mind, that the appellant when me copy of the said 'further conditions of service' was served upon him and he subscribed to the same, understood and agreed that the said 'further conditions of service' would govern the contract of employment between himself and the Commissioners. The facts of the instant case, in our opinion, are similar to those of the aforesaid case of P. P. Bose v. The Commissioners for the Port of Calcutta, (supra), with regard to the service, of the said 'further conditions of service' upon and acceptance of the same by the employee by subscribing thereon. We respectfully agree, with the conclusion arrived at by the learned Judges deciding the said case of P. P. Bose v. The Commissioners for the Port of Calcutta, (supra). We also held that by reason of the aforesaid facts the said 'further conditionals of service' became part of the terms and conditions of service of the employee and the Commissioners, in the instant case, as well. In view of the said decision of the said Division Bench in P. P. Bose v. The, Commissioners for the Port of calcutta, (supra), we are unable to accept the contention of Mr. Sarkar that terms of service in the case of an employee or servant of the Commissioners for the Port of Calcutta must always be governed by rules framed under section 31 (1) of the Calcutta Port Act to which approval of the Central government has been accorded. We are also unable to accept the contention that in a case where there is no valid rule there can be no contractual terms and conditions of the said service as urged by Mr. Sarkar. 13. IN view of our finding above we are of the opinion that the service of the appellant was governed by fundamental Rules including the F. R. 56, subject to the modification of the said rules, by the aforesaid 'further conditions of service'. Sarkar. 13. IN view of our finding above we are of the opinion that the service of the appellant was governed by fundamental Rules including the F. R. 56, subject to the modification of the said rules, by the aforesaid 'further conditions of service'. True F. R. 56 confers a right upon the appellant to continue to be in service until the age of superannuation, i.e., 58 years; but the said rule stands modified by the aforesaid condition which is a part of the terms and conditions of the employment of the appellant. The said term provides that the "service of any officer or servant may be terminated with a month's notice or a month's pay in lieu of notice in any case and without notice in the case of misconduct. . . . . . . . "therefore the service of the appellant could be terminated under this rule which has been done by the said notice dated, 7th march, 1964. That was a part of the contract between the parties. The said contract was not subject to or qualified by any other provision contained either in a statute or in a statutory rule. 14. ORDINARILY an employee is entitled to continue in service until. he attains 58 years but the employer, i. e. the Commissioners for the Port of calcutta are also entitled to terminate the contract of employment under the aforesaid term even prior to the employee's attaining the age of 58 years by serving one month's notice, or paying one month's salary in lieu of notice or summarily without notice in case of misconduct of such employee. The instant case, therefore, is the termination of service of the appellant by virtue of a special term of the contract of service. The appellant had not been removed or dismissed from service by way of punishment or for misconduct. Thus, in our opinion, there could not be any question of violation of any principle of natural justice or of any constitutional guarantee. Mr. The appellant had not been removed or dismissed from service by way of punishment or for misconduct. Thus, in our opinion, there could not be any question of violation of any principle of natural justice or of any constitutional guarantee. Mr. Sarkar relied on the case of (2) Dock Labour board, Calcutta v. Jaffar Imam and others, in the connected appeals reported in A. I. R. (1966) S. C. 282, and submitted that the ratio decidendi in the said case applies with equal force to the instant one and the service of the appellant could not be terminated without complying with or observing the principles of natural justice. Mr. Sarkar relied on the following passage at paragraph 10, Page 286 of the said report: ". . . . . . . . In cases where a statutory body or authority is empowered to terminate the employment of its employees, the said authority or body can not be heard to say that it will exercise its powers without due regard to the principles of natural justice. . . . . . . . . ." Mr. Sarkar cited the of (3)Commissioners for the Port of Calcutta and another, v. Baleswar Singh (71 C. W. N 786). In the said case Sinha, C. J. quoted the following passage from the judgment delivered by Gajendragadkar, C. J. of the Supreme Court in the afore said case of Docfc Labour Board, calcutta v. Jaffar Imam, (supra) ; ". . . . . . If. . . . . . the appellant wanted to take disciplinary action against them on the ground that they were guilty of misconduct, it was absolutely essential that the appellant should have held a proper enquiry. At this enquiry, reasonable opportunity should have been given to the respondents to show cause and before reaching its conclusion, the appellant was bound to lead evidence against the respondents, give them a reasonable chance to test the said evidence, allow them liberty to lead evidence in defence, and then come to a decision of its own. Such an enquiry is prescribed by the requirements of natural justice and an obligation to hold such an enquiry is also imposed on the appellant by clause 36 (3) of the Scheme of 1957 and clause 45 (6) of the Scheme of 1956. Such an enquiry is prescribed by the requirements of natural justice and an obligation to hold such an enquiry is also imposed on the appellant by clause 36 (3) of the Scheme of 1957 and clause 45 (6) of the Scheme of 1956. " After quoting the aforesaid observations Sinha, C. J. observed as follows : "we are however powerless in this matter and must follow the law as declared by the Supreme Court. We must, therefore, hold that if it was a case of there being no rules at all, or in the case of rule 18 of the Central c. S. (C. C. A.) Rules not being applicable; it was incumbent on the appellant to follow the rules of natural justice which has not been done in this case. " To appreciate the observations of the Supreme Court as well as of the division Bench in the said case of the commissioners for the Port of Calcutta v. Baleswar Singh (supra) it is necessary that the facts of the said two cases have to be considered. To me it appears that observations of the supreme Court as well as of the Division bench of this Court were made in the background of the facts of the said cases. In the said case of Dock Labour boatrd, Calcutta v. Jaffar Imam, (supra) and the connected appeals the Dock labour Board commenced disciplinary proceedings against the respondents who were registered dock workers and who had been detained by the commissioner of Police under the provisions of the Preventive Detention Act, 1950 and had been subsequently released. No specific charge was given or alleged or framed as against the said respondents. No evidence was taken in the enquiry. The appellants acted upon mere suspicion that the respondents were guilty of committing acts prejudicial to the maintenance of public order. Upon the aforesaid suspicion only, without any proper enquiry in the disciplinary proceedings the service of the respondents were terminated. In the aforesaid background the Supreme observed as follows:- "there can be no doubt that when the appellant purports to exercise its authority to terminate the employment of its employees such as the respondents in the present case it is exercising authority and power of a quasi-judicial character. In the aforesaid background the Supreme observed as follows:- "there can be no doubt that when the appellant purports to exercise its authority to terminate the employment of its employees such as the respondents in the present case it is exercising authority and power of a quasi-judicial character. In cases where a statutory body or authority is empowered to terminate the employment of its employees, the said authority or body cannot be heard to say that it will exercise its powers without due regard to the principles of natural justice. The nature or the character of the proceedings which such a statutory authority or body must adopt in exercising its disciplinary power for the purpose of terminating the employment of its employees, has been recently considered by this Court in. several cases; vide the Associated cementt Co. Ltd., Bhupendra Cement works, Surajpur v. P. N. Sharma, Civil appeal No. 44 of 1964, dated 9-12-1964; ( AIR 1965 SC 1595 ) and Bhagwan v. Ram Chan, Civil Appeal No. 764 of 1964 dated 1-3-1965 ; ( AIR 1965 SC 1767 ), and it has been held that in ascertaining the nature of such proceedings with a view to decide whether the principles of natural justice ought to be followed or not, the tests laid down by Lord Reid in Ridge v. Baldwin, 1964 AC 40, are relevant. In view of these decisions, Mr. Sen has not disputed this position and we think rightly". The second sentence in the said paragraph relied on by Mr. Sarkar has to be read, in our view, in the context of the entirety of the said paragraph as well as in the background of the facts and circumstances of the said case. The learned Chief Justice also observed at paragraph 13, p. 287, of the said judgment as follows to wit: "even in regard to its employees who may have been detained under the act, if after their release the appellant wanted to take disciplinary action against them on the ground that they were guilty of misconduct, it was absolutely essential that the appellant should have held a" proper enquiry. At this enquiry, reasonable opportunity should have been given to the respondents to show cause and before reaching its conclusion, the appellant was bound to lead evidence against the respondents, give them a reasonable chance to test the said evidence, allow them liberty to lead evidence in defence, and then come to a decision of its own. Such an enquiry is prescribed by the requirements of natural justice and an obligation to hold such an enquiry is also imposed on the appellant by Cl. 36 (3) of the Scheme of 1951 and Cl: 45 (6)of the Scheme of 1956. It appears that in the present enquiry, the respondents were not given notice of any specific allegatiens made against them, and the record clearly shows that no evidence was led in the enquiry at all. It is only the detention orders that were apparently produced and it is on the detention orders alone that the whole proceedings rest and the impugned orders are founded. That being so, we feel no hesitation in holding that the court of appeal was perfectly right in setting aside the respective orders passed by the two learned single judged when they dismissed the three writ petitions filed by the respondents". 15. THUS it willbe seen that the aforesaid observations were made in a case where an. enquiry was purported to have been held in the exercise of disciplinary, jurisdiction of the master against, the alleged misconduct of the employee. At the said enquiry no specific allegations or charges were made against the employee. No evidence was adduced, save and except, the detention orders pagsed against the employee. The, employee as a matter of fact was not given any opportunity whatsoever to defend himself Order of dismissal was passed, as and by way of punishment. In the said, context or background of events the Supreme Court made the aforesaid observations. 16. IN the case of Commissioners for the Port of Calcutta v. Baleswar singh, (Supra), the respondent Baleswar was a sub-gunner under the commissioners for the Port of Calcutta and was convicted under Sections 147 and 323 of the Indian Penal Code, i.e., he was held guiltv of rioting and volantarily causing. He was sentenced to a fine of Rs. 30/- under Section 147 I. P. C. in default to undergo rigorous imprisonment for ther week and a fine of Rs. He was sentenced to a fine of Rs. 30/- under Section 147 I. P. C. in default to undergo rigorous imprisonment for ther week and a fine of Rs. 30/- under, Section 323 I. P. C. in default to undergo rigoroas imprisonment for three weeks Baleswer was suspended on March 28, 1963. On April 9, 1963 Baleswar was served with an order passed by Traffic Manager removing him from his service under the Commissioners for the Port of Calcutta. The said order recited the aforesaid conviction of Baleswar and stated: "a. And whereas" it is considered that the conduct of the said Baleswar had led to his conviction is such as to render his further retention in service undesirable. Now, therefore, the deputy Chairman directs that the, said Sri Baleswar Singh, Sub-gunner should be removed from service". Baleswar was not even given any notice to show cause against the proposed removal from service. Thus in the said case of Baleswar Singh v. Commissioners. (supra), the. employer was exercising the right of removal or dismissal from the service of an employee on the ground of misconduct. In the said case the Commissioners for the Port of Calcutta took disciplinary action against the employee. Therefore the facts of the said case, were similar to that of Dock Labour Board, Calcutta v. Jaffar Imam, (supra ). 17. IN the instant case the facts are entirely different. The master never removed or dismissed the appellant for misconduct in the exercise of disciplinary jurisdiction. The master, i.e. the Commissioners for the Port of Calcutta terminated the service of the appellant in accordance with the provisions of a term of the contract of service. We are of the view that in the instant case the Commissioners for the Port of Calcutta never acted in any quasi-judicial capacity and so were not obliged to observe the principles of natural justice. 18. THUS, in our opinion, there is no substance in the first contention of mr. Sarkar. The next question that falls to be determined is whether the rules adopted by the Commissioners for the Port of Calcutta in 1959, set out at page 9 of the Paper-Book govern the service of the parties in the instant case. According to Mr. 18. THUS, in our opinion, there is no substance in the first contention of mr. Sarkar. The next question that falls to be determined is whether the rules adopted by the Commissioners for the Port of Calcutta in 1959, set out at page 9 of the Paper-Book govern the service of the parties in the instant case. According to Mr. Sarkar these rules which were adopted in 1959 are not of retrospective effect and cannot have the effect of taking away the vested right of the appellant to continue in service until 58 years. Rule (1)adopted in 1959 is the same as Rule (1)of "further conditions of service' adopted in 1945. The said rule has been quoted in the earlier part of the judgment. The case of (4) Moti Ram v. N. E. Frontier Railway, reported in AIR (1964); SC 660, relied on by Mr. Sarkar, held that R. 149 (3) of the Railway establishment Code was inconsistent with the provisions of Article 311. In the instant case there is no statutory provision or constitutional guarantee confronted with which the said terms of the contract of service now adopted as Rule (1) of 1959 Rules would become null and void. Mr. Sarkar also relied on the case of (5) Buckingham and Carnatic co. Ltd. v. Venkatiah and another, reported in AIR (1964) SC 1272, for the proposition that the rules subsequent to the commencement of the employment would not be binding upon the employee. Mr. Sarkar also relied on the case of (6) Laxmi Narayan Singh and others v. The Corporation of the city of Nagpur, reported in AIR (1959) Nagpur 206. That case was decided on the basis that there was no statutory rule governing the conditions of servie of the teachers in the primary school of the Corporation of Nagpur nor any term in the contract of service of the said teachers to oblige the said teachers to carry out additional duties. That case to our mind, does not help Mr. Sarkar. Mr. Sarkar also relied on the case of (7) Narayan Chettiar v. Annamalai Chettiar, AIR (1959) SC 275. In the instant case the power to frame rules regulating the period of service of the employees has been conferred by section 31 (1) (d) of the Calcutta Port Act. That case to our mind, does not help Mr. Sarkar. Mr. Sarkar also relied on the case of (7) Narayan Chettiar v. Annamalai Chettiar, AIR (1959) SC 275. In the instant case the power to frame rules regulating the period of service of the employees has been conferred by section 31 (1) (d) of the Calcutta Port Act. The said section provides as follows: "the Commissioners in meeting shall from time to time frame rules: (a) * * * * (b) * * * * (c) * * * * (d) For regulating the period of service of all such employees. " 19. IT is urged by Mr. Mitra, the learned Council for the Commissioners that at the time when the employee was employed the employee knew that the master, i.e. the Commissioners for the Port of Calcutta had power under the Calcutta Port Act to frame rules from time to time for regulating the period of his service. Mr. Mitra relied on the case of (8) The Bihar Mines ltd. v. The Union of India and others air 1967 SC 887 at 894. In the view that we have taken of this case it is not necessary for us to come to a finding as to whether the rules adopted in 1958 are binding on the appellant. We do not decide the said question as it is unnecessary for us to do so. 20. FOR the reasons stated above this appeal must fail and is dismissed. The judgment and order of B. C. Mitra, J., is confirmed. In the facts and circumstances of the case we do not make any order as to costs.