VENRATASWAMI, J. ( 1 ) THESE are a batch of eight Writ Petitions, raising common questions of fact and law. In all these petitions, reliefs sought are for the refund of the market fee collected by the Regulated Market Committee, Davangere, to be hereinafter referred to as the 'committee', and for the issue of a direction that the Committee should refrain from levying market fee on agricultural produce brought into the Market Area for purposes of consumption by the petitioners. It is, therefore, convenient to dispose of all these petitions together. For the purpose of such disposal it is sufficient if the facts in WP. No. 155/66 are mentioned. ( 2 ) THE petitioner is a proprietary concern carrying on business in Davangere. The business in question is one relating to purchase of oil-seeds, such as ground-nuts, cotton-seeds, gingelly-seeds, for the purpose of consumption in the manufacture of oil, refined oil, vanaspati, soap, oil cakes and such other products. In the process of carrying on this business, the oil-seeds are purchased from the markets outside Davangere City and brought into the Market under the control of the 'committee'. According to the reliefs claimed, the petitioner has been paying the market fees on such produce since 1-4-1962 as required by S. 6 (2) (v) of the Mysore Agricultural produce Markets Act, 1939 (No. XVI of 1939), to be hereinafter referred to as the 'act', read with the relevant Rule 46 and Bye-law No. 20 framed thereunder. According to the petitioner, the Chairman of the Committee was intimated of the fact that the produce so brought within the market area was not liable for the payment of the market fees as they were not brought in for re-sale. In spite of this step taken by the petitioner, the Committee continued to levy and collect the market fees in respect of such commodities brought In for the purpose of consumption as mentioned earlier. It would appear, the Committee also passed a Resolution on 7-4-1963 amending Bye-law NO. 21 so as to enable the Committee to refund amounts collected in respect of each commodity on production of evidence to the satisfaction of the Secretary of the committee that the commodities so brought were actually consumed for the purpose of extraction of oil and for manufacture of other goods, the said Resolution is pending before the Government for approval. 21 so as to enable the Committee to refund amounts collected in respect of each commodity on production of evidence to the satisfaction of the Secretary of the committee that the commodities so brought were actually consumed for the purpose of extraction of oil and for manufacture of other goods, the said Resolution is pending before the Government for approval. It may, however, be mentined that it is not disputed that the Act had been repealed by a later enactment which has incidentally done away with the need for amending the Bye-law or the approval of the said Resolution by the Government. In spite of all the oral representation to the Chairman of the Committee and the passing of the Resolution for the purpose of amending Bye-law No. 21, the Committee continued to levy and collect the market fees. The petitioner, therefore, has approached this court for a writ of mandamus directing refund of the fees collected by the Committee from 1-4-1962 upto-date. In so far as the other relief of Writ of mandamus restraining the Committee from collecting market fees in respect of the commodities brought into the market area for the purpose of consumption is concerned, it is conceded at the Bar that such a relief would not fall to be granted, in view of the enactment of 1966. Substantially, therefore, the petition is reduced to one for the relief of refund of market fees collected illegally or paid by mistake. ( 3 ) THE Committee filed an affidavit in opposition denying the allegations that all the produce so brought into the market area by the petitioner were intended for consumption, that is for the extraction of oil or manufacture of other goods. The Committee also produced a statement mentioning some instances of re-sale, by several of these petitioners, of the commodities on which such market fees had been levied. The Committee does not dispute that having regard to the Rules and the Bye Law the market fees was leviable only on goods which were brought into the market area for the purpose of re-sale or processing. It is denied that any request was made to the Committee for the refund of the fees paid and collected. Even otherwise, the petitioner at no time had made any attempt to satisfy the Committee that the commodities concerned were brought into the market area only for the purpose of consumption. It is denied that any request was made to the Committee for the refund of the fees paid and collected. Even otherwise, the petitioner at no time had made any attempt to satisfy the Committee that the commodities concerned were brought into the market area only for the purpose of consumption. Indeed, the petitioner has paid the fees all along without protest. It is, therefore, submitted that the petitions, for mere refund of fees so paid and collected, under Art. 226 of the Constitution, would not be maintainable. Before adverting to the contentions advanced on behalf of the petitioner, it would be necessary to refer to a few statutory provisions and the relevant bye-law. Rule 46 of the Rules framed under the Act reads thus:"fees to be levied: the following fees shall be levied on merchandise brought for sale or processing. ****" rule 47 of the same Rules reads: "recovery of fees: The fees shall be payable as soon as the commodity is brought into the market. " the relevant portion of Bye-law No. 20 reads thus: "fees on agricultural produce: Fees at the rate mentioned in the bye-law shall be levied by the Committee on merchandise brought into the market. . . . . " ( 4 ) THE main contention of Sri K. Srinivasan is that Bye-law No. 20 in terms, enables the levy of fees by the Committee on agricultural produce irrespective of the purpose for which it is brought into the market, namely consumption, processing or sale. That being so, he submitted that it was opposed to the provisions of S. 6 (2) (v) of the Act and R. 46 of the Rules, he proceeded to argue that if the Bye-law were to be read along with R. 46 of the Rules, it would be clear that the produce would not be liable for the fees if the same were brought for the purpose of consumption. According to him, any other view would render the Bye-law invalid, as being opposed to the Rules. It may, however,, be mentioned that the petitioners have not sought for any relief of certiorari, or even mandamus, on the basis of the invalidity of this Bye-law. According to him, any other view would render the Bye-law invalid, as being opposed to the Rules. It may, however,, be mentioned that the petitioners have not sought for any relief of certiorari, or even mandamus, on the basis of the invalidity of this Bye-law. It is unnecessary to consider these submissions at any length as it is not disputed by the Committee that fees would become leviable only when the goods are brought for sale or processing within the area of the regulated market. It was submitted on behalf of the Committee that fees had been paid as and when the produce was brought into the market area by the petitioners without protest. Further, they never claimed that the goods were intended for consumption only. The contention 0f the petitioners that the goods were brought into the market for their consumdtion only is falsified by the fact that almost every one of them had re-sold a portion of such produce within the market area as evidenced by the statement appended to the affidavit filed on behalf of the Committee. The said statement is not refuted in any manner by the petitioners. It is also clear from Rule 47 of the Rules that fees become exigible as soon as the commodities are brought into the market area. In view of these facts, circumstances and statutory provisions, we are unable to accede to the contention of Sri K. Srinivasan that fees would be exigible only when the taxable event of sale takes place. We are also satisfied that such fees were paid without protest of any kind on their part. ( 5 ) THE next contention of Sri K. Srinivasan was that in any event all -the produce brought into the market area had not been sold, even according to the case of the Committee. That being so, it would be a case for examination of accounts of the petitioners for the purpose of affording refund of market fees, if any, collected in regard to the produce utilised by the petitioners during the relevant period for personal consumption, in the manner already referred to. In any event, he argued, the fees collected were without the authority of law and as such liable to be refunded by the issue of an appropriate Writ by this Court. In any event, he argued, the fees collected were without the authority of law and as such liable to be refunded by the issue of an appropriate Writ by this Court. In support of this proposition, he relied on a decision in State of M. P. v. Bhailal Bhai, 15 STC 540 = AIR 1964 SC 1006 . ( 6 ) IN our view, the principle of the decision would not be applicable to the present case. The facts of that case were as follows: The petitioners were assessed to sales tax on their sales of tobacco on the basis of the notification issued by the State Government under S. 5 of the relevant Sales Tax act and large sums were collected by the Madhya Bharat Government and later by the Madhya Pradesh Government. The contention of the petitioners was that the taxing provision under which the tax was assessed and collected was unconstitutional as it infringed Art. 301 of the Constitution and did not come within the special provisions of Art. 304 (a ). Accordingly, they prayed for appropriate Writs or orders for refund of all the taxes that had been collected from them. The Supreme Court while holding that the powers of the High Court under Art. 226 of the constitution were discretionary, particularly in the case of Writs in the nature of mandamus, and sufficiently wide to enable refund to be made in cases where fundamental rights or statutory rights of petitioners are shown to have been infringed with a view to give complete relief, laid down certain principles governing such matters. The relevant passage, (at page 1011 of para 17) runs thus:". . . Among the several matters which the High Courts rightly take into consideration in the exercise of tnat discretion is the delay made by the aggrieved party in seeking this speciai remedy and what excuse there is for it. Another is the nature ol controversy of facts and law that may have to be decided as regards the availaiblity of consequential relief. Another is the nature ol controversy of facts and law that may have to be decided as regards the availaiblity of consequential relief. Thus, where as in these cases, a person comes to the court for relief under Art. 226 on the allegation that he has been assessed to tax under a void legislation and having paid it under a mistake is entitled to get it back, the Court, if it finds that the assessment was void, being made under a void provision of law, and the payment was made by mistake, is still not bound to exercise its discretion directing repayment. Whether repayment should be ordered in the exercise of this discretion will depend in each case on its own facts and circumstances. It is not easy nor it is desirable to lay down any rule for universal application. It may however be stated as a general rule that if there has been unreasonable delay the Court ought not ordinarily to lend its aid to a party by this extraordinary remedy of mandamus. Again, where even if there is no such delay the Government or the statutory authority against whom the consequential relief is prayed for raises a prima facie triable issue as regards the availability of such relief on the merits on the grounds like limitation the court should ordinarily refuse to issue the writ of mandamus for such payment. In both these kinds of cases it will be sound use of discretion to leave the party to seek his remedy by the ordinary mode of action in a Civil Court and to refuse to exercise in his favour the extraordinary remedy under Art. 226 of the Constitution. " ( 7 ) JUDGED in the light of the above enunciation, the present petitioners are clearly disentitled to relief. It is seen that the petitioners had paid without protest the market fees levied from 1-4-1962. It is also to be noted that their claim that the produce had been brought for consumption has been controverted by the Committee by citing certain specific instances of sales by the petitioners. Further, what is of greater importance is that no case of infringement of any constitutional or statutory right by the Committee, in levying and collecting the market fees has been made out in the present case. Further, what is of greater importance is that no case of infringement of any constitutional or statutory right by the Committee, in levying and collecting the market fees has been made out in the present case. Further more, it was contended by Sri R. S. Mahendra, the learned Counsel appearing on behalf of the Committee that the pleadings clearly raised a triable issue whether the produce was consumed or sold as contended for by the respective parties. We are clearly of the opinion that the contention in this regard is justified on the facts and circumstances of the case and deserves to be upheld. ( 8 ) IN the light of these facts and circumstances, we do not think that the decision relied upon by Sri Srinivasan could be of any assistance to him. Though the petitioner has raised other grounds in the petition, no other point was urged before us. ( 9 ) IT was argued by Sri Mahendra, the learned Counsel for the first respondent-Committee, that the case being one for mandamus there should have been a demand and refusal, the refusal being such as to be indicative of the fact that the statutory body had no intention of complying with any such demand. We are satisfied that there is considerable doubt as to whether there was any s'uch demand made by the petitioners. It is also to be remarked that no statutory Rule or Bye-law having the force of a statute, under which an obligation is imposed on the Committee to effect such refund of monies, has been brought to our notice. It is no doubt true that the proposed amendment to Bye-law No. 21 was intended to subserve such a purpose. It is fairly well established that a petitioner for the issue of a writ of mandamus must have a special legal right to the performance of a legal duty by a person or authority against whom a mandamus is sought. ( 10 ) WE are, therefore, clearly of the opinion that the petitioners have failed to establish a case for the issue of a writ of mandamus. In this connection our attention was invited to a decision of the Supreme court in Suganmal v. State of M. P. , AIR 1965 SC 1740 . ( 10 ) WE are, therefore, clearly of the opinion that the petitioners have failed to establish a case for the issue of a writ of mandamus. In this connection our attention was invited to a decision of the Supreme court in Suganmal v. State of M. P. , AIR 1965 SC 1740 . It was a case relating to a claim for refund of Industrial Tax which was collected by the Industrial tax Officer, Madhya Pradesh, during the years 1943-48. The facts of that case were as follows: The appellant was subject to the imposition of industrial tax on cotton under the Indore Industrial Tax Act, 1927. Excess profits duty was payable under Indore Excess Profits Duty Order, 1944. ( 11 ) THE Company did not run any cotton mill. Still, when the Company was called upon to submit its returns and to deposit industrial tax whenever its balance-sheets showed profits, it did so. Provisional assessment was made in respect of the relevant years, and the tax assessed at Rs. 62,809-5-2 was paid. On final assessment being made in the years 1951-52, the appellant filed appeals against various assessment orders to the appellate authority. The appeals against the assessment of industrial tax were allowed on the ground that the company was not liable to pay industrial tax as it did not carry on any business which was liable to be assessed to that tax and the various asessment orders under appeals were quashed. No direction was, however, given by the appellate authority for the refund of tax which had been realised from the appellant. The appellant being unsuccessful in his endeavours to secure a refund, approached the Court under Art. 226 of the Constitution for the issue of a writ of mandamus against the State of Madhya Bharat and others, directing them to perform their statutory duty and to refund or cause to be refunded to the appellant the amount paid by him as industrial tax. Their Lordships in addressing themselves to this question have observed at page 1742 thus:" We, therefore, held that normally petitions solely praying for the refund of money against the State by a writ of mandamus are not to be entertained. Their Lordships in addressing themselves to this question have observed at page 1742 thus:" We, therefore, held that normally petitions solely praying for the refund of money against the State by a writ of mandamus are not to be entertained. The aggrieved party has the right of going to the civil Court for claiming the amount and it is open to the State to raise all possible defences to the claim, defences which cannot in most cases be appropriately raised and considered in the exercise of writ jurisdiction. "again at page 1744, while adverting to the question whether a legal remedy was available under S. 72 of the Contract Act for recovery of money paid under mistake or coercion, it is observed thus:"reference is made to S. 72 of the Contract Act for the contention that the State is duty bound to return the amount to the appellant. Whether the case of the appellant falls under the provisions of that section would be a point for decision in a regular suit and not in the proceedings under Art. 266. . . . . " ( 12 ) THE principles in the above enunciations would be clearly applicable to the present case. It is clear from the pleadings that the petitioners have paid the fees without protest and the Committee collected it on the presumption that it was legitimately due on produce which had been brought within the limits of the market for the purpose of sale or processing, in accordance with Rules 46 and 47 of the Rules. The contention of the petitioners has been that they were not entitled to collect it on produce brought for consumption. It is not quite clear from the petitioners' affidavits that the fees were paid under a mistake. We do not, however, wish to be understood that our view is final on this question of fact as to the existence or otherwise of the element of mistake. Assuming that money was paid by mistake the other question whether auch a mistake falls squarely under S. 72 of the Contract Act would itself be an issue for decision in a regular suit as observed in the above decision. Further, the petitions are highly belated. The market fees have been levied from 1-4-1962 and continued to be levied till the date of the petitions. Further, the petitions are highly belated. The market fees have been levied from 1-4-1962 and continued to be levied till the date of the petitions. It is no doubt contended by Sri Srinivasan that it was somewhat analogous to a continuing wrong. But, every payment of market fees would give rise to a distinct and specific cause of action giving rise to defences such as limitation, acquiescence and absence of mistake, which may possibly be urged by the Committee. It is plain that if a Writ of mandamus were to be issued in terms prayed for by the petitioners, it would involve a ease of accounting on the part of the petitioners. As the accounts would necessarily have to be scrutinised for the purpose of apportioning the agricultural produce brought into the market by each individual petitioner between that used for consumption and that for sale and processing. This accounting would be necessary in order to direct a refund of the fees collected on produce used in consumption. Further, it is conceivable that in the process of accounting disputes are bound to arise which may have to be adjudicated upon only in a regular suit. In other words, in such circumstances, even if a mandamus were to be issued, the Court in enforcing obedience thereof, will have to decide such disputes. This a Court will not be able to do once it is held that accounts have to be taken between the parties and the plea of limitation will have to be adjudicated upon in respect of different items of fees paid by the petitioners. For these reasons we decline to exercise our discretion in favour of the petitioners for the issue of a mandamus as prayed for. ( 13 ) IN the result, these petitions fail and are dismissed. The first respondent would be entitled to its costs. Advocate's fee rs. 50 in each. --- *** --- .