JUDGMENT V.G. Oak, C.J. - The following question has been referred to a Full Bench: - "Whether the restrictions on appeals by paupers as laid down in Order 14 (1) (2) of the Code of Civil Procedure contravene Article 14 of the Constitution and are ultra tires the Constitution of India?" Vijay Kumar and others filed a suit against Bareilly Vyapar Mandal and others in the court of the Civil Judge, Bareilly. The suit was dismissed by the trial court. Shital Kumar and Papai plaintiffs have filed an appeal in this Court against the judgment and decree of the trial court dismissing the suit. The two plaintiffs did not pay the prescribed court fee on the memorandum of appeal. They have filed an application under Order 44, rule 1, C.P.C., for permission to appeal as paupers. , When the application for permission to appeal as paupers came up before a Division Bench of this Court, the judgment under appeal was perused. The learned Judges were satisfied that the judgment under appeal is based on findings of fact, and does not raise any question of law. It could not be said that the judgment was erroneous or unjust. So, the application was liable to be rejected under sub-rule (2) of rule 1 of Order 44 of the Code of Civil Procedure. But the appellants challenged the vires of the provision of Order 44, rule 1 (2) , C.P.C. The learned Judges of the Division Bench considered that the question of vires of the provision of Order 44, rule 1 (2) is not free from difficulty. So, the question was referred to a larger Bench. The Court Fees Act, 1870, prescribes payment of court fees on various documents filed in courts Section 4, Court Fees Act, lays down that no document of any of the kinds specified in the first or second schedule to the Act as chargeable with fees shall be filed, exhibited or recorded in, or shall be received or furnished by any High Court in any case coming before such court in the exercise of its jurisdiction as regards appeals from the courts subject to its superintendence, unless in respect of such document there be paid a fee or an amount not less than that indicated by either of the said schedules as the proper fee for such documents. When an appeal is filed in this Court against a decree of a Civil Judge; the appellant has to pay on the memorandum of appeal the prescribed court fee. Sec. 96, C.P.C., provides for appeals from original decrees. According to sub-sec. (I) of Section 96, C.P.C., an appeal shall lie from every decree passed by any court exercising original jurisdiction to the court authorised to hear appeals from the decisions if such court. An appeal under Section 96, C.P.C., lies on facts as well as on law. Order 44 of the Code of Civil Procedure deals with pauper appeals. Order 44, rule 1, C.P.C., states: " (1) Any person entitled to prefer an appeal, who is unable to pay the fee required for the memorandum of appeal, may present an application accompanied by a memorandum of appeal, and may be allowed to appeal as a pauper, subject, in all matters including the presentation of such application, to the provisions relating to wits by paupers, in so far as those provisions are applicable. (2) The appellate Court, after fixing a day for hearing the applicant or his pleader and hearing him accordingly if he appears on that day, and upon a perusal of the application and of the judgment and decree appealed from, shall reject the application, unless it sees reason to think that the decree is contrary to law or to some usage hiving the force of law, or is otherwise erroneous or unjust." Although an appellant has as a rule to pay court fee on the memorandum of appeal, sub-rule (1) of rule I of Order 44, C.P.C provides an exception to the rule. An appellant, who is unable to pay the prescribed court fee, may move the appellate court for permission to appeal as a pauper without payment of the prescribed court fee. I he right given by sub-rule (1) of rule 1. is subject to the provision of sub-rule (2) of rule 1. Sub-rule (2) of rule 1 lays down that the application for permission must be rejected by the appellate court if the appellant is unable to satisfy the court that the decree is contrary to law or to some usage having the force of law, or is otherwise erroneous or unjust. It follows that if the appeal raises pure questions of fact, permission will be refused. Mr. It follows that if the appeal raises pure questions of fact, permission will be refused. Mr. M.P. Bajpai appearing for the appellants has challenged the validity of Order 44, rule 1 (2), C.P.C. on two grounds. Firstly, it is contended that the right of appeal conferred by Section 96, C.P.C., has been taken away by Order 44, rule 1 (2), C.P.C. Secondly, it is said that sub-rule (2) introduces discrimination against poor persons, and contravenes Article 14 of the Constitution. On the first point, Mr. Bajpai relied upon Rant Prasad v. State of Bihar, A.I.R. 1953 SC 215. It was observed on page 220 that the meanest of citizens has a right of access to a court of law for the redress of his just grievances. In H.K. Dada (India) Ltd. v. State of Madhya Pradesh, A.I.R. 1953 SC 221 it was explained that a right of appeal is not merely a matter of procedure. It is a matter of substantive right. The leading case on Article 14 of the Constitution is Budhan Choudhry v. State of Bihar, A.I.R. 1955 SC 191. The Court explained on page 193: "While Article 14 forbids class legislation, it does not forbid reasonable classification for the purposes of legislation. In order, however, to pass the test of permissible classification two conditions must be fulfilled, namely, (i) that the classification must be founded on an intelligible differentia which distinguishes persons or things that are grouped together from others left out of the group and (ii) that that differentia must have a rational relation to the object sought to be achieved by the statute in question." In Balabhau Manaji v. B.S. Nandanwar, A.I.R. 1957 Bom. 233 Chagla, C.J. observed at page 234 that the object of Article 14 is that persons should be uniformly treated by law unless there is some rational reason why they should be treated differently. In State of West Bengal v. Anwar Ali, A.I.R. 1952 SC 75, Mukherjea, J. pointed out on page 89 that a rule of procedure laid down by law comes as much within the purview of Article 14 as any rule of substantive law. It is necessary that all litigants, who are similarly situated, are able to avail themselves of the same procedural rights for relief and for defence with like protection and without discrimination. It is necessary that all litigants, who are similarly situated, are able to avail themselves of the same procedural rights for relief and for defence with like protection and without discrimination. In Prem Chand v. Excise Commissioner, U.P., A.I.R. 1963 SC 996, it was held that rule 12 of Order 35 of the Supreme Court Rules and Orders in so far as it relates to the giving of security for costs in a petition under Article 32 of the Constitution retards the assertion or vindication or the fundamental right to move the Supreme Court under Article 32 of the Constitution, and constitutes its infringement. Consequently the rule is invalid. The learned Senior Standing Counsel relied upon Hanumantha Rao v. State of Andhra Pradesh, A.I.R. 1957 SC 927. It was held that in the provisions of Sections 207 and 207-A of the Code of Criminal Procedure the legislature has provided for a clear classification bet. ween two kinds of proceedings at the commitment stage based upon. a very relevant consideration, namely, whether or not there has been a previous enquiry by a responsible public servant whose duty it is to discover crime and to bring criminals to speedy justice. This basis of classification is clearly connected with the underlying principle of administration of justice. It must be held that there is no discrimination, and that provisions of Article 14 of the Constitution have not been contravened. In Abdur Rahint v. J.A. Pinto, A.I.R. 1951 Hyderabad 11, Naik, C.J. pointed out on page 12 that equal treatment does not necessarily mean identical treatment. In Pratap Singh v. State of V.P., A.I.R. 1961 S.C. 586 it was held that the proviso to Section 421 (1) of the Code of Criminal Procedure in so far as it denies an opportunity to be heard to a convicted person in jail who files an appeal through the jail authorities before the court dismisses his appeal summarily, while giving such an opportunity to a convicted person who presents his appeal either in person or through a pleader, does not offend against the provisions of Article 14. In Lala Ram v. Supreme Court of India, A.I.R. 1967 SC 847, it was held that sub-rule (2) of rule 2 of Order 40 of Supreme Court Rules, 1966, making furnishing of security as precondition for filing of review petition does not offend Article 14. In Lala Ram v. Supreme Court of India, A.I.R. 1967 SC 847, it was held that sub-rule (2) of rule 2 of Order 40 of Supreme Court Rules, 1966, making furnishing of security as precondition for filing of review petition does not offend Article 14. It has been found that the applicants are paupers. We may take it that they are experiencing difficulty in raising money for payment of the prescribed court fee on the memorandum of appeal. This difficulty has its origin in the provisions of the Court Fees Act, and not in the provisions of Order 44 of the Code of Civil Procedure. In the present reference we are not called upon to pronounce on the validity of the provisions of the Court Fees Act. We may proceed on the assumption that the provision contained in Section 4, Court Fees Act, is valid. The rigour of provisions of the Court Fees Act has been mitigated by the provisions contained in Order 44 of the Code of Civil Procedure. Rule 1 of Order 44 of the Code of Civil Procedure consists of two parts. Sub-rule (1) enables the appellate court to permit an appellant to lodge an appeal as a pauper (without payment of court fee). Sub-rule (1) divides appellants into two classes: (1) persons who can pay the prescribed court fee, and (2) impecunious persons. This classification is reasonable. The appellants have not challenged the validity of sub-rule (1) of rule 1. Sub-rule (2) of rule 1 lays down the procedure on application filed under sub-rule (1) . Sub-rule (2) lays down that such an application must be rejected unless the appellate court sees reason to think that the decree is contrary to law or to some usage having the force of law or is otherwise erroneous or unjust. Sub-rule (2) divides appeals into two classes: (1) appeals against decrees which are contrary to law or to some usage having the force of law or are otherwise erroneous or unjust; and (2) appeals from decrees where the judgments are erroneous on simple questions of fact. Points to be pressed in appeal may be divided two broad classes: (1) questions of fact, and (2) questions of law. Section 100 of the Code of Civil Procedure does not permit appeals on pure questions of fact. Points to be pressed in appeal may be divided two broad classes: (1) questions of fact, and (2) questions of law. Section 100 of the Code of Civil Procedure does not permit appeals on pure questions of fact. A similar classification has been made in Order 44, rule 1 (2) , C.P.C. This classification is also reasonable. It is true that the scope of an appeal under Order 44, rule 1, C.P.C., is narrower than the scope of an appeal under Section 96, C.P.C. But an appellant is under no obligation to come within the limited scope of Order 44, rule 1, C.P.C. If he can somehow raise funds for payment of the prescribed court fee, he can get the full benefit of Section 96, C.P.C. Order 44, rule 1 (2) , C.P.C., lays down that if an appellant wishes to take the benefit of sub-rule (1) or rule 1 of Order 44, he must satisfy the condition laid down by sub-rule (2) of rule 1 of Order 44. The Legislature might have thought that the case having been tried before one court, the pauper appeal - need not be entertained unless the condition laid down by sub rule (2) of rule 1 of Order 4-4 is satisfied. The provision of sub-rule (1) of rule 1 of Order 44 is in the nature of a concession. If an appellant wishes to take the benefit of this concession, he should be prepared to satisfy the condition laid down in sub-rule (2) of rule 1 of Order 44. The situation is somewhat analogous to the situation under Order 40, rule 2 (2) , Supreme Court Rules, 1966. The validity of that provision was upheld in Lala Ram v. Supreme Court of India. On that principle, the provision contained in Order 44, rule 1 (2) , C.P.C. is also valid. In my opinion, both the parts of the question referred to the Full Bench should be answered in the negative. Sub-rule (2) of rule I of Order 44 of the Code of Civil Procedure is valid. S.N. Singh, J. - I agree, and have no-thing to add. Pathak, J. - I am also of the view that sub-rule (2) of rule 1 of Order 44 of the Code of Civil Procedure does not violate Article 14 of the Constitution and is intra vires. S.N. Singh, J. - I agree, and have no-thing to add. Pathak, J. - I am also of the view that sub-rule (2) of rule 1 of Order 44 of the Code of Civil Procedure does not violate Article 14 of the Constitution and is intra vires. Shri M.P. Bajpai contends that the sub rule conflicts with Article 14 because it creates an invidious discrimination between the rich and the poor, the prince and the pauper, and while the well-to-do can appeal against an original decree on both facts and law, the impecunious is limited in his appeal to questions of law and usage having the force of law. I think it necessary to remove at once the confusion underlying the submission. The right to sue has long been accepted as a right rooted in the common law. It is regarded as flowing from that ancient legal maxim: 'Ubi jus ibi remedium" - where there is a right there is a remedy. The Legislature may abridge or limit that right or confine it to a class or indeed negative it altogether. But until that is done the right belongs to all, except that those who for want of natural capacity, by reason of minority or lunacy, are not sui juris must enter the Court through a next friend or guardian, or a juristic entity enjoying legal personality such as a corporation must act through a natural person. But I am unaware that either affluence or poverty was ever a circumstance determining the capacity to own that right. What however, the Legislature has done is to impose a fetter upon the exercise of that right and this it did when it enacted the Court Fees Act, 1870 and by Sections 4 and 6 thereof prohibited the Court from receiving a plaint (and a memorandum of appeal) unless in respect of such document the requisite court fee was paid. It imposed a tax upon the suitor. While the right to file the suit continued to vest in him, he was unable to exercise the right unless he met the tax liability. I am not concerned here with the wisdom of the policy underlying the imposition. I need only emphasise that the right to sue has been burdened through legislative action by a tax and that is a burden upon all who seek relief by suit in a court of law. I am not concerned here with the wisdom of the policy underlying the imposition. I need only emphasise that the right to sue has been burdened through legislative action by a tax and that is a burden upon all who seek relief by suit in a court of law. a burden imposed without distinction or favour and without regard to quality of person or status. But then there is the unfortunate who though owner of the right finds it difficult, or indeed impossible, to exercise it because he is not in a position to pay the court fee. He is not possessed of sufficient means to enable him to pay the fee prescribed by law. He is what the law describes as a "pauper". For him, Order 33 of the Code of Civil Procedure extends a concession. Subject to the provisions of that Order, he enjoys the privilege of instituting a suit without furnishing court fee upon the plaint. He must apply to the Court for permission to sue as a pauper and if the Court finds that he is a pauper within the contemplation of the law permission is granted. Thereupon, as rule 8 of Order 53 specifically declares. ".......the suit shall proceed - in all other respects as a suit instituted in the ordinary manner, except that the plaintiff shall not be liable to pay any court fee in respect of any petition, appoint tenant of a pleader or other proceeding connected with the suit." And, therefore, excepting for exemption from the liability to pay court fee, a pauper's suit is placed on exactly the same footing as a suit by any other. There is no distinction as to the questions which may be raised between the parties as the suit proceeds to a decree. Now a pauper, as much as the effluent, is anxious to rid himself of an adverse decree. The Code by Section 96, provides for an appeal against an original decree. That appeal is available, both on law and on facts, and may cover the entire range of controversy which was in trial before the court of institution. Again, the right to file that appeal and to take all conceivable grounds of objection are equally open to all, regardless of their pecuniary circumstances. That appeal is available, both on law and on facts, and may cover the entire range of controversy which was in trial before the court of institution. Again, the right to file that appeal and to take all conceivable grounds of objection are equally open to all, regardless of their pecuniary circumstances. The scope of the appeal is the same for the pauper as for the well-to-do, and the extent of the field which either appellant may cover is the same. But again, there is a court fee to be paid, and it is to be paid by every one who wishes to put in a memorandum of appeal. And here again the Code has relaxed the burden in the case of the pauper. Order 44 confers that concession. To avail of that concession, a pauper appellant must apply for relief against the statutory requirement of furnishing court fee upon the memorandum of appeal. He prays [or relief against the mandate of the provisions of Sections 4 and 6 of the Court Fees Act. That has nothing to do with the scope of his right of appeal. It does not determine which questions he can raise in the appeal and which he cannot. Order 44 contemplates an application for permission to file a memorandum of appeal without furnishing the requisite court fee. Sub-rule (I) of rule 1 provides that, "Any person entitled to prefer an appeal, who is unable to pay the fee required for the memorandum of appeal, may present an application accompanied by a memorandum of appeal, and may be allow ed to appeal as a pauper....." The application may be granted, but subject to certain conditions being satisfied by the judgment and decree under appeal. The appellate court must find, upon a perusal of the application and of the judg. merit and decree appealed from, that "the decree is contrary to law or to some usage having the force of law, or is otherwise erroneous or unjust." The conditions govern the order to be passed upon the application. They do not circumscribe the scope of the appeal. If the application is granted and the appellant is allowed to appeal as a pauper, the entire range open to any appellant is available to him in all its plenitude. They do not circumscribe the scope of the appeal. If the application is granted and the appellant is allowed to appeal as a pauper, the entire range open to any appellant is available to him in all its plenitude. The limitations imposed by sub-rule (2) of rule 1 relate only to the grant of relief against the requirement of finishing court fee in compliance with Sections 4 and 6 of the Court Fees Act. The scope of the appeal conferred by Section 96 is wholly independent of those limitations and is not governed by them. In my judgment, there is no substance in the submission that sub-rule (2) of rule I of Order 44 limits the scope of an appeal in the case of a pauper. The contention, upon which it is said that Article 14 is contravened, rests on a wholly insubstantial foundation and must be rejected. I confess I find it difficult to appreciate how a pauper can benefit from the contention that sub-rule (2) of rule 1 of Order 44 is ultra vires. The several provisions of rule 1 represent an organic completeness. If sub-rule (2) is ultra vires, then all of Order 41 must be effaced from the statute. It is not possible to separate sub-rule (2) from the rest. The exemption from furnishing court fee when filing the memorandum of appeal is available to a pauper provided certain conditions are satisfied. Those conditions are an integral part of the provision for exemption. It is impossible to say that the provision for exemption would have been made by the Legislature without the conditions. The two are not separable, and nothing urged before us persuades me to the conclusion that Order 44 can survive if the limitations are struck down. To say that the provision for exemption should be unrestricted by any condition indeed, that is what Shri M.P. Bajpai says is really to say that the Legislature should have provided for a complete and unqualified grant of the exemption. What is said is that the Legislature while providing for exemption from furnishing court fee has not gone far enough. It should not have, it is said, burdened the-grant of leave to appeal as a pauper by the irksome conditions of sub-rule (2) . Now that, I think, is a matter related to legislative policy. What is said is that the Legislature while providing for exemption from furnishing court fee has not gone far enough. It should not have, it is said, burdened the-grant of leave to appeal as a pauper by the irksome conditions of sub-rule (2) . Now that, I think, is a matter related to legislative policy. The generosity of the benefit extended by the Legislature is confined to limits which the Legislature considered expedient it is not for the recipient or its bounty to complain in a court of law that the Legislature has not been generous enough. There may be another forum for that, but it is not a court of law. By The Court - Our answers to both the parts of the question referred to the Full Ben are in the negative. Sub-rule (2) of 1 of Order 44 of the Code of Civil procedure is valid. Question answered.