JUDGMENT : Patra, J. - This in an appeal against an order of the Additional Sessions Judge, Cuttack acquitting the Respondent who had been convicted in the trial Court u/s 385A of the Orissa Municipal Act, 1950 and sentenced to pay a fine of Rs. 500/- and in default to undergo simple imprisonment for 5 months and also to pay daily fine of Rs. 5/- till he obtains necessary permission from the Municipality. The Cuttack Municipality launched a prosecution against the opposite party (Respondent) u/s 385A of the Orissa Municipal Act alleging this he started construction of a pucca building on holding No. 619 in Ward No. 3 and completed the construction of double storeyed building without obtaining permission from the Municipality as required u/s 264 of the Act. The Respondent pleaded not guilty and contended that he constructed the house on an old foundation which was existing there prior to his purchase and that in any case, the prosecution is barred by limitation. The trial Court over-ruled both the contentions and convicted the Respondent. On appeal, it was contended before the learned Additional Sessions Judge that the letter Ext. 3 which the Respondent submitted in reply to the notice issued to him by the Municipality u/s 271 and 273A of the Act to stop further progress of the work and to demolish the same within 7 days should have been construed to be an application for permission to construct the building and as no reply had been received either granting or fusing the permission, it should have been deemed that u/s 268 of the Act the permission had been granted. The plea of limitation which was unsuccessfully urged in the trial Court was repeated in the Court of appeal. The learned Additional Sessions. Judge rejected the first contention but accepted the plea of limitation and held that as the prosecution was not launched within 3 months of the construction, it was barred. He therefore allowed the appeal. It is against this order of acquittal that this criminal appeal hag been filed. 2. It is not disputed that the Respondent had constructed an upstairs building on holding No. 619 without containing permission therefore from the Municipality and that the construction began in February, 1963 and was completed within a few days thereafter. He therefore allowed the appeal. It is against this order of acquittal that this criminal appeal hag been filed. 2. It is not disputed that the Respondent had constructed an upstairs building on holding No. 619 without containing permission therefore from the Municipality and that the construction began in February, 1963 and was completed within a few days thereafter. Section 264 provides that if any person intends to construct or reconstruct a building he shall send to the Executive Officer an application in writing for the approval of the site, together with It site plan of the land; and an application in writing for permission to execute the work together with a ground plan, elevations and sections of the building and specification of the work. Section 266 provides that the construction or reconstruction of a building shall not be begun unless and until the Executive Officer has granted permission for the execution of the work. Section 207 enjoins that within thirty days after the receipt of any application made u/s 264 the Executive Officer shall by written order either approve the site or grant such permission or refuse such permission on one of the grounds mentioned in Section 269. Section 26 provides that if within the period prescribed by Section 267, the Executive Officer has neither given nor refused his approval, the Municipal Council shall be bound, on the written request of the Applicant, to determine by written order whether such approval or permission should be given or not. Sub-section (2) of Section 268 says that if the Council does not within one month from the receipt of such written request deliver to the Applicant an order either granting or refusing such approval or permission, it shall be deemed that the permission has been granted and thereafter the Applicant may proceed to execute the work. 3. In this case an argument was unsuccessfully advanced before the lower Courts an was repeated before me that Ext. 3 should be deemed to be an application made by the Respondent to the Municipality for grant of permission and that as no order was passed thereon it should be deemed u/s 268(2) that permission had been granted. 3. In this case an argument was unsuccessfully advanced before the lower Courts an was repeated before me that Ext. 3 should be deemed to be an application made by the Respondent to the Municipality for grant of permission and that as no order was passed thereon it should be deemed u/s 268(2) that permission had been granted. On a report submitted to the Executive Officer that the Respondent was constructing a pucca house on holding No. 619 without permission, the Executive Officer ordered that a notice should be issued to the Respondent under Sections 271 and 273-A of the Act. Ext. 2 is the notice which was served on the Respondent and which required that he should stop further construction of the building and demolish the same and if he bad any objection to carry out the direction, he should make necessary representation in that behalf. In reply thereto the Respondent submitted his application, Ext. 3 on 23.8.1963 admitting that as the old house standing on the holding had fallen down, be had constructed the new building, that he was not aware that in such circumstances any permission was necessary and concluded saying that he would be submitting an application for the purpose. On receipt of Ext. 3 which Executive Officer did not consider to be satisfactory, a final notice was issued to the party and the prosecution was launched. 4. It would thus be apparent that Ext. 3 can under no circumstances be construed as an application u/s 264 because the plan and other particulars required there under had not been submitted. Even assuming that Ext. 3 can be treated as an application u/s 264, the Respondent, when he failed to receive any reply from the Executive Officer ought to have made an application to the Municipal Council as contemplated under Sub-section (1) of Section 268 which, admittedly, he has not done. In the circumstances, therefore, his contention on this point has absolutely no force and has rightly been rejected by the learned Additional Sessions Judge. 5. In the circumstances, therefore, his contention on this point has absolutely no force and has rightly been rejected by the learned Additional Sessions Judge. 5. In order to appreciate the contention that the prosecution is barred by limitation, it is necessary to set down Section 347 which runs thus- Save as otherwise expressly provided in this Act, no person shall be tried for any offence against the provision of this Act, or of any rule, regulation or bylaws made under it unless a complaint is made by the police or the Executive Officer of a municipal council or by a person expressly authorised in this behalf by the municipal council or its Executive Officer, within three months of the commission of the offence. But nothing herein shall affect the provisions of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898 in regard to the power of certain Magistrates to take cognizance of offence upon information received or upon their own knowledge or suspicion: Provided that failure to take out a licence or obtain permission under this Act shall, for the purpose of this reflection, be deemed a continuing offence until the expiration of the period, if any, for which the licence or permission is required, and if no period is specified, complaint may be made at any time within twelve months from the commencement of the offence. It is, therefore, clear from the reaching of this section that while the first part of Section 347 which is general in nature provides that a prosecution should be launched within 3 months of the commission of the offence, the proviso applies to those cases where it would be necessary to take out a licence or to obtain permission under the Act. In those cases the offence should be deemed to be a continuing offence until the expiration of the period, if any, for which licence or permission is required. If no period is specified for which such licence is to be obtained as in the case of construction of a building, a complaint may be made at any time within twelve months from the commencement of the offence. It is not disputed in this case that the prosecution had been launched within seven or eight months of the commencement of the offence. It is not disputed in this case that the prosecution had been launched within seven or eight months of the commencement of the offence. The period limitation prescribed in the proviso to Section 347 applies to this case and it, therefore follows that the prosecution had been launched within time. 6. In the result, I would allow this appeal, set aside the order passed by the learned Additional Sessions Judge, convict the Respondent u/s 385-A of the Orissa Municipal Act and sentence him to pay a fine of Rs. 500/- and in default to undergo simple imprisonment for 5 months. He is further sentenced to pay fine of Rs. 5/- per day from the date the prosecution is launched till the Respondent either demolishes the building or obtains necessary permission from the Municipality. Final Result : Allowed