Judgment U.N.Sinha, J. 1. This is a batch of thirty-one writ applications filed under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India by the same petitioners, namely, Employers in relation to Patherdih Colliery of Messrs. Patherdih Sudamdih Colliery Private Limited. The main application is C. W. J. C. 108 of 1967 and the other applications are said to have been filed as a matter of abundant caution. This judgment and order will govern all these thirty-one cases. The petitioners prayer is that this Court should quash the order passed by the Presiding Officer, Central Government Labour Court, Dhanbad, dated the 30th January, 1967, by a writ of Certiorari. The impugned order had been passed by the Labour Court in connection with applications filed by certain persons under Sec.33C(2) of the Industrial Disputes Act 1947 (Central Act 14 of 1947), for determining some money said to have been due to the petitioners before the Labour Court. The Labour Court has allowed these applications holding that the petitioners before it were entitled to the amounts of money mentioned in a schedule attached to the order which is the subject-matter of these writ applications. 2. The relevant facts are as follows: Opposite Party Nos. 3 to 33 of C. W. J. C. 108 of 1967 had been employed by the present petitioners as miners on piece rate basis. For the sake of convenience, I will describe the petitioners, henceforth, as the employers and opposite party Nos. 3 to 33 as the employees. In 1958, the employers introduced tubs of the capacity 40 1/2 cubit feet for carrying coal cut by the miners. The employees case before the Labour Court was that they had always carried coal loading the tubs to their full capacity and they were entitled to receive Rs. 3.61 per tub, but the employers had been paying at the rate of Rs. 3.22 per tub only. Thus each of the employees claimed the difference for the years 1958 to 1965. The contention of the employers was that the employees were no longer in service from the 15th July, 1965 and as such, they were not "workmen." within the meaning of the Industrial Disputes Act and, therefore, the applications were not maintainable. 3.22 per tub only. Thus each of the employees claimed the difference for the years 1958 to 1965. The contention of the employers was that the employees were no longer in service from the 15th July, 1965 and as such, they were not "workmen." within the meaning of the Industrial Disputes Act and, therefore, the applications were not maintainable. On facts the employers case was, that, two types of tubs were in use in their mines, one having a capacity of 40 1/2 cubic feet and the other of 36 cubic feet. But, as the seam was very much inclined, the tubs used to be filled up upto a line 2 1/2 inches below the top edge of the 40 1/2 cubic feet tubs. Therefore, it was contended, that proper payments had always been made to the employees as long as they were in service. The employers also contended that there was an agreement between them and the Koila Mazdoor Sangh, the recognised union of this colliery on the 19th January, 1958, to the above effect of carrying only 38 cubic feet of coal in the 40 1/2 cubic feet tubs. 3. On these contentions raised by the parties, the Labour Court framed several points, of which the following three points (which were points Nos. 1, 2 and 6 before the Labour Court) have been re-ogitated by Sri S.K. Mazumdar appearing for the employers:- - (1). "Did the opposite party take the load from the applicants only upto a demarcating line 2 1/2 inches below the top edge of 40 1/2 C. ft. capacity tubs? If so, what is its effect? (2) "Was there any agreement on 19-1-1958 between the parties as pleaded by the opposite party? If so, what is its effect ?" (3) "What is the effect of the applicants not being in service of the opposite party from 15-7-1965?" On taking evidence and hearing the parties the Presiding Officer has come to the conclusion that the case of the employees was correct that they had always filled up the 40 1/2 cubic feet tubs to their fullest capacity. The employers contention that these tubs used to be loaded upto a line 2 1/2 inches below the top edge was not accepted. The employers contention that these tubs used to be loaded upto a line 2 1/2 inches below the top edge was not accepted. Secondly, the Presiding Officer has come to the conclusion that the alleged agreement between the parties relied upon by the employers dated the 19th January, 1958 could not be accepted as binding on the employees, because, Bihar Koila Mazdoor Sangh could not have represented these employees, as there was no evidence to the effect that during the time of the alleged agreement these employees were members of Koila Mazdoor Sangh. In substance, it has been held that there was no binding agreement between the employers and these employees which could affect the claim of the latter. It may be mentioned at this stage that the employees had made out a case that they had been paid for only 36 cubic feet of coal per tub. But this point has been decided in favour of the employers and it has been held that they had paid their employees for 38 cubic feet of coal per tub. On the question of maintainability of the applications raised by the last point quoted above, it has been held that the employers case based on the meaning of "workmen" could not be accepted and that the employees were entitled to obtain the various amounts calculated upto the 30th June, 1965. It has been held that the fact that the employees were not in service when these applications were filed did not make any difference, as they were admittedly in service during the period for which claims had been allowed. 4. Sri S.K. Mazumdar has re-agitated the question of the alleged agreement dated the 19th January, 1958 and he has referred to Exhibits A2 and O3, mentioned by the Presiding Officer in his order. 4. Sri S.K. Mazumdar has re-agitated the question of the alleged agreement dated the 19th January, 1958 and he has referred to Exhibits A2 and O3, mentioned by the Presiding Officer in his order. But, these documents are only letters and they have been considered along with the oral evidence adduced by both the parties and various other documents, and it is not possible to interfere with the finding of fact arrived at by the Labour Court, to the effect that there was no binding agreement between these employees and the employers in 1958, The second contention raised by Sri Mazumdar, as to whether the 40 1/2 cubic feet tubs used to be filled up upto their full capacity or whether only 38 cubic feet of coal used to be carried in each of these tubs, is also covered by the conclusion based on oral and documentary evidence on record, and I do not think that this matter can be re-investigated in a writ application. The question raised as to whether these employees were entitled to apply at all after they had ceased to be in service of the employers is a matter of general importance and requires consideration. The relevant provisions of the Industrial Disputes Act are Sections 33C(2) and 2(s), the latter giving a definition of the expression "workman" as it now stands. These provisions are quoted below:- - Sec.33C(2) -- "Where any workman is entitled to receive from the employer any money or any benefit which is capable of being computed in terms of money and if any question arises as to the amount of money due or as to the amount at which such benefit should be computed, then the question may, subject to any rules that may be made under this Act, be decided by such Labour Court as may be specified in this behalf by the appropriate Government." Sec.2(s). -- " Workman means any person (including an apprentice) employed in any industry to do any skilled or unskilled manual, supervisory, technical or clerical work for hire or reward, whether the terms of employment be expressed or implied, and for the purposes of any proceeding under this Act in relation to an industrial dispute, includes any such person who has been dismissed, discharged or retrenched in connection with, or as a consequence of that dispute, or whose dismissal, discharge or retrenchment has led to that dispute, but does not include any such person - (i) who is subject to the Army Act, 1950 or the Air Force Act, 1950, or the Navy (Discipline) Act, 1934, or (ii) who is employed in the police service or as an officer or other employee of a prison; or (iii) who is employed mainly in a managerial or administrative capacity; or (iv) who, being employed in a supervisory capacity, draws wages exceeding five hundred rupees per mensem or exercises, either by the nature of the duties attached to the office or by reason of the powers vested in him, functions mainly of a managerial nature". Sri Mazumdar has contended that when these employees filed their applications before the Labour Court, they were not "workmen" within the definition given in the Act and, therefore, they were not entitled to apply. According to him, "workman" means a person described under Sec.2(s), who is still in service, including, in relation to an industrial dispute, any person falling within the categories mentioned in the first part of the definition, who has been dismissed, discharged or retrenched in connection with or as a consequence of that dispute, or whose dismissal, discharge or retrenchment has led to that dispute, excluding the persons mentioned in Clauses (i), (ii), (iii) and (iv) mentioned at the end of the definition. In substance, Sri Mazumdars contention on the facts and circumstances of these particular cases is that these claims of the employees were not maintainable as they were not in actual employment of the employers at the time when they had filed their claims. According to Sri Mazumdar, these employees were ex-workmen and, therefore, their cases did not fall within the purview of Sec.33C(2) of the Industrial Disputes Act. According to Sri Mazumdar, these employees were ex-workmen and, therefore, their cases did not fall within the purview of Sec.33C(2) of the Industrial Disputes Act. In this connection, reference has been made to the form under which applications under Sec.33C(2) have to be made by virtue of Rule 62 of the Rules framed by the Central Government under the Industrial Disputes Act, and Sri Mazumdar has urged that the form also contemplates that an applicant must be a present workman and not an ex-workman. Sri S. AH Ahmad appearing for opposite party No. 1 of C. W. J. C. 108 of 1967 has argued that there is no validity in the contentions of Sri Mazumdar and all that has to be looked into is whether an applicant under Sec.33C(2) was a workman or not at the relevant time covered by the claim, and as there is no dispute that these employees were "workmen" within the definition of that expression for the period for which claims were made, the claims have been rightly accepted. I am of the opinion that it is not possible to accept the contention of Sri Mazumdar and hold that as these employees were not in actual service when they had filed their applications, they were not entitled to apply under Sec.33C(2). Sec.33C occurs in Chapter VII, which has the heading "Miscellaneous", and if Sri Mazumdars contention regarding the meaning of the word "workman" is accepted, then the same meaning must be given to this word wherever it occurs in Sec.33C and it is clear that if this meaning is given to the word "workman" in Sec.33C(1), that provision of law would be unworkable in many cases. Sec.33C(1), runs as follows;-- "Where any money is due to a workman from an employer under a settlement or an award or under the provisions of Chapter VA, the workman himself or any other person authorised by him in writing in this behalf, or, in the case of the death of the workman, his assignee or heirs may, without prejudice to any other mode of recovery, make an application to the appropriate Government for the recovery of the money due to him, and if the appropriate Government is satisfied that any money is so due, it shall issue a certificate for that amount to the Collector who shall proceed to recover the same in the same manner as an arrear of land revenue: Provided that every such application shall be made within one year from, the date on which the money became due to the workmen from the employer: Provided further that any such application may be entertained after the expiry of the said period of one year if the appropriate Government is satisfied that the applicant had sufficient cause for not making the application within the said period." Under the first paragraph of Sec.33C(1) even an assignee or heirs of a deceased workman can apply in certain matters covered by that provision of law. It is clear that the meaning of the word workman" in Sec.33C(1) cannot possibly mean a workman still in service and cannot cover an ex-workman. In my opinion, the meaning of the expression "workman" in Sec.33C(2) should be, that, before a person can make a claim under that provision of law, it is necessary that he should have been a workman within the definition clause, for the period for which he claims to be entitled to receive from the employer any money or any benefit which is capable of being computed in terms of money. The restrictive definition of the expression "workman" according to its definition, as contended for, by Sri Mazumdar, would nullify, in my opinion, the very purpose of enacting Sec.33C. Sri S. Ali Ahmad has drawn our attention to two decisions of the Madras High Court, which are, Management of the Tiruchi Srirangam Transport Co. Private Ltd. V/s. Labour Court, Madurai. AIR 1961 Mad 307 . and Manicka Mudaliar (M) V/s. Labour Court, Madras, 1961-1 Lab LJ 592 (Mad). Sri S. Ali Ahmad has drawn our attention to two decisions of the Madras High Court, which are, Management of the Tiruchi Srirangam Transport Co. Private Ltd. V/s. Labour Court, Madurai. AIR 1961 Mad 307 . and Manicka Mudaliar (M) V/s. Labour Court, Madras, 1961-1 Lab LJ 592 (Mad). A Division Bench of the Madras High Court in Manicka Mudaliars case came to the conclusion that an application under Sec.33C(2) may be made by a person who, on the date of the application, was not a "workman", but was a "workman" during the period in respect of which he was entitled to any benefit and I respectfully agree that this broad meaning should be given to the word "workman" occurring in Sec.33C of the Industrial Disputes Act. Sri S. Ali Ahmad has also referred to the case of Management of Navashakt Publishing Co. Ltd. V/s. State of Bihar, 1964 BLJR 82, which was a case of retrenchment followed by application under Sec.33C(2) of the Act According to the learned counsel, if a retrenched workman cannot be considered to be a workman for the purpose of Sec.33C (2) unless he raised an industrial dispute, referred to in the second half of the definition of a "workman" in Sec.2(s), then the decision in Navashakti Publishing Companys case was an erroneous one. There is force in the contention of the learned counsel although this particular point had not been raised in Navashakti Publishing Companys case. Be that as it may, for the reasons given earlier, I am of the opinion that the Labour Court was right in holding that these employees were "workmen" within the meaning of Sec.33C(2) of the Act, to be entitled to file their applications which were under consideration before that Court. 5. These applications must, therefore, fail and they are dismissed. An order was passed by this Court in C. W. J. C. No. 108 of 1967 on the 12th April, 1967, staying the operation of the order of the Labour Court during the pendency of the case, on an undertaking given by Sri Mazumdar, that, if the application fails, the petitioners of that case will be liable to pay interest at the rate of six per cent per annum from the date of the award, on the various amounts payable to opposite party Nos. 3 to 33 of that case. 3 to 33 of that case. In that view, it must be held that opposite party Nos. 3 to 33 of C. W. J. C. No. 108 of 1967 will now be entitled to interest at that rate on the various amounts mentioned in the schedule of the order of the Presiding Officer of the Labour Court which is under consideration, from the 30th January, 1967 upto the date of realisation. In view of this consideration, I will pass no order for costs in these cases. B.N.Jha, J. 6 I agree.