JUDGMENT Satish Chandra, J. - The Vice-Chancellor of the Allahabad University is a whole time officer of the University. He is appointed by the Chancellor. He holds office for a period of three years. Sri R. K. Nehru was the Vice-Chancellor. His term was due to expire in March, 1968. Section 11 (1) of the Allahabad University Act, 1921, required the Chancellor to appoint the Vice-Chancellor from amongst the persons whose names are submitted to him by the Committee constituted in accordance with the provisions of sub-sec. (4). Under sub-sec. (4) the Committee is to consist of three persons. The Committee is to submit to the Chancellor names of three persons suitable to hold the office of the Vice-Chancellor. In view of the impending vacancy caused by reason of the expiry of the term of the current Vice-Chancellor, a Committee consisting of Dr. Ram Dhat Misra, the Hon'ble Mr. Justice S.N. Dwivedi and Dr. Mata Prasad was constituted. It is alleged that this Committee met and submitted to the Chancellor names of four persons for the post of the Vice-Chancellor. This petition was filed at this stage to challenge the validity of the constitution of the Committee as also its recommendations. The constitution of the Committee was challenged on the following, grounds : (a) That Dr. Ram Dhar Misra was disqualified and could not be elected to the Committee. (b) That the Hon'ble Mr. Justice S.N. Dwivedi being a member of the Faculty Board of Law of the University was also disqualified. (c) That the Executive Council of the University was itself illegally constituted and was incompetent to elect a person to the Committee. The recommendations of the Committee were attacked on the ground that under the Act the Committee could submit names of only three persons. It exceeded its jurisdiction in submitting the names of four persons. The writ petition has been filed by three persons, two of whom are members of the Court of the University and one is a teacher in Political Science in the University. It is prayed that the Chancellor be directed not to consider the report of the Committee, but to reconstitute it according to law. The first point depends on an interpretation of sub-Sec. (4) of Section 11 of the Allahabad University Act, 1921. It is prayed that the Chancellor be directed not to consider the report of the Committee, but to reconstitute it according to law. The first point depends on an interpretation of sub-Sec. (4) of Section 11 of the Allahabad University Act, 1921. That provision may hence be read : " (4) (i) The Committee referred to in sub-Sec. (1) shall consist of three persons, namely - (a) One person, not being a person who is connected with the University, a College, an Associated College, a Constituent College or a Hostel, to be elected by the Executive Council; (b) another person, who is or has been a Judge of the High Court of Judicature at Allahabad to be nominated by the Chief Justice of that High Court; and (c) a third person to be appointed by the Chancellor who shall also be the Convener of the Committee; (ii) The Committee shall, as far as may be, at least thirty days before the date on which a vacancy in the office of the Vice-Chancellor is due to occur by reason of expiry of term or resignation under sub-Sec. (2) and also whenever so required by the Chancellor, submit to the Chancellor the names of three persons suitable to hold the Office of Vice-Chancellor. The Committee shall, while submitting the names, also forward to the Chancellor a concise statement showing the academic qualifications and other distinctions of each of the said three persons, but shall not indicate any order of preference." The Uttar Pradesh Universities (Appointment of Vice-Chancellors) (Amendment and Validations) Act, 1966 (which came into force on 2nd March, 1966) amended this provision. Sub-clause (b) mentioned above was repealed and substituted by the following clause : " (b) any person who is or has been a Judge of the High Court of Judicature at Allahabad including the Chief Justice thereof, nominated by the said Chief Justice; and". Sub-clause (b) mentioned above was repealed and substituted by the following clause : " (b) any person who is or has been a Judge of the High Court of Judicature at Allahabad including the Chief Justice thereof, nominated by the said Chief Justice; and". After clause (ii) mentioned above the following clause (iii) was added : "(iii) No act or proceedings of the Committee shall be invalidated merely by reason of the existence of a vacancy or vacancies among its members or by reason of some person having taken part in the proceedings who is subsequently found not to have been entitled to do so." For the petitioners it was urged that under sub-clause (a) the Executive Council could elect a person who was not connected with the University etc. Dr. Misra was connected with the University because he was a member of the Selection Committee constituted under Section 14 of the Allahabad University Act, 1921, for recommending a person for being appointed as the Registrar. In the next place, Dr. Misra was a member of the Committee appointed by the Executive Council of the University for considering the University's Statutes relating to seniority of teachers. Dr. Misra, was a member of these Committees when he was elected by the Executive Council on 26th November, 1967. Under Section 14 of the Act the Registrar is to be appointed by the Executive Council on the recommendation of a Selection Committee consisting of the Vice-Chancellor, an educationist nominated by the Chancellor, and, the Chairman of the Public Service Commission, Uttar Pradesh, or a member thereof nominated in this behalf by the Chairman. Dr. Misra was the Chairman of the Public Service Commission. It has been alleged that as such he became a member of the Selection Committee under Section 14. In the counter affidavit filed by the Registrar of the University it has been stated that the first appointment of the Registrar under Section 14 as it now stands, took place on 12th October, 1958. At that time Dr. Misra was not a member of the Selection Committee. A vacancy arose in the office of the Registrar in 1963. The present Registrar was appointed on 24th April, 1963, and he shall hold office till 15th July, 1969. In 1963 Dr. Radha Krishna Agrawal, who was the Chairman of the Public Service Commission, acted as a member of the Selection Committee. A vacancy arose in the office of the Registrar in 1963. The present Registrar was appointed on 24th April, 1963, and he shall hold office till 15th July, 1969. In 1963 Dr. Radha Krishna Agrawal, who was the Chairman of the Public Service Commission, acted as a member of the Selection Committee. On this basis it was denied that Dr. Misra was a member of the Selection Committee under Section 14. Under clause (iii) of Section 14 (1) the Chairman of the Public Service Commis. sion or a member thereof nominated in this behalf by the Chairman is entitled to be a member of the Selection Committee. The petitioners do not indicate the date when Dr. Misra became a member of the Selection Committee. Eversince Dr. Misra became the Chairman of the Public Service Commission the Selection Committee has had no occasion to meet or function. The Selection Committee has only one function to perform: to make recommendation for the appointment of a Registrar. The occasion for the exercise of such a function would arise when a vacancy is likely to occur in that office. That is not a periodical event. The term of the Registrar is not limited to a number of years. A vacancy would normally arise when he retires on attaining the age of superannuation. The Selection Committee under Section 14 has no other powers or duties or functions to perform. It is apparent that this Committee is to be constituted whenever an occasion arises for making recommendation for appointment to the post of the Registrar. After it has made its recommendation and the appointment has been made the Committee would become functus officio and defunct. We are unable to accede to the submission made for the petitioners that the Selection Committee is a continuing or a permanent Committee. It exists for a specific purpose temporarily. It will have to be constituted each time an occasion for making the appointment of the Registrar arises. The last such occasion was in 1963. After the appointment of the present Registrar in 1963 the ' Committee, then constituted, became defunct. It cannot be said that Committee continues in existence. Consequently, Dr. Misra never became a member of the Selection Committee under Section 14. The last such occasion was in 1963. After the appointment of the present Registrar in 1963 the ' Committee, then constituted, became defunct. It cannot be said that Committee continues in existence. Consequently, Dr. Misra never became a member of the Selection Committee under Section 14. In respect of the other ground, the facts are that on 20th March, 1965, the Executive Council appointed a Committee of five persons to examine the provision in Ordinance 3 of the Chapter XIV relating to seniority. Dr. Misra who was then a member of the Executive Council, was one of the member of this Committee. Dr. Misra resigned from the membership of the Executive Council, according to the learned counsel for the respondents, on 22nd December, 1965. On 21st April, 1966, the Executive Council resolved (resolution no. 158) to reconstitute and enlarge the Committee so as to consist of nine persons. Dr. Misra was retained on the reconstituted Committee. This Committee submitted a report which was considered by the Executive Council on 7th May, 1966. It appears that some parts of the report were accepted with some modifications. It was also resolved by eight votes against seven, that the Committee be granted some more time. In the counter affidavit it has been stated that subsequently the matters relating to the interpretation of Statutes on the question of seniority of teachers was determined by this Court in Writ Petition No. 1657 of 1966, decided on 12th July, 1966, and Special Appeal No. 393 of 1966, decided on 1st September, 1966. The decision of this Court was that the matter of seniority was governed by clause 205 of the Statutes. In view of these developments the committee appointed by the Executive Council never met after 7th May, 1966, and, therefore, it became defunct. The decision of this Court was that the matter of seniority was governed by clause 205 of the Statutes. In view of these developments the committee appointed by the Executive Council never met after 7th May, 1966, and, therefore, it became defunct. For the petitioners it was urged that the Committee had been appointed initially to examine the two kinds of seniority that were prevailing in the University; (1) under Section 30 (b) of the Act, that is in respect of the election, appointment and continuance in office of the members of the said Authority and Boards of the University; and (2) for purposes of matter governing the conditions of service as given in Section 32 (f) of the Act which are governed by Ordinance 3 of Chapter XIV of the University Calendar; and so since only one such matter, i.e. relating to the conditions of service was decided by this Court and the other remained still undetermined, the Committee could not be said to have become defunct. The basic premise of this submission appears to be misconceived. The Executive Council's resolution no. 124 dated 20th March, 1965, shows that on 14th November, 1964, the Executive Council had appointed a Committee to examine the two kinds of the above-mentioned seniority. That Committee had given a report. The same was considered by the Council and it was resolved that the report be recorded. Then the Executive Council further resolved to appoint a Committee of five members to examine the provision in Ordinance 3 of Chapter XIV relating to seniority. Dr. Misra was a member of this Committee. So the Committee appointed on 20th March 1965, was a fresh one. It was charged with the question of examining the provisions in Ordinance 3 which governed the conditions of service of teachers. This was only one of the two kinds of seniority that were prevailing in the University. The other kind of seniority was not referred to this Committee. It is, therefore, incorrect that the Committee appointed on 20th March, 1965, had to examine the provisions relating to both the kinds of seniority. In the writ petition and the special appeal, referred to in the counter affidavit, the question of seniority in respect of election, appointment etc. was gone into. It was held that clause 205 of the statutes would govern the matter. In the writ petition and the special appeal, referred to in the counter affidavit, the question of seniority in respect of election, appointment etc. was gone into. It was held that clause 205 of the statutes would govern the matter. Clause 205 of of the statutes deals with the seniority of teachers for the purpose of holding an office or for membership of the Authorities and Bodies of the University. It lays down principles for determining seniority for those purposes. Ordinance 3 of Chapter XIV on the other hand related to the determination of seniority as a condition of service. This matter was not decided by this Court. It cannot, therefore, be said that this Court while deciding the writ petition and the special appeals adjudicated or decided the question of seniority which was referred to the Committee. The question remained open and would be deemed to be still pending with the Committee by virtue of the resolution of the Executive Council dated 7th May, 1966, granting further time to the Committee to give its report. We are unable to agree with the respondents that the Committee became defunct. The question then arises whether Dr. Misra could be said to be a person not being connected with the University within meaning of clause (i) (a) of sub-Sec. (4) of Section 11. For the petitioners it was submitted that the legislative history of this provision shows that the intention was to disqualify all such persons who had any dealings with the University in any capacity, shape or form. A person who was functioning on a Committee appointed by the Executive Council to consider an affair of the University would be connected with the University. It has been asserted that previously the Vice-Chancellor was elected by the Executive Council. The Executive Council was ridden with politics. The election of the Vice-Chancellor was manipulated. The Vice-Chancellor remained largely abdicating his functions and being content with carrying out the behests of the Executive Council members. On 17th December, 1951, the Government of Uttar Pradesh appointed a Committee which gave its report in 1953, popularly known as the 'Mootham Committee Report'. In that report it was stressed that the appointment of the Vice-Chancellor should be removed from the span of political manipulations inside the University. On 17th December, 1951, the Government of Uttar Pradesh appointed a Committee which gave its report in 1953, popularly known as the 'Mootham Committee Report'. In that report it was stressed that the appointment of the Vice-Chancellor should be removed from the span of political manipulations inside the University. It has been stated that in deference to the recommendations of the Mootham Committee report the Allahabad University Act was amended by U.P. Act No. XII of 1961 and the present provision incorporated. That shows that the intention was to have a Selection Committee consisting of persons who are totally disassociated with the affairs of the University. In the counter affidavit it has been stated that the Mootham Committee report after examining the provision for appointment of the Vice-Chancellor as prevailing in the Delhi and Rajputana Universities, observed that the provision in the Acts relating to those Universities about excluding persons connected with the University or any College was unduly restrictive. They proposed that a person should not be excluded from membership of the ad hoc Committee solely on the ground that he is a member of the court. It cannot, therefore, be said that the Mootham Committee report visualised a Selection Committee consisting of persons who were complete strangers to the University. Learned counsel for the petitioners a drew support for this submission from sub-clause (b) of clause (i) of Section 11 (4) where under a person who is or has been a Judge of the High Court of Judicature at Allahabad is to be nominated by the Chief Justice. It was urged that under it, the Chief Justice could not nominate himself. Reliance was, for this proposition, placed upon the decision of a Division Bench of this Court in Kashi Nath Misra v. University of Allahabad, A.I.R. 1967 Alld. 101. In that case, the Division Bench proceeded (in paragraph 15) on interpretation of sub-clauses (b) and (c) , and the difference in the nature of the office of the Chief Justice and a Judge of the High Court. In paragraph 20, the Bench dealt with the argument raised by the counsel, appearing for the Chief Justice, that if the Legislature trusted the Chief Justice to nominate of Judge of the High Court to the Selection Committee, it was difficult to see why the Legislature preclude him from nominating himself. In paragraph 20, the Bench dealt with the argument raised by the counsel, appearing for the Chief Justice, that if the Legislature trusted the Chief Justice to nominate of Judge of the High Court to the Selection Committee, it was difficult to see why the Legislature preclude him from nominating himself. This submission was answered by saying that the Chief Justice was an ex-officio member of the University Court and also a member of the Executive Council and since the policy behind Section 11 of the Act was to have persons on the Selection Committee who were not in any manner connected with the University, or an associate College, or a constituent College, or a Hostel, the Chief Justice was precluded from nominating himself. In paragraph 13, the Bench had considered the significance of the word 'connected' occurring in sub-clause (a) , and had held that the word 'connected' meant intimately connected or connected in a manner so as to take pressure or to be unable to act independently; and that the scheme of Section 11 was that in the selection of the Vice-Chancellor, independent persons should have a hand. So, the passing observation that the policy behind Section 11 was to have persons on the Selection Committee who were not 'in any manner' connected with the University was not in derogation of their considered opinion as to the significance of the word 'connected' occurring in sub-clause (a) . The words 'in any manner' appears to have crept in paragraph 20 either inadvertently or they have been used merely to reject the submission of the counsel as to the improbability of the Legislature excluding the Chief Justice from nominating himself. Paragraph 20, therefore, cannot be taken to have expressed the considered opinion of the Bench on the significance of the word 'connected' occurring in sub-clause (a) in derogation of their finding in paragraph 13. Further, sub-clause (a) was repealed and re-enacted by the amending Act of 1966. Under the sub-clause, as it now stands, the Chief Justice could nominate himself also. Thus, it cannot be said that the intention of the Legislature was that the members of the Selection Committee were to be wholly unconnected with the University. The Chief Justice is a member of the Court. He himself could be a member of the Selection Committee. Under the sub-clause, as it now stands, the Chief Justice could nominate himself also. Thus, it cannot be said that the intention of the Legislature was that the members of the Selection Committee were to be wholly unconnected with the University. The Chief Justice is a member of the Court. He himself could be a member of the Selection Committee. As a member of the Court, the Chief Justice is connected with the affairs of the University because the Court is the supreme governing body of the University. Further, if the Legislature wished that all the three per. sons should be unconnected with the University, it would not have provided for that restriction only in sub-clause (a) . It would have made a similar provision in sub-clauses (b) and (c) also. It cannot, therefore, be said that the act of the Chief Justice in nominating the Hon'ble Mr. Justice S.N. Dwivedi as a member of the Committee was invalid merely because the latter was a member of the Faculty Board of law of the University. The significance of the phrase 'not connected with the University' came up for decision in Dr. Shabbir Fatima v. Allahabad University, A.I.R. 1966 Alld. 45. The election of Mr. Sri Prakash on the Selection Committee was challenged on the ground that he was a registered graduate of the University and as such was connected with the University. A single Judge of this Court repelled the submission that in order to qualify for election under sub-clause (a) a person must have no nexus whatever with the University and that the widest meaning must be attached to the words "connected with" used in sub-clause (a) . It was held that this expression must take its colour from the context and the object of the provision. The object was to ensure that the names recommended to the Chancellor would be suggested by an impartial and independent Committee so constituted as to preclude the possibility of the recommendations being influenced by the hope of favour or the fear of prejudice from the person who may be appointed as the Vice-Chancellor. He held that only such person can be said to be connected with the University who holds an office therein or enjoys a pecuniary or sonic other benefit from it. Dr. He held that only such person can be said to be connected with the University who holds an office therein or enjoys a pecuniary or sonic other benefit from it. Dr. Misra did not hold any office after he resigned from the membership of the Executive Council on 22nd December, 1965. He did not gain any pecuniary or any other benefit from the University merely because he functioned on a Committee constituted to examine the problem of seniority in general and without reference to any individual dispute or case. The same question came up before a Division Bench of this Court in Kashi Math's' case. In that case also it was alleged that Mr. Sri Prakash was disqualified from being elected as a member to the Executive Council because he being a registered graduate was a person connected with the University. The Bench held (paragraph 13) that a registered graduate does not hold a post of profit in the University. He is not an officer of the University or a Constituent College or an Associate College or Hostel. He has no concern with the administration of the University and has no dealing with it. There are no favours that the Vice-Chancellor can bestow on him. It then held that the word "connected" means "intimately connected or connected in a manner so as to take pressure or be unable to act independently. The scheme of Section 11 of the Act is that in the selection of the Vice-Chancellor independent persons should have a hand". This view seems to be in line with the view expressed by the learned single Judge in Dr. Shabbir Fatima's2 case. Learned counsel for the petitioners was unable to satisfy us that the view expressed in these previous cases of this Court was not satisfactory. In our view sub-clause (a) contemplates a connection which is real and substantial and not far fetched or incidental. Dr. Misra was the Chairman of the Public Service Commission. His independence was not doubted. Merely being a member of the Committee appointed to examine a difficult general problem would not make him intimately or substantially connected in a manner so as to take pressure or be unable to act independently. We are, therefore, satisfied that Dr. Dr. Misra was the Chairman of the Public Service Commission. His independence was not doubted. Merely being a member of the Committee appointed to examine a difficult general problem would not make him intimately or substantially connected in a manner so as to take pressure or be unable to act independently. We are, therefore, satisfied that Dr. Misra was not a person connected with the University within meaning of sub-clause (a) , and, was consequently not disqualified from being elected by the Executive Council. The other ground of attack relates to the constitution of the Executive Council itself. It was urged that Mr. P.K. Kaul and Mr. N.P. Shukla were not lawful members of the Executive Council, but they participated in the voting for the election to the Selection Committee. The election of Dr. Misra was consequently void. In relation to Mr. Kaul it was urged that Mr. Kaul was Warden of Ishwar Saran Hostel of the University. He was the senior-most Warden at the time. Under Section 20 (1) (vi) of the Act read with clause 65 of the Statute he was entitled to be a member of the Executive Council ex officio, that is to say as the senior-most Warden. Consequently it was argued, that he could not become a member of the Executive Council under any of the other clauses, especially clause (ix) under which the Chancellor could nominate persons to the Executive Council. Clause (ix) of sub-sec. (1) of Section 20 authorises the Chancellor to nominate persons less in number by one than the Deans of Faculties. There is no provision debarring the Chancellor from nominating persons who may be entitled to become members of the Executive Council under the other clauses. Under clause (viii) the Court elects five persons to the Executive Council from amongst its members. But there is no indication that a member of the Court could not be nominated by the Chancellor. This interpretation of Section 20 is strengthened by the provisions of Section 17 of the Act which provide for the membership of the court of the University. It has to be read with clause 49 of the Statute. But there is no indication that a member of the Court could not be nominated by the Chancellor. This interpretation of Section 20 is strengthened by the provisions of Section 17 of the Act which provide for the membership of the court of the University. It has to be read with clause 49 of the Statute. Under clause 49 of the Statute persons who are in the service of the University, a College, an Associated College or a Hostel are not eligible for nomination by the Chancellor under clause (xx) of Section 17 (I) of the Act nor are they eligible to be member of the Court except in their ex officio capacity under clauses (xiii) to (xviii) of Section 17 (1) . There is thus a specific prohibition that such persons are not eligible for nomination by the Chancellor. If a similar prohibition was intended for the membership of the Executive Council a similar provision was expected. The absence of such a provision would indicate that there was no desire to restrict in that respect the freedom of the Chancellor in making nominations to the Executive Council. It was urged by Mr. Ansari that the members of the Executive Council are ex officio members of the Court under clause (vii) of Section 17 (1) . In view of clause 49 of the statute a person in the service of a Hostel was not eligible to be nominated to the Court. This prohibition would stand circumvented if it is held that he could be nominated to the Executive Council; because then he would automatically become a member of the Court through the agency of nomination. This submission does not arise the case of Mr. Kaul because he was, on the submissions advanced on behalf of the petitioners, entitled to be a member of the Executive Council ex officio. In his case no provision of Section 17 was contravened or circumvented. The power of nomination is separately provided for the two bodies, with different limitations. Further, such a lacuna should not, in our opinion, be used to impose a restriction on the power of nomination conferred by clause (ix) of Section 20 on the Chancellor Mr. Kaul could validly be nominated by the Chancellor on the Executive Council and he was a lawful member thereof. In respect of Mr. Further, such a lacuna should not, in our opinion, be used to impose a restriction on the power of nomination conferred by clause (ix) of Section 20 on the Chancellor Mr. Kaul could validly be nominated by the Chancellor on the Executive Council and he was a lawful member thereof. In respect of Mr. Shukla it has been stated that he was not the senior-most Warden and, therefore, was not entitled to became a member of the Executive Council under clause (vi) of Section 20 (1) of the Act read with clause 65 of the Statute. Under these provisions only the senior-most Warden could become a member of the Executive Council. The senior-most Warden at that time was Mr. Kaul and not Mr. Shukla. Under clause (vi) of Section 20 (1) of the Act one representative of the Wardens and the Delegacy is to be a member of the Executive Council. Under clause 65 of the Status the representatives of the Wardens and of the Delegacy shall be members of the Executive Council in alternate terms. The representation of the Wardens shall be by rotation in order of seniority as Wardens, provided that a Warden, who has been a member of the Executive Council as a representative of the Wardens for three years or more, shall not be eligible till all the other Wardens have had their turn. Thus, under clause 65 of the Statute the Senior-most Warden can become a member of the Executive Council only in succession to the representative of the Delegacy. Further, the senior-most Warden can remain a member for three years. Thereafter he becomes dis-qualified till all the other Wardens have had their turn. So, when Mr. Shukla was engrafted as a member of the Executive Council on 18th August, 1967, on the footing that he was next to the senior-most Warden, it will have to be established that Mr. Kaul was entitled to become a member of the Executive Council and had not become disqualified by reason of having been a member of the Council as a representative of the Wardens for three years or more. The petitioners have not stated the relevant facts on these various aspects. Further, the representative of the Wardens and the Delegacy contemplated by clause (vi) is one who is available for membership of the Executive Council. The petitioners have not stated the relevant facts on these various aspects. Further, the representative of the Wardens and the Delegacy contemplated by clause (vi) is one who is available for membership of the Executive Council. This clause does not contemplate that person who is already a member of the Executive Committee should alone be eligible. If that interpretation was accepted, it may result in the continuance of a vacancy on the Executive Council, a rather undesirable consequence. So, when the senior-most Warden was not available, the next senior Warden would be eligible. Mr. Shukla, was, therefore, validly treated as a member of the Executive Council as a representative of the Wardens. There was thus no invalidity in the constitution of the Executive Council when it met to elect a person to the Selection Committee under Section 11 (4) of the Act, on 26th November, 1967. The last point taken for the petitioner was that the Selection Committee was under Section 11 (4) (ii) of the Act entitled to submit to the Chancellor the names of only three persons. The Committee actually recommended names of four persons. The four names sent were mentioned to be (i) Dr. Gopala Tripathi, (2) Dr. Pritam Das, (3) Prof. A.B. Lal, and (4) Dr. P.L. Srivastava. This allegation was made in paragraph 25. Paragraph 25 has been sworn on legal advice which the deponent verily believed to be true. The question whether the Committee recommended three names or four is one of fact. It is not dependent on legal advice. Paragraph 25, therefore, does not validly constitute a part of the petition and could not be relied upon as a foundation facts for this submission. The assertion, that four names were recommended, has been denied in the counter affidavit filed by the Registrar. This averment has been made on the basis of a copy of the recommendation received by the Registrar from the Secretary to the Chancellor for the purposes of the writ petition. The averment has been sworn on personal knowledge. The Senior Standing Counsel, appearing for the Chancellor, made a statement that he has been instructed to state that the Selection Committee had recommended the names of three persons only. Mr. The averment has been sworn on personal knowledge. The Senior Standing Counsel, appearing for the Chancellor, made a statement that he has been instructed to state that the Selection Committee had recommended the names of three persons only. Mr. Ansari urged that since the counsel for the respondents have in their possession the original recommendation, the Court may itself peruse the same without showing it to the learned counsel for the petitioners and without directing that the document be placed on the record. We are not inclined to adopt this unfamiliar course. In this connection it was also urged at the hearing that the Selection Committee indicated a preference for the various candidates in its recommendation. No such assertion was made in the petition. No ground was taken on this point. We are not inclined to entertain on the basis of the averments made for the first time in the rejoinder affidavit. Learned counsel appearing for the University urged that in view of clause (iii) added to Section 11 (4) by the Amending Act of 1966 the acts or proceedings of the Selection Committee could not be invalidated merely by reason of the existence of a vacancy or vacancies among its members or by reason of some person having taken part in the proceedings who is subsequently found not to have been entitled to do so. It was urged that even if the petitioner's submission were accepted the result would be that Dr. Misra and the Hon'ble Mr. Justice Dwivedi were not validly elected. There were vacancies in the Committee and that they were persons not entitled to take part in the proceedings of the Committee. On such grounds the recommendation of the Selection Committee could not be declared invalid. The petitioner's counsel responded by submitting that an objection to the election of Dr. Misra was taken at the meeting of the Executive Council before he was elected, but the objection was over-ruled by the Vice-Chancellor. The objection was raised on the very grounds which are now raised to attack his eligibility. An objection in the form of a representation was also made to the Chancellor before the Selection Committee made its recommendation. It could not, there. fore, be said that Dr. Misra or the Hon'ble Mr. Justice Dwivedi were persons who were "subsequently found" not to be entitled to take part in the proceedings of the Committee. An objection in the form of a representation was also made to the Chancellor before the Selection Committee made its recommendation. It could not, there. fore, be said that Dr. Misra or the Hon'ble Mr. Justice Dwivedi were persons who were "subsequently found" not to be entitled to take part in the proceedings of the Committee. It was urged that clause (iii) would not be attracted to the present case. In view of our findings, that the Executive Council was validity constituted and that the Hon'ble Mr. Justice Dwivedi and Dr. Misra were lawful members of the selection Committee we deem it unnecessary to deal with the correct connotation of the phrase " subsequently found not to have been entitled to do so" in clause (iii). In the result, the petition fails and is accordingly dismissed with costs. Petition dismissed