ORDER M.H. Beg, J. - The petitioner is a limited company manufacturing sugar by using vacuum pan process. It employs two categories of workmen, one permanent and the other seasonal. An industrial dispute arose about the amount of privilege and casual leave to be granted to some workmen of both these categories, who are all clerks in the instant case, employed by the petitioning company. Altogether fifty-nine workmen were involved in the two cases in which References Nos. 69 and 70 of 1962, to the Industrial Tribunal, Allahabad, under the U.P. Industrial Disputes Act, were made by the U.P. Government. The same question having arisen in both the cases the common question referred, decided by one award, was framed as follows: "Should the employers be required to allow 80 days' privilege and 10 days' casual leave in a year to their workmen named in the Annexure? If so, with effect from what date and with what other details? The four workmen named in the annexure to Reference No. 69 of 1962 were all alleged to be permanent clerks, Fifty out of the fifty-five workmen named in the annexure to Reference No. 70 of 1962 were said to be seasonal and five were alleged to be permanent clerks. 2. The Tribunal pointed out that the case of the Labour Unions was that fifty-seven workmen from the clerical staff of the petitioning company had been getting 30 days' privilege and ten days' casual leave in a year, whereas the 59 clerks concerned in two cases were only granted leave on the following scales:- I. Permanent clerks - Privilege leave 1 day fro every 20 days' sick leave 10 days in a calendar year, casual 6 days in a calendar year. II. Seasonal clerks - Privilege leave 1 day for 20 days/ work, sick leave day in a month and casual leave day in a month. The workmen's case was that this amounted to unjustifiable discrimination in favour of the class of fifty-seven workmen belonging to the same category who had been given thirty days' privilege leave and ten days' casual leave in a year as against the fifty-nine clerks named in the two cases who were given less leave on a lower scale. 3. The workmen's case was that this amounted to unjustifiable discrimination in favour of the class of fifty-seven workmen belonging to the same category who had been given thirty days' privilege leave and ten days' casual leave in a year as against the fifty-nine clerks named in the two cases who were given less leave on a lower scale. 3. With regard to permanent clerks the case of the petitioning company before the Tribunal the Factories Act of 1948, which came into force on 1.4.1949, were given the more liberal scale of leave by it because Section 78 of the Factories Act entitled them to the benefit of pre-existing agreements or contracts of service under which the Company used to allow the more liberal scale. The Company's case was that other permanent workmen, not so favoured, were entitled only to the benefits of Section 79 of the Factories Act as provided by Standing Orders No. 5436 (ST) XXXVI-A-208 (ST)58 dated 3-10-1958. These Standing Orders were said to be the result of a tripartite agreement arrived at between the representatives of workmen and the employers of sugar factories and the Government. 4. As regards seasonal workmen, the petitioning company, in paragraph 2 of the written statement, stated that they were entitled only to the benefits of leave contained in the Standing Orders mentioned above. In Paragraphs 8 of its written statement attached as Annexure B to the rejoinder affidavit), the petitioning company stated that "the quantum of leave for seasonal employees who work for about six months in a year is altogether different from that of regular employees, and, as such, the union's claim for these 51 employees on equal level is altogether baseless and is a clear departure from the policy laid down in the Government order. 5. The Industrial Tribunal, after examining the cases of permanent workmen, found that the petitioning company had been giving the more liberal scale of leave to some permanent workmen employed even after 1.4.1949 who were not entitled to the benefit of Section 78 of the Factories Act. It was therefore, rightly held that the petitioning company was not justified in discriminating between permanent workmen of the same category. It was therefore, rightly held that the petitioning company was not justified in discriminating between permanent workmen of the same category. It had already been decided, in a previous Reference, Adjudication Case No. 28 of 1961, by the same Industrial Tribunal, presided over by Shri J.N. Ugra, that 17 workmen of the petitioning company were entitled to leave at the rate of 30 days' privilege and ten days' casual leave on the ground that no distinction could be made between clerks belonging to the same category. It had been found in the earlier case that the distinction attempted to be drawn by the petitioning company, that those clerks who had been employed after 1.4.1949 and were given the more liberal scale belonged to a different category called "supervisory staff", was specious and untenable. Accepting the basis of the challenged by the petitioning company, as correct, and also applying the principle laid down by the Supreme Court in Diwan Badri Dass v. Industrial Tribunal, Punjab, A.I.R. 1963 SC 630. the Tribunal held that the petitioning company could not justifiably discriminate between the permanent clerks belonging to the same category. In the case of Diwan Dass, A.I.R. 1963 SC 636 (supra) followed by the Industrial Tribunal, it had been held by the Supreme Court that no distinction could be made between employees belonging to the same category, with regard to leave facilities, simply on the basis of the date on which they were employed. I do not think that any error can be found in the view taken by the Tribunal, much less an error apparent on the face of the record, so far as the basis of decision relating to permanent workmen is concerned. 6. The Tribunal, however, also held, without assigning any further reason: "the seasonal clerks should get privilege and casual leave in proportion to the period of their work on the basis of thirty days' privilege and en days' casual leave in a year." This part of the decision of the Industrial Tribunal has been strongly assailed as a mere ipse dixit unsupported by any reason. It was also contended that, even though the Industrial Tribunal may depart from Standing Orders for exceptional reasons, where it is necessary to do so in the interests of industrial peace and harmony or of social justice, yet, it can only do so after applying its mind to what is involved in such a departure from the agreed and standard scale. It was pointed out that the Supreme Court had held in Alembic Chemical Works Co. Ltd. v. Workmen, A.I.R. 1961 SC 647 at p. 651."There is no doubt that when industrial adjudication seeks to do social justice, it cannot ignore the needs of national economy; and so in considering matters of leave, either in the form of privilege leave or sick leave, the Tribunals should not ignore the consideration that unduly generous or liberal leave provision, would affect production and obviously production of essential commodities is in the interest of not only the employers and the employees but also of the general community...." 7. In the before me, I find no attempt whatsoever made by the Tribunal to correlate the decision given by the Industrial Tribunal, so far as seasonal workmen are concerned, with any requirement of social justice. It did not even mention social justice or any circumstance or factor involved in giving a decision based on social justice. It appears that the learned Presiding Officer, Shri H.A. Siddiqui, only held an opinion that it was fair that the same scale or rate of privilege and casual leave should be adopted in the case of seasonal workmen as is allowed in the case of permanent workmen. The principle of equality implies treating those in the same category alike,. But, treating those in different categories alike may result in inequality. The mere fact that the company gave some permanent workmen a more liberal scale of leave so that it was obliged to treat all permanent workmen of the same class alike, did not necessarily imply that it was bound, similarly, to give a corresponding liberal scale to seasonal workmen. The Tribunal overlooked that seasonal workmen work only during the crushing season and even that season is often not of normal duration. It recent times, the durations of crushing seasons have been shortened by a number of abnormal factors beyond the control of the sugar manufacturers. The Tribunal overlooked that seasonal workmen work only during the crushing season and even that season is often not of normal duration. It recent times, the durations of crushing seasons have been shortened by a number of abnormal factors beyond the control of the sugar manufacturers. The special position of seasonal workmen an the different conditions of their employment as compared with permanent workmen were not referred to or examined at the by the Industrial Tribunal. Nor do I find any reference to the needs of industry or conditions which may make it consonant with social justice that this departure from the standardised scale, provided by the Standing Orders should be sanctioned in the case of seasonal employees working as clerks. Although the Industrial Tribunal has the power to depart from the provisions of Standing Orders in this respect, it should only do so when there are strong and compelling reasons which should at least be stated. In the case of the permanent employees a reason, which was good enough was stated by the Industrial Tribunal. The reasons behind the decision have to be those of the Industrial Tribunal. This Court will not substitute its own reasons or decisions on such matters. Buts, where no reasons have been given and no attempt is made to correlate the decision to or to base it on relevant considerations, the adjudication must be held to suffer from an error apparent on the face of the record. 8. It may also be mentioned that the cases of seasonal workmen were not the subject-matter of the previous adjudication and that the principle stated by the Supreme Court in the case of Rai Bahadur Diwan Badri Dass (supra) is not applicable to their case because there was no discrimination of the kind by petitioning company between its workmen belonging to the seasonal category. In so far as the award purports to apply the same grounds of decision to the case of seasonal workmen as were applicable to the case of permanent workmen, the award suffers from an error apparent on the fact of the record. 9. A grievance has been made of the fact that the Tribunal did not frame proper issues that it has not been determined satisfactorily what workmen are permanent and what workmen are not permanent. This question arises only in the case of those treated as permanent workmen. 9. A grievance has been made of the fact that the Tribunal did not frame proper issues that it has not been determined satisfactorily what workmen are permanent and what workmen are not permanent. This question arises only in the case of those treated as permanent workmen. The Tribunal pointed out that Shri Suraj Narain Misra had been working continuously since November 17, 1958, although he was original employed as a seasonal clerk in 1947. Therefore, he was treated as a permanent workman without giving a specific finding that he was a permanent workman. It was urged on behalf of the opposite parties that he could not, on the finding that he was working continuously since 17.11.1958, be a seasonal workman. It would however, have been better if the Tribunal had definitely held how he was a permanent workman. In the case of Shri Kapil Deo Sahai, it was observed by the Tribunal that he had been 1951, but the further finding to show that he had been continuously working since then is not there so as to indicate the particular category to which he belonged even by a process of inference. It would, therefore, be helpful if he Tribunal were to frame an issue on the question and then arrives at its conclusions, after permitting parties to lead evidence, about disputed cases of workmen who are alleged to be permanent by one side and seasonal by the other side. 10. It was urged, on behalf of the Opposite Parties, that the petitioning company did not take up the case before the Tribunal that relevant considerations should be taken into account in determining the scale or rate of leave to be granted to seasonal workmen. I find, as already pointed out, that the petitioning company did take up the case before the Tribunal that the correct basis for seasonal workmen was found in the Standing Orders. The petitioning company had stated, in its written statement, that there was a marked distinction between the permanent and seasonal workmen with regard to quantum of leave given. A look at the Standing Orders and the terms and conditions of leave of seasonal workmen incorporated therein was enough to show the differences pleaded. The petitioning company had stated, in its written statement, that there was a marked distinction between the permanent and seasonal workmen with regard to quantum of leave given. A look at the Standing Orders and the terms and conditions of leave of seasonal workmen incorporated therein was enough to show the differences pleaded. It was, therefore, the Tribunal's duty to examine these differences and to determine whether, in spite of these differences, a departure should be made from the standardised and agreed scale, embodied in the Standing Orders, even in the case of the seasonal workmen. It had given its verdict on the question raised without supporting its bare conclusion, quoted above, by anything which could pass for reasoning or indicate an application of mind to relevant considerations. A party to an adjudication is not required to set out, in its pleadings all the reasons or arguments which support its case. I, therefore, overrule this technical objection advanced by Opposite Parties to support the decision of the Tribunal with regard to seasonal workmen. 11. The result of the foregoing discussion is that the award of the Industrial Tribunal, Allahabad, dated 28.3.1963, in References Nos. 69 and 70 of 1962 and its notification dated 20.4.1963 numbered 2382 (ST)/XXXVI-A26 (ST)-62 under Section 6 (3) of the U.P. Industrial Disputes act, 1947, must be and are hereby quashed. The parts which are legal cannot be separated from the illegal so long as the number of permanent workmen involved is not determined satisfactorily. The Tribunal is directed to give its decisions afresh according to law. I make no order as to costs.