Judgment M.P.Verma, J. 1. The four petitioners along with one Ambika Singh were tried for offences under Sections 147, 448, 380 and 342, Indian Penal Code. The learned Munsif Magistrate, Begusarai, convicted them under Section 147, 448 and 342, Indian Penal Code, and sentenced each of them to undergo rigorous imprisonment for four months under each section, "ordering further that these sentences will run concurrently. Against this order of convictions and sentences, there was an appeal which was heard and decided by the 4th Additional Sessions Judge of Monghyr. He did not find the petitioners guilty under Section 448, Indian Penal Code, and acquitted them of that charge, But he maintained their convictions under Sections 147 and 342, Indian Penal Code, awarding them a sentence of one months rigorous imprisonment under each of these two counts, and the sentences were ordered to run concurrently. As against this order of conviction and sentence, this present revision has been filed in Court. 2. When this revision petition was pending here, the complainant and the accused persons have compounded the offence under Section 342, Indian Penal Code, and a prayer has been made that this composition should be accepted by the court. Now that good feelings have been restored between them, I do not think that this Court should stand in their way and reject the compromise. In the circumstances, therefore, this compromise is accepted. 3. Learned Counsel appearing for the petitioners has further argued that as a court of revision, this Court may not like to interfere in the finding of facts arrived at by the Courts below; but if he has got any substantial point of Jaw to raise, the same should be considered by this Court. In my opinion, there cannot be any objection to this aspect of the matter I may not enter into details about the offence under Section 342, Indian Penal Code, which has been compounded, but as it has been argued before me that on the admitted facts of this case, this section is inapplicable, I may make some observations. 4. The facts of the case, briefly stated, are that petitioner Lakhi Das secured a licence under the Bihar and Orissa Excise Act for running a liquor shop. Thereafter he entered into some partnership with three other persons, namely, Maqbul Alam (P.W. 1), Mansoor Ali (P.W. 3) and Mohammad Muslim (P.W. 2). 4. The facts of the case, briefly stated, are that petitioner Lakhi Das secured a licence under the Bihar and Orissa Excise Act for running a liquor shop. Thereafter he entered into some partnership with three other persons, namely, Maqbul Alam (P.W. 1), Mansoor Ali (P.W. 3) and Mohammad Muslim (P.W. 2). It is alleged by the prosecution that on the date of occurrence, that is, on 19-10-1963 at about 4 A.M., all the accused persons along with many other men came in a mob, armed with deadly weapons in a truck and forcibly entered the liquor shop, broke open the lock of the box and took out cash and clothes, etc. therefrom and carried Mansoor Ali (P.W. 3), Maqbul Mian (P.W. 1) and Idris Mian (P.W. 4) on the truck. They were taken to some distance and thereafter dropped. P.W. 2 Mohammad Muslim lodged an F.I.R. with the police at Barauni police station. Thereafter the case proceeded. 5. Learned Counsel for the petitioners has urged that even accepting the facts of the case at their face value, no offence under Section 342, Indian Penal Code, had been made out. Section 342 is a penal section for wrongful confinement, and the offence itself is mentioned in Section 340, which reads as follows: Whoever wrongfully restrains any person in such a manner as to prevent that person from proceeding beyond certain circumscribing limits, is said wrongfully to confine that person. In the present case, the informant and his other colleagues or friends were not actually restrained in the shop from moving further. Rather they were carried from the shop on a truck to some distance. It can be very well said that in view of the definition given in Section 340, Indian Penal Code, it was not a case of wrongful confinement. Such an offence, of course, is covered under Section 362, which defines abduction and which reads as follows : Whoever by force compels, or by any deceitful means induces any person to go from any place, is said to abduct that person. It is to be noted that mere abduction is no offence, but if it is done with some criminal intention, it becomes punishable. So, in my opinion, the proper charge ought to have been under Section 362, Indian Penal Code, and not under Section 342, Indian Penal Code. It is to be noted that mere abduction is no offence, but if it is done with some criminal intention, it becomes punishable. So, in my opinion, the proper charge ought to have been under Section 362, Indian Penal Code, and not under Section 342, Indian Penal Code. Any way, I will not dilate upon this matter because this offence has been compounded. The learned lower appellate Court has also remarked that the common object of the unlawful assembly was to dispossess the co-partner of the liquor shop, but it may be pointed out that no such charge was ever framed and it cannot be substituted for a charge of wrongful confinement. 6. Learned Counsel appearing for the petitioners has raised another point to the effect that Lakhi Das, petitioner No. 1, was the sole licensee of the liquor shop and under rules 138 and 143 of the Bihar and Orissa Excise Rules, such a licensee cannot enter into any transfer or sub-lease of that licence. My attention was drawn to the case of Mahapatra Bhandar v. Commissioner of Income- tax where it was observed that a licensee cannot without the leave of the higher authorities enter into any agreement of partnership. It was also observed that when a licensee admits other persons as partners for the purpose of obtaining financial contribution for his business and sharing in the profits thereof, there is partial transfer of the licence which is also prohibited under the rules. Similar views were expressed by a Full Bench of the Madras High Court in the case of Valu Padayachi v. Sivasooriam Pillai. In this case it was held that a partner in a partnership entered into for the purpose of vending arrack (intoxicant) can not file a suit for the balance due on settlement of accounts when only one of the partners had obtained a licence under the Abkari Act. I need not further dilate upon this matter, because in view of this very legal position, as it appears, the petitioners have got acquittal under Section 380 as well as Section 448, Indian Penal Code. 7. The next question which -arises for consideration is whether in view of the compounding of the offence under Section 342, Indian Penal Code, the petitioners should get acquittal ipso facto under Section 147 of the Code. In the case of Gurunarayan Das V/s. Emperor A.I.R. 1948 Pat. 7. The next question which -arises for consideration is whether in view of the compounding of the offence under Section 342, Indian Penal Code, the petitioners should get acquittal ipso facto under Section 147 of the Code. In the case of Gurunarayan Das V/s. Emperor A.I.R. 1948 Pat. 58, it was observed by a Bench of this Court that the offences under Sections 147 and 148 of the Penal Code are not compoundable at all and, therefore, no acquittal can be allowed by reason of the compromise in regard to the conviction under other sections. In this case their Lordships, in view of the compromise arrived at under Sections 323, 324 and 325, allowed the convictions under Sections 147 and 148, Indian Penal Code, to stand, but reduced the sentence of the convicted persons to the period of imprisonment already undergone. This case was followed in many other cases of; this Court and similar observations have been made in some cases of other High Courts also. By way of reference I may refer to the cases of Deo Narain Rai V/s. State of Bihar 1967 B.L.J.R. 64, State V/s. Kamalakar Prabhakar Juvekar A.I.R. 1960 Bom. 269, Mangi Lal V/s. The State I.L.R. VI Raj. 811 and State V/s. Mohan . In a recent case, Sarju Rat V/s. State of Bihar 1968 B.L.J.R. 151, this Court also held the same view. But the matter cannot be allowed to test there, because learned Counsel for the petitioners has urged that on the evidence given by the prosecution, there cannot be any conviction of the petitioners under Section 147, Indian Penal Code. Section 147 provides punishment for rioting and the offence of rioting has been defined in Section 146, Indian Penal Code, which reads as follows : Whenever force or violence is used by an unlawful assembly, or by any member thereof, in prosecution of the common object of such assembly, every member of such assembly is guilty of the offence or rioting. In the present case, the charge under Section l47, Indian Penal Code was framed as follows: That you, on or about the 19th of October, 1963, at village Jamia, P.S. Barauni, were members of an unlawful assembly and in prosecution of the common object of such assembly, for committing criminal trespass in the shop of Mohammad Muslim and theft of his cash and also for committing wrongful confinement of Mansoor Mian, Maqbul Mian and Idris Mian committed the offence of rioting, and thereby committed the offence punishable under Section 147, Indian Penal Code, and within my cognizance. 8. So apparently, the petitioners were tried because it was said that they were members of an unlawful assembly, the common object of which was three fold. Firstly, to commit: criminal trespass; secondly to commit theft; and, thirdly, to commit wrongful confinement of three persons named in the charge. From the above discussion it is clear that the charge of criminal trespass was negatived by the appellate Court and the charge of theft was not accepted by the trial court, and on the facts of the present case, as given on behalf of the prosecution, there cannot , be any valid charge under Section 342, Indian Penal Code, In this view of the matter, none of the objects of the alleged unlawful assembly has been fulfilled and so it cannot be said that force was used in prosecution of the common object of such assembly. In my opinion, therefore, a review of the legal position shows that by the compounding of the offence under Section 342. Indian Penal Code the offence under Section 147, Indian Penal Code cannot be dropped or held to be ineffective. But on the basis of the above discussion it must be held that the charge under Section 146, Indian Penal Code, has also failed because no offence which is said to be thc common object of the unlawful assembly has been established. 9. In the result, this application succeeds and the order of conviction and sentence passed against the petitioners is set aside.