JUDGMENT V.G. Oak, C.J. - The following two questions of law have been referred to this Full Bench: - 1. Whether an application under Article 226 of the Constitution is a proceeding in a court of civil jurisdiction and as such the provision of Or. 1, R. I of the Code of Civil Procedure would be applicable to such a proceeding? 2. If the answer to the first question is in the affirmative, then whether persons more than one can join together in a petition under Article 226 of the Constitution in the circumstances in which persons more than one can join together as plaintiffs in a suit in accordance with the provisions of Or. I, R. I of the Code of Civil Procedure? The dispute between the parties relates to a number of plots, which were owned by Smt. Laksha Kumari Khaitan, opposite party No. I in the writ petition, which has given rise to the present reference. On 5-6-1961 these plots were sold in auction in order to realise certain dues that were out-standing against opposite-party No. 1. The auction sale was confirmed on 8-5-1962. On 26-3-1963 opposite party No. I moved before the Commissioner, Lucknow an application for setting aside the auction sale dated 5-6-1961. On 21-4-1964 the Commissioner set aside the auction sale. On 5.10-1964 Mall Singh and others moved before the Commissioner an application for recalling his order dated 21-4-1964. The application was rejected by the Commissioner on 18-1-1966. Mall Singh and 20 others have filed the writ petition for getting the two orders dated 214-1964 and 18-1-1966 quashed. The writ petition is opposed by opposite party No. 1. She raised a preliminary objection that a joint writ petition by 21 persons is not maintainable. When the writ petition came up for hearing before one of us, he found some difficulty in following a decision by a Division Bench of this Court on this question. He, therefore, referred the two questions of law quoted above to a Full Bench. On question No. 1 Mr. When the writ petition came up for hearing before one of us, he found some difficulty in following a decision by a Division Bench of this Court on this question. He, therefore, referred the two questions of law quoted above to a Full Bench. On question No. 1 Mr. B.K. Dhaon appearing for the petitioners relied upon Sec. I41, C.P.C. Section 141, C.P.C. states:- "The procedure provided in this Code in regard to suits shall be followed, as far as it can be made applicable, in all proceedings in any Court of civil jurisdiction." In order to decide whether Section 141, C.P.C. is attracted, it becomes necessary to ascertain whether under Article 226 of the Constitution this Court exercise civil jurisdiction. This question is closely connected with the question whether a petition under Article 226 is a civil proceeding. In Khurjawala Buckles Manufacturing Company v. Commissioner, Sales Tax, U.P., A.I.R. 1965 Alld. 517 it was held by Desai, C.J. that the provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure do not govern a proceeding under Article 226 of the Constitution. Hence a petition for the quashing of two assessment orders pertaining to two assessment years on one petition or one petition for the quashing of two assessment orders under different taxing statutes cannot be entertained. In Collector of Monghyr v. Pratap Singh, A.I.R. 1957 Pat. 103 it was held by a Full Bench of Patna High Court that a proceeding before the High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution is not a civil proceeding within the meaning of Article 133 of the Constitution. In A. Adinarayana v. State of Andhra Pradesh, A.I.R. 1958 AP 16 it was held that an application under Article 226 of the Constitution is a proceeding in a Court of civil jurisdiction. Section 141, C.P.C. is, therefore, directly attracted, and the provisions of Ors. 1 and 2 of the Code can be invoked so far as they can be made applicable to the proceeding in a writ application under Article 226. Ordinarily, two or more persons cannot join in a single petition to enforce separate claims. Section 141, C.P.C. is, therefore, directly attracted, and the provisions of Ors. 1 and 2 of the Code can be invoked so far as they can be made applicable to the proceeding in a writ application under Article 226. Ordinarily, two or more persons cannot join in a single petition to enforce separate claims. But where the right to relief arises from the same act or transaction, and there is a common question of law or fact, or where, though the right to relief claimed does not arise from the same act or transaction, the petitioners are jointly interested in the causes of action, one petition is maintainable at their instance. In Assistant District Panchayat Officer v. Jai Narain, A.I.R. 1967 Alld. 334 it was held by Bhargava, C.J. that if the proceeding on a petition under Article 226 of the Constitution relate to civil rights, they are civil proceedings. Being civil proceedings, the provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure apply to them under Section 141, C.P.C. in so far as the provisions of the Code can be made applicable. In State of Uttar Pradesh v. Vijay Anand, A.I.R. 1963 SC 946 Subba Rao, J. observed on page 951: - . "It is, therefore, clear from the nature of the power conferred under Article 226 of the Constitution and the decisions on the subject that the High Court in exercise of its power under Article 226 of the Constitution exercise original jurisdiction, though the said jurisdiction shall not be confused with the ordinary civil jurisdiction of the High Court. This jurisdiction, though original in character as contrasted with its appellate and re visional jurisdiction, is exercisable throughout the territories in relation to which it exercises jurisdiction and may, for convenience, be described as extraordinary original jurisdiction." The learned Standing Counsel placed reliance upon this decision of the Supreme Court in support of his contention that in dealing with a petition under Article 226 a High Court does not exercise civil jurisdiction. All that was emphasised in Vijay Anand's case was that the jurisdiction under Article 226 should not be regarded as ordinary civil jurisdiction. It does not follow that such jurisdiction cannot be extra-ordinary civil jurisdiction. In Riots of Garabandha v. Zamindar of Parlakirmidi, A.I.R. 1938 Madras 722 the Madras High Court refused to issue a writ of certiorari to the Board of Revenue. It does not follow that such jurisdiction cannot be extra-ordinary civil jurisdiction. In Riots of Garabandha v. Zamindar of Parlakirmidi, A.I.R. 1938 Madras 722 the Madras High Court refused to issue a writ of certiorari to the Board of Revenue. The petitioners requested for a certificate for an appeal to the Privy Council. It was held that the impugned order was passed by the High Court in the exercise of civil jurisdiction. In Narayan Row v. Ishwarlal, A.I.R. 1965 SC 1818 it was held that proceedings before a High Court on a petition under Article 226 in the matter of recovery of income-tax are civil proceedings within the meaning of Article 133 (1) (c) In Ramesh v. Gendalal, A.I.R. 1966 SC 1445 a claim for a sum of money was made before the Claims Officer. The claim was discharged by the Claims Officer. On appeal the Commissioner, Nagpur Division remanded the case to the Claims Officer for disposal according to law. Ramesh and others filed before the Bombay High Court a petition under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution on the ground that the Commissioner, Nagpur Division had no jurisdiction to entertain the appeal. The petition was summarily dismissed by the High Court. An application for a certificate for an appeal to the Supreme Court was rejected by the High Court. When the matter went before the Supreme Court upon special leave, the question arose whether the appellants were entitled to a certificate as of right under Article 133 (1) (a) and (b). Hidayatullah, J. observed on page 1448: - "We have explained what is meant by a civil proceeding and have held that such proceedings must concern civil rights including those arising from status as well as contract. Once that test is satisfied the word 'proceedings' is a word of very wide import. We have held that the proceeding in the High Court was a civil proceeding and although it was for the exercise of extraordinary original civil jurisdiction, the word 'any' must take in a decision provided it is a judgment, decree or final order." Again on page 1449: - "We are concerned here with the exercise of extraordinary original civil jurisdiction under Article 226." It will be noticed that the Supreme Court repeatedly observed in Ramesh's8 case that the High Court was exercising civil jurisdiction under Article 226. The learned Standing Council tried to get over the effect of these observations in two ways. Firstly. he pointed out that the case arose from Bombay. Bombay High Court had the power to issue writs even before the Constitution of India came into force. Allahabad High Court had no such power before 1950. Secondly, the learned Standing Counsel suggested that these observations are obiter dicta. It is not possible to accept either of these two contentions. It is true that Bombay High Court had the power to issue writs even before 1950. But the whole discussion in Ramesh's8 case is with reference to Article 226 of the Constitution of India. There is no reference to the power of Bombay High Court to issue writs before 1950. The question before the Supreme Court was whether in the circumstances of that case the appellants were entitled to obtain a certificate under Article 133. For deciding that question, it was necessary to examine the nature of the proceeding before Bombay High Court. After carefully considering the nature of the proceeding before Bombay High Court, their Lordships of the Supreme Court concluded that the High Court was exercising extraordinary original civil jurisdiction under Article 226. The decision of the Supreme Court in Narayan Row's case is that when a petition under Article 226 relates to civil rights, the petition gives rise to a civil proceeding. The decision of the Supreme Court in Ramesh's8 case lays down that when civil rights are involved, the High Court exercises extraordinary original civil jurisdiction under Article 226. Since the High Court exercises civil jurisdiction under Article 226, Section 141, C.P.C. is attracted. Consequently, the procedure provided the Code of Civil Procedure in regard to suits has to be followed, as far as it can be made applicable. One such provision is contained in Or. 1, R. 1, C.P.C. So, the provision of Or. 1, R.1, C.P.C. is applicable to a proceeding under Article 226 of the Constitution. It appears that the word "affirmative" has been used inadvertently for the word "negative" in the introductory part of question No. 2. I shall therefore, dispose of question No. 2 on the assumption that the opening words of question No. 2 are: - "If the answer to the first question is in the negative..." In Bankim Chandra v. Regional Provident Fund Commissioner, A.I.R. 1958 Pat. I shall therefore, dispose of question No. 2 on the assumption that the opening words of question No. 2 are: - "If the answer to the first question is in the negative..." In Bankim Chandra v. Regional Provident Fund Commissioner, A.I.R. 1958 Pat. 314 it was held that a joint application under Article 226 for quashing several orders is not maintainable. In Bishwaranjan v. Secretary, Ram Krishna Mission, A.I.R. 1958 Pat. 655 it was held that separate applications must be made for issue of separate writs to quash separate orders. In Muhammad Ibrahim v. Deputy Commercial Tax Officer, A.I.R. 1956 Mad. 626 it was held that the fact that similar orders are passed in the case of a number of individuals does not mean that the injury caused is a common or class injury so as to justify a single petition. In Ganapathi Nadar Factory v. State of Madras, A.I.R. 1957 Mad. 616 Government by a single notification referred disputes between seven establishments and their workmen to an Industrial Tribunal. These establishments filed a single writ petition against the Tribunal and the Government. It was held that a single petition was not maintainable. In Kailash Chandra v. District Registrar, A.I.R. 1961 Alld. 61 licences of a number of deed-writers were cancelled. It was held that a joint writ petition by the former deed-writers was not maintainable. In Ramchand v. Anandlal, A.I.R. 1962 Guj. 21 it was held that there must be separate applications by every applicant for every main right or claim sought to be enforced in a writ petition. Two or more persons cannot join in a single application to enforce separate rights or claims by way of writs. In Mount Corporation v. Director of Industries and Commerce, A.I.R. 1965 Mys. 148 it was held that if a number of persons have joint interest in the subject-matter but possess separate and distinct rights, a joint petition by them under Article 226 is not maintainable. Or. 1, R. 1, C.P.C. is not applicable. In Mandir Thakar Damara v. State of Pepsu, A.I.R. 1955 Pepsu 159 it was held that there must be separate applications for separate writs. In Inder Singh v. State of Rajasthan, A.I.R. 1954 Raj. 185 there were 23 separate applications pending before the Anti Ejectment Officer. Twenty three separate revisions were filed by the different applicants. In Mandir Thakar Damara v. State of Pepsu, A.I.R. 1955 Pepsu 159 it was held that there must be separate applications for separate writs. In Inder Singh v. State of Rajasthan, A.I.R. 1954 Raj. 185 there were 23 separate applications pending before the Anti Ejectment Officer. Twenty three separate revisions were filed by the different applicants. The 25 cases were disposed of by the Board of Revenue by a single judgment. It was held that it was not proper for the petitioners to file n single petition under Article 226 in respect of all the 23 cases. In Management of Rain Bow Dyeing Factory v. industrial Tribunal, A.I.R. 1959 Mad. 137 it was held that the provisions of Or. 1 of the Code of Civil Procedure cannot be applied to writ proceedings on the strength of the rule laid down by Section 141, C.P.C. In In re.: A Gopalakrishnarao, A.I.R. 1957 AP 88 it was held that two or more persons could not join in a single petition for a writ of mandamus to enforce separate claims. The principle of Or. 1 of the Code of Civil Procedure cannot be extended to such a case. In Halsbury's Laws of England, Third Edition, Vol. 11 the subject of enforcement of a separate claims has been disapoed on page 83 under Section 155: - "Two persons cannot join in a single application for an order of mandamus to enforce separate claims. There must be separate applications for separate orders, and that although the several applicants are successors in the office in respect of which the claims arise." In Extraordinary Legal Remedies by Ferris the question of joinder has been discussed under Section 233 on page 275: - "The rule is that persons having a common and joint interest in the subject-matter in controversy may be joined as relator's, while those having separate and distinct right may not." In Corpus Juris Secundum, Vol. 14. we find the following passage on page 205: "It is improper to join persons who are not jointly interested in the proceedings of which a review is sought, and whose interests are separate and distinct. Parties severally affected by the proceedings below mast sue out separate writs, although there is but one act to be reviewed and but one record." In Uma Shankar Rai v. Divisional Superintendent, Northern Railway, A.I.R. 1960 Alld. Parties severally affected by the proceedings below mast sue out separate writs, although there is but one act to be reviewed and but one record." In Uma Shankar Rai v. Divisional Superintendent, Northern Railway, A.I.R. 1960 Alld. 366 it was held by a Division Bench of this Court that in case of a common right it is not open to the persons who are affected by a common order to file a joint writ petition. Writ jurisdiction is for the enforcement of an individual right. There can be no ques i of application of Or. 1 of the Code of CI% 1 Procedure in such proceedings. Order 1, Rule 1, C.P.C. states: - "All persons may be joined in one suit as plaintiffs in whom any right to relief in respect of or arising out of the same set or transaction or series of acts or transactions is alleged to exist, whether jointly, severally or in the alternative, where, if such persons brought separate suits, any common question of law or fact would arise." Order 1, Rule 2, C.P.C. states: - "Where it appears to the Court that any joinder of plaintiffs may embarrass or delay the trial of the suit, the Court may put the plaintiffs to their election or order separate, to trials or make such other order as m2ly be expedient." In Khem Koran v. State of U.P., A.I.R. 1966 Alld. 255 there was a single notification under Section 4, Land Acquisition Act, and a single notification under Section 6 of the Act. These notifications affected a large number of persons. It was held by Satish Chandra, J. that all such persons may file a single petition under Article 226 challenging the validity of such action. It will be to the convenience of all concerned and would serve the interests of justice. In Qurabali v. Government of Rajasthan, A.I.R. 1960 Raj 152 it was held that a joint application by several persons involving common questions was maintainable. In Abdul Qayum v. Keshav Saran, A.I.R. 1964 Alld. 386 the petitioners had a common cause of action, and sought a common relief arising out of identical facts. It was held that a joint writ petition by them was maintainable. In United Motors (India) Ltd. v. The State of Bombay, 4 STC 10 six corporations and one firm carried on the business of buying and selling motor cars. 386 the petitioners had a common cause of action, and sought a common relief arising out of identical facts. It was held that a joint writ petition by them was maintainable. In United Motors (India) Ltd. v. The State of Bombay, 4 STC 10 six corporations and one firm carried on the business of buying and selling motor cars. They filed one petition under Article 226 of the Constitution challenging the validity of the Bombay Sales Tax Act, 1952. It was held that the petition was maintainable. In Manindra Nath v. Baranagore Municipality, AIR 1956 Calcutta 291 Sinha, J. observed on page 295: - "Reference has been made to American Jurisprudence Vol. 35, page 81 para. 333. In my opinion, such highly technical rules of procedure should not be incorporated in our law. This is a poor country and litigation expenses are high. Multiplication of legal proceedings should be avoided at all costs." It is true that there is much support for the view that if a number of persons have separate claims, a joint writ petition is not maintainable. But the decision by the Division Bench of this Court in Umg Shanker Rai's case and decision by other High Courts are largely based on English and American cases. High Courts in India need not feel oppressed by technicalities of English law. In dealing with petitions under Article 26, High Courts exercise power conferred upon them by the Constitution of India. The power should be so exercised as to advance the course of justice. It was not suggested for the respondents that in trying civil suits civil courts experience any difficulty in operating Or. 1, R. 1. C.P.C. On the contrary, that provision is highly convenient. If a number of per-sons have to place before the Court the same set of facts or have to urge the same question of law, there is not much point in insisting that they must file separate writ petitions. In the present case there are 21 petitioners. They have paid a court-fee of Rs. 50/- on the writ petition if they are ordered to file 21 separate writ petitions, they will have to pay a total court-fee of Rs. 1,050/-. That would no doubt be a gain to revenue. But gain to revenue is not a circumstance, which can outweigh convenience of litigants and administration of justice. They have paid a court-fee of Rs. 50/- on the writ petition if they are ordered to file 21 separate writ petitions, they will have to pay a total court-fee of Rs. 1,050/-. That would no doubt be a gain to revenue. But gain to revenue is not a circumstance, which can outweigh convenience of litigants and administration of justice. When a number of persons make the same grievance before the Court, it is usually convenient for the Court and the aggrieved persons to have the whole matte' disposed of in a single proceeding. In Constitutional Law of India by Seervai the learned author observes on page 738: - ".....There are cogent reasons for not following the strict technicalities of the English law in India .... for example, a law for the abolition of zamindaris may affect thousands of people, and it is submitted that it would be unjust and oppressive to drive thousands of persons to file separate petitions when the only question involved is whether the legislature was competent to enact the law or not, and a representative petition will completely dispose of the matter." The provision of Or. 1, R. 1, C.P.C. is permissive. The provision is subject to Or. 1, R. 2, C.P.C. Ordinarily, if two or more persons put forward claims involving common questions of law and fact, such claims may be combined in a single suit. But if the Court finds that combining a number of claims in a single suit would be embarrassing, it is open to the Court to direct separate trials of different claims. The same procedure may be adopted at the hearing of writ petitions. Ordinarily, if a number of persons challenge a single order or decisions involving common questions of law and fact, their claims may be combined in a single writ petition. But if the Court finds that it will not be convenient to dispose of so many claims in a single writ petition, the Court may direct the petitioners to file separate writ petitions. My answers to the two questions referred to the cull Bench are: - Question No. 1 - An application under Article 22ti of the Constitution involving civil rights is a proceeding in a Court of civil jurisdiction. So, the provision of Or. 1. K.1, C.P.C. is applicable to such a proceeding. My answers to the two questions referred to the cull Bench are: - Question No. 1 - An application under Article 22ti of the Constitution involving civil rights is a proceeding in a Court of civil jurisdiction. So, the provision of Or. 1. K.1, C.P.C. is applicable to such a proceeding. Question No. 2 - Even if we assume that a writ petition is not a proceeding in a Court of civil jurisdiction, and Or. 1, K. 1, C.Y.C. in terms does not apply to such a proceeding, more persons wan one can join in a petition under Article r2b of the Constitution under circumstances in which persons more than one can join as plaintiff in a suit in accordance with the provisions of Or. 1, R. 1, C.P.C. Lakslimi Prasad, J. - I have had the advantage of going through the judgment prepared by my Lord the Chief Justice. 1 regret my inability to agree wan the answers proposed by his Lordship to the two questions referred to the lull Bench. The questions referred to the Full Bench are: - (1) Whether an application under Article 226 of the Constitution of India is a proceeding in a Court of civil jurisdiction and as such the provision of Or. 1, R. 1 of the Code of Civil Procedure would be applicable to such a proceeding? (2) If the answer to the first question is in the affirmative, then whether person more than one can join together in a petition under Article 226 of the Constitution in the circumstances in which persons more than one can join together as plaintiffs in a suit in accordance with the provisions of Or. 1, R. 1 of the Code of Civil Procedure? Obviously the word "affirmative" occurring in question No. 2 appears to have been used inadvertently, in so far as having regard to the context in which question No. 2 is posed the more appropriate word would be "negative". I would accordingly. proceed on the basis that the point posed in question No. 2 arises for consideration only if the answer to the first question is found in the negative. The facts giving rise to the petition out of which arises this reference may be noted briefly. I would accordingly. proceed on the basis that the point posed in question No. 2 arises for consideration only if the answer to the first question is found in the negative. The facts giving rise to the petition out of which arises this reference may be noted briefly. For the realisation of the dues payable by opposite party No. 1 under the provisions of U.P. Large Land Holdings 'Tax Act certain plots were auctioned on 5-6-1961 and were purchased by the petitioners. That auction sale was confirmed in due course on 8-5-1962. Subsequently . on 26-3-1963 opposite party No. 1 moved an application before opposite party No. 2 (The Commissioner, Lucknow Division, Lucknow) for setting aside that sale and opposite party No. 2, without issue of any notice to the purchasers namely the petitioners set aside that sale on 21-4-1964. The petitioners moved an application on getting knowledge of the order dated 21-4-1964 for recalling it but opposite party No. 2 rejected that application by his order dated 18-1-1966. It is thereupon that the petitioners approached this Court under Article 226 of the Constitution. On these facts it was contended on be. half of opposite party No. 1 that all the 21 petitioners could not join in a single petition and in support of that contention reliance was placed on Uma Shanker Rai v. Divisional Superintendent, Northern Railway, Lucknow. It expresses an extreme view in so far as it purports to lay down that more than one person cannot join in a petition under Article 226 of the Constitution except in case of joint owner-ship. The case of Haji Abdul Qayurn v. Keshav Saran decided by another Division bench of this Court lays down that in appropriate circumstances more than one person can join in a petition under Article 226 of the Constitution. The material observations occur on page 389 in para. 5. These read as below: - "The second point, urged, though very feebly, by learned counsel was that this petition should not have been allowed as it had been filed jointly by more than one person. The objection, on the face of it, has no force. All the 16 writ petitioners had a common cause of action and were seeking a common relief arising out of identical facts. The objection, on the face of it, has no force. All the 16 writ petitioners had a common cause of action and were seeking a common relief arising out of identical facts. There was no reason why they should not all join together and seek issue of one single writ so as to serve the object of all the petitioners." The occasion for reference to the Full Bench arose because of the conflict of views expressed in the two Division Bench cases referred to above. The answer of the first question depends on the application or otherwise of Section 141 of the Code of Civil Procedure to a proceeding under Article 226 of the Constitution. Section 141 provides, "The procedure provided in this Code in regard to suits shall be followed, as far as it can be made applicable, in all proceedings in any Court of civil jurisdiction". It shall thus appear that Section 141 can be attracted to a proceeding under Article 226 only if it be possible to hold that the same is a proceeding in a court of civil jurisdiction. Whatever may have been the view at one stage it is now settled by the decision of Supreme Court in the case, Narayan Row Ishwarlal that a proceeding, under Article 226 of the Constitution if it relates to relief against infringement of civil right of a person is a civil proceeding. Likewise in view of the observations made by the Supreme Court in the case, Ramesh v. Gendalol Motilal Patni which observations have been reproduced in the judgment of Hon'ble the Chief Justice there is no escape from the conclusion that in relation to a proceeding under Article 226 of the Constitution seeking relief against infringement of civil right of a person the High Court exercises extraordinary original civil jurisdiction. In view of the observations made by the Supreme Court in the aforesaid case it can no more be maintained, as was expressed by some courts in some cases including this Court in the case of Khurjawala Buckles Manufacturing Co. Tantanpara v. Commissioner, Sales Tax, U.P. Lucknow that under Article 226 of the Constitution the High Court exercises neither civil nor criminal jurisdiction but extraordinary jurisdiction. Tantanpara v. Commissioner, Sales Tax, U.P. Lucknow that under Article 226 of the Constitution the High Court exercises neither civil nor criminal jurisdiction but extraordinary jurisdiction. So in view of the above cited Supreme Court cases the inevitable conclusion is that proceeding under Article 226 of the Constitution where under relief is sought against infringement of one' s civil right is a civil proceeding in a court of civil jurisdiction. In that view of the matter Section 141 of the Code of Civil Procedure would stand attracted with the result that Or. 1, R. 1 of the Code of Civil Procedure would be applicable to such a proceeding, "as far as it can be made applicable." Sec. 141 of the Code of Civil Procedure itself envisages the application of procedure provided by the Code in regard to a proceeding in a court of civil jurisdiction only to the extent the same can be made applicable. So merely because Section 141 is found attracted to a proceeding under Article 226 of the Constitution it does not follow therefrom that the provision of Or. 1, R. 1 of the Code of Civil Procedure would apply whole hog to such a proceeding. In the very words of Section 141 it can apply to the extent it can be made applicable. Thus we have to fall back upon the nature of a proceeding under Article 226 and the principles governing it in order to ascertain as to what extent the provision of Or. 1, R. 1 of the Code of Civil Procedure can be made applicable to such a proceeding. As pointed out in the case, re A. Gopalakrishnaroa the right of a person to apply for an appropriate writ flows from the order that affects him. A person desirous of questioning the validity or legality of such an order is entitled, subject to other conditions, to apply for such writ. It is not open to him to join in the petition other person or persons affected by similar orders - not the same order - for they too have a remedy open to them and the quashing of one order does not necessarily render the other order null and void. In this very case after quoting from Halsbury's Laws of England (Third Edition Vol. II page 83 para. In this very case after quoting from Halsbury's Laws of England (Third Edition Vol. II page 83 para. 155) that "Two persons cannot join in a single application for an order of mandamus to enforce separate claims. There must be separate applications for separate orders, and that although the several applicants are successors in the office in respect of which the claims arise", the learned Judge goes on to observe on page 89, "This rule is warranted by the nature of the writ proceedings and is calculated to remove great inconvenience which might otherwise result in issuing several writs, orders or directions in the nature of writ on a single omnibus petition relating to rights of several persons affected by distinct or separate orders." If I may say so with respect to the learned Judge I am in entire agreement with his observations. In the case of Annam Adinarayana v. State of Andhra Pradesh the point ill issue is discussed at some length and the earlier authorities are reviewed. While making the order of reference I expressed my respectful agreement with the views expressed in the case reported in A.I.R. 1958 A.P. 16. The judgment in this case is delivered by Subba Rao, C.J., as he then was, on behalf of the Division Bench. After discussing the entire legal position he sums up the conclusion in para. 10 which appears on page 19. It runs as below: - "The legal position may now be summarised. An application under Article 226 of the Constitution of India is a proceeding in a court of civil jurisdiction. The provisions of Ors. 1 and 2 can be invoked as far as they can be made applicable to the proceedings in a writ application under Article 226. Ordinarily, two or more persons cannot join in a single petition to enforce separate claims. But where the right to relief arises from the same act or transaction and there is a common question of law or fact or where, though the right to relief claimed does not arise from the same or transaction, the petitioners are jointly interested in the cause or causes of action, one petition is maintainable at their instance." If I may say so with respect these observations lay down the legal position correctly. It means that Section 141 of the Code of Civil Procedure is attracted to a proceeding under Article 226 of the Constitution if it is a Civil proceeding, that is, if thereby relief is sought against infringement of one's civil right and as such Or. 1, R. 1 of the Code of Civil Procedure would apply to such a proceeding but only to the extent it can be made applicable. It has not to be lost sight of that ordinarily two or more persons cannot join in a single petition to enforce separate claims. More than one person can join in a single petition subject to certain conditions, the conditions being either where the right to relief arises from the same act or transaction and there is a common question of law or fact or that the petitioners are jointly interested in the Answer or causes of action in cases where the right to relief claimed does not arise from the same act or transaction. The extreme view propounded in Corpus Juris Secundum, Volume 14, page 205, "It is improper to join persons who are not jointly interested in the proceedings of which review is sought and whose interests are separate and distinct", may not be adhered to, but it would be equally not correct to go to the other extreme and lay down as a general proposition that more than one person can join in a petition under Article 226 of the Constitution in all such cases in which more than one plaintiff can join together in a suit in accordance with the provisions of Or. 1, R. 1, C.P.C. It may be that under Or. 1, R. 2, C.P.C. power is given to the court to require the plaintiffs to elect or order separate trials if it finds that any joinder of plaintiffs may embarrass or delay the trial. That can by itself be not a basis for applying Or. I, R. 1 in its entirety to a proceeding under Article 226 if otherwise it appears that such an application would be inconsistent with the basic principles governing a proceeding for the issue of a writ be it certiorari or mandamus. None of the cases cited in the course of arguments before the Bench went to the extent of laying down that the provisions of Or. None of the cases cited in the course of arguments before the Bench went to the extent of laying down that the provisions of Or. 1, R. 1, C.P.C. apply without any qualification to a proceeding under Article 226. Of the decided cases cited before the Bench the case of Manindra Nath Pal v. Municipal Commissioners of Baranagore Municipality appears to go the farthest. Even it simply says on page 295 "It would be sufficient to follow analogously the provisions of Or. 1, C.P.C." The cases of this court which have permitted more than one person to join in a petition under Article 226 and were cited before the Bench are, (1) Haji Abdul Qayum v. Keshav Saran and (2) Khem Karan v. State of Uttar Pradesh. I have already reproduced the material observations made in A.I.R. 1964 , Alld. 386. What is laid down on this point in A. I. R. 1966, Alld. 255, appears in para. 9 of the report at page 257. It runs as below: - "To my mind in a single proceeding culminating in a single order affecting a large number of persons all such persons can raise a single complaint to this Court under Article 226 to canvass the validity of such action. It will be to the convenience of all concerned and would serve the interest of justice. It shall thus be seen that not a single decided cases of this Court has permitted joinder of more than one person in a petition under Article 226 except under conditions under which such joinder is envisaged in the case reported in A.I.R. 1958 , A.P. 16. There can be little doubt that the weight of authority even in this country is that a number of persons who have separate claims cannot maintain a joint writ petition. That such is the position has been recognised by Hon'ble the Chief Justice when he observes, "It is true that there is much support for the view that if a number of persons have separate claims a joint writ petition is not maintainable." I see no good reason to go beyond what has been laid down in A. I. R. 1958, A. P. Case. I cannot see as to how requiring a person having a separate claim to bring separate petition amounts to hampering justice. I cannot see as to how requiring a person having a separate claim to bring separate petition amounts to hampering justice. On the other hand if an omnibus petition is permitted it may result in embarrassment and delay. It may be that under Or. 1, R. 2, Code of Civil Procedure, the Court would be entitled to direct separate trial in appropriate circumstances but even that would mean some delay and consequently inconvenience to all concerned. So whether considered do the basis of convenience or on the ground of principle I am firmly of opinion that joinder of more than one person in a petition under Article 226 can be permitted only where the right to relief arises from the same act or transaction and there is a common question of law or fact or where though the right of claim does not arise from the same act or transaction the petitioners are jointly interested in the cause or causes of action. I would accordingly answer the two questions as below: - Question No. 1 - An application under Article 226 of the Constitution involving civil rights is a proceeding in a court of civil jurisdiction and as such the provisions of Or. 1, R. 1, C.P.C. would be applicable to such a proceeding but only to a limited extent, that is, the joinder of more than one person under Article 226 can be permitted only where the right to relief arises from the same act or transaction and there is a common question of law or fact or where though the right of claim does not arise from the same act or transaction the petitioners are jointly interested in the cause or causes of action. Question No. 2 - In view of the answer given to question No. 1 it does not arise. Sahgal, J. - I have had the advantage of going through the drafts of judgments prepared by my Lord the Chief Justice and the Hon'ble Lakshmi Prasad, J. I agree generally with the view expressed by the Hon'ble Lakshmi Prasad, J. but I would like to add a few lines of my own. The following two questions of law have been referred to the Full Bench: 1. Whether an application under Article 226 of the Constitution is a proceeding in a court of civil jurisdiction and as such the provision of Or. The following two questions of law have been referred to the Full Bench: 1. Whether an application under Article 226 of the Constitution is a proceeding in a court of civil jurisdiction and as such the provision of Or. 1, R. 1 of the Code of Civil Procedure would be applicable to such a proceeding. 2. If the answer to the first question is in the affirmative this should have been 'negative' it being a case of clerical error - then whether persons more than one can join together in a petition under Article 226 of the Constitution in the circumstances in which persons more than one can join together as plaintiffs in a suit in accordance with the provisions of Or. 1, R. 1 of the Code of Civil Procedure? For the determination of the first question the provisions of Section 141 of the Code of Civil Procedure are relevant. Section 141 reads: 141. "The procedure provided in this Code in regard to suits shall be followed, as far as it can be made applicable, in all proceedings in any Court of civil jurisdiction." As far back as the year 1894, the Privy Council in Thakur Prasad v. Fakur Ullah, ILR 27 Alld. 106 laid down with respect to Section 647 of the Code of Civil Procedure then in force, which provision of law was equivalent to Section 141 of the current Code, as follows: "Their Lordships think that proceedings spoken of in Section 647 include original matters in the nature of suits such as proceedings in probates, guardianship, and so forth, and do not include executions." The question, therefore, to be decided is whether the proceedings before the court under Article 226 of the Constitution can be said to be the proceedings in any court of civil jurisdiction and if so, whether such proceedings can be said to be proceedings in original matters in the nature of suits. In S.A.L. Narayan Row v. Ishwarlal Bhagwandas the Supreme Court held that proceedings before the High Court on a petition under Article 226, in the matter of recovery of Income-tax are "civil proceedings" within the meaning of Article 133 (1) (c) . A proceeding in which relief is claimed against action of revenue authorities is included in the civil proceedings and not in "other proceedings". A proceeding in which relief is claimed against action of revenue authorities is included in the civil proceedings and not in "other proceedings". It was pointed out that by a petition for a writ under Article 226 of the Constitution, extraordinary jurisdiction of the High Court to issue high prerogative writs granting relief in special cases to persons aggrieved by the exercise of authority-statutory or otherwise - by public officers or authorities is invoked. This jurisdiction is undoubtedly special and exclusive, but on that account the nature of the proceedings in which it is exercised is not altered. Where a revenue authority seeks to levy tax or threatens action in purported exercise of powers conferred by an act relating to revenue, the primary impact of such an act or threat is on the civil rights of the party aggrieved and when relief is claimed in that behalf it is a civil proceeding, even if relief is Limed not in a suit but by resort to the extraordinary jurisdiction of the High Court to issue writs. In Ramesh v. Gendalal Motilal Pathi, the Supreme Court remarked that the term 'civil proceeding' has been held to include at least all proceedings affecting civil rights, which are not criminal. The words 'civil proceedings' are used in widest sense in contradistinction to criminal proceedings which affect directly civil rights. A proceeding under Article 226 for a writ to bring up a proceeding for consideration must be a civil proceeding, if the original proceeding concerned civil rights. At page 1449 the Supreme Court remarked: "We are concerned here with the exercise of extraordinary original civil jurisdiction under Article 226. Under that jurisdiction, the High Court does not hear an appeal or revision. The High Court is moved to intervene and to bring before itself, the record of a case decided by or pending before a Court or tribunal or any authority within the High Court's jurisdiction" would thus appear that a proceeding under Article 226 before a Court if it relates to a civil matter is a civil proceeding and in deciding such a matter the High Court exercises extraordinary original civil jurisdiction. The jurisdiction is not in execution, it is not exercised by way of appeal. The proceedings are in the nature of a suit, as such Section 141 of the Code of Civil Procedure applies. The jurisdiction is not in execution, it is not exercised by way of appeal. The proceedings are in the nature of a suit, as such Section 141 of the Code of Civil Procedure applies. There can, in the circumstances, be no manner of doubt that such proceedings are "proceedings in a court of a civil jurisdiction", within the meaning of that term under Section 141 of the Code of Civil Procedure. In Khuriawala Buckles Manufacturing Co. v. Commissioner Sales Tax, U.P. it has, however, been held by a Division Bench of this Court that the provisions of Civil Procedure Code do not govern a proceeding under Article 226 of the Constitution. It is pointed out therein that what is laid down in Section 141 of the Civil Procedure Code is that the procedure laid down in the Code in regard to suits is to be followed, so far as it can be, in all proceedings is any court of Civil jurisdiction. A High Court when exercising jurisdiction under Article 226, according to the view expressed by that Bench, cannot be held to be a court of civil jurisdiction. That jurisdiction is not ordinary jurisdiction, but it is extraordinary jurisdiction which means that it is neither civil nor criminal. This view, with respect, will no longer hold good in view of the two Supreme Court decisions referred to above. The jurisdiction may be extraordinary jurisdiction, but that does not mean that it is not civil just as the ordinary jurisdiction of the High Court may either be civil or criminal, the extraordinary jurisdiction as opposed to ordinary jurisdiction may also either be civil or criminal. The classification into "ordinary" and "extraordinary" jurisdiction is different from the classification between "civil and criminal" jurisdiction for both the civil and criminal jurisdiction may be ordinary or extraordinary. The jurisdiction with respect to a petition under Article 226 of the Constitution may be extraordinary jurisdiction, but if the impact of the decision is on the civil rights of a party, it would be exercised under its civil jurisdiction, if its impact is on criminal rights it is exercised under its criminal jurisdiction. The jurisdiction that is exercised under Article 226 is neither appellate nor in the execution department. The jurisdiction that is exercised under Article 226 is neither appellate nor in the execution department. It is an original jurisdiction and is in the nature of a suit and as such Section 141 of the Code of Civil Procedure will apply to it. The conclusion, therefore, is that the procedure provided in the Code in regard to suits shall be followed as far as it can be made applicable in such proceedings. The provisions of Or. 1, R. 1 shall thus be applicable to such proceedings in so far as they can be made applicable. The words "in so far as they can be made applicable" are important. The provisions of Or. 1, R. 1 of the Code of Civil Procedure, therefore, do apply to the proceedings under Article 226 of the Constitution before the court in civil matters only to the extent to which the nature of such proceedings permits that provision to be applied to them. The proceedings under Article 226 are of a summary nature. Cases under Article 226 of the Constitution are decided mainly on affidavits. The controversial questions of fact if they arise in such proceedings are as a general rule with rare exceptions not decided in such proceedings and the parties are left to seek other appropriate remedies if such controversy arises. In the nature of things, therefore, the provisions of Or. 1, R. 1 of the Code of Civil Procedure cannot be made applicable in their entirety in such proceedings. The Civil Procedure Code itself provides a safeguard against this provision becoming embarrassing to the trial of a suit or causing delay in the trial. While Or. 1, R. 1 of the Code provides: "All persons may be joined in one suit as plaintiffs in whom any right to relief in respect of or arising out of the same act or transaction or series of acts or transactions is alleged to exist, whether jointly, severally or in the alternative, where, if such persons brought separate suits, any common question of law or fact would arise". Rule 2 of that Order provides: "Where it appears to the Court that any joinder of plaintiffs may embarrass or delay the trial of the suit, the Court may put the plaintiffs to their election or order separate trials or make such other order as may be expedient." Thus it would be seen that even in original suits an application of Or. 1, R. 1 may embarrass or delay the trial of a suit and in such a case the court has been given power to order an election to be made by the plaintiff so that there may be separate trials in such matters. The proceedings under Article 226 being summary proceedings and having been provided to give effective and speedy remedy to a litigant, there is all the more reason that the provisions of Or. 1, R. 1 which may apply to such proceedings in view of the provisions of Section 141 of the Code of Civil Procedure should not be allowed to hamper the very purpose for which Article 226 existed. The right to claim an appropriate which flows from the order affecting the claimant is essentially an individual right. So it is not open to him to join in the petition other person or persons affected by similar orders in contradistinction to the same order for the simple reason that each of them has a remedy open to him and the quashing of one order does not necessarily render the other order null and void. This rule is obviously calculated to remove great inconvenience which might otherwise result in issuing several writs, orders or directions in the nature of writ on a single omnibus petition relating to rights of several persons affected by distinct or separate,-orders. The position in regard to joinder of persons more than one in a single petition has been considered in the case of, Annam Odinarayana v. State of Andhra Pradesh. I am in respectful agreement with the relevant observations made in that case and of those observations, I have my answers to the reference made to this bench. I would, therefore, suggest the following answers to the two questions referred to the Full Bench: - Question No. 1 - An application under Article 226 of the Constitution is a proceeding in a court of civil jurisdiction if it relates to a civil matter and as such the provisions of Or. I would, therefore, suggest the following answers to the two questions referred to the Full Bench: - Question No. 1 - An application under Article 226 of the Constitution is a proceeding in a court of civil jurisdiction if it relates to a civil matter and as such the provisions of Or. 1, R. 1 of the Code of Civil Procedure do apply to such a proceeding but only to the extent they are not inconsistent with the nature of the proceeding. Thus the joinder of more than one person under Article 226 can be permitted only where the right to relief arises from the same act or transaction and there is a common question of law or fact or where though the right of claim does not arise from the same act or transaction the petitioners are jointly interested in the cause or causes of action. Question No. 2 - In view of the answer to question No. 1. the second question does not arise. By the Court - Our answers to the two questions of law referred to the Full Bench at e as follows: - Question No. 1 - An application under Article 226 of the Constitution is a proceeding in a court of civil jurisdiction if it relates to a civil matter, and as such the provisions of Or. 1, R. 1 of the Code of Civil Procedure do apply to such a proceeding but only to the extent they are not inconsistent with the nature of the proceeding. Tints the joinder of more than one person under Article 226 can be permitted only where the right to relief arises [tom the same act or transaction and there is a common question of law or fact or where though the right of claim does not :Else from the same act or transaction the petitioners are jointly ' interested in the cause or causes/of action. Question" No. 2 - In view of the answer to question "No. 1, the second question does not arise.