JUDGMENT : G.K. Misra, J. - Plaintiff is the legally married wife of Defendant, 1. Her case is that as she had no issue, Defendant-1 developed apathy and indifference towards her. For sometime she left for her father's house and resided there for about it years till July, 1960. During her absence the natural parents of Defendant. 2 prevailed upon Defendant. 1 to execute a deed of adoption in favour of Defendant. 2. Though there was no giving and taking and the Plaintiff did not give her consent to the adoption, Defendant. 1 executed a deed of adoption on 5.2.1959. Later on Defendant-2 assaulted the Plaintiff and Defendant-1 and wanted to take forcible possession of their property. Plaintiff has accordingly filed the suit for a declaration that Defendant. 2 is not the adopted son of Defendant. 1 and herself. Defendant-1 is ex parte. Defendant. 2 contested the suit alleging that he was duly adopted on 29.5-1950 by the Plaintiff and Defendant-1. In order to avoid dispute, a deed of adoption was executed and registered by Defendant-Ion 5.2.1959. The allegation of fraud and coercion is denied. Without going into evidence, the learned Munsif decided the first issue to the effect "Can the Plaintiff maintain the suit ?" and dismissed the suit holding that a suit for mere declaration was not maintainable. In appeal, the learned Subordinate Judge held that the suit was maintainable. He accordingly remanded the suit for disposal after going into merits. Against the Appellate order remanding the case, the miscellaneous appeal has been filed. 2. Mr. P.V.B. Rao contends that Courts should not grant a declaration simpliciter u/s 42 of the Specific Relief Act (Old), hereinafter referred to as the Act, if that declaration (sic) likely to prove ineffective ultimately. Applying the aforesaid principle to the facts of this case, he continues that Defendant-1 is an absolute owner of his property in which the Plaintiff has no right, title and interest in present. Even if a declaration, as prayed for by the Plaintiff is granted by the Court, it would be made nugatory by Defendant-1 by disposing of his entire property by transfer or by Will. He placed reliance on two unreported decisions of this Court in Kalachand Bhoi v. Balabhadra Bhoi S.A. 281 of 1947 and Balmukunda Dip v. Bahnu Dip S.A. 360 of 1950 and some decisions of other High Courts. The contention requires careful examination. He placed reliance on two unreported decisions of this Court in Kalachand Bhoi v. Balabhadra Bhoi S.A. 281 of 1947 and Balmukunda Dip v. Bahnu Dip S.A. 360 of 1950 and some decisions of other High Courts. The contention requires careful examination. 3. Section 42 runs thus: Any person entitled to any legal character, or to any right as to any property, may institute a suit against any person denying, or interested to deny, his title to such character or right, and the Court may in its discretion make therein a declaration that he is so entitled, and, the Plaintiff need not in such suit ask for any further relief. On an analysis it would appear that the section allows institution of declaratory suits firstly for establishing a right as to any property and secondly for establishing any legal character. The cause of action arises not only when the legal character or the right to property is denied, but also when there is likelihood of such denial by the Defendant. In AIR 1944 266 (Lahore), their Lordships observed thus: On the plain language of the section there does not appear to be any justification for assuming that a suit for a declaration as to a certain status claimed by the Plaintiff cannot be maintained unless the declaration sought will confer on the Plaintiff an immediate right to some property. It is quite true that a suit merely for a declaration as to the Plaintiff being related to the Defendant in a certain manner is not contemplated by the section but where the relationship does carry with it certain legal consequences, even though it may not affect or involve any right to property, a suit for a declaration as to the existence of such relationship is competent. In that particular case, the suit had been filed by a Muslim child for declaration of his legitimacy. The declaration of legitimacy did not confer on the child any present interest in the property held by the father. Their Lordships on analysis came to the conclusion that the child had the right to succeed to the father in case the latter predeceased the child and died intestate. It was also found that in case of testacy, the child would have the further right to succeed to the father's legal share in the estate left by him except to the extent of one-third. It was also found that in case of testacy, the child would have the further right to succeed to the father's legal share in the estate left by him except to the extent of one-third. During his minority he had the legal right to be maintained by the father. He had also the right of preemption in respect of sale of agricultural land held by the father. On the aforesaid analysis their Lordships came to the conclusion that the declaration of legitimacy carried with itself very important legal incidents. Though the child had no immediate right to some property, the declaration was given as the child was entitled to a legal character. This decision was accepted as laying down good law in Second Appeal No. 360 of 1950 though it was distinguished on facts. His Lordship observed thus: Indeed the Plaintiff had no right to the property of Defendant-1 in praeseni. But nevertheless he had the right to claim for maintenance against the father on the ground of legitimacy during his minority. Such a right to claim maintenance indeed is a valuable right and, therefore, on that basis, a declaration could be made u/s 42, Specific Relief Act. The Lahore Full bench case and the Single Judge decision of this Court firmly establish the proposition that if a person has a right of maintenance, then he/she can bring a suit for declaration of his/her legal status to claim maintenance against any person denying or interested to deny the same. 4. In Noor Jehan Begum Vs. Eugene Tiscenko, the meaning of the expression "interested to deny" was very succinctly and clearly presented. Their Lordships said: If the claim which may be set up by the Defendant is a hindrance to the Plaintiff in the exercise of his or her rights or will expose him or her to liability if he or she disregards it he or she may come to Court for a declaration that the claim which may be so set up by the Defendant is not well founded. This principle in its application to the present case may be analysed. Suppose the Plaintiff claims maintenance against Defendant-1. If Defendant-2 resists her claim in any manner on the basis of his adoption, than Plaintiff's right to get maintenance is jeopardized. She is entitled to file a suit for declaration that Defendant. 2 is not the adopted son of Defendant. This principle in its application to the present case may be analysed. Suppose the Plaintiff claims maintenance against Defendant-1. If Defendant-2 resists her claim in any manner on the basis of his adoption, than Plaintiff's right to get maintenance is jeopardized. She is entitled to file a suit for declaration that Defendant. 2 is not the adopted son of Defendant. 1 to get rid of this jeopardy. 5. It is not necessary to multiply authorities. I am discreetly not placing any reliance on those series of decisions where declaratory suits are filed by reversioners against alienation by a widow who is a limited owner. Those cases are specifically covered by Illustration (f) to Section 42, The Illustration runs thus: A Hindu widow in possession of property adopts a son to her deceased husband. The person presumptively entitled to possession of the property on her death without a son may, in a suit against the adopted son, obtain a declaration that the adoption was invalid. Those classes of cases are covered by the observation of their Lordships in Sheo Prasanna Singh v. Ramanandan Singh 43 I.A. 91. Their Lordships indicated therein that suits of that kind form a very special class and have been entertained by Courts ex necessitate. 6. I would now proceed to examine if by the adoption of Defendant-2, Plaintiff's right of maintenance is in any way affected. There is no dispute that Plaintiff has no right in the property of Defendant-1 in praesenti. Under the Old Hindu Law the maintenance of wife by her husband is a personal obligation arising from the very existence of the relationship. This is also independent of possession of any property by the husband. The quantum of maintenance payable to a wife would depend upon many factors including the means of the husband. The Old Hindu Law got a statutory recognition under Act XIX of 1946 (Hindu Married Women's Right to Separate Residence and Maintenance Act, 1946). Section 3 thereof lays down that when allowing a claim for separate residence and maintenance u/s 2, the Court shall determine the amount to be paid by the husband to the wife therefore and in so doing shall have regard to the social standing of the parties and the extent of the husband's means. Section 3 thereof lays down that when allowing a claim for separate residence and maintenance u/s 2, the Court shall determine the amount to be paid by the husband to the wife therefore and in so doing shall have regard to the social standing of the parties and the extent of the husband's means. Thus the properties of the husband constitute an important factor in determining the quantum of maintenance to the wife Act XIX of 1946 has been repealed by the Hindu Adoptions and Maintenance Act, 1950 (Act 78 of 1956). u/s 18, the claim of the wife to maintenance is recognised. Section 23 deals with the amount of maintenance. Section 23, Sub-section (2) does not refer to the means of the husband as a factor to be taken into consideration while it specifically refers to the means of the wife under Clause (d). Section 23, Sub-section (2), Clause (a) says that in determining the amount of maintenance, if any, to be awarded to a wife, regard shall be had to the position and status of the parties. The expression "the position and status of the parties" is wide enough to include the financial position of the husband as an important factor for consideration. Thus not only under the Old Hindu Law but by statutory law, the right of the wife to maintenances is recognised. One of the important factors for determination of the quantum of maintenance is the property of the husband. In Ekradeshwari v. Homeshwar 56 I.A. 91, their Lordships were dealing with the maintenance of a widow. The consideration to weigh with the Court in fixing the quantum of maintenance were succinctly put thus: Upon this last their Lordships observe that it may be so, for the simple reason that maintenance depends upon a gathering together of all the facts of the situation. The consideration to weigh with the Court in fixing the quantum of maintenance were succinctly put thus: Upon this last their Lordships observe that it may be so, for the simple reason that maintenance depends upon a gathering together of all the facts of the situation. The amount of free estate the past life of the married parties and the families, a survey of the condition and necessities and the rights of the members, on a reasonable view of change of circumstances possibly required in the future regard being of course had to the scale and mode of living and to the age, habits, wants and class of life of the parties, In short, it is out of a great category of circumstances, small in themselves, that a safe and reasonable induction is to be made by a Court of law in arriving at a fixed sum. The identical principle applies to the case of wife. The point to be emphasised is that the properties of the husband constitute an important factor in determining the quantum of maintenance. 7. If Defendant-2 is not declared as the adopted son of Defendant-1 and Plaintiff claims maintenance against her husband, she would be entitled to higher amount of maintenance than if Defendant-2 is recognised as the adopted Bon whereby he would be entitled to half the properties if his case that he was adopted in 1950 is upheld. In such a case, the claim set up by Defendant-2 becomes a hindrance to the Plaintiff in exercise of her rights to claim a particular rate of maintenance. She is, therefore, to come to Court for a declaration that the claim set up by Defendant-2 is not well founded. The principle already elucidated directly applies to this case and the suit is, therefore, maintainable. It is not necessary to cover wider grounds and examine on what other basis Plaintiff's declaratory suit is maintainable. 8. As I have already stated, it is not necessary to multiply authorities. All the decisions which have held that a declaratory suit is not maintainable are based on the principle that in that particular Case the suit was merely for a declaration as to the Plaintiff being related to the Defendant in a particular manner. 8. As I have already stated, it is not necessary to multiply authorities. All the decisions which have held that a declaratory suit is not maintainable are based on the principle that in that particular Case the suit was merely for a declaration as to the Plaintiff being related to the Defendant in a particular manner. In this case, the relationship of Defendant-2 as adopted son of the Plaintiff and Defendant-1 carries with it certain legal consequences even though it does not involve any right to the property. The suit is accordingly maintainable. 9. On the aforesaid analysis, the appeal fails and is dismissed. As there is no appearance for the Respondents, there will be no order as to costs. Mr. Dhal argued this case for the Respondents as amicus curiae and rendered substantial assistance to the Court. Final Result : Dismissed