JUDGMENT : G.K. Misra, J. - The suit has been instituted by the State of Orissa for recovery of Rs. 2664.50 paise from the Defendant as damages for remaining in possession of a fishery in Sunamunhi river of a sub-proprietary estate in Touzi 268 for the years 1953-54 and 1954-55 after vesting of the estate. On 25-2-1936, Defendant purchased the rights of the lessees in execution of a money decree by Ex. 4. The lessees had the fishery rights for the term of the settlement on payment of annual rent of Rs. 240/- as would appear from the record-of-rights (Ex. Q). The estate vested in the State of Orissa on 27-11-1953. For the suit years the Defendant had sub-let the fishery by Ex. 1 on 17.5.1954 at the rate of Rs. 1470/- per annum. On 21-2-1955 the Collector passed an order to put the fishery to public auction. The Defendant filed an appeal before the Board of Revenue Case No. 1 of 1956. The Board passed the following order: What has been recorded is not a tenancy right. It is a contract between the proprietor of the Anabadi land and the persons whose right to catch fish has been recorded....The fishery therefore is a part of the estate which has vested and the fishery has therefore vested. On 21-6-1956 the Orissa Estates Abolition (Amendment) Act, 1955 (Orissa Act XV of 1950) was passed making substantial alterations in Section 5 of the Orissa Estates Abolition Act (herein after referred to as the Act). On 11-8-1958, the Collector of Puri by his order (Ex. G) in Misc. Case No. 9 of 195. 1959 u/s 5(k) fixed Rs. 2021.12 paise as the amount payable by Durgacharan Jagdeb Ray and directed that this amount would be deducted from the final compensation. The Collector in Ex. H dated 5-11-1958 maintained the previous order and rejected the contention that the Defendant was liable to pay at the most, at the rate of Rs. 240/- per annum for one year and 137 days. The Collector in Ex. H dated 5-11-1958 maintained the previous order and rejected the contention that the Defendant was liable to pay at the most, at the rate of Rs. 240/- per annum for one year and 137 days. On 5-10-159 the Member, Board of Revenue, in E.A. Appeal Case No. 51 of 58-59 allowed the appeal and set aside the order of the Collector on the ground that on the date of Amendment of the Act, that is, on 21-6-1956, the Defendant was a lessee under the State b y virtue of Board's order dated 1-3-1956 and so Section 5(k) had no application. The Board, however, further observed thus the order of this appeal does not preclude the Collector from taking such further action as he is entitled to under the law for claiming Government's share of the usufruct for the Sunia years 1953.54 and 1954-65. Thereafter on 15-3-1960 the Collector gave notice (Ex. K) to the Defendant demanding Rs. 2940/- which was alleged to have been realised by sub-letting the fishery for the years 1953-54 and 1954-55. The defence was that the State was entitled to recover rent at the rate of Rs. 240/- per annum and the suit in the Civil Court did not lie. The trial Court held that the Defendant was in possession of the fishery as a rightful owner in the suit years and that the Plaintiff was not entitled to damages but at least could recover rent at the rate of Rs. 240/- per annum. On the finding that the provisions of Section 5(h) or (k) applied, it held that Section 39 of the Act was a bar to the suit. It also held that the Defendant did not realise any amount from the Subleases. The learned lower Appellate Court held that possession of the Defendant for the suit years was wrongful and Section 5(k) had no application as the sub-lease was given by the Defendant not as an Intermediary but as a lessee of fishery. It determined the quantum of damages at Rs. 2664.50 paise and held that Section 39 was not a bar as Section 5(k) had no application Against the Appellate decree, the second appeal has been filed by the Defendant. 2. Mr. It determined the quantum of damages at Rs. 2664.50 paise and held that Section 39 was not a bar as Section 5(k) had no application Against the Appellate decree, the second appeal has been filed by the Defendant. 2. Mr. Mohanty raises the sole contention that the facts of this case come within the ambit of Section 5(k) of the Act and that a proceeding u/s 5(k) having been initiated and finally decided on 5-10-1959 by the Member, Board of Revenue, in Ex. J., the suit is barred u/s 39 of the Act. The contention requires careful examination. 3. Section 5(k), so far as relevant, and Section 39 of the Act run thus: Section 5. Notwithstanding anything contained in any other law for the time being in force of in any contract, on the publication of the notification in the Gazette under Sub-section (1) of Section 3 or Sub-section (1) of Section A or from the date of the execution of the agreements u/s 4, as the case may be, the following consequences shall ensure, namely: ... ... ... (k) With effect from the date of vesting or the date of the commencement of the Orissa Estates Abolition (Amendment) Act., 1956 (Orissa Act 15 of 1956), whichever date comes later, all contracts for gathering of produce from land or for collection of produce or fish from forests or fisheries or collection of fees or tolls from bats, bazars, ferries and such other sairat interests lying within the estate entered into between an Intermediary and any other person shall, notwithstanding anything in any judgment, decree or order of any Court, become void: Provided that where the person concerned has enjoyed his rights under any such contract during any period after the date of vesting but before the date of commencement of the aforesaid Act the Collector shall order a deduction from the total amount of compensation payable to the Intermediary an amount which bears the same proportion to the value of the total benefits contracted for by the Intermediary as the aforesaid period bears to the total period of such contract and the amount to be so deducted shall be determined by the Collector after such inquiry as the State Government may by rules prescribe: ... ... ... S. 39. ... ... S. 39. No suit shall be brought in any Civil Court in respect of any entry in or omission from a Compensation Assessment roll or in respect of any order passed under Chapters II to VI or concerting any matter which is or has already been the subject of any application made or proceeding taken under the said Chapters. 4. In Ex. F, dated 1-3-1956, the Board of Revenue had held that the lease of fishery right was a contract between the proprietor of the Anabadi land and the person whose right to catch fish has been recorded and that the fishery therefore was a part of the estate which had vested and the fishery had therefore vested. There is no dispute that the lease in favour of the Defendant regarding fishery right became void on 21-6-1956 when Orissa Act 15 of 1956 came into force. The Defendant enjoyed the rights under the contract for 1953-54 and 1954-55 which are in between the date of vesting on 27-11-1953 and the date of coming into force of Orissa Act 15 of 1956 on 31-6-1956. Under the proviso, it is open to the Collector to order deduction from the total amount of compensation payable to the Intermediary, an amount which bears the same proportion to the value of the total benefits contracted for by the Intermediary as the aforesaid period bears to the total period of such contract. It is again within the jurisdiction of the Collector to make an inquiry in accordance with the prescribed rules and determine the amount sought to be deducted. There is thus an express provision in Section 5(k), first proviso, for the Collector to determine the amount payable by the lessee and to deduct the same from the compensation to which the Intermediary is entitled. This exclusive jurisdiction has been conferred on the Collector u/s 5(k). Even without Section 39 of the Act, the jurisdiction of the Civil Court is impliedly barred by the first proviso to Section 5(k). u/s 9, Civil Procedure Code, the Civil Court has jurisdiction to decide all matters of civil nature unless they are expressly or impliedly barred. The express provision in Section 5(k) impliedly bars the jurisdiction of the Civil Court to determine the quantum. 5. u/s 9, Civil Procedure Code, the Civil Court has jurisdiction to decide all matters of civil nature unless they are expressly or impliedly barred. The express provision in Section 5(k) impliedly bars the jurisdiction of the Civil Court to determine the quantum. 5. u/s 39 of the Act, no suit shall be brought in any Civil Court in respect of an order passed under Chapter II or concerning any matter which is or has already been the subject of any application made or proceeding taken under the said Chapter. It is to be noted that in Ex. H the Collect or of puri passed an order on 25-11-1958 in a proceeding u/s 5(k) that the Defendant was liable to pay to the Government Rs. 2,021/12/-. In appeal, the Board of Revenue set aside the order of the Collector and passed an order to the following effect: The order on this appeal does not preclude the Collector from taking such further action as he is entitled under the law for, claiming Government's share of the usufruct for the Sonia year 1953-54 and 54-55. The order, constructed in its true significance, means that the dues claimed by the Collector against the Defendant cannot be recovered in a proceeding u/s 5(k). The Board of Revenue took an erroneous view of law. But whether right or wrong, it had jurisdiction to take such a view. Once such a view had been taken and an order bad been passed with respect to matter covered by Chapter II, Section 39 is a clear bar for recovery of dues in the Civil Court. 6. On ground of want of jurisdiction, the suit must fail. The suit is accordingly dismissed. The judgment of the lower Appellate Court is set aside and the second appeal is allowed with costs throughout. Final Result : Allowed