In Chamber—Sub-Divisional Magistrate, Merta, by his judgment dated December 9, 1965, convicted the accused Ram Singh for an offence under S. 123 read with S. 42 Motor Vehicles Act, 1939, and sentenced him to pay a fine of Rs. 500/-, and also ordered issue of process against the accused Ramavtar Gupta. 2. The prosecution story, in brief, is that driver Ram Singh contravened the provisions of S. 42/123, Motor Vehicles Act, 1939, by plying truck No. R.J.A. 1128 of Jaipur region in Jodhpur region, in contravention of the terms of the permit. Ramavtar Gupta, is the owner of the said truck. On a plea of guilty, Ram Singh was convicted and sentenced, as aforesaid. The owner of the truck, Ramavtar Gupta, was ordered to be summoned by the Sub-Divisional Magistrate, to face trial. Against that order a revision-application was filed in the court of learned Session Judge, Merta. The said Judge, while relying upon an authority of this Court, reported in Bagh Singh vs. State of Rajasthan(l), has observed that the provisions of S. 130, Motor Vehicles Act, 1939, are mandatory and that a court, taking cognizance of an offence, unless the offence is one specified in part A of the 5th Schedule, must have stated on the summons to be served upon the accused person that he may appear by pleader and not in person or that he may by a specific date prior to the hearing of the charge plead guilty to the charge by registered letter and remit to the court such amount not exceeding Rs. 25/-, as the court may specify. According to learned Sessions Judge, that being the settled law, the order issuing process otherwise than in the manner laid down in S.130 of the Motor Vehicles Act, should be quashed, and that the Sub-Divisional Magistrate, Merta, should be directed to comply with the mandatory provisions of the above law. Learned Sessions Judge has further observed that conviction of Ram Singh should also be held illegal on account of non-compliance with the mandatory provisions of S. 130(1) (b), Motor Vehicles Act, 1939. 3. Learned Sessions Judge has further observed that conviction of Ram Singh should also be held illegal on account of non-compliance with the mandatory provisions of S. 130(1) (b), Motor Vehicles Act, 1939. 3. It is true that my learned brother Chhangani J. has pointed out in Bagh Singh vs. State of Rajasthan (supra) that if a Magistrate does not adopt the procedure prescribed under S. 130 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939, it would not be fair and reasonable to deprive the accused of the benefits, available to him. Learned Judge further observed that bearing in mind the provisions of S. 130 and the spirit behind it, the accused could not be awarded sentence of fine exceeding Rs. 25/-, in respect of each of the offences. Learned Judge also laid down that benefits available to the accused are two fold: (1) he need not appear personally and (2) it is open to him to plead guilty to the charge through registered letter by specified date and to remit to the court a sum not exceeding Rs. 25/-. The court cannot deprive the accused of these benefits by disregarding the procedure under S. 130, Motor Vehicles Act, 1939. But there is also a decision of the Supreme Court on the point in issue. In Puran Singh vs. The State of Madhya Pradesh(2) while over-ruling State vs. Mangal Singh (3) and State of Assam vs. Suleman Khan(4), the Supreme Court has held that the Magistrate is not obliged in complaint for offences not specified in Part A of the Fifth Schedule to make an endorsement in process in terms of S. 130(1)(b), Motor Vehicles Act, 1939. He has the option to issue a summons with an endorsement in terms of sub-sec. (1) (a) or of sub-sec. (l)(b) and only if a summons is issued with the endorsement specified by sub-sec. (1) (b), it is open to the accused to avail himself of the option to plead guilty and to claim the privilege mentioned in sub-sec. (3). Their Lordships have further made it clear that where in a complaint for an offence, which is not covered by any offence specified in Part A of the Fifth Schedule the Magistrate issues process against the person complained of, but does not make any endorsement thereon in terms of sec. 130(l)(b), the summons cannot be said to be illegal. 4. Their Lordships have further made it clear that where in a complaint for an offence, which is not covered by any offence specified in Part A of the Fifth Schedule the Magistrate issues process against the person complained of, but does not make any endorsement thereon in terms of sec. 130(l)(b), the summons cannot be said to be illegal. 4. S. 130 of the Act was enacted with a view to protect from harassment a person guilty of minor infraction of the Motor Vehicles Act or the rules framed thereunder by dispensing with his presence before a Magistrate and in proper cases giving him an option to plead guilty to the charge and to remit the amount which can in no case exceed Rs. 25/-. But that does not mean that in serious cases also punishment cannot transgress that limit. In that event, non-compliance with S. 130(l)(b) will not be material. There is nothing in sub-sec. (1) of S. 130 which may indicate that the Magistrate must endorse the summons in terms of both claus- es (a) and (b) of sub-sec. (1) of S. 130. To hold otherwise, would mean conversion of conjunction "or" into "and". That apart, it will be difficult to hold that even in serious cases the Legislature intended that offenders should be absolved from crime irrespective of gravity by realising a paltry sum not exceeding Rs. 25/-. Sec. 130, on the other hand, gives wide discretion to the Magistrate to make or not to make endorsement on the process in terms of S. 130(l)(b). 5. That being the settled law, this reference has no force. The reference is accordingly rejected.