Judgment 1. There are two petitioners who have been found guilty under S.7 of the Essential Commodities Act and sentenced to undergo rigorous imprisonment for 18 months and further to pay a fine of Rs. 500/-, each, in default to suffer further rigorous imprisonment for three months, each. Along with these two petitioners, some other persons were also convicted by the Munsif-Magistrate, First Class, Gopalganj, but on appeal to the Second Additional Sessions Judge, Chapra, those other persons were acquitted and the conviction was maintained only as regards these two petitioners as stated above. 2. The facts of the case relating to the present petition may be summarised as follows : In the District of Saran there is a Block at Bhorey which is also a police station. On the 7th August, 1964 there was a staff meeting in the office of the Black Development Officer of Bhorey where it was discussed that some members of the Bharat Sewak Samaj had informed the Block Development Officer that Ramayan Bhagat and others were in the habit of smuggling food-grains from Bihar to U.P., and the Block Development Officer asked his staff to be vigilant about it. On the very next day i.e. on the 8th August, 1964, the Supervisor Rajbanshi Prasad (P.W. 4) detected that two carts containing rice bags (13 bags on one and 5 bags on the other) were being driven by two persons. The Supervisor thereafter directed the cartmen to accompany him to Bhorey police station and the carts proceeded for some distance in that direction. Meanwhile, it is alleged that petitioner Ramayan Bhagat came there and forced the cartmen not to go towards the police station. This created some confusion and meanwhile many persons collected there as also a police constable. Some Mukhias also intervened in the matter and at their instance the 18 bags of vice were kept in charge of Ramayan Bhagat who granted a receipt (Ext. 1) for the same. At that very time he had produced 4 cash memos standing in the name of different persons, and informed the Supervisor that he had purchased those bags in the name of four different persons and the sale was to be done in his own village. 1) for the same. At that very time he had produced 4 cash memos standing in the name of different persons, and informed the Supervisor that he had purchased those bags in the name of four different persons and the sale was to be done in his own village. On the 11th August, 1964, the Block Development Officer, got some confidential information that Ramayan Bhagat had kept some cancealed bags of rice in the houses of different persons of his own village as well as the neighbouring village and so he made a raid of those houses. From the houses of Mokhtar Mian, Nabijan and Ramjan Mian he recovered four bags of rice from each house. Thereafter the house of Ramayan Bhagat was also searched and 16 full bags of rice and two bags containing some rice were also recovered. These three Muslims admitted that the bags recovered from their houses had been kept by Ramayan Bhagat. The Block Development Officer then entrusted 12 bags of rice to P.W. 3, Birbahadur Singh, but on the 12th August, 1964 Birbahadur Singh reported to the Block Development Officer that Ramayan Bhagat and five others raided his house and forcibly removed those 12 bags of rice. The matter was repotted to the police on the 14th August, 1964 by the Block Development Officer as a result of which a case under S.395 of the Indian Penal Code was a started against both these petitioners and some others. That case ended in conviction of Ramayan Bhagat only under S.380 of the Indian Penal Code by the appellate Court and the rest of the accused were acquitted. On the basis of the report filed by the Block Development Officer an another case under S.7 of the Essential Commodities Act was started against these two petitioners and under S.8 of that Act against other accused persons. In this case these two petitioners were convicted and sentenced to undergo rigorous imprisonment and pay fine as stated above, but the lower appellate Court acquitted the remaining accused who had been convicted by the learned Magistrate. As against this order of conviction the present petition has been filed. 3. Mr. Thakur Prasad, learned counsel for the petitioners has urged only two points before me. His first contention is that the second trial was in violation of the provisions of S.403 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. As against this order of conviction the present petition has been filed. 3. Mr. Thakur Prasad, learned counsel for the petitioners has urged only two points before me. His first contention is that the second trial was in violation of the provisions of S.403 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. The second point raised by him is that these petitioners have been sufficiently harassed by now, because Ramayan Bhagat has already undergone the punishment of jail for one year in the previous case and so a lenient view concerning the sentence should be taken. 4. As regards the first point he has drawn my attention to the case of Pritam Singh V/s. State of Punjab, AIR 1956 SC 415 . In this case the petitioners had been tried for an offence under S.19(f) of the Arms Act (as then stood) and acquitted and secondly they along with others were put on trial for an offence under S.302/34 of the Indian Penal Code. In the latter case they were convicted. Their Lordships of the Supreme Court observed that the maxim rea judicata provertitate accipitur is no leas applicable to criminal than to civil proceedings. Thus an acquittal of an accused in a trial under S.19(f), Arms Act, is tantamount to a finding that the prosecution had failed to establish the possession of certain revolver by the accused as alleged. The possession of that revolver was a fact in issue which had to be established by the prosecution before he could be convicted of the offence under S.19(f). That fact was found against the prosecution and could not be proved against the accused in the subsequent proceedings between the Crown and him, under a charge of murder. This view was reiterated in the case of Manipur Administration, Manipur V/s. Thokchom Bira Singh, reported in AIR 1965 SC 87 . That fact was found against the prosecution and could not be proved against the accused in the subsequent proceedings between the Crown and him, under a charge of murder. This view was reiterated in the case of Manipur Administration, Manipur V/s. Thokchom Bira Singh, reported in AIR 1965 SC 87 . It was stated therein that the rule of issue estoppel in a criminal trial is that where an issue of fact has been tried by a competent Court on a former occasion and a finding has been reached in favour of an accused, such a finding would constitute an estoppel or resjudicata against the prosecution, not as a bar to the trial and conviction of the accused for a different or distinct offence, but as precluding the reception of evidence to disturb that finding of fact when the accused is tried subsequently even for a different offence which might be permitted by the terms of S.403(2). The rule is not the same as the plea of double jeopardy or autrefois acquit. The rule thus relates only to the admissibility of evidence which is designed to upset a finding of fact recorded by a competent Court at a previous trial. He also referred to Art.20(2) of the Constitution which lays down that no person shall be prosecuted and punished for the same offence more than once. 5. The learned State Counsel has urged that the decisions of these case laws do not cover the facts of the present one. S.403(1) of the Code of Criminal Procedure lays down : "A person who has once been tried by a Court of competent jurisdiction for an offence and convicted or acquitted of such offence shall, while such conviction or acquittal remains in force, not be liable to be tried again for the same offence, nor on the same facts for any other offence for which a different charge from the one made against him might have been made under S.236, or for which he might have been convicted under S.237." Under Sub-S. (2) a person acquitted or convicted of any offence may be afterwards tried for any distinct offence for which a separate charge might have been made against him on the former trial under S.235, Sub-S. (1). There are several illustrations appended to S.403 and a careful study of those illustrations reveals the exact position. There are several illustrations appended to S.403 and a careful study of those illustrations reveals the exact position. On a close examination of the various sub-sections of S.403 of the Code of Criminal Procedure and on a consideration of the principle behind the section, as a whole, it seems very clear that the section, in effect, intends to lay down that generally no accused shall be tried for the offence for more than once arising out of the same set of facts. Under Sub-S. (1) of S.235 of the Code, different offences as contemplated do not arise out of the same set of facts, though they do arise in one series of acts so connected together as to form the same transaction, that is to say, that when there is a series of acts connected together so as to form the same transaction, different acts committed in course of the same transaction may give rise to different offences. In other words, the acts are different and necessarily the facts which amount to the acts must be different, though the different offences arising out of the different acts may form the subject matter of separate charges in one trial and that does not mean that either the facts or acts are identical. So, in my opinion, S.403(2) does not militate against the view contained in S.235(1) of the Code. 6 Applying these principles to the facts of the present case, it must be held that these petitioners have not been tried and convicted for the same offence twice over. The former case related to a case of dacoity and the start of the case was from that point at which these bags had been kept in the custody of Bir Bahadur Singh. But the offence under the Essential Commodities Act started much earlier, that is to say, when it was noticed that these petitioners not being licensees were in possession of more rice than the prescribed limit. In the report of the Block Development Officer, it is mentioned that Ramayan Bhagat was holding an old licence and had not renewed the licence for the last three or four years. The receipts which he had produced before the Block Development Officer showed that he had purchased 23 bags of rice out of which 5 bags were not accounted for. The receipts which he had produced before the Block Development Officer showed that he had purchased 23 bags of rice out of which 5 bags were not accounted for. In the circumstance, the evidence is also not the same though some identical witnesses might have been examined. I am told there were 12 witnesses in the previous Sessions Court and 7 witnesses were examined in the present case before the learned Munsif-Magistrate. Out of these seven witnesses, only four are common. Moreover, those witnesses do not speak anything about the occurrence of dacoity or snatching away of the rice bags. In the charge I find that it is for storing 48 bags of rice; whereas in the former case we were concerned only with 12 bags of rice which were alleged to have been taken away. From these discussions, it is apparent that both the offences are distinct and so the same persons could be tried twice for these two offences. The rule of double jeopardy or autrefois acquit does not apply to the facts of the present case. That being so, the first contention raised by learned counsel must be ruled out of consideration. 7. I would then come to the second point, which has been urged before me on behalf of these petitioners. Petitioner No. 1 Ramayan Bhagat has already undergone a sentence of one years rigorous imprisonment, because of his conviction under Sec.380 of the Penal Code which had been confirmed by the High Court. In the present case also he was, I am told, in jail for ten days. So taking these facts into consideration, I think the sentence passed against him may be suitably reduced. In his case, therefore, the period of jail punishment is reduced to the period already undergone, but he will pay the fine imposed on him. 8. The case of the other petitioner. Ram Prasad Bhagat, who is the brother of petitioner No. 1, stands on a somewhat different footing. He had been tried in the previous case, but was acquitted. In this case he has been found guilty along with his brother with whom he is residing. He has already undergone some detention in jail, say about ten days. In the circumstances of the case, therefore, I reduce his sentence also to the period already undergone while maintaining the penalty of fine imposed on him. 9. In this case he has been found guilty along with his brother with whom he is residing. He has already undergone some detention in jail, say about ten days. In the circumstances of the case, therefore, I reduce his sentence also to the period already undergone while maintaining the penalty of fine imposed on him. 9. With this modification in the sentence, this petition is dismissed.