ORDER The State of Madras, the defendant in a suit, has filed this second appeal and the question raised is the jurisdiction of the civil Court in a segment of the field covered by the Madras Estates (Abolition and Conversion into Ryotwari) Act, 1948. There has been no challenge before me to the findings on the merits of the case. The plaintiff is Ramalingaswamigal Madam, North Tiruppachetti, represented by its trustee Sutha Chitanya Swamigal and the suit is for a declaration of the title of the Madam to the suit property S.No. 114 and for an Injunction against the State’s interference with the enjoyment of the property by the plaintiff. The case of the plaintiff is that on the suit property, the Madam in question was situated in a portion that as an adjunct to the Madam, shrines, Mantapam, house for Stanicks, Oorani, well and coconut trees all came into existence, and that in January, 1938 the Sivaganga Estate recognised the Madam’s actual enjoyment of the property and assigned the same to the plaintiff represented by the trustee, subject to the payment of rent of Re. 1 per acre besides cesses. Exhibit A-1 dated 29th January, 1938 is the order of the Sivaganga Estate providing for the issue of a Teervapat Cowle patta for the land in favour of Sutha Chaithanya Swamigal as the trustee of the Madam. S. No. 114 now stands sub-divided into S. No. 114/1 of an extent of 7 cents, S.No. 114/2 of an extent of 3 acres 48 cents. While the plaintiff’s case is that the suit property divided into the sub-divisions is that of the plaintiff, the contention on behalf of the State is that the suit property is communal land, that S. No. 114/1 was occupied by Udayanatchiamman Koil worshipped by Harijans and that S. No. 114/2 contained a public Oorani, a burial ground for the Asari community and another burning ground for the Brahmins. It was therefore contended that the entire suit property was communal poromboke which vested in the Government. The Courts below, on an exhaustive consideration of the oral and documentary evidence, negatived the contention of the State and found for the plaintiff. It was therefore contended that the entire suit property was communal poromboke which vested in the Government. The Courts below, on an exhaustive consideration of the oral and documentary evidence, negatived the contention of the State and found for the plaintiff. Kist receipts have been produced by the plaintiff from 1944 to 1958 ihowing the plaintiff’s possession, and of these kist receipts while Exhibits A-2 to A-8 have been issued by the Zamindar, Exhibits A-9 to A-13 have been issued by the Government after taking over of the Sivaganga Estate by the State under Abolition Act. The suit property had been fenced even in 1940 and there was evidence of buildings on the property before 1920. After the Abolition Act the plaintiff had sought recognition of his title. On 29th December, 1953 the Additional Assistant Settlement Officer Sivaganga, informed the plaintiff that his petition would be considered at the time of the section 11 enquiry. There is an order Exhibit B-4 dated 25th June, 1954, holding that no one is entitled to a ryotwari patta in respect of the field. It purports to be passed suo moto and also on the petition of Sutha Chaithanya Swamigal. It is noticed there that as per the Old Land Register the entire survey field was noted as an Oorani Poramboke, that the landholder had assigned the Kudiwaram right in 1938 in the entire field on a nominal nazar, because presumably the entire extent was encroached upon and reference was made to the absence of sanction under section 20 of the Estates Land Act. There is no evidence of this order having been communicated then and there to the plaintiff. After the issue of suit notice by the plaintiff in 1957, the plaintiff received a reply Exhibit A-17 referring to the order Exhibit B-4 and stating that it would take effect from 1st July, 1957. It was stated in the reply that the plaintiff had no valid cause of action. A fresh notice was issued by the plaintiff before the filing of the suit. The case of the plaintiff was that the order purported to have been passed on 25th June, 1954, was on an erroneous view that the suit property was an Oorani Poramboke while the records of the village did not have any entry that the suit land was communal poramboke. The case of the plaintiff was that the order purported to have been passed on 25th June, 1954, was on an erroneous view that the suit property was an Oorani Poramboke while the records of the village did not have any entry that the suit land was communal poramboke. It is now found that even the documents produced for the State do not show either the existence of the temple for the Harijans or burning or burial grounds. D.W. 1, a witness for the State, even in the chief examination, stated that in S.No. 114 there were two thatched sheds which were two Madams, and that those sheds had been converted into two temples. In the cross-examination he admitted that the Madam was there from ancient times and the buildings other than the temples were constructed over 18 years before. He admitted that the buildings on the suit property were attached to the Madam only. It is unnecessary to examine the evidence with regard to the theory of a temple for Harijans on S.No. 114/1. The lower appellate Court concurring with the trial Court finds satisfactorily proved that the plaintiff’s Madam was on the suit survey field. As regards the sub-division the Oorani was claimed as an adjunct to the Madam. There was ample evidence to sustain this claim and reject the contention that it is a public Oorani. A commissioner had been appointed and he had submitted his report and plan. The Courts below have found on the oral evidence and on the Commissioner’s report that the defendant’s case as to the existence of a burial or cremation ground on this sub-division also failed. The ultimate conclusion of the Courts below is that the suit property S.Nos. 114/1 and 114/2-inits entirety has not been put to any communal use or purpose, and that there is nothing to show that any part of the suit property had been at the disposal of the villagers of Tiruppachetti or any other community. The contention of the state that the suit property was a communal Poramboke was rejected. The Courts below find that it had been only the private property of the plaintiff by reason of assignment made by the Sivaganga Estate. This finding which is one of fact was not the subject to challenge before me. The contention of the state that the suit property was a communal Poramboke was rejected. The Courts below find that it had been only the private property of the plaintiff by reason of assignment made by the Sivaganga Estate. This finding which is one of fact was not the subject to challenge before me. What is contended for the State before me is that the civil Court has no jurisdiction whatsoever to entertain the suit, as in substance the plaintiff is claiming and seeking to establish his right to a patta for the suit property when the same had been denied by the state, the State having held rightly or wrongly that the suit property was a communal Poramboke. The contention is that after the Abolition Act, the entire estate in which the plaintiff’s property is situated has vested in the State and the plaintiff can only claim such rights, if any conferred under the provision of the Act and that in the manner provided by the Act. The Act which confers rights in relation to estates on the abolition, is a self-contained code which provides a hierarchy of authorities for determination of the matters and grant of reliefs contemplated under the Act. Under section 3 (b) with effect on and from the notified date and save as otherwise expressly provided in the Act, the entire estate including all communal lands and prombokes, other non-ryoti lands, waste lands, lanka lands, forests, mines and minerals, quarries, rivers and streams, tanks and irrigation works, fisheries and ferries shall stand transferred to the Government and vest in them free of all encumbrances and by virtue of sub-clause (c) all rights and interests created in or over the estate before the notified date by the principal or any other landholder shall as against the Government cease and determine. Section 3 (g) provides that any rights and privileges which may have accrued in the estate to any person before the notified date against the principal or any other landholder thereof, shall cease and determine and shall not be enforceable against the Government or landholders, and every such person shall be entitled only to such rights and privileges as are recognised or conferred on him by or under the Act. Section 11 provides for the issue of ryotwari pattas to ryots in the estates. Section 11 provides for the issue of ryotwari pattas to ryots in the estates. Sections 12, 13 and 14 deal with the rights of landholders to pattas in respect of private lands and other lands. Section 15 empowers the Settlement Officer to examine the nature and history of all lands in respect of which the landholder claims ryotwari patta under sections 12, 13 or 14, as the case may be, and decide on the claim. Sections 21 and 22 provide for the survey of estates under the Madras Survey and Boundaries Act and ryotwari settlement of the estate by the Settlement Officer. Learned Counsel for the State points out that there being specific provision for the grant of ryotwari patta under section 11 the plaintiff cannot indirectly get an adjudication on the matter in a civil Court. The relevant portion of section 11 in the context of the present case may be set out. "11. Every ryot in an estate shall, with effect on and from the notified date, be entitled to a ryotwari patta in respect of- (a) all ryoti lands which, immediately before the notified date, were Properly included or ought to have been properly included in his holding and which are not either lanka lands or lands in respect of which a landholder or some other person is entitled to a ryotwari patta under any other provision of this Act........ (b).......................... (b).......................... Provided that no person who has been admitted into possession of any land by a landholder on or after the 1st day of July, 1945 shall, except where the Government, after an examination of all the circumstances otherwise direct, be entitled to a ryotwari patta in respect of such land." Section 19 which is relevant may also be set out: "Where any person has been admitted into possession of any ryoti land by any landholder for a non-agricultural purpose that person shall be entitled to remain in possession of the land subject however to the payment by him to the Government of the ryotwari or other assessment or the ground rent which may be imposed upon the land for each fasli year commencing with the fash year in which the estate is notified: Provided that such transaction was not void or illegal under any law in force at the time: Provided further that a person who has been admitted into possession of any ryoti land on or after the first day of July, 1945 shall be entitled to no rights in respect of such land except where the Government otherwise direct. The plaintiff would, for retaining his right to continue in possession of the property, rely on either of the provisions, section 11 or section 19. Learned Counsel for the State drew my attention to sections 5 and 7 investing revisional powers in the Director of Settlement and Board of Revenue. The Director of Settlement is empowered to cancel or revise any of the orders, acts or proceedings of the Settlement Officer, other than those in respect of which an appeal lies to the Tribunal. The Board of Revenue is empowered to cancel or revise any of the orders, acts or proceedings of the Director of Settlement or of any District Collector, including those passed, done or taken in the exercise of revisional powers. My attention was drawn for the State to section 64-C which runs thus: "(1) Any order passed by the Government or other authority under this Act in respect or matters to be determined for the purposes of this Act shall, subject only to any appeal or provision provided by or under this Act, be final. My attention was drawn for the State to section 64-C which runs thus: "(1) Any order passed by the Government or other authority under this Act in respect or matters to be determined for the purposes of this Act shall, subject only to any appeal or provision provided by or under this Act, be final. (2) No such order shall be liable to be quashed in any Court of Law." Referring to this provision, learned Counsel for the State contended that the bar of judrisdiction of a civil Court is complete in the matter when rightly or wrongly the Settlement Officer has held that no one is entitled to ryotwari patta in respect of the field and that it is a communal poramboke. The plaintiff in the present ease was seeking to have the order set aside and revised by the Civil Court and this it is said-is prohibited by the provisions of the Act, particularly section 64-C. For the plaintiff, Mr. Vendantachari contended that section 64-C can have no application on the facts of the present case. It is contended that section 11 by itself does not provide for determination of the character of the estate, but provides only for the grant of ryotwari patta to a ryot in respect of his ryoti land in the circumstances provided for. It is argued that no determination is contemplated under section 11 when a dispute arises between the State and a ryot as to the character of the land, the State contending that it is communal or Poramboke and the ryot contending that it is a land to which he is entitled to a patta. Learned Counsel points out that the State in this case, relies only on the general powers of revision Which the superior officers functioning under the Act are invested with. Learned Counsel for the plaintiff in this connection contrasts and emphasises the elaborate provisions made in respect of the enquiry when a claim for a patta is made by a landholder under sections 12, 13 and 14. Section 15 specifically invests the Settlement Officer with jurisdiction to determine and adjudicate on the claim. The settlement Officer is directed to examine the nature and history of all lands in respect of which the landholder claims ryotwari patta under sections 12, 13 or 14. No such provision is made when the claim is for ryotwari patta by a ryot. Section 15 specifically invests the Settlement Officer with jurisdiction to determine and adjudicate on the claim. The settlement Officer is directed to examine the nature and history of all lands in respect of which the landholder claims ryotwari patta under sections 12, 13 or 14. No such provision is made when the claim is for ryotwari patta by a ryot. Against the decision of the Settlement Officer under section 15 an appeal is provided to the Tribunal and statutorily the Tribunal is to be constituted by a person, who shall be a judicial Officer not below the rank of a District Judge or an Additional District Judge. The Tribunal in invested with powers vested in a civil Court when trying a suit or when hearing an appeal. Section 64-C, it is submitted applies only in respect of the matters to be determined for the purpose of the Act and section 11 does not provide for any determination of the title or right to enjoyment. It provides only for the grant of patta for the purpose of the Act. Learned Counsel for the plaintiff submits that the plaintiff is not now claiming any patta. It may be when his rights are established, he may seek for the issue of patta. Reference in this connection is made to the following observations of Ramachandra Iyer, J., (as he then was) in Krishnaswami Thevar v. Perumal Konar1: “The effect of sections 11 to 14 is to declare that the ryots in the quondam estate as well as the Zamindar or inamdar as the case may be, would be respectively entitled to patta in respect of the kudiwaram or pannai lands. Section 11 read with section 3 (d) Proviso 1, would show that the ryotwari patta in respect of ryoti lands would be granted to the ryot by the Settlement Officer. Thee is no provision in the section for the ascertainment of even the character of the land. Nor is there any machinery to decide whenever a dispute arises between the rival claimants for the patta................ It may be noticed that under section 15, it is only the nature and character of the land that has got to be decided by the special machinery created by the Act. Patta would be given to the landholder, if the land is of the category mentioned in sections 12 to 14. It may be noticed that under section 15, it is only the nature and character of the land that has got to be decided by the special machinery created by the Act. Patta would be given to the landholder, if the land is of the category mentioned in sections 12 to 14. But if there are rival claims to the title of the landholder himself, there would be no power in the Settlement Officer or the Tribunal to adjudicate as to who among them would have a preferential right. This is more so in a case under section 11 where no question of any decision at all can arise............As the object of the Abolition Act is only to introduce the ryotwari system by granting pattas to the ryots in respect of the erstwhile ryoti lands and to landholders in respect of their private lands, the patta granted under sections 11 to 14 cannot be anything more than a ryotwari patta of the kind mentioned by Bhashyam Ayyangar, J., in the Secretary of State for India in Council v. Katturi Reddi2................ Thus, if a ryot is entitled to the ryoti land before the notification, he would by virtue of that right be entitled to the grant of ryotwari patta. There is nothing in the procedure to be adopted for the grant of patta under section 11, to justify an adjudication of title. Nor is there anything in the nature of the patta itself to show that there must have been an adjudication of title in favour of the pattadar.” The aforesaid observations it is claimed strongly support the contention of learned Counsel for the plaintiff that the grant or refusal under section 11 cannot amount to a determination which will bar an adjudication of title as to the character of the land by virtue of only section 64-C of the Act. No doubt the learned Judge was considering a case of dispute between rival claimants to Patta, but some of the observations therein, are general in their application. The general presumption is in favour of the jurisdiction of a civil Court. When a question of jurisdiction of the civil Court to entertain a particular suit is raised, the exclusion of the jurisdiction of the Court will Rot be assumed unless the relevant statute contains an express provision to that effect or by necessary and inevitable implication it bars the civil Court. When a question of jurisdiction of the civil Court to entertain a particular suit is raised, the exclusion of the jurisdiction of the Court will Rot be assumed unless the relevant statute contains an express provision to that effect or by necessary and inevitable implication it bars the civil Court. The mere fact that the statute provides for certain remedies, may not by itself exclude the jurisdiction of the civil Court to deal with cases brought before it, in respect of some of the matters covered by the statute. Reference may be made to the observations of Gajendragadkar, C.J. in Kamala Mills v. Bombay State1: “Whenever it is urged before a civil Court that its jurisdiction is excluded either expressly or by necessary implication to entertain the claims of a civil nature, the Court actually feels inclined to consider whether the remedy afforded by an alternative provision prescribed by a special statute is sufficient or adequate. In cases where the exclusion of the civil Court’s jurisdiction is expressly provided for, the consideration as to the scheme of the statute in question and the adequacy or the sufficiency of the remedies provided for by it may be relevant but cannot be decisive. But where exclusion is pleaded as a matter of necessary implication, such consideration would be very important and in conceivable circumstances might even become decisive. If it appears that a statute creates a special right or a liability and provides for the determination of the right and liability to be dealt with by tribunals specially constituted in that behalf, and it further lays down that all questions about the said right and liability shall be determined by the tribunals so constituted it becomes pertinent to’ enquire whether remedies normally associated with actions to civil Courts are prescribed by the said statute or not.” It is urged by learned Counsel for the plaintiff that there is no clear provision for a regular adjudication of the rights of a claimant to patta as against the State which may contend that the land is poromboke. If it is said that a decision in this regard is involved while providing for the grant of a patta under section 11 or making an order under section 19, the argument is that it would be a collateral adjudication of title or rights involved in the matter and therefore there can be no finality in such a determination. In Kamala Mills v. Bombay State1, already cited it is said: “In other words is the decision about the character of the transaction the decision of a collateral fact, the finding on which alone confers jurisdiction on the tribunal to levy the tax, or is it the decision on a question of fact which is left to be determined by the appropriate authority itself? If the jurisdiction conferred on the appropriate authority falls under the first category, then its finding that a particular transaction is taxable under the relevant provision of the Act, would be a finding on a collateral question of fact, and it may be permissible to a party aggrieved by the said finding to contend that the tax levied on the basis of an erroneous decision about the nature of the transaction is without jurisdiction. If, however, the appropriate authority has been given jurisdiction to determine the nature of the transaction and proceed to levy a tax in accordance with its decision on the first issue, then the decision on the first issue cannot be said to be a decision on a collateral issue, and even if the said issue is erroneously determined by the appellate authority, the tax levied by it in accordance with its decision cannot be said to be without jurisdiction.” The Supreme Court in this connection referred to Halsbury’s Laws of England where the principle is stated thus: “The jurisdiction of an inferior tribunal may depend upon the fulfilment of some condition precedent or upon the existence of some particular fact. Such a fact is collateral to the actual matter which the inferior tribunal has to try and the determination whether it exists or not is logically and temporarily prior to the determination of the actual question which an inferior tribunal has to try.” Based on the above observations, it may, with some force, be contended that the order under section 11 relates only to the actual grant of patta and the authority acting under section 11 has no jurisdiction to finally determine the title which is required for granting a patta. I have here to refer to the following observations of Ramachandra Iyer, J. (as he then was) in Soosai Udayar v. Andiyappan1, “A person should not, for the purpose of obtaining a ryotwari patta, be enabled to get a declaration of his title to kudivaram so as to force the tribunals under the Act to grant the patta to him, as the duty of deciding that question is invested in the Tribunal. If, however, that determination becomes relevant for deciding any other issue between the parties in a civil suit, there can be no exclusion of jurisdiction of the civil Courts.” The learned Judge further observed: “But if the relief claimed in a civil Court is not what is created or granted by the Act, e.g., the right to obtain a patta, but a civil right the jurisdiction of the civil Court which always existed, cannot be held to be ousted as the statute does not either expressly or impliedly extinguish such rights.” A point was made for the State that section 64-C was newly introduced in the Act and the question must now be decided with reference to it. As regards this section, in a recent decision of this Court, Sanjeevi Naicker v. Shanmugha Udayar2, the learned Judge Ramamurti, J., held that the issue of a patta in respect of a land taken over under section 11 of the Abolition Act would not take away the jurisdiction of a civil Court to adjudicate upon competing titles to such lands section 64-C of the Act having no such effect. See also Ratna Sabapathy Servai v. Sannasi Ambalam3, It will be seen that these cases are cases of competing titles to patta and not claims for patta against the State. The distinction is not without significance. See also Ratna Sabapathy Servai v. Sannasi Ambalam3, It will be seen that these cases are cases of competing titles to patta and not claims for patta against the State. The distinction is not without significance. If the nature of the tenure is left to the determination by the authorities under the Act, that determination cannot be circumvented. The position is not res Integra. In Ramaswami Naicker v. Parimala Pandian4, a suit was instituted for a declaration of the plaintiffs’ title involving an examination of the nature of lands. The plaintiffs claimed that the lands which were within an Inam estate were ryoti lands and on that footing sought a permanent injunction against the State and other defendants from interfering with their possession and enjoyment of the lands. On principles the position is similar to the present case. The suit lands had been treated in the village accounts as ryoti lands. But the Settlement Officer treated the lands as assessed waste and refused to issue ryotwari pattas. While holding that the civil Court’s jurisdiction was ousted, the learned Judge Veeraswami, J., observed: “It is obvious that such a prayer necessarily involves an examination of the nature of the lands as to whether they are ryoti or not in character. But the jurisdiction to enquire and decide the character of lands in a quondam estate notified and taken over is specially entrusted by the provisions of the statute to stated authorities or forums. That being the case, it is not within the jurisdiction of the ordinary civil Court, to go into the nature of the lands and grant a declaration of title to the lands. There is also another aspect of the matter. As 1 said, the effect of a notification under section 3 is to abolish all titles. The only right that can at all be said to survive after such a notification is the right of a person to apply for and get a ryotwari patta. Unless he successfully pursues that right, he cannot claim any title to any land in a notified estate de hors that peocedure ......................... The only right that can at all be said to survive after such a notification is the right of a person to apply for and get a ryotwari patta. Unless he successfully pursues that right, he cannot claim any title to any land in a notified estate de hors that peocedure ......................... Where the nature of the land is determined and ryotwari patta is directed under the provisions of the Act, a question of conflicting claims to title may be a different matter which may well come within the jurisdiction of the civil Court.” In Parvathi Ammal v. Ponniah Nadar1, the question was whether the property was communal property as contended for by the villagers who figured as plaintiffs, or the first defendant in the suit was entitled to a ryotwari patta which had been granted to him under section 11 of the Abolition Act. The learned Judge Veeraswami, J., held that section 64-C raised a bar to any order passed by the authorities set up under the Act in respect of matters to be determined for the purpose of the Act being questioned in any Court of law, and that apart from the scheme of the Act it is clear that the character or tenure of the lands in an estate taken over under the statutory provisions is to be decided by the officers set up by the Act for the purpose subject to appeals and revisions as provided by the Act. A similar view has been taken by Venkataraman, J., in Somasundaram Servai v. The State of Madras2. The learned Judge has followed Ramaswami Naicker v. Parimala Pandian3cited above as a direct decision on the point. In the case before Venkataraman, J., the question was whether the land was tank Poramboke or belonged to the Merchants’ Association which the plaintiffs in the suit represented. The learned Judge has followed Ramaswami Naicker v. Parimala Pandian3cited above as a direct decision on the point. In the case before Venkataraman, J., the question was whether the land was tank Poramboke or belonged to the Merchants’ Association which the plaintiffs in the suit represented. The learned Judge, on a consideration of the case-law, held that the Act after abolishing the pre-existing rights of the ryot in ryoti land had provided a machinery for getting a patta which would permanently protect his rights, that the abolition under section 3 (b) of the Act was so complete as to vest in the Government the rights of the ryot in what was admittedly a ryoti land, that a machinery for determination of the question whether the land was a ryoti land or a poramboke land must be held to be implied in the application which the plaintiffs had to make to the Settlement Officer for getting a patta under section 11, and that the Settlement Officer would have to decide before granting a patta whether the land was ryoti land or poramboke. The three decisions cited above are directly in point and against the maintainability of the present suit. But Mr. Vedanthachari contends that some recent decisions show a different approach to the question. It is submitted that the effect of the Act is not to abolish once for all the pre-existing rights, of a ryot and then grant patta on certain basis, the foundation for the above decisions, but to vest the estate in the State subject to reservation of the rights in favour of the ryot. Learned Counsel submits that approached from this angle the bar of the jurisdiction of a civil Court in a case like the present cannot be inferred from the provisions of the Act. Learned Counsel in this connection referred to the decision of a Division Bench in State of Madras v. Parisutha Nadar4, wherein Jagadisan, J., observed ; "Sections 11 to 14 are equally mandatory enabling the ryot or the landholder to claim ryotwari patta in accordance whith the terms of the said sections. Learned Counsel in this connection referred to the decision of a Division Bench in State of Madras v. Parisutha Nadar4, wherein Jagadisan, J., observed ; "Sections 11 to 14 are equally mandatory enabling the ryot or the landholder to claim ryotwari patta in accordance whith the terms of the said sections. The immunity from dispossession as vouchsafed under the proviso to section 3 (d) in favour persons in possession of parcels of lands in the estate is part and parcel of the vesting of the entire estate in favour of the State Government, and it can be said that to the extent to which this right of immunity has to be recognised the operation of the vesting itself has to be limited. The Act does not create new rights of ownership and the grant of ryotwari patta under the Act is not a conferment of rights by way of grant or conveyance. The obtaining of ryotwari patta by the persons entitled to such patta under the Act can if at all be only in recognition of pre-existing rights of ownership. A ryotwari patta granted by the Revenue Authorities in respect of lands in a Government village is not a title deed but is only a bill for rent." Similar views have been taken by another Division Bench (Veeraswami, J. and Krishnaswamy Reddy, J.) in Md. Mustafa v. Udayanachiammal5. The learned Judges held: "We think that the issue of patta is in recognition of the title that inhered before the notified date and continued to inhere in the landholder thereafter to the private lands but only with this difference that after the notification the tenure of the land is no longer pannai or private but on grant of ryotwari patta become ryotwai land subject to payment of assessment." Learned Counsel contends that the earlier cases finding against the jurisdiction of a civil Court have proceeded in the view that the effect of the Act was to abolish the pre-existing rights of a ryot in his land and that rights thereafter must be claimed or flowed from the provisions of the Act alone, that is fresh rights are conferred under the Act after the vesting of the estate in its entirety in the State. Besides contending for a new approach, learned Counsel drew my attention to the decision of a Division Bench of this Court (Ramachandra Iyer, C.J. and Ramakrishnan, J. in Ratnagiri Meenakshi Ammal v. The Manager of Estates, Bodinayakanur1, wherein it was observed: "..............the appellant has a remedy by way of suit to vindicate her rights if any to ryotwari patta. It has been held by one of us sitting alone that it will be open to a ryot in a village which has been taken over by Government under Act XXVI of 1948 to file a civil suit for establishing his right to the grant of ryotwari patta. We consider that in the circumstances of the case the appropriate course for the appellant to follow would be to establish her claim to ryotwari patta by means of a suit." These observations of the Division Bench are claimed as directly in favour of the plaintiff in the present case. The Bench is of the view that a civil suit is competent to establish a claim to the grant of a ryotwari patta. In Meenakshisundaram Iyer v. The State of Madras2, a question arose whether the particular lands were ryotwari lands or not. Patta under section 11 was disallowed and the petitioner for certiorari failed before the Assistant Settlement Officer., the Director of Settlement and the Board of Revenue. The lands in question had been surveyed as river and path Porambokes. Observing that the petitions involved the determination, of the question as to title of the petitioner to obtain ryotwari patta under section 11 of the Abolition Act, the learned Judge Ramachandra Iyer, J. as he then was said that he had already taken the view that a question as to title to obtain a patta under section 11 can be adjudicated by a civil Court, that the petitioner had already issued notice under section 80, Civil Procedure Code and that in the circumstances the rule nisi should be discharged. No doubt the question was not considered on objection being taken in a suit. It will be apparent from the above citations that apart from the new angle of approach which learned Counsel for the plaintiff pleads for, there is conflict of authorities. A Division Bench has categerically upheld the claim of a person to adjudicate in a civil Court his right to patta. It will be apparent from the above citations that apart from the new angle of approach which learned Counsel for the plaintiff pleads for, there is conflict of authorities. A Division Bench has categerically upheld the claim of a person to adjudicate in a civil Court his right to patta. There may be no discussion; but the pronouncement is clear and categorical. Having regard to the importance of the question raised, it is desirable that the matter should be determined by a Division Bench. I direct that the papers may be placed before my Lord the Chief Justice for orders for posting of the case before a Division Bench. In Second Appeal (S. A. No. 338 of 1963) came on for hearing before him Natesan, J., made the following ORDER*.- The State of Madras whose objection to the jurisdiction of a civil Court to entertain the suit in question has been overruled by the Courts below, has preferred this second appeal. The merits of the case have not been under challenge before me. The plaintiffs instituted the suit against the State for a declaration of their title to and possession of the plaint schedule property and for an injunction restraining the State from interfering with the plaintiff’s enjoyment of the property. Defendants 2 and 3 sailed with the plaintiffs, and the declaration and injunction were to enure in their favour also against the State. The property bearing Adangal No. 1361 is situated in a Mitta village which has been taken over by the Government under the Abolition Act. The patta in respect of the property shows an extent of 7 acres 85 cents. Subsequent to the abolition of estates, there has been a survey and Adangal No. 1361 has been made into three Sub-divisions-S. No. 193/1 of an extent of 3 acres 10 cents, S. No. 193/2 of 1 acre 66 cents and S. No. 193/3 of an extent of 1 acre 55 cents. S. Nos. 193/2 and 193/3 are treated as Oorani and Odai Porambokes and S. No. 193/1 is alone recognised as patta land. It is in those circumstances the plaintiffs came with the suit in question. It is the plaintiff’s case that there is no poramboke in Adangal No. 1361 and even now the three sub-divisions taken together give only 6 acres 31 cents. It is in those circumstances the plaintiffs came with the suit in question. It is the plaintiff’s case that there is no poramboke in Adangal No. 1361 and even now the three sub-divisions taken together give only 6 acres 31 cents. The Courts below on the merits find that the village register did not show the existence of any Odai Poramboke in the Adangal No. They point out that from Adangals and pattas it is seen that the entire land had been under cultivation, and that S. No. 193/2 has always been a cultivable land. The Courts below find that except for some measurements by the Government there is no evidence at all to show that S. No. 193/2 is poramboke and it is observed that it is not possible to explain how the survey authorities found the plot to be poramboke. The plaintiffs claim that the entire area has been enjoyed as ryoti land for upwards of 100 years and that there has never been any Oorani on the plot within living memory. On ample and substantial evidence, after observing that a Court cannot proceed on surmises and conjuctures, the Courts below find for the plaintiffs on the merits. There appears to have been some proceedings under section 11 of the Act even before the general settlement in the village. It is found that an enquiry under section 11 was taken up in advance, as the Government wanted to build Police Lines in the village and directed the village officers to point out some Poramboke area suitable for erecting buildings. There was no specific notice to the plaintiffs in whose names the property stood recorded as registered Pattadars. A distressing feature that has to be noticed in this case is a reference in the proceedings before the Assistant Settlement Officer of more or less an ukase from the Collector requiring him to declare that the land is not ryoti land. It is admitted by the Village Officers that there is a land register maintained by the Mitta Officer which would show the boundaries of each Adangal number, but the register has been kept back and not produced in spite of requisition by the plaintiffs. In these circumstances, there has been no challenge before me to the findings on the merits of the plaintiffs’ title and right to possession of the plaint schedule property. In these circumstances, there has been no challenge before me to the findings on the merits of the plaintiffs’ title and right to possession of the plaint schedule property. As in the other case S.A. No. 1149 of 1962, for the State the jurisdiction of a civil Court to entertain the suit is questioned. The decisions in Ramaswami Naicker v. Parimala Pandian1, Parvathi Ammal v. Ponniah Nadar2, Somasundaram Servia v. The State of Madras3and State of Madras v. Swaminathan4, are directly in favour of the State. There are observations in Soosai Udayar v. Andiyappan5, which have been approved by a Division Bench in Adakalathammal v. Chinnayan Panipundar6, and which takes the same view. As against this a different view is expressed in Meenakshisundaram Iyer v. The State of Madras7, and the same view is found stated by a Division Bench in Ratnagiri Meenakshi Ammal v. The Manager of Estates8. It is in this state of authorities I have referred the question in S.A. No. 1149 of 1962 to a Division Bench. I have discussed therein two Division Bench cases which take a new angle of approach on the impact of the Abolition Act in respect of existing rights in estates. An aspect of the matter which requires emphasis is that when the claim is by a landholder for patta, there is ample provi ion for determination of the matter by a judicial officer of the rank of a District Judge, while if the claim happens to be that of a ryot for patta and the State treats the land as poramboke there is no provision for adjudication of his claim by any judicial officer. Specific provision for a hierarchy of tribunals is not made in this regard. It is well established that the question about the exclusion of a civil Court either expressly or by necessary implication must be considered in the light of the words used in the related statutory provision on which the plea is rested, the scheme of the provisions in the statute, their object and purpose. The object of the Abolition Act is to provide for the repeal of the Permanent Settlement, the acquisition of the rights of the landholder in permanently settled and certain other estates and the introduction of ryotwari settlement in the estates. The object is not to deprive the actual ryot of his holding . The object of the Abolition Act is to provide for the repeal of the Permanent Settlement, the acquisition of the rights of the landholder in permanently settled and certain other estates and the introduction of ryotwari settlement in the estates. The object is not to deprive the actual ryot of his holding . Rather the idea behind the Act is to affirm the holdings to the ryot on a more permanent basis on the ryotwari system. The character or relationship in which the holding is held is changed from that of occupancy tenant to that of a ryotwari proprietor. Can it be said in this context that an adequate remedy to an affected ryot is provided in the statute itself when the State claims that the land is not a holding but promboke? The present case is a good illustration for the position that a civil Court’s jurisdiction should not be readily assumed to be taken away. Here a direction goes from a superior revenue officer for an advance settlement in respect the field treating the same as Poramboke. If the matter has come up before this Court in its jurisdiction under Article 226, I have no doubt the order would have been quashed. But the jurisdiction of this Court generally under Article 226 is limited and when the determination purports to be on the merits the suit or would have to establish that there is absolutely no evidence for the finding which goes against him not always an easy task. In this connection I may refer to the observations of Romer, L.J., in Lee v. Showmen’s Guild of Great Britain1, that the proper tribunals for the determination of legal disputes are the Courts and they are the only tribunals which, by training and experience, and assisted by properly qualified Advocates, are fitted for the task and that naturally the Courts jealously uphold and safeguard the prima facie privilege of every man to resort to them for the determination and enforcement of his legal rights. In these circumstances, I direct that this second appeal also may be placed before my Lord the Chief Justice for orders as to posting it before a Division Bench along with S.A. No. 1149 of 1962. In these circumstances, I direct that this second appeal also may be placed before my Lord the Chief Justice for orders as to posting it before a Division Bench along with S.A. No. 1149 of 1962. These Second Appeals, on reference from the orders of Natesan, J., dated 7th April, 1967, in the two Second Appeals then came on for hearing before the Division Bench (Srinivasan and Sadasivam, JJ.). The Advocate General and The Additional Government Pleader, for Appellant. V. Vedantachari, and K. Parasaran, for Respondents. The Court delivered the following JUDGMENT*- The State of Madras is the appellant in these second appeals, which came up originally before Natesan, J., who considered it desirable that they should be decided by a Division Bench, in view of the conflicting decisions as to the jurisdiction of civil Courts to give declaration of title in respect of property included in an estate taken over by the Government by virtue of the Madras Estates (Abolition and Conversion into Ryotwari) Act, 1948, hereinafter referred to as “the Act.” It is really unnecessary to deal with the concurrent findings of fact in both these second appeals and, in fact, Natesan, J., has in his orders of reference in these second appeals, observed that there has been no challenge before him with regard to the findings on the merits of the title put forward by the plaintiff in each of the second appeals. It is sufficient to refer to the findings of fact to appreciate the question of jurisdiction raised in these second appeals. Ramalinga Swamigal Madam, represented by its trustee is the plaintiff, respondent in S.A. No. 1149 of 1962. The Madam is situated in a portion of Survey No. 114 in Sivaganga Estate, which formed the subject-matter of the suit. Even in January, 1938, the Sivaganga Estate recognised the actual enjoyment of the suit property by the Madam and assigned the same to the plaintiff subject to payment of rent Re. 1 per acre, besides cesses. S.No. 114 now stands sub-divided into S. No. 114/1 measuring 7 cents and S.No. 114/2 measuring 3 acres 48 cents. Even in January, 1938, the Sivaganga Estate recognised the actual enjoyment of the suit property by the Madam and assigned the same to the plaintiff subject to payment of rent Re. 1 per acre, besides cesses. S.No. 114 now stands sub-divided into S. No. 114/1 measuring 7 cents and S.No. 114/2 measuring 3 acres 48 cents. The State of Madras, the defendant-appellant, pleaded that S. No. 114/1 was occupied by Udayanatchiamman Koil worshipped by the Harijans and that S.No. 114/2 contained a public Oorani, a burial ground for the Asari community and another burial ground for the Brahmins and claimed the entire suit property as a communal poramboke property. After the Abolition Act, the respondent sought recognition of its title. On 29th December, 1953, the Additional Assistant Settlement Officer, Sivaganga, informed the plaintiff-respondent that its petition would be considered at the time of enquiry under section 11 of the Act. The Assistant Settlement Officer Sivaganga passed the order Exhibit B-4 dated 25th June, 1954 purporting to act suo motu, and also on the petition of Sutha Chaitanya Swamigal, holding that no one was entitled to a ryotwari patta in respect of the suit property. There is nothing to show that this order was communicated to the plaintiff-respondent till it was sent to it by way of a reply to the suit notice. The Courts below found that it had been established by ample evidence that the suit property was only the private property of the plaintiff-Madam by reason of the assignment made by the Sivaganga Estate, and this finding is one of fact, which was not the subject of challenge before Natesan, J., when the second appeal came up before him. The findings in S.A. No. 338 of 1963 on the file of this Court, are rested on even stronger grounds than in the other case. The suit property in this second appeal bearing Adangal No. 1361 is situated in a mitta village, taken over by the Government under the Abolition Act. The patta in respect of the property gives the extent as 7 acres 85 cents. There has been a survey in the village subsequent to the abolition of the estate and Adangal No. 1361 has been sub-divided into S.No. 193/1 measuring 3 acres 10 cents, 193/2 measuring 1 acre 66 cents and 193/3 measuring 1 acre 55 cents. S. No. 193/1 alone has been recognised as patta land. There has been a survey in the village subsequent to the abolition of the estate and Adangal No. 1361 has been sub-divided into S.No. 193/1 measuring 3 acres 10 cents, 193/2 measuring 1 acre 66 cents and 193/3 measuring 1 acre 55 cents. S. No. 193/1 alone has been recognised as patta land. S.Nos. 193/2 and 193/3 have been treated as Oorani and Odai Porambokes. The claim of the plaintiffs is that the entire exent in the old Adangal No. 1361 comprising the several sub-divisions of the new S.No. 193 have been enjoyed as ryoti land for over a century and that there has never been any Oorani in the land within living memory. On ample and substantial evidence, the Courts below found in favour of the plaintiffs on the merits of the case. A distressing feature of the case noticed by Natesan, J., is that, even before the commencement of the enquiry contemplated under section 11 of the Act, proceedings were taken in advance by the Assistant Settlement Officer as the Government wanted to build Polite lines in the village and directed the Village Officers to point out some poramboke area suitable for erecting buildings and the Assistant Settlement Officer has practically complied with the directions of the Collector in finding that the land in dispute is not ryoti land. It is admitted by the Village Officers that there is a Land Register maintained by the Mitta Office which would show the boundaries of each Adangal number, but the register has been kept back and not produced in spite of the requisition by the plaintiffs. Natesan, J., has referred to the direction from a superior Revenue Officer for an advance settlement in respect of the suit land treating the same as poramboke and observed that if the matter had come up before this Court in its jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, he had no doubt that the order would have been quashed. It is clear from the order of reference made by Natesan, J., that there has been no challenge before him with regard to the findings on the merits of the plaintiffs’ title and right to possession of the plaint schedule property. Thus the decision in each of the second appeals depends entirely on the question whether a civil Court has jurisdiction to entertain the suit by the plaintiff in each case. Thus the decision in each of the second appeals depends entirely on the question whether a civil Court has jurisdiction to entertain the suit by the plaintiff in each case. The contention of the learned Advocate-General is that the State, having rightly or wrongly held that the suit property is communal poramboke, the civil Court would have no jurisdiction to entertain the suit for declaration of title to the suit property, having regard to the provisions of the Abolition Act. Sri Vedantachari appearing for the respondents in these second appeals contended that having regard to the Preamble and purpose of the Act, the interest of the ryot is not in any way Intended to be affected and it did not vest in the Government, that the Act is intended only for the acquisition of the rights of landholder, that there is no machinery provided under the Act to determine whether the land in the possession of a tenant is a ryoti land or poramboke land and that even if the title of a tenant for a ryotwari patta is considered by a Settlement Officer for purpose of granting patta, it would only be a collateral or incidental adjudication of title which would not preclude a civil Court by virtue of anything contained in section 64-G of the Act from deciding questions of title. We may at once mention that conflicting views have been expressed in several decisions and in some cases even by the same judge and hence the question for decision is not free from difficulty. Under section 9 of the Civil Procedure Code, “the Court shall (subject to the provisions herein contained) have jurisdiction to try all suits of a civil nature excepting suits of which their cognizance is either expressly or impliedly barred.” It is a well known principle that a party seeking to oust the jurisdiction of ordinary civil Courts must establish his right to do so. Natesan, J., has in his order of reference in S. A. No. 338 of 1963 referred to the observations of Romer, L. J. in Lee v. Showmen’s Guild of Great Britain1, that “the proper tribunal for the determination of legal disputes are the Courts and they are the only tribunals which, by training and experience, and assisted by properly qualified Advocates are fitted for the task and that, naturally the Courts zealously uphold and safeguard the prima facie privilege of every man to resort to them for the determination and enforcement of his legal rights.” He has further observed that the [claim forming the subject-matter of that second appeal is a good illustration for the position that a civil Court’s jurisdiction should not be readily assumed to be taken away. In Secretary of State for India v. Mask & Co.2, the Privy Council stated it as settled law that the exclusion of the jurisdiction of the Civil Court is not to be readily inferred, but that such exclusion must be explicitly expressed or clearly implied. Willes, J., in his classical judgment in Wolverhampton Mew Waterworks Co. v. Hawkesford3 , has explained the scope of the above principle in the following passage: “There are three classes of cases in which a liability may be established founded upon a statute. One is where there was a liability existing at Common Law and that liability is affirmed by a statute which gives special and peculiar form of remedy different from the remedy which existed at Common Law ; there, unless the statute contains words which expressly or by necessary implication exclude the Common Law remedy, the party suing has his election to pursue either that or the statutory remedy. The second class of cases is, where the statute gives the right to sue merely, but provides no particular form of remedy. There, the party can only proceed by action at Common Law. But, there is a third class, viz., where a liability not existing at Common Law is created by a statute which at the same time gives a special and particular remedy for enforcing it. There, the party can only proceed by action at Common Law. But, there is a third class, viz., where a liability not existing at Common Law is created by a statute which at the same time gives a special and particular remedy for enforcing it. The remedy provided by the statute must be followed and it is not competent to the party to pursue the course applicable to cases of the second class.” Ramachandra Iyer, J., as he then was, has rightly pointed out in Soosai Odayar v. Andiyappan4, that the right to obtain ryotwari patta was not a Common Law right of the ryot who was holding under the landholder in an estate, that the said right is conferred on a ryot by virtue of the Act and that such a right is a creature of the statute and the remedy provided by the statute should be deemed to be the exclusive remedy on the basis of the third category of the cases mentioned in the above passage of Willes, J., Ramachandra Iyer, J., has explained that this is not really exclusion of jurisdiction of the Court, but as stated by Maxwell in his Interpretation of Statutes (10th edition) at page 132: “Where indeed a new duty or cause of action is created by statute, and a special jurisdiction out of the course of the Common Law is prescribed there is no ouster of the ordinary Courts for they never had any.” Thus if a claim is made to obtain a ryotwari patta under the provisions of the Act, civil Courts would have no jurisdiction to entertain the same as a machinery has been provided for in the Act for the said purpose. Sri Vedantachari urged on the strength of the Preamble and the other provisions of the Act that the interests of a ryot in an estate did not vest in the Government under the Act. He stressed on the fact that the purpose of the Act was to bring into existence ryotwari tenure in estates and that the Act was not intended to destroy the rights of the ryot ,or to vest them in the Government. He relied on the proviso to section 3 (d) of the Act. He stressed on the fact that the purpose of the Act was to bring into existence ryotwari tenure in estates and that the Act was not intended to destroy the rights of the ryot ,or to vest them in the Government. He relied on the proviso to section 3 (d) of the Act. which safeguards the rights of a ryot to remain in possession of a ryoti land and of a landlord to remain in possession of his private lands, pending the grant of ryotwari patta under the Act. It is true there are observations in several decisions that in granting ryotwari pattas to a ryot for ryoti land and to a landholder for his private land in an estate, the pre-existing title is recognised and given effect to under the provisions of the Act. Thus, in Writ C.M.Ps. Nos. 8017 etc. of 1950, attack was made on the provisions contained in section 27 of the Act, excluding the income from the lands for which the landholder is entitled to a ryotwari patta in computing the gross annual demand for the purpose of fixing compensation, as a fraud on the Constitution. But the said contention was negatived on the ground that a Zamindar cannot both have the lands and also ask for the income from the lands to be included in the computation of the basic annual sum. It is observed in that decision that the ownership of the land which was originally subject to peishcush continued to be with the Zamindar subject to payment of kist. The above decision has been followed in Seethalakskmi Ammal v. Krishnaswami Rao1, where Ramaswami, J., has pointed out that it has been held in the said case that practically there has been no change by reason of the Act in so far as pannai lands are concerned and that instead of the burden of peishcush, there is the burden of ryotwari assessment and that the Zamindar cannot both have the lands and also ask for the income from the lands to be included in the computation of the basic annual sum, for the ownership of the lands, subject to assessment, continues to be with the Zamindar and that therefore there is no real grievance on that account. There was an appeal against the above decision of Ramaswami, J., and the judgment of the appellate Court is reported in Seethalakskmi Ammal v. Krishnaswami Rao2. There was an appeal against the above decision of Ramaswami, J., and the judgment of the appellate Court is reported in Seethalakskmi Ammal v. Krishnaswami Rao2. It was held in this decision that the ownership of the private lands must be deemed to continue with the Zamindar and that there has only been a change of the nature of the burden on such land. It was held that the charge for unpaid purchase money would continue to subsist over the private lands for which a ryotwari patta had been issued to the landholder. The decision in Rana Sheo Ambar Singh v. Allahabad Bank3. turned on the construction of section 18 of the U. P. Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act I of 1951, which is different from the Madras Act. By virtue of sections 4 and 6 of the said Uttar Pradesh Act, the entire estate vested in the State, and the bhumidari rights created under section 18 of the said Act conferred new rights on the intermediary and hence it was held that the said bhumidari rights cannot be followed by a mortgagee, who had taken a mortgage prior to the Abolition Act, as substituted security. In Sidheshwar Prasad v. Ram Saroop4, a Full Bench of the Patna High Court distinguished the above decision of the Supreme Court. It was held in this Full Bench decision that by virtue of sections 4 and 6 of the Bihar Land Reforms Act, XXX of 1950, the bakasht lands constituted an entity separate and distinct from the estate which has vested in the State without reservation, that the intermediaries became statutory tenants in respect of the said bakasht lands, that the bakasht lands could be proceeded against by the mortgagees who had taken a mortgage of the lands prior to the said Bihar Land Reforms Act and that this is on the doctrine of substituted security. This decision follows the above Supreme Court decision in recognising the principle that the vesting of the estate has not the effect of destroying the mortgage, but that the mortgage could operate only on. that portion of the hypotheca which has not vested in the State. The above decisions have all been referred to in Md. Mustafa Marakayar v. Md. This decision follows the above Supreme Court decision in recognising the principle that the vesting of the estate has not the effect of destroying the mortgage, but that the mortgage could operate only on. that portion of the hypotheca which has not vested in the State. The above decisions have all been referred to in Md. Mustafa Marakayar v. Md. Aliar Marakayar1, which upheld the right of a mortgagee to proceed against the pannai lands of the mortgagor subsequent to the grant of ryotwari patta to the landholder in pursuance of the Act. It has been held in this decision that both possession and title of a person who is entitled to a ryotwari patta are saved from the effect of the notification under section 3 (b) of the Act and the ownership in such lands continue in the quondam landholder notwithstanding the notification and the fact that it is subject to determination of the character of the land for which he will be entitled to a ryotwari patta. It is observed in this decision that the change brought about is not with regard to the ownership but in respect of the tenure of the land for which ryotwari patta is granted. It is clear from the decision that the grant of patta under sections 12 to 14 of the Act read with the protection of continued posses ion of the private land with the landlord is only in recognition of the anterior title which is continued with different incidence from the standpoint of revenue and the relationship of landlord and tenant. It is pointed out in this decision that the position under the Madras Act appears to be very akin to that of the Bihar Act which was under consideration in Sidheswar Prasad v. Ram Saroop2, and that there is nothing in the Madras Act corresponding to section 18 of the Uttar Pradesh Act. The State of Madras v. Parisutha Nadar3, it has been held that it is not open to the Government in the course of the proceedings to put forward its own title to the property sought to be acquired so as to defeat the rights of the persons entitled to the compensation. It is true the decision is based on the principle of estoppel. It is true the decision is based on the principle of estoppel. It was contended by the State in that case that in the absence of ryotwari patta in favour of the claimant in the land acquisition proceedings, the mere possession of the land with the claimant (ryot) would not give him a right to claim compensation amount. But the contention was negatived in that case. It was held in this decision that a claimant could claim the benefit of the proviso to section 3 (d) of the Act, if he is sought to be dispossessed from his holding and that he could not be dispossessed under the provisions of the Land Acquisition Act without being paid compensation. This decision supports several of the contentions put forward by Sri Vedantachari. It is pointed out in this decision that the Preamble to the Act indicates that the Act was intended to provide for the repeal of the Permanent Settlement and for the acquisition of the rights of the landholders in permanently settled estates and other estates in the State of Madras and for the introduction of Ryotwai i Settlement in, such estates. The effect of the said conversion is stated in the following passage at page 289: “In this process of statutory conversion of erstwhile Zamin and inam estates into ryotwari villages, it was the landholder who lost his existence as such. Even this landholder, despite the Act, is not deprived of the holding of his private lands as he had a right to obtain a ryotwari patta in respect of such lands. The vesting of the entire estate as provided for under section 3 of the Act free of all encumbrances and the transfer to the Government have got to be understood and interpreted in the light of the object of the enactment and should not be construed as having brought about a total abolition of all rights of ownership of properties lying within the limits of the taken over estate.” It is further held in the decision that the obtaining of ryotwari patta by the person entitled to such patta under the Act can, if at all, be only in recognition of the pre existing rights of ownership. Though the pre-existing title of a ryot in a ryoti land and of a landholder in a private land is recognised for granting a ryotwari patta under the Act, it cannot affect the clear language of section 3 of the Act that what vests in the Government is the entire estate and the words used in the section are wide enough to include the vesting of the ryoti land of a ryot and the private land of a landholder. In Kumararajah of Venkatagiri v. State of Andhra Pradesh1, it was urged that the Long Title and the Preamble to the Act indicate that the object of the Act is to provide for the acquisition of the rights of landholders and that the policy of the Act is not to interfere with the rights of other persons in the estate. But it has been pointed out by the Supreme Court that this assumption, however, is not borne out by the substantive provisions of the Act itself and that section 3 sets forth the consequences which ensue on the notification of an estate and that it is clear that on an estate being notified, the entire estate is to stand transferred to the Government and all rights and interests created in or over the estate before the notified date by the principal or any other landholder must, as against the Government, cease and determine. All the above decisions, where the question of vesting of the estate in the Government has been considered, relate to suits to enforce mortgages, or charges. In Barmeshwar Hath v. Babu Kuer Rai2, it has been held that where a mortgage consists of several items of properties, some of which have vested in the State under the provisions of the Bihar Act XXX of 1950 and others have not to vested, the mortgagee has the option to elect whether he will seek his remedy under section 14, or will proceed in the civil Court as against the non-vested properties, but he cannot have both the remedies. It has been further held in this decision that a suit for enforcing the mortgage in such a case will be perfectly maintainable as against the non-vested mortgaged properties, but in no case the mortgaged properties vested in the State could be proceeded against in the Civil Court. It has been further held in this decision that a suit for enforcing the mortgage in such a case will be perfectly maintainable as against the non-vested mortgaged properties, but in no case the mortgaged properties vested in the State could be proceeded against in the Civil Court. The right to proceed against the properties taken over under the Abolition Act and vested again in the mortgagor, whether he be landlord owning pannai lands, or ryot owning ryoti lands, really proceeds on the well-known equitable doctrine of substituted security, the principle of which is embodied in section 74 of the Transfer of Property Act. As pointed out by Mulla in his Transfer of Property Act, section 73 of the Transfer of Property Act is an instance of the application of the doctrine of substituted security, viz., that the mortgagee is, for the purpose of his security, entitled not only to the mortgaged property, but also to anything that is substituted for it. If the subject of the mortgage is the undivided share of the joint sharers effecting a partition, the mortgagee must pursue his remedy against the share allotted in severalty to his mortgagor and in the absence of fraud or collussion, the co-sharers of the mortgagor would hold their shares free of the mortgage. Mulla has pointed out that this is a case not dealt with in section 73 of the Transfer of Property Act, to which the same doctrine applies. Another illustration of this principle of substituted security is given by Sri L. G. Mukherje in his Law of Transfer of Property, second edition, page 182. Suppose the land mortgaged is sold in public auction and purchased by a third party from whom the mortgagor re-purchases the land. Here, the moment the hypotheca comes back into the hands of the mortgagor, it is again responsible for the mortgagee’s claims. It is true the decision in Rana Sheo Ambar Singh v. Allahabad Bank3, appears at first sight to conflict with the above view. But it could be distinguished on the ground that it proceeded on a construction of section 18 of the Uttar Pradesh Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act. It is true the decision in Rana Sheo Ambar Singh v. Allahabad Bank3, appears at first sight to conflict with the above view. But it could be distinguished on the ground that it proceeded on a construction of section 18 of the Uttar Pradesh Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act. Hence, however attractive the arguments of Sri Vedantachari are, it is not possible to accede to them in full and find that the rights of a ryot in a ryoti land are not affected by the Act, that they do not vest in the Government and therefore, any claim to such right could not be the subject-matter of any decision under the Act, but could be dealt with only by civil Courts. Section 64-G of the Act provides for finality of orders passed under the Act and it runs as follows: “(1) Any order passed by the Government or other authority under this Act in respect of matters to be determined for the purposes of this Act shall, subject to any appeal or revision provided by or under this Act., be final. (2) No such order shall be liable to be questioned in any Court of Law.” The contention of Sri Vedantachari is that there is no provision in the Act enabling a ryot of a ryoti land in an estate abolished under the Act, to put forward a claim for a ryotwari patta, unlike in the case of a landholder, on whom sections 12 to 14 of the Act confers a right to apply for the issue of a ryotwari patta. There is no provision for a Settlement Officer to investigate into the claim of any ryot in an estate abolished under the Act, for a ryotwari patta corresponding to section 15 of the Act, which empowers the Settlement Officer to determine the private lands in respect of which the landholder is entitled to a ryotwari patta. Section 11 of the Act provides for grant of ryotwari patta to a ryot in respect of a ryoti land in his possession. In State of Madras v. Karuppiah Ambalam1, Ramachandra Iyer, J., as he then was, has pointed out that there is no provision for deciding the character of the lands which is claimed to be ryoti lands as it is evidently presumed that every cultivable land is ryoti land. In State of Madras v. Karuppiah Ambalam1, Ramachandra Iyer, J., as he then was, has pointed out that there is no provision for deciding the character of the lands which is claimed to be ryoti lands as it is evidently presumed that every cultivable land is ryoti land. He has however pointed out that section 3 (d) proviso would seem to contemplate a decision by the Settlement Officer as to whether a person in possession would be entitled to patta which would include a determination whether a land was a ryoti land or not, and that Rules have been framed under section 67 of the Act to regulate the granting of pattas by a Government notification dated 2nd March, 1955. Ramachandra Iyer, J., in Soosai Udayar v. Andiayappan2relied on the provisions of section 56 of the Act, (since repealed) as providing an agency to decide disputes as to who was the lawful ryot of a holding prior to the notification. Section 56 of the Act ran as follows: “(1) Where an estate is notified and a dispute arises as to (a) whether any rent due from a ryot for any fasli year is in arrear or (b) what amount of rent is in arrear or (c) who the lawful ryot in respect of any holding is, the dispute shall be decided by the Settlement Officer. (2) Any person deeming himself aggrieved by any decision of the Settlement Officer under sub-section (1) may within two months from the date of the decision or such further time as the Tribunal may in its discretion allow, appeal to the Tribunal; and its decision shall be final and not be liable to be questioned in any Court of law.” It is true under section 56 (1) of the Act a Settlement Officer has to decide as to who is the lawful ryot in respect of any holding. But it is clear that the section was intended to provide a machinery for summary decision as between rival claimants for ryotwari patta solely for the purpose of deciding from whom the kist should be collected. But it is clear that the section was intended to provide a machinery for summary decision as between rival claimants for ryotwari patta solely for the purpose of deciding from whom the kist should be collected. In fact, section 56 of the Act has since been repealed and the effect of the same has been considered in Adakalathammal v. Chinnayan Panipundar3 , and in Krishnaswami Thevar v. Perumal Konar4, section 21 (1) of the Act provides for the survey of the estates taken over under the Act and section 22 of the Act provides the manner of effecting ryotwari settlement of estate. In Venkata Subba Rao v. State of Andhra5, Chandra Reddy, C.J., as he then was, held in a Division Bench judment, that a combined reading of section 3 (d) and section 11 of the Act will result in the inescapable conclusion that jurisdiction was vested in the Settlement Officer to decide whether a ryot was entitled to a ryotwari patta of ryoti land. This view has also been expressed in several decisions of our own High Court. It is sufficient to refer to the recent decision of Venkataraman, J, in Somasundara Servai v State of Madras6. Chandra Reddy, C. J., has pointed out in the decision referred to above that the Legislature intended that the rights and obligations should be worked out as speedily as possible by the tribunals set up under the Act. Normally, there would be no difficulty in determining the ryoti land in an estate having regard to the exchange of pattas between the landlord and ryot and other records kept under the provisions of the Estates Land Act. Having regard to section 21 of the Act providing for survey of the estates, and the proviso to section 3 (d) protecting the possession of a ryot in a ryoti land and the general section 11 providing for the grant of ryotwari patta to such ryots, it could not be said that the Act does not contemplate an order by the authority under the Act for grant of ryotwari patta and there could be no doubt about the finality of such an order under section 64-C of the Act. We have already pointed out that the grant of a ryotwari patta under the Act is a right created under the Act and that the machinery provided under the Act is the only remedy for obtaining ryotwari patta. If the provisions of the Act are disregarded and the principles of natural justice are violated, it would certainly be open to an aggrieved party to obtain relief under the writ jurisdiction of this Court. In some of the earlier writs, Ramachandra Iyer, J, as he then was, has expressed his opinion that a ryot who has failed to obtain patta under section 11 of the Act has got a remedy by way of suit. Thus in Writ Petitions Nos. 759 and 760 of 1958, which involved the determination of the question as to the title of the petitioners to obtain ryotwari patta under section 11 of the Act, Ramachandra Iyer, J., dismissed the petitions at the admission stage after expressing his view that the question as to title and the right to obtain patta under section 11 of the Act could be adjudicated by a civil Court. In a subsequent Writ Appeal 147 of 1959, Ramachandra Iyer, C.J., as he then was, took the same view and dismissed the appeal at the admission stage. The learned Advocate-General relied on the decision in Abdul Malick v. Collector of Dharmapuri1, in support of his contention that the above two judgments given by a Court per incuriam,, i. e., judgments rendered on hearing only one side, will have no force as precedents. We have pointed out that the right to secure patta is one given under the Act and it could be obtained only under the provisions of the Act. Therefore, no suit would lie for the grant of patta and this principle has been stated in several decisions. It is well recognised that in construing the plaint, the substance of the same should be looked into and not merely the form in which it has been couched and that if the suit is really one for patta, the civil Court would not entertain the same. Thus in Ramaswami v. Parimala Pandian2. it has been held that if the suit is in effect for grant of a ryotwari patta in respect of land in a notified estate, such a suit does not lie in a civil Court. Thus in Ramaswami v. Parimala Pandian2. it has been held that if the suit is in effect for grant of a ryotwari patta in respect of land in a notified estate, such a suit does not lie in a civil Court. The decisions in State of Madras v. Swaminathan3, and Somasundara Servai v. State of Madras4, that if the plaint is framed as one based upon the proviso to clause (d) of section 3 of the Act, the plaintiff will be entitled to sue for and obtain an injunction. The decisions under section 189 (3) of the Madras Estates Land Act as to the scope of that section are pretinent to the present case. The earlier decisions have all been considered in the Full Bench decision in Venhatarama Rao v. Venkayya5, It has been held in that case that a decision of a Revenue Court on a matter falling within its exclusive jurisdiction shall be binding on the parties and their representatives in any suit or proceedings in a civil Court and that a decision of a Revenue Court incidentally on a particular matter, which does not fall within its exclusive jurisidtion cannot be binding on the parties in a Civil Court. A decision of a Revenue Court as to a claim of occupancy right and the question whether particular lands are situated in an estate or not, are not within its exclusive jurisdiction and therefore it is not res judicata in a subsequent civil proceeding. In Raja Rajeswara Sethupathi v. Muthudayan6, it has been held by Philips and Madhavan Nair, JJ., that a decision of a Revenue Court in a suit by a tenant under section 55 of the Madras Estates Land Act that he was not entitled to demand a patta is res judicata on the ground that he was the occupancy tenant because of the provisions of section 189 (3) of that Act In this case, reference was made to the decision of Spencer, J., in Appa Rao v. Gurraiu1that the decision as to title in the Revenue Court was a decision on an incidental matter inasmuch as the patta had been ordered and its provisions were settled and it was observed that if the decision as to the occupancy right of the plaintiff in that suit could be deemed to be on an incidental matter, it would not constitute res judicata in the subsequent civil proceedings. But Philips, J., was however of the opinion that the claim for occupancy right which is the basis for the grant of a patta was within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Revenue Court and that the subsequent civil suit was barred. In the Full Bench decision in Venkatarama Rao v. Venkayya2, it has been held that "Raja Rajeswara Sethupathi v. Muthudayan3, was wrongly decided and is opposed to a considerable body of judicial opinion in our Court ". The Full Bench agreed with the interpretation of section 189 (3) of the Madras Estates Land Act adopted by successive Bench decisions referred to by it, namely, that it is only in respect of disputes or matters exclusively within the jurisdiction of a Revenue Court that its decision would be binding on the parties in a subsequent civil proceedings and not its decision on incidental disputes or matters which arise in the course of adjudicating on the disputes and matters not falling within its exclusive jurisdiction. The Supreme Court in Desika Charyulu v. State of A.P.4, has in considering the exclusive jurisdiction of the tribunal by virtue of the then existing section 9 (4) (c) of the Madras Estates (Abolition and Conversion into Ryotwari) Act XXVI of 1948, clearly enunciated the principles for deciding that question. Under the relevant provision considered by the Supreme Court in that decision, the decision of the Tribunal shall be final and not liable to be questioned in any Court of law. The very provision setting up an hierarchy of judicial tribunals for the determination of the question on which the applicability of the Act depends, as pointed out in that decision, is sufficient in most cases for inferring that the jurisdiction of the Civil Courts to try the same matter is barred. But even in such cases it has been held that this exclusion of jurisdiction of civil Courts would be subject to two limitations first even if the jurisdiction is so excluded, the civil Courts have jurisdiction to examine cases where the provisions of the Act have not been complied with, or the statutory tribunal has not acted in conformity with the fundamental principles of judicial procedure. The second is as regards the extent to which the powers of statutory tribunals are exclusive. The second is as regards the extent to which the powers of statutory tribunals are exclusive. The following principle formulated by Lord Esher on this point in The Queen v. The Commissioner for Special Purposes of the Income Tax5, has been quoted with approval by the Supreme Court: "When an inferior Court or tribunal, or body, which has to exercise the power of deciding facts, is first established by Act of Parliament, the Legislature has to consider what powers it will give the tribunal or body. It may in effect say that if a certain state of facts exists and is shown to such tribunal or body before it proceeds to do certain things, it shall have jurisdiction to do such things, but not otherwise. There it is not for them conclusively to decide whether that state of facts exists, and, if they exercise the jurisdiction without its existence, what they do may be questioned and it will be held that they have acted without jurisdiction. But there is another state of things which may exist. The Legislature may entrust the tribunal or body with a jurisdiction, which includes the jurisdiction to determine whether the preliminary state of facts exists as well as the jurisdiction, on finding that it does exist, to proceed further or do something more. When the Legislatures are establishing such a tribunal or body with limited jurisdiction, they also have to consider whatever jurisdiction they give them, whether there shall be any appeal from their decision, for otherwise there will be none. When the Legislatures are establishing such a tribunal or body with limited jurisdiction, they also have to consider whatever jurisdiction they give them, whether there shall be any appeal from their decision, for otherwise there will be none. In the second of the two cases I have mentioned it is an erroneous application of the formula to say that the tribunal cannot give themselves jurisdiction by wrongly deciding certain facts to exist because the Legislature gave them jurisdiction to determine all the facts including the existence of the preliminary facts on which the further exercise of their jurisdiction depends, and if they were given jurisdiction so to decide, without any appeal being given there is no appeal from such exercise of their jurisdiction." We have already referred to the decision in Krishnaswami Thevar v. Perumal Konar1and the observations at pages 170 and 171 which support the view that the grant or refusal of patta under section 11 of the Act cannot amount to a determination which will bar an adjudication of title and as to the character of the land by virtue of section 64-C of the Act. It is true that case relates to competing titles of rival claimants. But after the repeal of section 56 of the Act, there is no scope even for the semblance of an arguments that there is any machinery to decide the case of a claim to patta by rival claimants. If the claim of a ryot for a ryotwari patta is a matter which could be decided by a Settlement Officer by virtue of section 11 read with proviso (1) to section 3 (d) of the Act, it would stand to reason that the claim of a number of applicants for the same relief would equally fall under the same provisions. In Ramaswami v. Parimda Pandian2, Veeraswami, J., has expressed the view that the jurisdiction of the civil Court is certainly excluded from determining the nature of the lands in a notified estate and granting declarations of title. But he has added that where the nature of the land is determined and ryotwari patta is directed under the provisions of the Act, the question of conflicting claims to title may be a different matter, which may well come within the jurisdiction of the civil Court. But he has added that where the nature of the land is determined and ryotwari patta is directed under the provisions of the Act, the question of conflicting claims to title may be a different matter, which may well come within the jurisdiction of the civil Court. The finality under section 64-C of the Act is only in respect of matters to be determined for the purpose of the Act. Unlike in sections 12 to 14 of the Act for the grant of ryotwari patta to a landholder in respect of private lands, there is no similar express provision for any enquiry and grant of a ryotwari patta to a ryot in respect of a ryoti land. It is only by reading section 11 in the light of proviso (1) to section 3 (d) of the Act that an inference could be made that a Settlement Officer is enabled to grant a ryotwari patta to a ryot. In Writ Petitions Nos. 707 and 708 of 1957, on the file of this Court, Rajagopalan, J., accepted the contention that the proviso to section 3 (d) has to be read with section 22 of the Act and that the determination of the question whether a given person is entitled to a ryotwari patta is part of the Settlement Proceedings for which section 22 provides. He did not accept the contention of the learned Additional Government Pleader that the proviso to section 3 (d) confers the jurisdiction on the Settlement Officer independent of the jurisdiction conferred on him by section 22 of the Act, though he recognised the undoubted jurisdiction of the Settlement Officer to determine whether a claim by a ryot under section 11 of the Act is well founded and to determine whether a ryotwari patta should be issued to him. In Appeal No. 359 of 1961, on the file of this Court, Veeraswami, J., has, in delivering the judgment of the Division Bench, held that the issue of patta is in recognition of the title that inhered before the notified date and continued to inhere in the landholder thereafter to the private lands but only with this difference that after the notification the tenure of the land is no longer pannal or private, but on grant of ryotwari patta, becomes ryotwari land subject to payment of assessment. It is clear from the provisions of the Act that what really vests in the Government in respect of a ryoti or private land is merely title and there is no vesting of possession, which is protected under the proviso to section 3 (d) of the Act. So long as the possession of the land continues to vest in the ryot, he would be entitled to protect this right in respect of the same by resorting to civil Courts. This is clear from the decision of Krishnaswami Thevar v. Perumal Konar1. Ramachandra Iyer, J., as he then was has pointed out that irrespective of any question of title, the plaintiff could base his title on his antecedent possessory title and that if the defendant in such a case is able to obtain patta from the authorities, he can put forward a superior title under it in answer to the ‘plaintiffs’ claim. He has pointed out that this is but an illustration of the familiar rule of law that mere possessory title would avail against the rest of the world except the true owner. In Adakalathammal v. Chinaayyan1, it is pointed out that if a person has been in possession of a ryoti land, and any person has trespassed on his holding and no ryotwari patta has actually been granted to either of the persons, there is nothing prima facie in any of the provisions of the Act which prevents a civil Court from entertaining a suit for possession by a person who had been in possession and who had been dispossessed, though such a dispute would not necessarily mean that the successful party would be eventually entitled to a patta. It is pointed out in the decision that the jurisdiction conferred on the Settlement Officer was only for the purpose of the working of the Act, that is, to enable the grant of patta. The case related to the jurisdiction of civil Court to try a suit for possession and other incidental reliefs based! on title. In Bhagawan Dayal v. Reoti Devi2, the plaintiff claimed title to the suit properties and for an injunction restraining the execution of the decree obained by the defendant in a Revenue Court. It was held that the Revenue Court was not competent to try the subsequent suit filed in the civil Court and hence the civil Court’s jurisdiction was not ousted. It was held that the Revenue Court was not competent to try the subsequent suit filed in the civil Court and hence the civil Court’s jurisdiction was not ousted. On the same analogy by the claim made in these suits could not have been agitated before the Settlement Officers on applications for obtaining ryotwari patta. There is also no provision under section 11 of the Act read with the proviso 1 to section 3 (2) of the Act for the ascertainment of the character of the land, namely,, whether it is ryoti land, or communal land. The decision of a Settlement Officer. whether a land is ryoti land or not is only for the purpose of granting a ryotwari patta and it is only an incidental determination for the purpose of granting patta. In Venkatarama Rao v. Venkayya3, Rajamannar, C.J., in delivering the judgment of the Division Bench, agreed with the view of Spencer, J., in Appa Rao v. Gururaju4, that the dispute as to occupancy right and the question whether the lands are situated in an estate or not are not matters falling within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Revenue Court and differed, with respect, from the view of Philips, J., in Raja Rajeswara Sethupathi v. Muthudayan5, that the decision as regards the claim for occupancy right of the plaintiff was a matter falling within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Revenue Court, on the ground that it was not incidental to the grant of patta. In State of Madras v. Umayal Achi and another6, it was held that the civil Court had jurisdiction to entertain the suit for a mere injunction restraining the Government from arbitrarily and oppressively applying the provisions of the Land Encroachment Act to persons like the plaintiffs who have been in occupation of lands in a notified estate even prior to the date of the notification. It was contended by the learned Government Pleader in that case that the only course open to the plaintiffs was to apply to the Settlement Officer for the grant of a patta and that this Court had no jurisdiction to go into the question whether the plaintiffs were entitled to a ryotwari patta. This contention was negatived on the ground that there was no prayer in the suit for the grant of a ryotwari patta. This contention was negatived on the ground that there was no prayer in the suit for the grant of a ryotwari patta. It has been pointed out that the civil Court cannot itself grant a ryotwari patta to the plaintiffs, nor can it direct the Government to grant such a patta, as it is a matter entirely within the cognizance of the Special Officers on whom statutory powers have been conferred under the Act. But it was pointed out in that decision that there is no impediment to the plaintiffs obtaining the limited relief of injunction against dispossession which was all they had sought in that case. The decision of Jagadeesan, J. in State of Madras v. Ramaswami Chettiar and others7, distinguished the above decision on the ground that the provisions of the Land Encroachment Act were sought in aid by the State Government to evict a person from the possession of a Land in a quondam estate taken over under the Abolition Act, in stead of resorting to the special machinery provided in the Rules framed under the Act. The plaintiff in that case sued for a declaration that the land described in the plaint schedule belonged exclusively to him and that he was entitled to a ryotwari patta in respect thereof and for a permanant injunction restrating the State of Madras from interfering with his possession. Though he gave up the relief for declaration that he was entitled to a ryotwari patta in respect of the suit land, it was held that he could not be granted an injunction on the ground that the civil Court can have no jurisdiction to entertain a suit in which the relief asked for if granted may lead to the abrogation of the powers of the State under section 3 (d) of the Act. It is clear from the decision that the competency of the Court to grant a declaration and injunction and the propriety of granting such reliefs are distinct matters and they ought not to be mixed up. It was found in that case that the substance of the relief was for a declaration and injunction against the Government on the ground that the plaintiff was entitled to a ryotwari patta. It was found in that case that the substance of the relief was for a declaration and injunction against the Government on the ground that the plaintiff was entitled to a ryotwari patta. But the same learned Judge Jagadisan, J., in State of Madras v. Parisudda Nadar1, has expressed a different view, namely, that a ryotwari patta granted by the revenue authorities in respect of lands in a Government village is not a title deed, but only a bill for rent and that it is not as if the right of ownership of property in an estate which has been taken over cannot be proved except by the production of the ryotwari patta. Under the Abolition Act a claimant could claim benefit of the proviso to section 3 (d) of the Act if he was sought to be dispossessed from his holding. If such a right were to be recognised in favour of a claimant it follows that the State Government cannot put forward any obstacle In his way to receive the compensation amount under the Land Acquisition Act. In both these second appeals, the plaintiffs claimed title to the suit property by virtue of their possession, which is protected under section 3 (d) of the Act. There is no machinery in the Act to determine whether a land in an estate is a ryoti lands or a communal land. In S.A. No. 1149 of 1962 there was no enquiry in the presence of the plaintiff-Madam and there is nothing to show that the order that no one was entitled to a ryotwari patta in respect of the suit property was communicated to the Madam. In the other second appeal, the enquiry as to the character of the land was taken up in advance by the Assistant Settlement Officer and it was decided practically in pursuance of the direction given by the Government. It could not be said that there was any order passed by the Government, or other authority under the Act, in matters to be determined for the purpose of the Act as contemplated under section 64-C of the Act. It could not be said that there was any order passed by the Government, or other authority under the Act, in matters to be determined for the purpose of the Act as contemplated under section 64-C of the Act. Even in respect of an enquiry for grant of a ryotwari patta under section 11 real with section 3 (2) of the Act, the decision as to question of tide by the statutory authorities is only an incidental matter which would not preclude a civil Court independently enquiring into it in a properly constituted suit. Hence section 64-C of the Act cannot be held to be a bar to the present suits, which form die subjectmatter of the second appeals. The decrees and judgments of the Courts below upholding the title of the plaintiff in each of the suits cannot be said to be without jurisdiction. The suits are not for grant of ryotwari pattas which alone could be determined by the authorities appointed under the Act. For the foregoing reasons, the second appeals are liable to be dismissed and they are hereby dismissed with costs. S.V.J. ------------- Second appeals dismissed.