Judgment Tarkeshwar Nath, J. 1. This application by defendant No. 1 is directed against an order passed under Section 11A of the Bihar Buildings (Lease, Rent and Eviction) Control Act, 1947, directing him and opposite party Nos. 2 and 3 to deposit a sum of Rs. 6,300/- as arrears of rent within a month and the current rent at the rate of Rs. 350/- per month by the first week of every month. 1. 2. Opposite party No. 1 (Plaintiff) filed a Title Suit No. 27 of 1968 on 29-2-1968 for the eviction of the petitioner and opposite party Nos. 2 and 3. On 20-4-1968 the plaintiff filed an application under Section 11A of the said Act for a direction to the defendants to deposit the arrears of rent and currentrent. None of the defendant had filed any written statement till that date (20-4-1968). Defendant No. 1 (the petitioner) filed a rejoinder on 26-4-1968 asserting that the said petition under Section 11A was premature inasmuch as he (defendant No. 1) had not even filed a written statement at that stage. He further contested the application, on other grounds, but it is not necessary to refer to those grounds. The learned Subordinate Judge passed an order directing the defendants to make the deposit as stated above and hence defendant No. 1 has filed this application in revision. 3. Learned Counsel for the petitioner submitted that the application under Section 11A of the aforesaid Act was extremely premature and not maintainable as there was nothing to show that the petitioner had contested the claim for ejectment till the 20th of April, 1968 when the said application was filed. The point raised by learned Counsel is interesting. His contention was that a written statement not having been filed till the 20th of April, 1968, no defence at all was known to the trial court and it could not be said at that stage that there was any contest with regard to the claim made by the plaintiff for ejectment. He further pressed that no defence having been taken till that time the court could not possibly strike out any defence against ejectment in the event of the default by the defendant in making the said deposit. He further pressed that no defence having been taken till that time the court could not possibly strike out any defence against ejectment in the event of the default by the defendant in making the said deposit. In answer to this, learned Counsel for opposite party No. 1 (plaintiff) submitted that the petitioner had filed an application showing cause when the plaintiff sought to attach his properties before judgment by filing an application under Order XXVIII, Rule 5 of the Code of Civil Procedure and the statements made in that show cause petition indicated that the petitioner had contested the plaintiffs suit. 4. In order to appreciate the respective contentions, it is essential to mention certain dates. As already indicated, the suit was filed on 29-2-1968. On 29-3-1968 the plaintiff filed an application for attachment of certain properties before judgment in accordance with the provisions of Order XXXVIII of the Code of Civil Procedure. A notice of that application was issued and then defendant No. 1 appeared on 3-4-1968 and filed a petition showing cause in that matter. He stated in paragraph 11 that the order fixing fair rent at the rate of Rs. 350/- per month was illegal and the plaintiff had made a prayer for attachment before judgment only with a view to vex and harass him (defendant No. 1) inasmuch as the fixation of rent itself was invalid. On this basis, learned Counsel for opposite party No. 1 contended that there was sufficient material before the court for indicating that the suit was contested by defendant No. 1. 5. The question for consideration is as to how the court can come to a conclusion that the claim for ejectment was being contested in the suit instituted by the plaintiff landlord. On the facts of the present case, it is quite clear that a written statement had not been filed by any of the defendants till the 20th April, 1968. In other words, their defence, if any, had not been disclosed in the trial court till the 20th April, 1968, when the petition under Section 11A was filed by the plaintiff. Order VIII, Rule 1 of the Code of Civil Procedure provides for the presentation of a written statement by a defendant mentioning his defence therein. In other words, whatever defence is open to a defendant he should mention it in his written statement. Order VIII, Rule 1 of the Code of Civil Procedure provides for the presentation of a written statement by a defendant mentioning his defence therein. In other words, whatever defence is open to a defendant he should mention it in his written statement. Rule 10 of Order VIII provides that where a party from whom a written statement is so required fails to present the same within the time fixed by the Court, the Court may pronounce judgment against him, or make such order in relation to the suit as it thinks fit. The effect of this rule is that if there is no written statement, it is open to the Court to pronounce judgment against a defendant. Order XIV, Rule 1 of the Code of Civil Procedure provides for the framing of issue but in order to frame an issue the court has to ascertain whether a material proposition either of fact or of law affirmed by the one party was denied by the other. According to Order XIV, Rule 1 (5) the Court at the first hearing of the suit shall ascertain after reading the plaint and the written statement, if any and after such examination of the parties as may appear necessary as to upon what material propositions of fact or of law the parties are at variance. The effect of this provision is that the defence, if any disclosed in the written has to be considered by the court before framing an issue. The position thus is that it is only on a perusal of a written statement that the court would be in a position to know as to what is the defence of a defendant and as to whether he contests the claim for ejectment. In case there is no written statement at all, the Court cannot speculate and make a surmise about the defence of a defendant. In the present case there being no written statement till the 20th of April, 1968, the trial court was not in a position to come to any conclusion as to whether the defendants would contest the claim for ejectment. 6. The show cause application referred to above was filed in another connection and the averments made in paragraph 11 of that application do not clearly indicate that the claim for ejectment was going to be contested by defendant No. 1. 6. The show cause application referred to above was filed in another connection and the averments made in paragraph 11 of that application do not clearly indicate that the claim for ejectment was going to be contested by defendant No. 1. Apart from that application, learned Counsel for opposite party No. 1 has not been able to point out any other material for showing that the claim for ejectment had been contested in the trial court till the crucial date (20th of April, 1968). 7. Learned Subordinate Judge, no doubt, noted that defendant No. 1 had not filed his written statement but he took the view that the application in the present case under Section 11A was maintainable as it could be filed at any stage of the suit. It is quite true that an application under Section 11A can be filed at any stage of the suit but before that stage arrives, there are two essential requisites in order to make an application under Section 11A maintainable. The first one is that there must be a suit for recovery of possession of any building. There can be no doubt that Title suit No. 27 of 1968, was a suit for recovery of possession of a building. The second one is that there should be a contest by the defendant as regards the claim for ejectment. Unless both these conditions are fulfilled, the application under Section 11A could not be maintainable. Therefore, in my opinion, the occasion for filing an application under Section 11A arises only after those two conditions are fulfilled. In the present case, the second condition was not fulfilled. 8. The matter can be considered from another point of view. The effect of not making the deposit within the stipulated time is that the defence against ejectment has to be struck out and the tenant has to be placed in the same position as if he had not defended the claim in ejectment. A question would arise as to if there was no defence at all inasmuch as there was no written statement, what would be struck out? A question would arise as to if there was no defence at all inasmuch as there was no written statement, what would be struck out? In order to find out whether there was a defence against ejectment the court has necessarily to look to the written statement itself but in the present case, there being no written statement, the court below cannot pass an order for striking out the defence against ejectment in the event of default. This penalty regarding striking out of the defence has, however, not been mentioned in the present order. 9. On a consideration of the entire Section 11A, I am of the opinion that if there is a defence against ejectment and that defence appears from the written statement then only it can be said that the claim for ejectment was being contested by the defendant. I have already indicated that in the present case, there was no written statement and, as such, it can not be held that the claim for ejectment was contested at least till the 20th of April, 1968, when the application under Section 11A was filed by the plaintiff. Accordingly, the application under Section 11A was not maintainable. This was the only point urged by learned Counsel for the petitioner. The application under Section 11A itself being premature, the other question about the quantum of deposit and arrears of rent should not be gone into and in fact no argument has been advanced with regard to that question. 10. For the reasons given above, I am of the view that the application under Section 11A was premature and not maintainable. In the result, this application is allowed and the order of the court below is set aside; but there will be no order for costs. 11. Learned Counsel for opposite party No. 1 has made a prayer that the defendants should be given peremptory time for the filing of the written statement, if any. This, however, is a matter which can be pressed in the trial court and I have no doubt that the court would pass a suitable order in this connection.