JUDGMENT : V. Bhargava, J. 1. The appellant, Janardan Yadhav Sakhre, was declared elected to the Maharashtra Legislative Assembly from the Sironcha Scheduled Caste Reserved Constituency of Chanda District in the General Elections held in February 1967. The election was contested by three other candidates, Mukund Vithoba Alone, Respondent 1 (hereinafter referred to as "the election petitioner"), Laxman Khobragade, and Adku Raoji Gedam. The appellant and Adku Raoji Gedam stood as Independent candidates. The election petitioner was a candidate on behalf of the Congress Party and Laxman Khobragade on behalf of the Republican Party of India. The appellant received the largest number of votes and the next largest number was received by the election petitioner. The appellant defeated the election petitioner by 15,920 votes to 14,275 votes. Mention may also be made of the fact that Laxman Khobragade, the candidate on behalf of the Republican Party, received only 6,425 votes. The election petitioner challenged the election of the appellant on the ground that the appellant had been converted to Buddhism on or about the 26th May, 1958 and after that conversion he ceased to be a member of the Scheduled Caste to which he earlier belonged by birth. It was urged that, since he had started professing a religion other than Hindu or Sikh, the appellant was not eligible to stand for election for a seat reserved for members of a Scheduled Caste, so that his nomination and election were void. Some other grounds were also taken in the election petition with which we are not concerned in the present appeal. 2. The appellant contested the election petition by denying that he was ever converted to Buddhism and claimed that he had throughout remained a Hindu, so that he never lost the right to stand as a candidate for the reserved seat, because he continued to be a member of the Scheduled Caste in which he was born. The question that thus came up for decision before the High Court of Bombay was whether the appellant had or had not been converted to Buddhism. That was the sole question of fact requiring decision and it was decided by the High Court against the appellant. The High Court, having held that the conversion was established, declared the election of the appellant void and set it aside. That was the sole question of fact requiring decision and it was decided by the High Court against the appellant. The High Court, having held that the conversion was established, declared the election of the appellant void and set it aside. The appellant has, therefore, come up in appeal to this Court under Section 116-A of the Representation of the People Act, 1951. 3. The election petitioner, in order to establish the conversion of the appellant to Buddhism, examined seven witnesses, including himself. In his own evidence, he admitted that he had no personal knowledge of the conversion ceremony and only related how he had succeeded in finding out material to prove this conversion. His evidence is, therefore, of little importance. The other six witnesses, however, all proved the conversion ceremony. The case put forward by these witnesses is that a ceremony for mass conversion of a large number of Hindus to Buddhism was held in Village Armori on the 26th May, 1958, and at that ceremony the appellant was actually the Chairman of the Reception Committee. He not only took an active part in the ceremony, but was also himself converted to Buddhism after going through the detailed process of the ceremony adopted for conversion of Hindus to Buddhism. 4. The two principal witnesses, on whom the High Court has relied to hold that these allegations against the appellant have been proved, are PW 2, Sakharam Masah Meshram, an Advocate, and PW 7, Bhaurao Dewaji Khobragade, a Barrister. These two witnesses as well as all other witnesses examined on behalf of the election petitioner have stated that PW 2 presided at that ceremony and PW 7 gave the Diksha at that ceremony, so that he acted as the principal person conducting the rites for conversion. They have also stated that the appellant was present, functioned as Chairman of the Reception Committee, and was himself converted to Buddhism at the same time. They could remember the appellant as one of the persons converted, because he took a prominent part at the ceremony and was on the dais where the main office-bearers organising the ceremony were seated. The witnesses who corroborate the evidence of these two witnesses are PW 3 Laxman Narayan Khobragade, PW 4 Dinkarrao Karuji Ramteke, PW 5 Ramnath Sitaramji Wakade, and PW 6 Dharmaji Zaduji Khobragade. The witnesses who corroborate the evidence of these two witnesses are PW 3 Laxman Narayan Khobragade, PW 4 Dinkarrao Karuji Ramteke, PW 5 Ramnath Sitaramji Wakade, and PW 6 Dharmaji Zaduji Khobragade. The principal ground, on which the reliability of these witnesses is challenged is that all these witnesses are members of the Republican Party or supporters of the candidate of that Party and, consequently, they are interested in having the election of the appellant set aside. PW 3 was himself the rival candidate who was sponsored by the Republican Party. PW 2 and PW 7 both admit that they are active workers of that party. PW 4, PW 5 and PW 6 also admit their interest in or membership of that Party. We do not, however, consider that this can be held to be a sufficient reason to disbelieve the evidence of the witnesses who are very respectable persons and include an Advocate and a Barrister. We have already noticed earlier that, though PW 3 was a candidate sponsored by the Republican Party, he received only 6,425 votes. The appellant and the election petitioner received very much larger number of votes and defeated him by a very big margin. If the election of the appellant is set aside, it would enure to the benefit of the election petitioner, but hardly be of any advantage to PW 3. In these circumstances, we consider it highly improbable that persons of such standing as PW 2 and PW 7 would come and give false evidence in order to have the election of one Independent candidate set aside so as to favour another Independent candidate. We are not, therefore, prepared to accept the submission that these witnesses cannot be treated as independent witnesses. 5. Very strong corroboration of the evidence of these witnesses is provided by a letter Ext. P-25 written by the appellant himself prior to the time when this conversion ceremony was held. The appellant himself admits in his evidence, and that is also clarified by the letter Ext. P-25, that the appellant was approached by the Organisers of the ceremony to accept the office of Chairman of the Reception Committee. This letter has been admitted by the appellant as having been sent by him in reply to a letter received by him from Dr Wankhede. P-25, that the appellant was approached by the Organisers of the ceremony to accept the office of Chairman of the Reception Committee. This letter has been admitted by the appellant as having been sent by him in reply to a letter received by him from Dr Wankhede. That letter, which was received by the appellant, has not been produced, and the explanation is that the appellant did not preserve it as he considered it unnecessary. In the letter Ext. P-25: the appellant has shown his modesty by pleading that he did not possess the capability required for the post of the Chairman of the Reception Committee, but, thereafter, he thanked all the persons who had decided to entrust this responsibility to him and to give him an opportunity to speak before the public on that auspicious occasion. He went on to say that he could not disobey an elderly and learned person like Dr Wankhede; and, thereafter, made a suggestion that he will be available if the ceremony is held after his examinations for the M.A., and L.L.B. Degrees, which were expected to end in the month of April. In the last paragraph, he said that, if the Diksha ceremony is fixed after his examination, he would be able to fulfil his responsibility, otherwise not. Then he gave a definite assurance that, if the function is fixed after the dates mentioned by him, he would come positively. He requested the addressee to show that letter to Dinkarrao, by which he was referring to PW 4 Dinkarrao Ramteke. This letter provides very strong evidence against the plea of the appellant that he had nothing to do at all with the conversion ceremony. The appellant has pleaded that, though he wrote this letter, the plans were changed subsequently and he did not, in fact, participate in the ceremony at all and did not function as Chairman of the Reception Committee. No documentary evidence is, however, available to show that the appellant at any stage later on went back on the promise given by him in this letter and, in the circumstances, there is no reason to disbelieve the evidence of witnesses examined by the election petitioner who have stated that the appellant did, in fact, discharge the function which was entrusted to him. That the appellant intended to become a Buddhist at the conversion ceremony finds some indication in this letter in which, at the very top, the appellant has written "Namo Buddhaya" If the appellant was not desirous of conversion to Buddhism, there is no reason why he should have started his letter by obeisance to Buddha rather than any other Saint or God. When questioned on this point, the appellant was unable to give any satisfactory explanation for starting his letter in this manner. This is another circumstance that indicates that the witnesses of the election petitioner, who have stated about the conversion of the appellant and his active participation as an office- bearer, are speaking the truth. 6. It was argued by learned counsel for the appellant that no evidence has been given by the election petitioner to show that, at the organisational meetings held prior to the actual conversion ceremony, the appellant also attended and took any active part; and, from this, learned counsel wanted to infer that the appellant must have dropped out of the organisation. In fact, the appellant stated that, after he had written this letter, he received no further communication and, therefore, he did not participate in the ceremony at all. We are unable to accept that there is any force in this argument. Once the appellant had definitely given his consent to become the Chairman of the Reception Committee and had given a positive assurance that he will be present to discharge his duties, it cannot be expected that he would be dropped completely without any further communication at all. 7. Reference was so made by learned counsel to the admissions made by the witnesses for the election petitioner that the persons originally proposed as the President and the Master of ceremony at this conversion festival were not those who actually discharged those functions. Advocate Sakharam Masah Meshram, and Barrister Bhaurao Dewaji Khobragade were not the persons originally selected for this purpose, but they later took over these offices, because the persons originally selected did not attend. An analogy was sought to be drawn that, similarly, the appellant might also have dropped out and might not have functioned as Chairman of the Reception Committee. Advocate Sakharam Masah Meshram, and Barrister Bhaurao Dewaji Khobragade were not the persons originally selected for this purpose, but they later took over these offices, because the persons originally selected did not attend. An analogy was sought to be drawn that, similarly, the appellant might also have dropped out and might not have functioned as Chairman of the Reception Committee. The mere fact that some persons originally chosen to discharge functions at that festival could not do so and other persons were called upon to take over their functions cannot mean that every person selected for every office must have been similarly changed. There is definite evidence that, so far as the appellant is concerned, he did, in pursuance of his promise contained in the letter Ext. P-25, participate in the ceremony and carry out the functions of the office entrusted to him. 8. In order to show that this ceremony was held on 26th May, 1958, and that the appellant functioned as Chairman of the Reception Committee, reliance was also placed on two pamphlets Exts. 28 and 29 purported to have been circulated in connection with the holding of this ceremony. The fact that pamphlet Ext. 28 was issued appears from the evidence of PW 4 Dinkarrao Karuji Ramteke. That pamphlet is, however, not of great importance, because it does not contain the name of any person organising the ceremony. Further, it mentions the proposed date for the ceremony as 31st January, 1958, and it is no party's case that the ceremony was ever proposed to be held on that date. In fact, the High Court has also commented on this circumstance and has come to the view that this date in the pamphlet appears to have been printed by some mistake. The pamphlet that is really of importance is Ext. 29, the issuing of which shortly before the date of ceremony has been deposed to by PWs 3, 4, 5, 6 and 7. In this pamphlet, names of a large number of persons concerned with the organisation of the ceremony appear at the end of the pamphlet. The pamphlet also indicates the names of the office- bearers elected for organising that ceremony and it mentions Reception Chairman as Shri Janardhan Sakhare, Manapur, MA (Final), which clearly refers to the appellant. The Chief Secretary is named as Shri Dinkarrao Ramteke, PW 4. The pamphlet also indicates the names of the office- bearers elected for organising that ceremony and it mentions Reception Chairman as Shri Janardhan Sakhare, Manapur, MA (Final), which clearly refers to the appellant. The Chief Secretary is named as Shri Dinkarrao Ramteke, PW 4. Amongst additional members appears the name of Namaji Sakhare, Nagpur, who, the appellant has admitted, was his real brother. This pamphlet mentions that the Buddha Religion `Diksha' Ceremony is going to be held. The place of the ceremony is mentioned as Armori, District Chanda, Weekly Bazar, opposite police station, and the date and time of the ceremony are mentioned as 26th May, 1958, Monday, 6 p.m. It is true that no evidence has been given on behalf of the election petitioner to prove that the original draft of this pamphlet, which was sent to the Press for having this pamphlet printed, was actually signed by the appellant or to prove who printed this pamphlet and got it distributed. The witnesses have, however, clearly stated that this pamphlet was, in fact, distributed before the ceremony took place and, in our opinion, it confirms the evidence of the election petitioner's witnesses that the appellant's name was put forward as one of the active workers for this ceremony in his capacity as Chairman, Reception Committee. When this pamphlet is read with the letter Ext. P-25 written by the appellant himself, it provides very good support to the evidence of the witnesses who have stated that the appellant participated in the function as Chairman, Reception Committee. 9. Additional evidence in support of the case of the election petitioner is provided by some other documentary evidence. Four such documents are Passes Exts. 54 to 57 which were purported to be issued to persons attending the ceremony in order to give them the right to sit near the dais. These passes purport to bear the signatures of the appellant on their back for authenticating them. It appears to be quite natural that the signatures on such passes should be those of the Chairman of the Reception Committee, because he would be the Head of the Committee entrusted with the task of arranging the seating at the time of the actual ceremony. It appears to be quite natural that the signatures on such passes should be those of the Chairman of the Reception Committee, because he would be the Head of the Committee entrusted with the task of arranging the seating at the time of the actual ceremony. It is true that the appellant has denied his signatures on these passes; but the fact that these are signatures of the appellant has been proved clearly by PW 4 Dinkarrao Karuji Ramteke who has stated that he is familiar with the handwriting and signature of the appellant. In this connection, we may also take notice of the fact that the learned Judge of the High Court, on a comparison of these signatures on the Passes with the admitted signatures of the appellant, found a very close similarity between them. It is true that the learned Judge was not a handwriting expert; but the fact that such close similarity exists is a sufficient reason for placing reliance on the evidence of PW 4 Dinkarrao Karuji Ranateke and for not acting on the evidence of the appellant himself who, of course, was greatly interested in denying these signatures in order to escape from the consequences of this election petition. 10. Similarly, signatures of the appellant were also proved by PW 4 Dinkarrao Karuji Ramteke on some counter foils of Receipts in respect of moneys collected by the appellant in connection with the organisation of this ceremony. The amounts collected through those counter-foil receipts were entered by PW 4 himself in the statement of account Ext. 62 which was prepared and signed by him. It will thus be seen that, apart from the fact that the conversion of the appellant to Buddhism is deposed to by very good and reliable witnesses, there is a lot of other material supporting and corroborating their evidence. 11. On behalf of the appellant, this evidence tendered by the election petitioner was sought to be rebutted by the appellant's own sworn testimony that he did not attend any such ceremony, was not converted to Buddhism, was not even present at Armori on that day and was, in fact, in Calcutta. This statement of the appellant has remained uncorroborated and no attempt was made on his behalf to prove by examining witnesses who could have deposed that he was in Calcutta on that day. 12. This statement of the appellant has remained uncorroborated and no attempt was made on his behalf to prove by examining witnesses who could have deposed that he was in Calcutta on that day. 12. The evidence of PW 7 Bhaurao Dewaji Khobragade was sought to be challenged on the ground that he issued a certificate to the appellant, after this ceremony had been held, to the effect that the appellant belonged to the Mahar community which was declared as a Scheduled Caste. The appellant, however, failed in this attempt, because he was unable to produce the actual certificate issued by PW 7. According to PW 7, he did not give any such certificate to the appellant after 26th May, 1958. He stated that, if any certificate of his certifying that the appellant belongs to the Mahar community which is a Scheduled Caste is in existence, it must have been issued by him before that date. The appellant has relied on a certificate Ext. 40 purported to be signed by Chief Presidency Magistrate, Bombay, and Additional District Magistrate, Chanda certifying the appellant as a member of a Scheduled Caste in which there is a mention that the particulars of proof which were submitted included the certificate from Sri B.D. Khobragade, M. P. PW 7, Barrister Khobragade, was a Member of Parliament for a number of years. That certificate Ext. 40 does not, however, contain any entry showing when the certificate of PW 7 Barrister Khobragade relied upon as proof had been issued by the latter. This is significant when we find that amongst the particulars of proof was another certificate from Sub-Divisional Magistrate, Chanda and the year of that certificate is mentioned as 1961. Since the year of issue of the certificate by PW 7 does not appear at all anywhere, there seems to be no reason to disbelieve the evidence of PW 7 that he did not issue any such certificate after 26th May, 1958. It appears that this certificate mentioned in Ext. 40 must have been issued by him before 26th May, 1958 as stated by him in his evidence. It is true that the appellant has succeeded in proving that this certificate issued by PW 7 is no longer available, because the papers which were submitted by the appellant to the Additional District Magistrate, Chanda in order to obtain certificate Ext. 40 must have been issued by him before 26th May, 1958 as stated by him in his evidence. It is true that the appellant has succeeded in proving that this certificate issued by PW 7 is no longer available, because the papers which were submitted by the appellant to the Additional District Magistrate, Chanda in order to obtain certificate Ext. 40 have been weeded out in accordance with rules. The appellant cannot take advantage of the fact that this certificate of PW 7 mentioned in Ext. 40 has been weeded out to urge that that certificate must necessarily have been issued after 26th May, 1958 and, consequently, we are unable to accept the submission that the evidence of PW 7 Barrister Khobragade about the conversion of the appellant to Buddhism cannot be relied upon. 13. Reference was also made to this very certificate Ext. 40 as well as to another certificate Ext. 53 issued by the District Magistrate, Nagpur, in support of the plea of the appellant that he had continued to belong to the Mahar community as a member of a Scheduled Caste. Certificate Ext. 53 was obtained by the appellant from the District Magistrate of Nagpur on 26th June, 1958 on the basis of two other certificates, one dated 20th August, 1957, and the other of one B.K. Wasnik, dated 22nd June, 1958. It was urged that this certificate shows that within a period of one month from the alleged date of conversion, the appellant put himself forward as a member of the Mahar community and did not claim to be a Buddhist. The other certificate Ext. 40 was obtained on 18th February, 1964. This certificate also mentions the appellant as a member of the Mahar community and reliance is placed on it also to urge that he continued to belong to that community. It appears to us that both these certificates were obtained by the appellant in spite of his conversion to Buddhism in order to take advantage of the privileges which were being afforded to the members of the Scheduled Caste and it was solely for the purpose of personal advantage that he obtained the certificates showing him as belonging to Mahar community. The fact that he succeeded in obtaining such certificates from the authorities on the basis of representations made does not mean that no conversion ceremony in fact took place. The fact that he succeeded in obtaining such certificates from the authorities on the basis of representations made does not mean that no conversion ceremony in fact took place. These documents produced do not thus disprove the conversion which has been amply established by the evidence given on behalf of the election petitioner. We may add that the learned Judge of the High Court, who had the benefit of watching the demeanour of the witnesses when they were examined before him, was also impressed by them and held them to be truthful. In the circumstances, we can find no reason at all to differ from the view taken by the High Court and to upset the finding of fact recorded by it. The appeal fails and is dismissed with costs.