JUDGMENT Verma, J. - This is an appeal under Section 6-A of the Court Fees Act. 2. The suit was filed by the appellants for a declaration that the Kothi, described at the foot of the plaint, was not liable to be sold in execution of the decree No. 39 of 1955 State Bank of India v. Messrs Banarsi Dass Dev Kumar. Banarsi Dass is the father of the plaintiffs and Dev Kumar is their brother. 3. The allegations in the plaint are that the plaintiffs were owners of the Kothi in question and that they were joint with their father Banarsi Das who was defendant No. 3 and their brother Dev Kumar, defendant No. 4. The State Bank of India obtained a decree against Messrs Banarsi Dass Dev Kumar for a sum of Rs. 1,50,000-. In the previous suit the plaintiffs' guardian Misri Lal was negligent and did not protect the plaintiffs' interest. Banarsi Dass is alleged to have been in collusion with the officials of the State Bank of India. The money was borrowed by Banarsi Dass for wagering and speculating transactions and the debt was tainted with immorality. The existence of legal necessity was also denied by the plaintiffs. The plaintiffs paid court fee under Schedule 2 Article 17 (iii) of the Court Fees Act. 4. Among the pleas taken in defence by the State Bank of India was the plea of insufficiency of court fee. The issue regarding this plea was decided by the learned Additional Civil Judge of Badaun against the plaintiffs and hence tuns appeal. 5. The court below has held that the court fee payable was under Section 7 iv-A) , sub-clause (1) of the Court Fees Act. In this view of the matter the court below found a deficiency of Rs. 11,495/-. The relief claimed in the plaint is in these terms :- "The plaintiffs pray that the decree No. 35 of 1955 of the court of the Civil Judge Budaun State Bank of India v. M/s. Banarsi Dass Dev Kumar being void and not binding on the plaintiffs it be declared that the property mentioned below is not liable to be sold in execution of the said decree. Costs of the suit are also claimed." It is obvious that the relief for declaration cannot be given to the plaintiff unless the decree is cancelled or adjudged to be void. Costs of the suit are also claimed." It is obvious that the relief for declaration cannot be given to the plaintiff unless the decree is cancelled or adjudged to be void. This, therefore, is clearly a suit involving "cancellation of or adjudging void" of the decree which was for money. 6. Learned counsel for the appellants has relied upon two decisions of this Court. In the case of Kishan Lal v. Pearelal, A.I.R. 1963 Alld. 330 a Hindu widow inherited properties from her husband under a will. She executed deeds of sale and waqf in respect of a portion of the same. A reversioner filed a suit for a declaration that the sale deed and the waqf deed were not binding on him after the widow's death, she being a Hindu widow and the alienations being bad in law, Court fee on 115th of the aggregate amounts of the sale deed and the waqf deed under Section 7 (iv-A) (2) was paid. The Chief Inspector of Stamps reported that additional Court fee was necessary since the suit involved cancellation of the will or its being adjudged void or voidable, in addition to the relief of adjudging the two deeds void or voidable. On these facts a Division Bench of this Court held that the court fee paid was sufficient. This decision is clearly distinguishable. The plaintiff did not have to refer to the will at all much less- was the relief claimed by him dependent upon the cancellation of or adjudging void the will. The Bench rightly pointed out that the substance of the allegations in the plaint has to be considered and on the allegations in the plaint the plaintiff did not have to claim any relief in respect of the will and that it was for the defendant to set up a valid will in order to defeat the plaintiffs' claim. In the case in hand, however, the plaintiffs have, despite skillful drafting of the relief, claimed the declaration on the ground that the decree was void and not binding on the plaintiffs. The true test appears to be can the declaration claimed by the plain- tiffs be granted without the cancellation of or adjudging void a decree for money or other property having market value or an instrument securing money or other property having such market value ? The true test appears to be can the declaration claimed by the plain- tiffs be granted without the cancellation of or adjudging void a decree for money or other property having market value or an instrument securing money or other property having such market value ? If the answer to the question is in the affirmative then Section 7 (iv-A) (1) of the Court Fees Act would have no application. If the answer to the question is in the negative then the court fee would be payable under the aforesaid section. 7. The next decision relied upon by the learned counsel for the appellant is Ram Krishna v. Mohan Lal, A.I.R. 1965 Alld. 10. This case is also distinguishable because the declaration was sought in respect of a decree which was not for money or other property. The earlier decree was also a declaratory decree. In the case in hand the previous decree was for money. The cases in point, however, are (1) Kamla Devi v. Sunni Central Board of Waqf, A.I.R. 1949 Alld. 63, (2) Mst. Jileba v. Mst. Parmesra, A.I.R. 1949 Alld. 641, (3) Suraj Prasad v. Jagannath Prasad, A.I.R. 1955 Alld. 319 and (4) Udai Bhan v. Lachhman Dass, A.I.R. 1955 Alld. 667 In the first case the plaintiff was a purchaser of waqf property from the heir of the waqif. She brought a suit for a declaration under Section 5 (2) of the U. P. Muslim Waqfs Act, 1936, that the property purchased by her was not subject to waqf and that she was the owner thereof. There was no relief claimed for the cancellation of the waqfnama or for its being adjudged void. A Division Bench of this Court held that, in fact, the suit was for cancellation of or adjudging void the waqfnama as the declaration that the property was not subject to waqf did in fact involve cancellation of or adjudging void the deed of waqf. It was, there- fore, held that court fee , was payable under Section 7 (iv-A) (1) of the Court Fees Act. 8. In the second case a Hindu widow claimed the relief of possession of her husband's property. She alleged that a compromise entered into on her behalf during her minority under which a certain share of the property was given to the defendant was not binding on her. 8. In the second case a Hindu widow claimed the relief of possession of her husband's property. She alleged that a compromise entered into on her behalf during her minority under which a certain share of the property was given to the defendant was not binding on her. No relief was, however, claimed for adjudging void the compromise or for declaration that the compromise was not binding on her. Court fee was paid only for the relief of possession under Section 7 (v) of the Court Fees Act. A Division Bench of this Court held that the suit involved the relief of cancellation of the compromise and the plaintiff was bound to pay court fee under Section 7 (iv-A) also. 9. In the third cave the plaintiff filed a suit for partition alleging that the previous partition by his father between the coparceners including the plaintiff who was then a minor and was represented by his father as guardian, was invalid and that he was entitled to ignore it. It was held that the court fee was payable under Section 7 (iv-A) of the Court Fees Act. 10. In the fourth and the last case mentioned above. it was held that where the effect of a declaration in favour of the plaintiff would be that the decree being a charge against the property which was the subject-matter of the suit would no longer be a good decree and would be void so far as that property was concerned, the suit clearly involved adjudging void or voidable the decree. 11. In my opinion the view taken by the court below is perfectly correct. The appeal is dismissed with costs.