JUDGMENT T.S. Krishnamoorthy Iyer, J. 1. The suit is instituted by the plaintiffs 1 and 2 claiming to be the President and Secretary of Viswakarma Samudayam to set aside Ex. P 10 order dated 14-10-1955 passed under S.145 of the Criminal Procedure Code, for declaration of the title of the 'Pazhayasalayil Viswabrahma Samudayam' now called 'Viswakarma Samudayam' to the plaint schedule items, for recovery of the same and for removal of the defendants from management thereof. The suit was instituted on 18-9-1956 and it is agreed that the suit on the date of its institution is not barfed by limitation. The third plaintiff got himself impleaded pending suit on the ground that he is the President of the Samudayam elected after the institution of the suit. 2. The plaintiffs filed an application under O.1 R.8, C.P.C. on 5-9-1961 to continue the suit as a representative suit and it was allowed by the trial court. 3. The courts below held that in view of S.22 of the Indian Limitation Act, 1908 the suit must be deemed to have been instituted only on 5-9-1961 the date of the filing of the application for permission under O.1 R.8, C.P.C. Since the said date is beyond three years from the date of the accrual of the cause of action the suit is barred by limitation. The courts below have relied on the decision of the Bombay High Court in Hubli Panjarapole v. Saraswatayya AIR 1953 Bombay 334, for their conclusion. 4. The learned counsel for the appellants challenged the correctness of the view of the courts below because of the decision of the Madras High Court in Nandaramdas v. Zulika Bibi AIR 1943 Madras 531. This decision arose out of a suit which was in substance under S.53 of the Transfer of Property Act. The plaintiff instead of filing the suit on behalf of all the creditors sued on his own behalf. He did not also invoke the provisions of O.1 R.8, C.P.C. When objection was taken by the defendant to the frame of the suit the plaintiff applied for amendment of the plaint so as to bring it in conformity with S.53 of the Transfer of property Act which was allowed by the trial court by the order dated 22nd August 1940. If this date is taken as the crucial date the suit would be barred by limitation. If this date is taken as the crucial date the suit would be barred by limitation. The trial court upheld the plea of limitation holding that the effect of the amendment was to introduce new plaintiffs in the suit and there was also a change in the capacity of the plaintiffs in filing the suit. In reserving the decision of the trial court Krishnaswamy Iyengar, J. observed: "An amendment which does not seek to bring in a new party but only varies the ground on which the relief was originally sought or asks for a different or additional relief without changing the cause of action, does not bring the case within S.22, Limitation Act. It is equally clear that where a party is already on the record either as a plaintiff or as a defendant, an amendment which merely alters the capacity in which he has been impleaded to one of a different character does not involve an addition of parties so as to attract the provisions of S.22". 5. In the decision in Hubli Panjarapole v. Saraswatayya AIR 1953 Bombay 334. Ganjendragadkar and Chainani, JJ. were dealing with a suit filed against the Hubli Panjarapole represented by its Chairman. Sometime after the institution of the suit the plaintiff alleged that it was necessary to sue the Panjarapole in a representative, capacity under O.1 R.8, C.P.C. and filed an application on 2-12-1947 to convert the suit into a representative one under O.1 R.8, C.P.C. After notice additional defendants who came forward were impleaded on 8-1-1948. The contention was raised that the suit was defective when it was instituted and the crucial date for deciding the plea of limitation is 2-12-1947. The learned Judges of the Bombay High Court accepted this contention and observed: "Now, the legal position appears to be that on this day, the Hubli Panjarapole had not been properly sued and technically the suit against the Panjarapole would have been dismissed on that ground alone. It may perhaps be that by obtaining leave under O.1 R.8, 'new' parties 'as such' are not added, but a defect in the suit is removed by bringing before the Court either directly or constructively ail the constituent members of the Panjarapole. It may perhaps be that by obtaining leave under O.1 R.8, 'new' parties 'as such' are not added, but a defect in the suit is removed by bringing before the Court either directly or constructively ail the constituent members of the Panjarapole. But if the suit was materially defective when it was filed and if for removing such defect additional parties had to be brought before the Court may be not in their own individual rights but as constituting the Panjarapole collectively it seems to us difficult to hold that the suit in this altered representative form could be said to relate back to the date on which the original suit was filed. It is clear that if parties are added under O.1 R.10, S.22 Limitation Act will come into operation and the proceedings against these added parties shall be deemed in the words of Tyabji J. to have been begun only on the service of the summons. In the present case it is possible to say that in the eye of law, parties are added after leave is granted under O.1 R.8, and so the suit must really be taken to have been properly filed on 2-12-1947. But even if it is held that technically it is not a case of addition of 'new' parties as such, technically again it is equally clear that it is a case where the suit has been properly filed for the first time when leave was obtained: and if that be so, the point of limitation raised before us by Mr. Kalagate must obviously be answered in his favour. It cannot be said that in the suit as it was originally filed the defendant institution had been merely misdescribed. In fact the said institution had not then been properly brought before the Court at all; and so it is only when action is taken under O.1 R.8, that the suit is properly brought against the defendant. It is thus not a case of making a formal amendment in the plaint at all. The suit which would have been dismissed as having been improperly filed is allowed to be converted into a proper and competent suit and so this material alteration in the nature of the suit cannot operate retrospectively. That in our opinion is the true legal position." 6. The suit which would have been dismissed as having been improperly filed is allowed to be converted into a proper and competent suit and so this material alteration in the nature of the suit cannot operate retrospectively. That in our opinion is the true legal position." 6. The facts of the case before me are distinguishable from those in the decision of the Bombay High Court. Here the defendants already on the party array are alleged to be in management of the plaint properties and acting detrimental to the interests of the members of Satnudayam. The defendants against whom the decree is prayed for have been properly described. The plaintiffs filed the suit on behalf of Samudayam describing themselves as its President and Secretary. It is not necessary to sue the defendants in a representative capacity to obtain a decree against them. The plaintiffs do not by resorting to O.1 R.8, C.P.C. seek to convert the suit into a representative one as regards the defendants but they want to sue as representatives of the Samudayam. The plaint already filed is not in the individual capacity of the plaintiffs. Though the plaintiffs have described themselves as the President and the Secretary of the Samudayam, as members of the Samudayam they have got common right in the properties of the Samudayam to be protected, along with the other members of the Samudayam. It is no doubt true that in the case of unincorporated associations the office bearer cannot sue on behalf of others without obtaining the leave under O.1 R.8, C.P.C. What was claimed by the application of 5-9-1961 is permission under O.1 R.8, C.P.C. It is not a case where the plaintiffs filed the suit in their individual capacity and attempted to convert the suit later on into a representative suit. In a representative suit filed, instead of filing the application for permission along with the suit, it was filed after the filing of the suit. Though the proper course is to obtain permission when the suit is filed, it may be granted after suit. This is therefore a case where the principle in Nandaramdas v. Zulika Bibi AIR 1943 Madras 531 will apply, in which case the suit is not barred by limitation. The other issues in the suit have not been considered in the merits. 7. This is therefore a case where the principle in Nandaramdas v. Zulika Bibi AIR 1943 Madras 531 will apply, in which case the suit is not barred by limitation. The other issues in the suit have not been considered in the merits. 7. I therefore set aside the judgment and decree of the courts below and remand the suit for disposal of the other issues. The entire evidence was adduced in the suit. The parties are not allowed to adduce any fresh evidence. The trial court will only hear arguments and dispose of the suit. Since the suit is of 1956, the trial court will dispose of the same within three months from the date of the receipt of this judgment and report the matter to this court. The second appeal is thus allowed. There will be no order as to costs.