ORDER Tare, J. In this petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, the auction-purchasers challenge the order of the Board of Revenue holding that the Petitioners' second appeal filed in that Court was independent under the law. Revenue recovery proceedings for realisation of taccavi loan to the extent of Rs. 1055.19 were started against the 4th Respondent, Sarfaraz Ahmed. The proceedings were instituted on 30-11-1957. The property consisting of 42.52 acres of land was attached on 11-1-1958. On an earlier occasion, there was an auction sale which was ultimately set aside in appeal and a fresh sale was directed to be held. Consequently, a fresh sale proclamation was issued and the auction sale was held on 2-5-1962. The fresh proclamation was undoubtedly issued after the M. P. Land Revenue Code, 1959, came into force with effect from 2-10-1959. The land was sold in favour of the Petitioners for a sum of Rs. 3,200 out of which Rs. 800 had been paid immediately. The balance of the sale price, according to the Bhopal Land Revenue Act, 1932, or even according to Rule 38 of the M. P. Land Revenue Code, 1959, ought to have been deposited within 15 days of the acceptance of the bid. But the balance was actually deposited on 28-5-1962 and the sale was consequently confirmed on 4-6-1962. Thereafter, on 30-5-1962, the 4th Respondent, Sarfaraz Ahmed, filed an application for setting the auction sale purporting to be one under Rule 44, framed under the M. P. Land Revenue Code, 1959. The Collector, by order, dated 21-5-1963, dismissed that application. Thereafter the debtor filed an appeal before the Additional Commissioner who, by order, dated 5-8-1964 (annexure F) set aside the sale holding that the failure to deposit the balance of the auction price within 15 days was fatal and the auction sale became a nullity. Against that order, the auction-purchasers filed an appeal before the Board of Revenue. By order, dated 22-5-1967, the Revenue Board held that the appeal was incompetent as in the opinion of the learned President of the Board of revenue, the matter was governed by the provisions of the Bhopal State Land Revenue Act, 1932, and not by the provisions of the M. P. Land Revenue Code, 1959. The auction-purchasers thereafter applied for review and the Revenue Board, by order, dated 20-6-1968, reiterated its earlier opinion. The auction-purchasers thereafter applied for review and the Revenue Board, by order, dated 20-6-1968, reiterated its earlier opinion. Hence this writ petition for issuance of a writ of certiorari. The learned President of the Board of Revenue expressed the opinion that the case of Shriram v. Colletor, Raigarh 1967 Revn. Nirnaya 142, decided by a Division Bench of this Court, was distinguishable and the second appeal filed by the auction-purchasers was incompetent as the M. P. Land Revenue Code, 1959, was inapplicable. The contention of the learned Counsel for the Petitioners is that on a wrong assumption of law, the Petitioners have been deprived of a valuable right of appeal and on this ground it is sought to get the order of the Board of Revenue quashed. As against this, the learned Counsel for the 4th Respondents contended that the auction-purchasers could not have the sale set aside on any ground whatsoever. It is pointed out that the Petitioners' attempt is merely to adopt dilatory tactics and as substantial justice has been done, this Court should decline to exercise its prerogative powers by issuing a writ of certiorari against the order of the Revenue Board. It is further pointed out that the decision of the question would be more or less academic and will not affect the ultimate result of the revenue recovery proceedings. We might observe that it is true that the revenue recovery proceedings were initiated on 30-11-1957. At that time, the Bhopal Land Revenue Act, 1932, was in force. The same was repealed by the M. P. Land Revenue, Code, 1959, which came into force with effect from 2-10-1959. As such, as per Section 262(1) of the M. P. Land Revenue Code, 1959, all pending cases will be governed by the provisions of the repealed enactment and not by the provisions of the repealing enactment. Thus, there can be no doubt that the revenue recovery proceedings, which were pending at the time the M. P. Land Revenue Code, 1959, came into force, would be governed by the provisions of the Bhopal Land Revenue Act, 1932. So far as that proposition is concerned, there can be no doubt about it. But in the revenue recovery proceedings, definite steps have to be taken in the matter of relisation of the account. So far as that proposition is concerned, there can be no doubt about it. But in the revenue recovery proceedings, definite steps have to be taken in the matter of relisation of the account. Further, there can be no doubt that the previous auction sale, which was held prior to the coming into force of the M. P. Land Revenue Code, 1959, would be governed by the provisions of the Bhopal Land Revenue Act, 1932. But that sale had been set aside and the revenue authority was required to issue a fresh proclamation for the purpose of holding a fresh auction sale. Learned Counsel for the respective parties did not dispute the fact that the said sale proclamation was issued after the M. P. Land Revenue Code, 1959, came into force and the proceedings relating to the auction sale were conducted in accordance with the procedure laid down by the M. P. Land Revenue Code, 1959. Thereafter, the sale was actually held on 2-5-1962 and it was duly confirmed. Even an application for setting aside the sale as per Rule 44 of the M. P. Land Revenue Code, 1959, had been filed on 30-5-1962. As such, the proceedings relating to the auction sale were all taken after the M. P. Land Revenue Code, 1959, came into force. Thus, it cannot be asserted on behalf of the Respondents that the proceedings relating to the auction sale were pending at the time the M. P. Land Revenue Code, 1959, came into force. What can be contended at the most is that the revenue recovery proceedings were pending at the relevant date. But mere pendency of a revenue recovery proceedings, in our opinion, will not attract the provisions of Section 262(1) of the M. P. Land Revenue Code, 1959. In our opinion, the proceedings from the stage of issuance of a fresh proclamation and the subsequent sale will be taken to be separate proceedings to which, undoubtedly, the provisions of the M. P. Land Revenue Code, 1959, would be applicable. That was actually what was done by all the parties concerned, including the revenue Courts. Under these circumstances, it would be difficult to, accept the contention of the learned Counsel for the 4th Respondent that this should be held to have been governed by the provisions of the Bhopal Land Revenue Act, 1932. That was actually what was done by all the parties concerned, including the revenue Courts. Under these circumstances, it would be difficult to, accept the contention of the learned Counsel for the 4th Respondent that this should be held to have been governed by the provisions of the Bhopal Land Revenue Act, 1932. In this connection, we may refer to the observations of a Division Bench of this Court in Shriram v. Collector, Raigarh, (supra). As indicated by the learned Judges constituting the Division Bench, the material date would be the date of sale proclamation. The same having been issued after the M. P. Land Revenue Code, 1959, came into force, we feel that the entire matter will be governed by the new Code and not by the provisions of the repealed enactment. We are unable to distinguish that case from the present one and we are unable to appreciate the remark of the learned President of the Board of Revenue that the said case is distinguishable. If the same proclamation had been issued before the M. P. Land Revenue Code, 1959, had came into force, there might have been some substance in the view taken by the Revenue Board that the repealed enactment will govern this case. But, as all the proceedings about the auction sale were conducted after the coming into force of the new Code, we are unable to concur with that view. Thus, there can be no doubt that the Revenue Board was in error in holding that no second appeal lay under the provisions of the M. P. Land Revenue Code, 1959. We may further observe that there were similar provisions in the Bhopal Land Revenue Act, 1932. The only difference is that in the Madhya Pradesh State powers of the State Government had been transferred to the Board of Revenue under the M. P. Board of Revenue Act, 1949, but in the erstwhile Bhopal State, which subsequently became a part of the Madhya Pradesh, a second appeal could be heard by the State Government, which had not delegated its powers to the Revenue Board. But all the same, even under the repealed enactment, a party had a right of second appeal on the same grounds as under the M. P. Land Revenue Code, 1959, or even under the M. P. Land Revenue Code, 1954. But all the same, even under the repealed enactment, a party had a right of second appeal on the same grounds as under the M. P. Land Revenue Code, 1959, or even under the M. P. Land Revenue Code, 1954. Thus, on account of the misapprehension of the law, the Petitioners were denied their valuable right of second appeal. Although it may be true that the deposit of the balance of 3/4th of the auction price would be required to be made within 15 days of the acceptance of the bid and on such failure an auction sale would be rendered a nullity, in our opinion, that is not the only consideration which should determine whether we should exercise our discretion in the matter of issuing a writ of certiorari against the impugned order. If it had been so simple, then necessarily we would not have been inclined to exercise our discretion in favour of the Petitioners, as laid down by their Lordships of the Supreme Court in Veerappa Pillai Vs. Raman and Raman Ltd. and Others, ; D.N. Banerji Vs. P.R. Mukherjee and Others, ; and Waryam Singh and Another Vs. Amarnath and Another, . But, in the present case, the Petitioners have been deprived of valuable right of appeal under a misapprehension of the law and it is for that reason that we feel that this is a fit case where we ought to interfere with the impugned order by issuing a writ of certiorari. The right of appeal has always been considered to be a vested right, which cannot be allowed to be taken away in a manner done by the Board of Revenue. We may observe that either under the repealing enactment, or under the repealed enactment, any of the aggrived parties has a right of second appeal, although under the new Code, the forum will be the Board of Revenue, while under the repealed enactment, the forum would be the State Government, but the right of second appeal cannot be denied. It may be that there may be some substance in the appeal, or there may not be any substance. But it is for the proper forum to adjudicate on that aspect on merits and not for us to forestall the view that the second appellate Court or Tribunal may take in that behalf. It may be that there may be some substance in the appeal, or there may not be any substance. But it is for the proper forum to adjudicate on that aspect on merits and not for us to forestall the view that the second appellate Court or Tribunal may take in that behalf. As a result of the discussion aforesaid, we quash the orders of the Board of Revenue dated. 22-5-1967 and 20-6-1968 by holding that the second appeal before the Revenue Board was competent under the provisions of the M. P. Land Revenue Code, 1959. Therefore, the case is remitted to the Board of Revenue for a decision of the appeal on merits. However, in view of the fact that the Petitioners themselves were responsible for all this confusion, as their stand at different times has been absolutely contradictory, we do not think that the Respondents ought to be mulcted in costs. The Petitioners themselves, at one stage, contended that the Bhopal Land Revenue Act, 1932, was applicable to the present case, but they changed their stand afterwards. Consequently, although we allow the present writ petition, we further direct that there shall be no order as to costs. The security deposit be refunded to the Petitioners. Final Result : Allowed