JUDGMENT : V. Bhargava, J. 1. The appellant Jagpati Singh who was an elector for the Chitrakoot Assembly Constituency, filed an election petition in the High Court of Madhya Pradesh challenging the election of respondent Ramanand Singh, who was declared elected on 22nd February, 1967, in the general election held for that constituency. The election was sought to be set aside on two grounds. One was that the respondent had exercised undue influence at Polling Station Karigohi at about 3.30 p.m. when voting was actually going on the 20th February, 1967, by coming there accompanied by three other, persons, one of whom was carrying a gun, and threatening the voters with the gun to induce them to vote for the respondent or to go away without voting, and by further threatening polling agents of various other rival candidates and driving them away from the polling station. The second ground was of bribery on the allegation that on 19th February, 1967, a day prior to the date of polling, the respondent paid a sum of Rs. 378 to one Lalji Tewari asking him to distribute that sum as labour charges to a number of labourers who had carried out relief work of construction of a tank in village Pipritola between 8th January, 1967 and 10th January, 1967 which work had been done without the sanction of the Government or the village panchayat and, at the same time, asking Laiji Tewari, when distributing the wages, to tell the labourers to vote for the respondent. The charge of bribery was put forward on one other count which was to the effect that the respondent, on 20th February, 1967, the day on which the polling was actually going on, distributed milo and jwar valued at Rs. 350 to the voters through one Shiv Kumar in order to induce them to vote for him. These allegations of corrupt practice were held by the High Court not to have been proved by the appellant. 2. One other ground, which was taken for challenging the respondent's election, was that the respondent was not qualified to be elected as a member of the State legislature, because he was holding a post of profit under the Government of Madhya Pradesh at the relevant time. 2. One other ground, which was taken for challenging the respondent's election, was that the respondent was not qualified to be elected as a member of the State legislature, because he was holding a post of profit under the Government of Madhya Pradesh at the relevant time. We are, however, not concerned with this ground in this appeal, because the decision against the appellant on that ground for challenging the election was not challenged before us at all by learned counsel for the appellant. In this appeal under Section 116-A of the Representation of the People Act, 1951, the two grounds of commission of corrupt practices of undue influence and bribery rejected by the High Court have been pressed again before us. 3. Even amongst these grounds, learned counsel for the appellant relied mainly on the charge of exercise of undue influence by the respondent. In order to prove this charge, the appellant examined 10 witnesses who are numbered as PWs 11 to 20. The evidence of these witnesses was not accepted by the High Court as reliable. We were taken through the evidence of some of these witnesses by learned counsel and, after going through their statements, we are inclined to agree with the High Court that these witnesses cannot be held to be reliable enough to prove the charge of undue influence which is in the nature of a quasi-criminal charge. Almost all the witnesses arc persons who were interested in candidates who were rivals of the respondent. Even the versions given by these witnesses are contradictory and the statements given by some of them show that the charge of giving threats with the gun must be an exaggeration, even if it be held that any incident of the nature deposed to by these witnesses did take place. The principal witness, on whom the case mainly rested, is PW 13 Laxmi Prasad, who was a worker and a polling agent of the candidate set up on behalf of the Jan Congress Party. It may be mentioned that the respondent was sponsored by the Praja Socialist Party. There was another candidate put up by the Congress Party and his polling agent was PW 15 Munishwar Prasad. Laxmi Prasad's version was that the respondent came to the polling station at Karigohi at 3.30 p.m. in a jeep together with his brothers Ram Narayan and Indrapal and another person Sokhilal Pyasi. There was another candidate put up by the Congress Party and his polling agent was PW 15 Munishwar Prasad. Laxmi Prasad's version was that the respondent came to the polling station at Karigohi at 3.30 p.m. in a jeep together with his brothers Ram Narayan and Indrapal and another person Sokhilal Pyasi. Sokhilal Pyasi was carrying the gun. He remained seated in the jeep, while the other three came inside the polling station. These three persons threatened Laxmi Prasad saying that if he did not want to vote for the respondent, he should get out, whereupon he left the polling station. His sister Murti was standing in the queue for entering the polling station to cast her vote and Ramnarayan caught her by her hand and turned her out. Sokhilal Pyasi pointed the gun at some of the voters and asked them to go away if they were not prepared to vote for the respondent. Thereupon, the various polling agents of the candidates, other than the polling agent of the respondent, and a number of voters left. This version is not fully supported by the various other witnesses examined on behalf of the appellant. According to some of them, even Sokhilal Pyasi came inside the polling station and did not remain seated in the jeep. According to another witness, PW 19 Bela Prasad, the gun was never pointed at any one and there were no threats given at the point of the gun to induce either the voters or the polling agents to go away. The case set up in the election petition was that threats were given to the polling agents of all other candidates, except the polling agent of the respondent but in the evidence, the witnesses only deposed about the threat given to Laxmi Prasad. The nature of the threat contained in the version of Laxmi Prasad is itself highly improbable. Laxmi Prasad was the polling agent of a rival candidate and there could be no question of his casting his vote for the respondent, so that the respondent could not have said, when giving the threat, that he should go away, because he was not prepared to vote for the respondent. 4. Laxmi Prasad was the polling agent of a rival candidate and there could be no question of his casting his vote for the respondent, so that the respondent could not have said, when giving the threat, that he should go away, because he was not prepared to vote for the respondent. 4. It is true that the same day at 8.13 p.m. Laxmi Prasad sent a telegram to the District Election Officer, Satna, giving his version of such an incident and, later, he lodged a report at Police Station Sabhapur at 10.00 p.m. The versions given by Laxmi Prasad himself in the telegram, the report to the police, and the evidence given in court are not quite consistent with one another apart from being different from versions given by other witnesses in their evidence. Even the telegram was given after an interval of more than 4 hours and, though Laxmi Prasad has tried to explain the delay in sending the telegram, that explanation was not found by the High Court to be at all convincing. The telegram and the report lodged with the police do not, therefore, in any way add to the value of the evidence given on behalf of the appellant to prove this incident. 5. On the other hand, a very important circumstance is that no complaint about such an incident was ever made by any one at all to the Presiding Officer of the polling station whose duty it was to see that the voting takes place peacefully and without interruption. It is further obvious that the best and most independent witness to prove such a charge would have been the Presiding Officer himself, but he was not examined on behalf of the appellant. No doubt a summons was got issued for his attendance in court to give evidence on 14th September, 1967 and that summons was served on him on 27th August, 1967. After the receipt of the summons, the Officer sent an application expressing his inability to attend the court on 14th September, 1967 on the ground that he was ill and had been advised rest for eight days. The medical certificate attached to the application was dated 8th September, 1967. The period of eight days, which was advised for rest, was due to expire on 16th September, 1967. The medical certificate attached to the application was dated 8th September, 1967. The period of eight days, which was advised for rest, was due to expire on 16th September, 1967. Evidence in this case continued to be recorded by the High Court right up to 20th September, 1967. If the appellant really wanted to examine the Presiding Officer, he could have easily requested the court to fix another date for the evidence of this Officer subsequent to 16th September, 1967 without dislocating the work of the court. The medical certificate merely stated that the Officer was being treated for carbuncle. There is nothing to show that he could not have been examined at least on 16th September, 1967, before the examination of witnesses of the respondent started on that day. Obviously, an excuse was being put forward for not producing the Presiding Officer as a witness and this must be because he was not prepared to support the case set up by the appellant. 6. Apart from the Presiding Officer, there were other independent persons connected with the conduct of the election. They were an Assistant Presiding Officer and four Polling Officers. No attempt was made on behalf of the appellant to examine any one of them. On the contrary, one of the Polling Officers, Chhotelal Sharma has been examined by the respondent as RW 12. He has completely refuted the version put forward on behalf of the appellant and has stated that the polling continued peacefully till it was finished at 5.30 p.m. His veracity was challenged only on one ground on behalf of the appellant. That ground was that, according to him, the polling finished at 5.30 p.m., while the diary of the Presiding Officer showed that polling continued till 7.45 p.m. In fact, reliance was sought to be placed on the entry in this diary on behalf of the appellant to urge that the polling continued beyond the fixed hour only because their was a disturbance at 3.30 p.m. as alleged by the appellant. In support of this argument, the factual assertion was that the polling continued till 9 p.m. and, in fact, some of the witnesses examined on behalf of the appellant stated that they saw voters going to the polling station till 9 p.m. These facts alleged could also have been properly established if the appellant had cared to examine the Presiding Officer and asked him to prove his diary and explain the reason why polling continued after the fixed hour. The diary was, no doubt, summoned in the High Court; but the High Court refused to admit it in evidence on the ground that it was not a public document and it could not be taken into account unless it was proved by the writer viz. the Presiding Officer. A grievance was made before us that this evidence was wrongly excluded by the High Court, because the diary was maintained by the Presiding Officer in the normal course of his duties under the Rules and was, consequently, a public document and admissible in evidence without proof. This argument is, however, of no assistance to the appellant, because no prayer was put forward in this court to admit that diary as additional evidence under Order 41 Rule 27 of the Code of Civil Procedure. If the appellant wanted to rely on that diary in this appeal, it was open to him to make an application for its admission in evidence under Order 41 Rule 27 CPC, on the ground that it had been wrongly excluded by the High Court and, in that case, he should have applied to this court to summon the diary. The appellant failed to take any such steps and, consequently, no inference can be drawn in favour of the appellant on the basis of that diary. 7. It, however, appears that that diary was actually examined by the learned Judge of the High Court who tried the election petition and he took notice of the fact that the polling on that day concluded at 7.45 p.m. according to the entry in the diary. 7. It, however, appears that that diary was actually examined by the learned Judge of the High Court who tried the election petition and he took notice of the fact that the polling on that day concluded at 7.45 p.m. according to the entry in the diary. Even if this fact be taken into account, it does not help the appellant, because there is no presumption that this continued polling after 5.30 p.m. was due to any interruption at 3.30 p.m. On the other hand, the presumption of regularity of official acts would lead to the inference that the polling must have continued till 7.45 p.m. only because voters, who had arrived and entered the polling station before 5.30 p.m., could not cast their votes earlier and had to be permitted to vote till 7.45 p.m. It is also significant that the learned Judge does not mention that there was any entry in the diary showing that any disturbance had taken place at 3.30 p.m. To the extent that information of the entries in the diary is available in the judgment of the High Court these entries thus disprove the case of the appellant rather than support it. It may be that RW 12 Chhotelal Sharma, Polling Officer, made a mistake when he stated that the polling ended at 5.30 P.M.; but that by itself is no sufficient ground for rejecting his evidence altogether. In any case, his evidence is much more reliable than the evidence of the interested witnesses examined on behalf of the appellant in support of his case. We may also take notice of the fact that on behalf of the respondent also a number of witnesses were examined to prove that no such incident took place on the day of polling at about 3.30 p.m. as alleged by the appellant; and that evidence was considered more reliable by the High Court than the evidence of witnesses examined on behalf of the appellant. In these circumstances, we agree with the High Court's finding that this charge has not been established. 8. With regard to the charge of bribery, emphasis was laid on behalf of the appellant on the first instance of payment of money to voters with the consent of the respondent by Lalji Tewari in order to induce them to vote for the respondent. 8. With regard to the charge of bribery, emphasis was laid on behalf of the appellant on the first instance of payment of money to voters with the consent of the respondent by Lalji Tewari in order to induce them to vote for the respondent. A number of witnesses were examined on behalf of the appellant to prove that relief work of construction of a tank was started in Village Pipritola at the instance of PW 3, Lalji Tewari himself, who was the Up-Sarpanch of the village panchayat of Pipritola. In our opinion, the High Court has rightly considered his evidence on this point unreliable, because, according to him, he got the work started without the sanction of the Government or the village panchayat itself. He did not even take the permission of the Sarpanch, PW 4, Aditya Narain. He admits that he got the work started knowing that payment would have to be made to the labourers and that no arrangement at all had been made in respect of the source from which the money for payment was to become available. It is very difficult to believe that Lalji Tewari could have asked the labourers to start work on his own initiative taking the risk that they would demand payment of their wages from him when he had no resources available for making the payment. It is also significant in this connection that, in the original draft of the election petition, the dates on which the work was said to have been carried out were not 8th January 1967 to 10th January, 1967, but later dates falling in the month of February, 1967, indicating how this story was being made up in order to challenge the election of the respondent. It is true that the Sarpanch Aditya Narain has come to support the version given by Lalji Tewari; but he is also very obviously an interested witness, because he was in fact nominated as a dummy candidate for the Congress Party and only withdrew his candidature when the nomination of the main Congress candidate was accepted. He is, therefore, a person interested in a candidate who was rival of the respondent in the election. 9. He is, therefore, a person interested in a candidate who was rival of the respondent in the election. 9. Apart from this circumstance, we consider that the main reason for rejecting this allegation of bribery is that the evidence given on behalf of the appellant to prove that the money was actually paid by the respondent is not at all satisfactory. On this point, only two witnesses have been examined. They are Lalji Tewari, the Up-sarpanch himself, and one Ramsajivan, PW 10. Both of them have stated that this sum of Rs. 378 was given by the respondent to Lalji Tewari on 19th February, 1967 when the respondent visited diary Village Pipritola in connection with the canvassing for his election. These witnesses were not found by the learned Judge of the High Court to be reliable and, in fact, they did not impress him as truthful witnesses. Lalji Tewari in his evidence did not state that the respondent asked him to tell the labourers that the respondent had paid the money and they should vote for him. Ram Sajivan alone has made such a statement. Learned counsel for the appellant placed great reliance on the evidence of Ram Sajivan, because it appears that, at a later date. Ram Sajivan actually worked as one of the polling agents of the respondent. It seems that, after the election was over, attempts were made to prepare evidence to challenge the election of the respondent and somehow or the other Ramsajivan, who had acted as polling agent for the respondent, was persuaded to become one of the witnesses against him. It has to be remembered that the charge of corrupt practice of bribery under the election law is in the nature of a quasi-criminal charge, and we do not consider that there will be any justification for us to interfere with the finding recorded by the High Court in favour of the respondent, who was accused of this charge, when the only evidence given in support of it consists of two such witnesses, Lalji Tewari and Ram Sajivan. Ram Sajivan, of course, stated that no other person, besides the respondent and the two of them, was present when this money was paid by the respondent to Lalji Tewari. Naturally, in these circumstances, the respondent was not in a position to give any other evidence to disprove the charge, except his own statement. Ram Sajivan, of course, stated that no other person, besides the respondent and the two of them, was present when this money was paid by the respondent to Lalji Tewari. Naturally, in these circumstances, the respondent was not in a position to give any other evidence to disprove the charge, except his own statement. The respondent did examine himself as a witness and denied having made any such payment. A payment supported by such oral evidence is rarely accepted even in a case where a debtor alleges that he has paid money to his creditor. case of a quasi-criminal charge of briber, such evidence is even more unsatisfactory and, consequently, we are unable to accept the submission that the appellant has succeeded in proving that the sum of Rs. 378 was given by the respondent to Lalji Tewari to be distributed to the labourers after telling them to vote for the respondent, The finding given by the High Court on this ground must also be affirmed. 10. The second charge of bribery related to distribution of grain at the instance of the respondent by one Shiv Kumar in village Harsend to voters on the day of polling itself, the principal witness on this point was Shiv Kumar himself; but Shiv Kumar is a brother of PW 4, Aditya Narain, who was a dummy candidate for the rival Congress Party against the respondent. He is, therefore, clearly an interested witness. The High Court has discussed the evidence of Shiv Kumar in detail, indicating the improbability of his having been asked to distribute the grain and his being able to obtain the grain for distribution when rationing was in force. Learned counsel for the appellant was unable to advance any cogent reasons for our differing from the view taken by the High Court, so that this ground in the appeal also fails. 11. The appeal is dismissed with costs.