Judgment H.Mahapatra, J. 1. This is a defendants appeal arising out of a suit for declaration that a partnership business, in which he was the working and managing partner, was already dissolved and, if not dissolved, for dissolution of the same. The suit was valued at Rs. 10,000, at which the two plaintiffs claimed tentatively their dues out of the winding or dissolution of the partnership business. The defendant appellant had made an application under Sec.20 of the Arbitration Act for reference to arbitration of the dispute that arose between the parties, and under Sec.34 of that Act he made an application to the trial Court for stay of the suit till the disposal of the application under Sec.20 of the Act. That however, was not granted. The defendant was ultimately appointed as a receiver in regard to the partnership business, which is the subject-matter of the suit. That order was passed on 4th of September, 1967, the suit having been tiled on 20th of June, 1967. At that time the Court thought that the defendant by his experience and skill, was the most competent person to manage the business during the pendency of the suit, as otherwise, without him, the business was bound to be closed down. He was asked to furnish accounts monthly of the income and expenditure in Court and also to give a complete list of the partnership property by the 11th of September. 1967. The next order on the 12th of February. 1968 gives an impression that whatever accounts were filed by the defendant receiver did not satisfy the Court, and the Court thought that he had not conducted himself as a prudent business man. But the Court did not decide at that time to remove him from receivership. He was asked to notify, by 17th of February, 1968. his consent to certain conditions which the Court indicated to be imposed upon him in case his receivership was to continue. The presiding officer of the Court appears to have been transferred after that order. The defendant appellant made an application to that Court for a review of the order passed on the 12th of February, 1968. But that was rejected by the order passed on the 19th of May. 1968. In that order, however, the succeeding presiding officer thought that the previous order of the Court of the 12th of February. The defendant appellant made an application to that Court for a review of the order passed on the 12th of February, 1968. But that was rejected by the order passed on the 19th of May. 1968. In that order, however, the succeeding presiding officer thought that the previous order of the Court of the 12th of February. 1968 in regard to the proposed conditions to be imposed upon the receiver was rather vague and required clarification and preciseness He also asked the receiver to submit all the accounts up to date and asked the plaintiffs to file their objections to the accounts, if any, by the 23rd of May, 1968. The case was fixed for 24th of May. 1968, for hearing in the matter of the continuance of the receivership and the conditions to be imposed in that connection as also the accounts submitted by the defendant receiver. On the 23rd of May the plaintiffs filed their objections to the accounts given by the receiver and on the 24th of May to which date the interlocutory matters were fixed for hearing, the receiver made an application for time to file a rejoinder to the objections raised by the plaintiffs in respect of the accounts submitted by him. No time appears to have been granted to him on that application though, I find from the order passed on that day, by consent of the parties the receivership matter was posted for hearing to the 20th of May. The appellant as defendant had also ask-ed for time for filing the written statement and that prayer was allowed subject to payment of a cost of Rs. 40/-, and he was required to file the written statement by the 30th of May. On that date (30th of May) the appellant -- both as 8 defendant as well as receiver -- made several applications to the Court, the sum total of which was to gain some time before the receivership matter was considered finally. All his applications were rejected, and at that stage, it appears, the defendants lawyer withdrew from the Court and intimated the Court that he intended to file an application before the District Judge for transfer of the case from the file of the Subordinate Judge. All his applications were rejected, and at that stage, it appears, the defendants lawyer withdrew from the Court and intimated the Court that he intended to file an application before the District Judge for transfer of the case from the file of the Subordinate Judge. The result was that the Court proceeded to hear ex parte from the plaintiffs side in respect of the accounts that had been filed by the receiver. He did not have the advantage of hearing the receivers explanation or comments on the objections raised by the plaintiffs. After such ex parte hearing, the Court posted the matter to the 6th of June. 1968 for orders. 2. In the meanwhile, the receiver moved the District Judge for transfer of the case and obtained an order of stay of further proceedings in the case, from him on the 4th of June. 1968. That stay order was given, at the request of the appellant, to him to be delivered to the Court by hand. That stay order was given to the Seristedar of the Subordinate Judge8 Court at 7 a. m. in the morning of the 6th of June, 1968, as stated on affidavit by the appellant in this Court as well as before the Subordinate Judge on the 7th of June when he applied for expunging the impugned order of the 6th of June. Now the controversy between the parties starts, with which we are concerned in this appeal 3. On the 6th of June, the Court made its order about the matters which it had heard on the 30th of May, 1968 and signed the same. By that order, the subordinate Judge cancelled the appointment of the defendant appellant as receiver and appointed a lawyer to be the interim receiver, pending the final selection of a suitable person as receiver in consultation with the parties in the suit. It is that order which is under challenge in this appeal. 4. Learned counsel for the appellant contended that the impugned order, which was passed after the stay order from the District Judge was communicated to the Court, was a nullity or. at least, illegal. It is that order which is under challenge in this appeal. 4. Learned counsel for the appellant contended that the impugned order, which was passed after the stay order from the District Judge was communicated to the Court, was a nullity or. at least, illegal. He pointed out that the stay order having been delivered to the subordinate Judges Seristedar early in the morning at 7 Oclock (those were the morning Court sitting days), the Court shall be deemed to have known the stay order and the impugned order, in that view, cannot be sustained. In connection with the transfer of the case, the Subordinate Judge had sent an explanation, which was placed before me and from that it appears that the impugned order was signed by the subordinate Judge at 7.30 a. m. as he stated in his explanation, on the 6th of June. 1968. I find from the order sheet under date 6-6-1968 the Court said (vide order No. 57):- - "Later At 9.30 a.m. when I was about to rise. B. C. (Bench clerk) gave me order of the D. J. staving further proceeding in the suit I have already passed orders. However, in view of the order of the D. J. the operation of the order is stayed and the new receiver will not assume charge. The status quo will remain as it was before the passing of the order. Put up on 15-7-68 for further order." Another portion of the order in the order sheet that day was: "56/6-6-68 Order passed on separate sheets. I will hear the parties after recess, i.e. at 10 a. m." In the explanation given by the subordinate Judge in connection with the transfer of the case, he also stated that the order had been given to the Seristedar of his Court before it was shown to him by his Bench clerk at 9.30 a. m. Thus, there is no dispute that the stay order had come to the subordinate Judges Court and was given in the hands of the Seristedar who passed it on to the Bench clerk of the subordinate Judge. In that view, this order shall be taken to have been communicated to the Court, Learned counsel for the plaintiffs-respondents contended that mere handing of the order of stay to the Seristedar or to the Bench clerk is not enough and that will not amount to intimation or communication of the order to the Court so as to make it prohibitory on his part to have any further proceedings in the suit. He referred to the case of Mulraj V/s. Murti Raghunathji Maharai, 1967 BLJR 665= ( AIR 1967 SC 1386 ) where it was observed by their Lordships of the Supreme Court that stay order will operate when it is communicated to the Court concerned. In case the Court finds that it had passed certain orders during the period between the time when the stay order was passed by the superior Court and when it was communicated to it, it will be open to the Court to take necessary action under Sec.151 of the Code of Civil Procedure and recall the orders passed during that period if that is necessary for ends of justice. It has also been mentioned therein that the party aggrieved may also ask the Court to recall that order Learned counsel for the respondents very much stressed upon the observations of their Lordships in that judgment where they said that the Court, until it is communicated the stay order, retains the jurisdiction to pass any orders or to go on with the case, as it may think. Thereafter the jurisdiction of the Court is not taken away in regard to the proceedings of the suit upon a mere passing of stay order by a superior Court, but only the Court is prohibited from proceeding further and any order passed thereafter will be a nullity or illegality. There cannot be now any dispute over this proposition although different views had been taken earlier in regard to stay matters compared with injunction matters in some of the High Courts including this Court in Liakat Mian V/s. Padampat Singhania, AIR 1951 Pat 130 . 5. There cannot be now any dispute over this proposition although different views had been taken earlier in regard to stay matters compared with injunction matters in some of the High Courts including this Court in Liakat Mian V/s. Padampat Singhania, AIR 1951 Pat 130 . 5. In the instant case, if the order was communicated to the subordinate Judges Court at 7 Oclock in the morning and if the impugned order was signed or passed at 7.30 a. m. that day, as stated by the subordinate Judge, it should be deemed to have been so signed and passed subsequent to the communication of the stay order. In that view and following the dictum laid down in the aforesaid decision of the Supreme Court, the impugned order will be an illegality and also a nullity. It was, however, urged on behalf of the plaintiffs-respondents that communicatation of the order means communication to the presiding officer. How the affairs of a particular Court are to be arranged is undoubtedly the concern of the presiding officer and if his arrangements of receiving letters and communications are that they should be received by the seristedar, that is a domestic, internal matter of the Court, and once in accord with such arrangements a communicatation is delivered to that Court through that particular officer, it will be deemed that the communication is complete. Suppose the stay order came by a registered letter addressed to the subordinate Judge and the letter is delivered, while the Court is working on the ijlas, to its Bench clerk who signed the acknowledgment. Suppose further that the Bench clerk hands over this letter to the Presiding officer of the Court but the letter remains unopened or unread with the Presiding officer, will that mean that there has been no communication to the Court and will any order that might have been passed before the letter is opened or read be an order without intimation of the stay order ? I think the only view that can be taken on the facts of this case will be that the stay order had been communicated to the Court at 7 Oclock in the morning. 6. I think the only view that can be taken on the facts of this case will be that the stay order had been communicated to the Court at 7 Oclock in the morning. 6. Assuming that the Court did not have any knowledge of that stay order till 9.30 a. m. that day when its Bench clerk gave him that order, following the decision of the Supreme Court referred to above, the Court would and should have recalled the impugned order saying that that order had been passed after the 4th of June, 1968 when the stay order was passed by the District Judge and before the time that he came to know of it. This could have been done under Sec.151 C. P. C. because for ends of justice that was very much called for, as by the impugned order the receivership had been terminated. Of course, the Court stayed the operation of the order as soon as the Bench clerk gave the said order to it. But that means that the impugned order was kept alive. When the receiver made an application for expunging that order on the next day (7-6-68), the Court did not pass any order on that but filed that application. That means neither suo motu nor oh the application of the receiver the impugned order which had been passed after the stay order was given by the District Judge and before, let us take it, the subordinate Judge came to know of it personally, was not recalled. 7. Learned counsel for the appellant also contended that the impugned order cannot be taken to be an order in accordance with law as it was not delivered or pronounced in Court by the Presiding officer for the information of the parties concerned, I find that the impugned order was not in the regular order sheet of the case but was contained in separate sheets of paper typed. Further I find that those sheets form part of the order sheet, showing the continuing pages in the order sheet beginning from XXV to XXVI (XXVI should have been XXVII). On page XXIV order No. 56 dated 6th of June, 1968 says "Order passed on separate sheets". Further I find that those sheets form part of the order sheet, showing the continuing pages in the order sheet beginning from XXV to XXVI (XXVI should have been XXVII). On page XXIV order No. 56 dated 6th of June, 1968 says "Order passed on separate sheets". If these separate sheets were to be made the continuing pages of the order sheet, then this endorsement should have come after the separate sheets attached to the order sheet and not preceded them. Further I find that the impugned order does not bear the usual endorsement "Dictated and corrected by me" with the initial of the subordinate Judge and date, as it was given on previous occasions whenever typed orders were incorporated in the order sheet. Nowhere it has been stated either by the plaintiffs respondents who have filed several affidavits in appeal in this Court or in the explanation given by the subordinate Judge to the District Judge about the transfer of the case that the impugned order was pronounced in open Court. All that has been stated is that he had signed it at 7.30 a. m. It is well known that a judgment in order to have its sanctity and legal value must be intimated to the parties or to their lawyers. In some form or the other the substance of the decision of the Court must be made known and that in the Court itself: see the case of Surendra Sing v. State of Uttar Pradesh, AIR 1954 SC 194 . The formal intimation of the opinion of a Court openly is the very core of a judgment and as long as that is not done, it cannot be said that there has been a pronouncement or delivery of the judgment or order by the Court. It does not appear that the impugned order had been pronounced in Court or was intimated to the parties in open Court before 9.30 a. m. on the 6th of June, 1968. It may have been signed, as the learned subordinate Judge says, at 7.30 a.m. but that will not make it the order of the Court until it is pronounced in open Court in some form or other. In that view also, this order in question cannot be sustained. 8. (In paragraph 8, it was observed that even on merits the impugned order could not be upheld. In that view also, this order in question cannot be sustained. 8. (In paragraph 8, it was observed that even on merits the impugned order could not be upheld. The judgment then proceeds:) 9. It will be open to the Court below to consider the question of termination of receivership, the accounts filed by the receiver, and objections raised by the plaintiffs when the impugned order is set aside. This should be done as expeditious-ly as possible. The receiver must be given an opportunity to explain or file his rejoinder in regard to the objections raised by the plaintiffs. For that two weeks time will be sufficient. Let the records be sent down at once. 10. For the reasons given above, I allow this appeal, and set aside the order dated 6th of June, 1968. In view of the circumstances of the case, parties will bear their own costs in this Court.