JUDGMENT Jagdish Sahai and Gangeshwar Prasad, JJ. - Our brother Rajeshwari Prasad has referred the following question to us for our opinion : - "In view of the Division Bench decision of this Court in the case of Nagar Mahapalika, Kanpur v. Debi Gulam Gupta, ILR 1965 (1) All. 329 whether it is open to a Bench of a single Judge, to dismiss a writ filed under Article 226 of the Constitution of India on the sole ground of delay if that writ petition had been admitted by a Division Bench of this Court?" Under the Rules of the Court a writ petition is filed before a Bench of two Judges. After admission it is heard by a single Judge of this Court. Our brother Rajeshwari Prasad felt some difficulty in entertaining the question whether or not the petition should be dismissed on the ground of delay. He was apparently influenced by the consideration that the writ petition had been admitted by a Bench of higher status in the sense that it was admitted by a Division Bench and, therefore the learned single Judge could not interfere with the discretion of the Division Bench. He also found some difficulty because of the following observation made by a Division Bench of this Court of which one of us was a member in Nagar Mahapalika, Kanpur v. Debi Gulam Gupta, ILR 1965 (1) All. 329: "Besides, whether or not a petition was belated and whether or not this Court would exercise its powers under Article 226 of the Constitution were matters to be decided by the learned Single Judge. In fact that this was a question which was to be considered at the time of the admission of the writ petition and the learned Single Judge having exercised his discretion in favour of the respondents, it is not for us to go into that question and to decide whether or not the learned Single Judge correctly exercised his discretion." We would like to point out that whether it is the Full Court of a Full Bench (of whatever strength) or a Division Bench or a single Judge each one of them speak for the whole Court and the decision recorded by any one of them is a decision for the whole Court until superseded by a Bench of higher status. This position was envisaged by clause 27 of the Letters Patent of this Court. Merely because a petition had been admitted does not mean that the jurisdiction of the learned single Judge has been in any way curtailed over the case. The entire matter is before him and he can examine and adjudicate upon each and every aspect of the case, be it pure merits or delay in filing the petition or the ground of alternative remedy. The admission of a petition does not result in an adjudication on any of the aspects of the case. It only entitles the petitioner to have his petition decided and disposed of by the Court. Petitions are listed for admission for the purpose of screening so that the worthless ones may not engage the attention of the Court and only the worthwhile ones are heard by the Court. If by the mere admission of a petition by a Division Bench, a single Judge is not precluded from adjudicating upon the merits of the case, and there is no presumption that the grounds taken in the petition stand substantiated it is difficult to see how he can be deemed to be precluded from considering the question of, delay also. It is true that once a belated petition has been admitted, and has been pending in the Court for some time for adjudication on merits, and its dismissal on the ground of delay would entail some hardship on the petitioner, it would be proper exercise of discretion not to dismiss it on the ground of delay but that is quite different from saying that the learned single Judge has no jurisdiction to dismiss it on those grounds. It may be pointed out that there is no period of limitation provided by statute for the filing of a writ petition. The Court declines to interfere on the ground of delay because in the exercise of writ jurisdiction equitable considerations also prevail and a party guilty of laches dis entitles itself to be heard and also because the Court would not like to unsettle matters which are long matted by course of time. It is true that while deciding whether or not a writ petition should be dismissed on the ground of delay or alternative remedy, the learned single Judge would examine all the factors involved. It is true that while deciding whether or not a writ petition should be dismissed on the ground of delay or alternative remedy, the learned single Judge would examine all the factors involved. IL: would have to see as to what is the period of the delay and the extent of illegality in the orders impugned. He would also have to give consideration to the question as to whether the dismissal of the writ petition specially at a late stage would not pre-judicially effect the right of the petitioner of availing other remedies the other remedies may have become barred by time. All that is observed by the Division Bench in Nagar Mahapalika, Kanpur v. Debi Gulam Gupta, is that normally the question whether or not a belated petition should be admitted should be considered at the time of admission, the matter being between the Court and the petitioner, there being no period of limitation provided by law. If the Court admits a petition in spite of its being belated, after considering that matter, at a later stage, it should not normally be dismissed on that ground. The appellate Bench is generally reluctant to go into the question of belatedness of a petition if the learned single Judge has adjudicated upon the merits after considering the question of delay. This is all that was held in the division Bench case mentioned above. Similar view has been expressed in Damodar Goswami v. Narnarayan Goswami, A.I.R. 1955 Assam 163, Dalpathbhai Hemchand v. The Municipality of Chansama, A.I.R. 1968 Gujarat 38 and S. Gurmej Singh Hira Singh v. The Election Tribunal Gurdaspur, A.I.R. 1964 (2) Punjab 243. Our answer to the question referred to us, therefore, is that the entire matter is at large before the learned single Judge and he is free to entertain and adjudicate upon the plea that the petition is a belated one. He would naturally exercise his discretion in accordance with the well settled principles. The costs of this reference shall be me by the, parties. Question answered