JUDGMENT : 1. This is a. Letters Patent Appeal from the order of Mr. Justice A. H. Khan in Miscellaneous Appeal No. 9 /1964 arising from an execution proceeding. 2. It appears that an award was made by the Registrar, Co-Operative Societies under the C. P. and Berar Co-operative Societies Act, 1912 (Act No, 11 of 1912), hereinafter called “the Act,” in favour of the respondent-Bank against the appellant. On April 21, 1961, a certificate of non-payment of Rs. 11,273-7-0 with interest at 10% per annum to be calculated from January 1, 1955, to the date of realisation was granted by the Deputy Registrar, Co-operative Societies, Madhya Pradesh. On October 28, 1959, on the basis of this certificate the Sagar Co-operative Bank made an application for execution in the Court of the Additional District Judge, Sagar. The prayer in this execution application was that the decree be transferred to the District Judge, Guna, for execution. Eventually, on January 25, 1960, the Sugar Court transferred the decree to Guna Court. 3. On November 29, 1961, an application for execution was made in the Court of the Additional District Judge, Guna. Certain objections were raised by the judgment-debtor. They are stated by the learned Additional District Judge as follows:— (i) That he was not served in the original case and such as the present decree is illegal and not executable. (ii) The present execution application is time-barred. (iii) The decree is not transferred by the original Court and non-satisfaction certificate is not issued by the same and as such this Court has no jurisdiction to execute it. (iv) The decree-holder-Sagar Co-operative Bank is not authorised to present this execution application. 4. The learned Additional District Judge, held that the application for execution which was made on October 28, 1959, in the Court of the Additional District Judge, Sagar, was within time. He says:— “At first the application was given in the Court of the Additional Tahsildar, Sagar, for recovery of the decretal amount was arrear of land revenue on 6-6-66 which continued upto 27-7-59, then it was filed in the Court of the Additional District Judge, Sagar, on 28-10-1959, and from that Court it has been transferred to this Court and hence each execution application was filed within three years and as such the present application is within time.” 5. The learned District Judge further held that the Sagar Court was competent to transfer the decree to Guna Court. This view was upheld by the learned single Judge. 6. The learned single Judge referred to section 85 of the Madhya Pradesh Co-operative Societies Act (Act No. 17 of 1961) which is now in force. But that Act will not govern this case. It is governed by the C. P. and Berar Co-operative Societies Act (Act No. 11 of 1912). Rules 32 and 33 of the Rules framed under section 43 of that earlier Act may be reproduced below:— “Rule 32—An award of the arbitrators, if not appealed against within one month, and any decision or order of the Registrar shall as between the parties to the dispute, not be liable to be called in question in any civil or revenue Court and shall be in all respects final and conclusive.” Rule 33— “Any order of attachment of property passed under section 42-A shall, on application to any civil Court having local jurisdiction, be executed by such Court as if made by such Court. Any award, decision or order mentioned in Rule 32 shall, on application to such Court, be enforced in the same manner as a decree of such Court, and any sum falling due under such award, decision or order shall, on a certificate signed by the Registrar, be recovered by the Deputy Commissioner as an arrear of land revenue; provided that objections to attachment shall be made to the Court which made the attachment on the application of the Registrar.” Rule 42-A provided for attachment before award. It will be clearly seen that Rule 33 is in three parts:— (i) Where property was attached before award it could be executed by any civil Court having local jurisdiction as if it had been made by such Court. (ii) Any award, decision or order which attained finality, could on application to any civil Court having local jurisdiction be enforced in the same manner as a decree of such Court. (iii) On Registrar’s certificate the balance remaining unpaid under the award could be recovered by the Deputy Commissioner as arrears of land revenue. Under the second part of Rule 33 the award it-self was executable in a civil Court and a certificate of the Registrar was not necessary. The award was proprio vigore executable by any civil Court having local jurisdiction. Under the second part of Rule 33 the award it-self was executable in a civil Court and a certificate of the Registrar was not necessary. The award was proprio vigore executable by any civil Court having local jurisdiction. 7. The decision in Indore Pamspar Sahkari Pedhi, Ltd. v. B. M. Thorat ( AIR 1958 MP 199 ) is clearly distinguishable. That was a case under the Gwalior State Co-operative Societies Act. There, Rule 46 (3) of the Rules made under the Gwalior Act did not make an award, under section 60 of that Act, a decree of a civil Court. That Rule was in these words:— “Application for execution of such order or award (according to the form prescribed in section 243, Civil Procedure Code) shall be presented to the Government Inspector, Co-operative Societies, who shall execute the same by attachment and sale of the property of the debtor as provided for in clause (4) (a) and (b) of this rule, or if necessary shall transfer it to a competent Court (civil or revenue) or to some other Government Inspector Co-operative Societies, having jurisdiction for execution. Such Inspector or Court shall execute it according to law.” It was held that the sub-rule required an application for execution of the award to be made before the Government Inspector, Co-operative Societies. He could himself execute an award according to the proceedings prescribed in sub-rules (4) to (8) of Rule 46. If the Inspector did not execute the award himself he could transfer it to a competent civil or Revenue Court for execution. It was, therefore, held that a civil or Revenue Court had no jurisdiction to execute an award under Rule 46 (3) unless it was transferred to it for execution by Government Inspector of Co-operative Societies. 8. We are clearly of the view that different position obtained under the C. P. Rule 33. Under this rule an award could reach a civil Court for execution directly, and not through the agency of the Registrar. If the award was sought to be executed as a decree of the civil Court all that was necessary was to make an application to a civil Court having local jurisdiction. That being so, it was not necessary for the respondent-Co-operative Bank to obtain a certificate from the Registrar to enable it to enforce the award in that Court. If the award was sought to be executed as a decree of the civil Court all that was necessary was to make an application to a civil Court having local jurisdiction. That being so, it was not necessary for the respondent-Co-operative Bank to obtain a certificate from the Registrar to enable it to enforce the award in that Court. It is not known whether the certificate dated April 21, 1956, was obtained by the Co-operative Bank for the purpose of execution in the civil Court or for proceeding under the third part of Rule 33. In connection with the question of limitation Shri Gupta referred to, and relied on, a statement in the application for execution that proceedings were taken before the Government Officers for recovery of the amount due under the award. It therefore, appears that the certificate dated April 21, 1956, was really sought by the Co-operative Bank for enforcing the remedy under the third part of the Rule. That question, however, is not material for the purposes of determinig the question of jurisdiction. It will be relevant for the purposes of the question of limitation. 9. In the view that we take it must be said that an execution proceeding could directly be taken out in the Sagar Court for recovery of the amount due under the award. For that purpose a certificate of non-payment was not required to be obtained from the Registrar. It would be deemed as if the Registrar’s award was a decree passed by the Sagar Court. It is not in dispute before us that Sagar Court had territorial jurisdiction. We, therefore, hold that the Sagar Court was not a transferee Court. It was competent to transfer the decree (i. e. the award) to the Guna Court. The appellant’s first contention is rejected. 10. It is then urged for the appellant that the learned single Judge did not decide the question of limitation although it was specifically raised before him. The learned counsel has referred to the grounds of appeal before the single Judge and also the grounds of appeal before us. It is remarkable that the application for execution which was made in the Sagar Court is dated October 28, 1959, and in the Column “dated of the decree”, April 21, 1956, is written. Thus the application for execution was made patently and obviously beyond three years. It is remarkable that the application for execution which was made in the Sagar Court is dated October 28, 1959, and in the Column “dated of the decree”, April 21, 1956, is written. Thus the application for execution was made patently and obviously beyond three years. If the award was itself, by legal fiction a decree of the Sagar Court, for purposes of the second part of Rule 33, it will have to be seen whether from the date of the award the application for execution was made within the prescribed period of limitation. The learned counsel for the respondent-Bank contends that there was no period of limitation prescribed for an application for execution in the civil Court under Rule 33. In our opinion this contention must be rejected. The legal fiction must be read with its logical conclusions. When by legal fiction the Registrar’s award is deemed to be a decree of a civil Court, application for its execution under the second part of Rule 33 I will be governed by Article 182 of the Limitation Act, 1908, which was then in force. 11. Shri Motilal Gupta then contends that some time was spent before the revenue authorities and when amount was not recovered through the agency of the revenue authorities, the Co-operative Bank chose to execute the award through the civil Court. His argument is that the time spent there should be excluded in computing the period of limitation for execution in the civil Court. This point being a mixed question of law and fact has first to be decided by a single Judge. 12. The appeal is partly allowed. It is held that the Sagar Court had jurisdiction to transfer the decree (award) to the Guna Court. The case shall now be placed before a single Judge for deciding the question of limitation. There shall be no order for costs in the present appeal.