JUDGMENT 1. THIS appeal by five out of the seven defendants, in an action in ejectment, from an appellate judgment and decree of substantial affirmance, is put in two ways: first, the very sale-deed put forward as the source of the plaintiffs' title to the premises in controversy here goes down, because of infraction of the law of registration. Second, the plaint as constituted is bad at law, combining as it does an action in ejectment proper against a tenant and an action against the trespassers (which the appellants admittedly are),-badness which could have been, but was not, got rid of by the plaintiffs having been put to election at the trial. 2. TO the first point first. The vendors, the principals, do not reside at the relevant time in India. They, therefore, go in for a power-of-attorney executed before and authenticated by a magistrate, first class, Comilla (East pakistan), authorizing Surendra Nath pandey to execute the sale-deed for their house at Chinsurah, the premises in controversy, and that too to the present plaintiffs. The power-of-attorney has been produced before the two courts below and also before me. It purports on the face of it to have been executed before and authenticated by the aforesaid magistrate. So it proves itself under section 33, subsection 4, of the Registration Act 16 of 1908, let alone section 85 of the Evidence Act 1872, read with section 4 thereof, by which the court shall presume its due execution, nothing to the contrary disproving it. Armed with such power, Surendra Nath Pandey executes the impugned sale-deed in favour of the two plaintiffs. What is there to impugn it? The contention is that such authorization must appear on the endorsement. The endorsement of the registrar does contain, on the back of the first page of the sale-deed, such authorization: execution by Surendra Nath Pandey as constituted attorney for the vendors, and presentation by him. Thus, the requirements of section 32, clause (c), and section 33, subsection 1, clause (c), are well met here. Surendra Nath pandey, who executes the sale-deed under the power-of-attorney, is the person executing. In what goes before is seen no violation of the law laid down by Viscount Sumner in (1) Puran Chand nahatta v. Monmotho Nath Mukherjee, (1927) 32 CWN 629 (PC), as contended for, on behalf of the appellants. What is seen instead is compliance therewith. Surendra Nath pandey, who executes the sale-deed under the power-of-attorney, is the person executing. In what goes before is seen no violation of the law laid down by Viscount Sumner in (1) Puran Chand nahatta v. Monmotho Nath Mukherjee, (1927) 32 CWN 629 (PC), as contended for, on behalf of the appellants. What is seen instead is compliance therewith. There the conveyance was signed on behalf of B by J, purporting to act under a power of attorney. When the conveyance came to be registered, B again acted by an attorney, not J. but another person. The objection that only J, the person whose hand signed the conveyance, could appear as the person executing it, and that appearance and admission by the second attorney was no good, was repelled. And it was held : "personal signature is not required, and another person, duly authorized, may, by writing the name of the party executing, bring about his valid execution, and put him under the obligations involved. Hence the words 'person executing' in the Act cannot be read merely as 'person signing'. They mean something more, namely, the person, who by a valid execution enters into obligation under the instrument." the case before me appears to be so much the stronger, with no second attorney near about or anywhere. There is one, and only one, attorney : surendra Nath Pandey. He executes the sale-deed on behalf of the principals. He presents it, on their behalf, before the registrar who registers it, certifying that the document has been copied in Book No. 1, volume No. 38, at pages 208 to 218. More, such certificate is signed, sealed and dated by him : the registering officer. That being so, a conveyance as this is admissible for the purpose of proving that it has been duly registered in the manner provided by the Registration Act 1908 and that the facts mentioned in the Registrar's (endorsement have occured as therein mentioned : just what section 60, subsection 2, prescribes. Execution by Surendra as a constituted attorney is one such fact. So, no departure from the law laid down in the nahatta case (Supra) is there. 3. THEN, what an earlier decision of the Privy Council: (2) Mohammed ewaz v. Birj Lall, (1877) Lr. Execution by Surendra as a constituted attorney is one such fact. So, no departure from the law laid down in the nahatta case (Supra) is there. 3. THEN, what an earlier decision of the Privy Council: (2) Mohammed ewaz v. Birj Lall, (1877) Lr. 4 IA 166, enunciates, needs remembering : A certificate of registration is sufficient to render a document admissible in evidence, without inquiry as to whether the same was properly granted. 4. THE case of (3) Abdus Samad v. Majitan Bibi, (1960) 65 CWN 696, the appellants rely on, 'but in vain. There "the admitted fact" was "that the power-of-attorney was not executed in the manner provided in section 33 (1) (c)" by the principal Noor Mahammed, a resident outside India. No wonder, a conveyance on the foot of such an infirm power-of-attorney could not receive effect, presentation by the attorney, in the circumstances, 'being not presentation on behalf of the pirincipal. But here the power-of-attorney :is what it should be under section 33, subsection l, clause (c ). So, Abdus Samad's case (Supra) cannot be assimated to the facts before me. The test no doubt is, as emphasized on behalf of the appellant, that registration is invalid if presentstion is unauthorised, the registrar having then neither the power nor the jurisdiction to register the document. And the several requirements of the Act, touching presentation of documents for registration, should be followed, no matter how exacting and strict they are : (4) Chhotey Lal v. Collector of moradabad, (1922) 49 IA 375, where a mortgage was presented for registration, and registered, with the regisstrar's endorsement: "under a power-of-attorney duly authenticated". And endorsement s this was held to be prima fade evidence that the power-of-attorney was regulr in all respects-evidence which, in absence of anything to the contrary, established the validity of the presentation made. True it is that such endorsement is missed in the conveyance before me. So what? I see the original power-of-attorney, as the learned judges below do. It is an immaculate power-of-attorney not liable to attack nor attacked either. It is on the strength of such a one that the conveyance is executed. And still the conveyance will fail! That cannot be. Indeed, the very power-of-attorney establishes the validity of the origional presentation by Surendra Nath Pandey. 5. It is an immaculate power-of-attorney not liable to attack nor attacked either. It is on the strength of such a one that the conveyance is executed. And still the conveyance will fail! That cannot be. Indeed, the very power-of-attorney establishes the validity of the origional presentation by Surendra Nath Pandey. 5. THUS, the first point, on which the appeal has been opened, fails on merit, no matter that nothing like this has been agitated in the courts belaw-a contention urged on behalf of the respondents. On such a contention, it is hardly necessary to say more than this : A point can be taken at any stage provided that no new facts have to be alleged or proved : (5) Chandra Mohan Sah v. Union of India, AIR 1953 Assam 193 (FB ). The appellants allege no new facts. They rest their contention on facts that exist. 6. NOW, to the second point on which the appeal has been opened. The five appellants are admittedly trespassers. The fourth respondent (pro forma) is admittedly the tenant. In a combined suit against all, the position now is, in view of the appellate decree: a. All these five appellants, the fourth respondent (tenant), as also the 3rd one (a brother of the first four appellants) shall be evicted. B. The plaintiffs (respondents l and 2) shall recover arrears of rent, as decreed by the trial court, from January 10, 1956, to October 1958, from the tenant only : the 4th respondent. C. " From the five appellants, the plaintiffs respondents shall recover damages at the same rate as rent from November 1958. Such then is the suit, and such is the decree it has culminated in. I am not prepared to strlke it down on the ground of multifariousness, as I am invited to do. To Statute law first. Order l, rule 3, of the Procedure Code prescribes, in so far as it is material here, that all persons may be joined as defendants against whom any right to relief arising out of a series of acts or transactions is alleged to exist, whether jointly, severally or in the alternative, where, if separate suits were brought against such persons, any common question of law or fact would arise. By rule 5 of the same Order, it is provided that it shall not be necessary that every defendant shall be interested as to all the reliefs claimed in any suit against him. By the conjoint operation of these rules, the following propositions follow: A. There may in a single suit be a number of defendants. B. In such a suit, different reliefs may be claimed without all the defendants being interested in all the reliefs claimed. C. If separate units were brought, some common question of law or fact would arise. 7. THESE propositions fit the present suit nicely enough. Here are so many defendants. The relief of eviction is sought against all. So far as a dichotomy of that relief is concerned : (i) eviction of the tenant and (ii) eviction. of the trespassers, only the tenant defendant is interested in the former, and the rest, intruders all, are interested in the latter. That may very well be, by the clear terms of Order 1, rule 5. What is stated to be missing here is some nexus between the different acts the tenant and the trespassers are charged with. But the "series of acts"-words of amplitude Order 1, rule 3, employs-furnish the nexus. The landlord knows only his tenant whom he lets in. The tenant lets in so many or suffers so many to be let in, without surrendering his tenancy and delivering up possession. On this series of acts, the landlord sues them all in ejectment. So, the nexus, far from missing, is right here; the more so, because, if two separate suits were brought, one against the tenant, and another against the trespassers, the common question of law (lack of the plaintiffs' title, as discussed above) and of fact (sale by the previous owner with the tenancy, the tenant standing by and intruders getting into, etc.) would have arisen. So, the plaint as constituted appears to be too good, going by its substance, and leaving aside its prolixity. Multifarious-ness is nowhere near. No misjoinder of causes of action. Indeed, the cause of action is one, though the reliefs claimed are more than one. Cause of action is one, because everything of what goes before : the power-of-attorney, the conveyance, the tenant continuing, and then suffering the trespassers to invade, etc., the plaintiffs have to prove. Multifarious-ness is nowhere near. No misjoinder of causes of action. Indeed, the cause of action is one, though the reliefs claimed are more than one. Cause of action is one, because everything of what goes before : the power-of-attorney, the conveyance, the tenant continuing, and then suffering the trespassers to invade, etc., the plaintiffs have to prove. And if not proved, that gives the defendant or defendants, as the case may be, an immediate right to judgment. So, here is this bundle of essential facts, which makes but one cause of action : (6) Read v. Brown, (1888)22 QB 128, for Fry L. J. 's classic definition of cause of action, (7) Baroda Oil cake Traders v. Purushottam narayandas Bagulia, ILR 1954 Bombay 1137: air 1954 Bombay 491, and (8)Bhagandas Goverdhandas Kedia v. Girdharlal purshottamdas and Co., (1966) SCA 166 : air 1966 SC 543 , approving the Bombay decision above. It, therefore, follows that one single cause of action being there, misjoinder of causes of action cannot be there, and far less misjoinder of parties and causes of action, the two together making multifariousness. 8. THE cases relied on by the appellants lead them nowhere. In (9)Pramatha Nath Ganguly v. Amiraddi, (1919) 24 CWN 151, the first defendant, a tenant on the basis of a Kabuliyat, did not resist his landlord's suit for khas possession. But the other two defendants, claiming under a third party (Amodini Debi), did. In such facts, multifariousness is plain to be seen. Sure enough, the appellants before me do not claim to be in the premises in controversy under a third party. (10)Sarada Prasad Roy Chowdhury v. Provash Chandra Mandal, (1952) 57 CWN 97, reveals payments, distinct, separate and unconnected with each other, for default in revenue. Still the payers, the plaintiffs, brought one suit for reimbursement of all such amounts and against all defaulters. So, multifariousness was found, and the plaintiffs were put to election. The requisite nexus, badly missing in those unconnected payments, is very much to be seen in the closely connected series of acts here : the tenant continuing, with nothing like a surrender or delivering up possession of the premises, and suffering the intruders to get into the premises to the detriment of the landlords and his own tenancy. Even if it be assumed that multifariousness is there, I am not bound to interfere. Even if it be assumed that multifariousness is there, I am not bound to interfere. So I say on the authority of (11) Suniti Sundari Devi v. Srikrishna Chakravarti, AIR 1928 Calcutta 514, which concedes that the suit, for removal of a defendant from, the office of sebait, for striking down the alienation made by him in favour of other defendants, and for possession, may well be multifarious, but yet upholds it, because of common question of law and fact and of the injustice in compelling the plaintiff to bring suits, only to be consolidated later. 9. ON top of all this, there is section 99 of the Procedure Code, referred to on behalf of the respondents. It cures errors due to misjoinder of parties or causes of action unless it is shown that such errors have affected the merits of the case or the jurisdiction of the court. Here, on merits, what has been done secures justice and nothing but justice, putting the appellants, trespassers all, in their proper place. And the jurisdiction of the trial court is of course there. The attempt to get away from section 99, on the ground that it provides for "misjoinder of parties or causes of action", not for multifariousness which is misjoinder of parties and causes of action, cannot succeed. It cannot, because the intention of the legislature in enacting section 99 appears to be so clear : 'do not reverse or modify a decree for any error which affects not merit or jurisdiction.' With a view to carrying out such intention, "it" is permissible, in appropriate cases to read the conjunction "or" as "and". Not that "or" means "and". In English language, "or" never does mean "and", as Jessel m. R. put it in (12) Morgan v. Thomas, (1882) 9 QBD 643. I need say no more on a point which does not arise. Because I see no multifariousness. 10. THUS, the second point fails too. In the result, the appeal fails and be dismissed with costs. 11. LEAVE to appeal under clause 15 of the Letters Patent has been asked for. It is refused.