Dulli Chand Kashi Prasad v. State of Uttar Pradesh
1968-04-26
M.H.BEG, R.S.PATHAK
body1968
DigiLaw.ai
JUDGMENT R.S. Pathak, J. - The Sales Tax Officer, Kanpur, made an assessment order under the U.P Sales Tax Act against the petitioners for each of the assessment years 1953-54m 1954-55 and 1955-56. These assessment orders were challenged by petitions under Article 226 of the Constitution. A Division Bench of this Court dismissed the petitions on the ground that adequate alternative relief was available to the petitioners under the U.P. Sales Tax Act and it was not a fit case upon which the petitioner should be permitted to invoke the extraordinary jurisdiction of the Court conferred by Article 226. 2. The Petitioners propose to appeal to the Supreme Court against the decision of the Division Bench. In these three connected petitions the petitioners pray for certificates under sub-clauses (a), (b) and (c) of clause (1) of Article 133 of the Constitution. 3. At the outset, learned counsel for the respondents has raised the objection that as the Court declined to interfere on the ground that an alternative remedy under the stature was available to the petitioners, the order dismissing the writ petitions the order dismissing the writ meaning of clause (1) of Article 133 and the instant petitions are not maintainable. Article 133 (1) of the Constitution provides: " An appeal shall lie to the supreme court from any judgment, decree of final order in a civil proceeding of a High Court in the territory of India it the High court certifies- (a).............................. (b)............................. (C)............................ 4. It is plain that in order to qualify for any or all of the certificates mentioned in clause (1) of Article 133 it must be shown that the appeal is proposed against a judgment, decree or final order within the contemplation of that clause. 5. What is a judgment for the purposes of Article 133 was considered by a bench of this Court in Vishnu pratap v. smt. Rewati Devi, AIR 1953 Allahabad 647. it was pointed out that a judgment means an adjudication which conclusively determines the right of the parties.. The question as to what constitutes a final order received the attention of a Full Bench of this Court in Mohd Mahmood Hasan khan v. Government of U.P., A.I.R. 1956 ALLD. 457.
Rewati Devi, AIR 1953 Allahabad 647. it was pointed out that a judgment means an adjudication which conclusively determines the right of the parties.. The question as to what constitutes a final order received the attention of a Full Bench of this Court in Mohd Mahmood Hasan khan v. Government of U.P., A.I.R. 1956 ALLD. 457. It was observed that even though it was an order which deposed of the proceeding before the Court finally, it should not be an order which left the original proceeding in the court below alive, and there should be a final determination of the rights of the parties or the order of its own force should affect the right of the parties. These were opinions expressed in proceedings under the Code of Civil Procedure. 6. The Position in respect of a proceeding under Article 226 of the Constitution was considered by this Court in M/s. Bhargawa Das and Co. Pvt. Ltd. v. Income Tax Officer.AIR 1958 ALLd. 800. It was held that a judgment or order disposing of a petition under Article 226 must satisfy the tests laid down in vishnu Pratap case and mohd. Mahmood under Article 133 may be granted. The learned Judges were considering a case where the availed of an alternative remedy. In refusing the certificate, the Court pointed out: "It will thus be seen that by order of this court no rights of the applicant were at all decided. The order, which was impugned, was left untouched. It was neither set aside nor affirmed. It was left to the applicant to continue his remedy against the order in the proceedings which he had already in respect of it before the Income-tax Appellate Tribunal, so that the right which were decided by that order continued to remain within the jurisdiction of the income-tax appellant Tribunal to adjudicate upon." 7. It was contended by the Petitioner in that case that in any event the order of the court disposing of the under Article 226 decided the right of the petitioner to obtain a writ from the court. But that contention was also rejected on the view that the issue of directions, orders or writs under Article 226 was entirely discretionary and no person had any right to them.
But that contention was also rejected on the view that the issue of directions, orders or writs under Article 226 was entirely discretionary and no person had any right to them. it was observe:- " In this case, therefore, when this Court refused to exercise the power on the application of the applicant, the Court did not, by dismissing that application, adjudicate upon any right of the applicant to obtain a writ from this Court." 8. Learned counsel for the respondents has also referred as to C. Dhanalakshmi v. I.T. Officer A.I.R. 1958 Mad. 151. where the Madras High Court upon a petition for certificate against an order dismissing a petition under Article 226 held that the order must be one which finally disposes of the right of the parties. 9. The Mysore High Court in Vishwa nathan v. Abdul Wajid A.I.R. 1960 Mys. 261, declined to grant a certificate against an order dismissing a petition under Article 226 where the court had refused relief on the preliminary ground that the impugned order had not been made by a court inferior or subordinate to the Mysoure High Court and that the impugned order had become final before the constitution came into force. 10. It seems to us that the position has now been settled by what the supreme court has said in Ramesh v. Gendalal, A.I.R. 1966 SC 1445. Among other matters, two important points of controversy were resolved in that case it was held that the question whether the order of the High court disposing of the petition under Article 226 decided the rights of the Parties must be considered independently of the original controversy giving rise to the petition under Article 226. Hidayatullah, J. (As he then was) , speaking for the Court, observed: "We are concerned here with the exercise of extraordinary original civil Jurisdiction under Article 226. Under that jurisdiction, the High court does not hear an appeal or revision. The High Court is moved to intervene, and to bring before itself, the record of a case decided by or pending before a court or tribunal or any authority within the High Court's jurisdiction. A petition to the High court invoking this jurisdiction is a proceeding quit independent of the original controversy.
The High Court is moved to intervene, and to bring before itself, the record of a case decided by or pending before a court or tribunal or any authority within the High Court's jurisdiction. A petition to the High court invoking this jurisdiction is a proceeding quit independent of the original controversy. The controversy in the High court in proceedings arising under Article 226 ordinarily is whether a decision of, or a proceeding before, a Court or tribunal or should be allowed to stand or should be quashed, for want of jurisdiction or on account of errors of law apparent on the face of the record. A decision in the exercise of this jurisdiction, whether interfering with the proceeding impugned or declining to do so, is a final decision in so far as the High court is concerned because it terminate finally the special proceeding before it." 11. It was then pointed out that every order disposing of a petition under Article 226 was not necessarily a final order. It was observed: "There are orders and orders. The question will always arise what has the high court decided and what is the effect of the order. If, for example, the High court declines to interfere because all the remedies open under the law are not exhausted, the order of the High court may not possess that finality which the article contemplates. Bet the order would be final if the jurisdiction of a tribunal is questioned and the High court either up holds it or does not. In either case the controversy in the High Court is finally decided." 12. In a petition under Article 226. the contention may be that the inferior authourity has no jurisdiction to make the impugned order or that the impugned order is vitiated by a manifest error of law or by a breach of the principles of natural justice. a decision on these questions may be sufficient to dispose of the petition on its merits. Such an order will be a final order within the contemplation of Article 133 (1) But where the Court declines to consider the points in controversy at all and refuses relief on the ground that the petitioner should have resorted to an alternative remedy it is clearly a case (in which?) no question between the parties arising in the petition has been decided. 13.
13. The petitioners rely upon a recent decision of the Supreme Court in Mohan lal Magan lal Thacker v. The State of Gujarat. Criminal appeal No. 105 of 1965. D/d. 15.12.1967. That case arose out of a criminal revision in the High court against the order of the Additional Sessions Judge upholding the Magistrate's order under Section 476 of the Code of Criminal Procedure directing the filing of a complaint against the appellant. The criminal revision was dismissed by the High court by the following order: "This is a matter in which this court should never interfere in revision the revision application is, therefore, dismissed." 14. The High court granted a certificate under sub-clause (c) of clause (1) of Article 134. when the appeal came on before the supreme Court, the respondent raised the preliminary objection that as the order of the High court dismissing the revision application was not a final order the certificate granted by the High court was incompetent and, therefore, the appeal was not maintainable. The Constitution Bench of the Supreme Court, That conclusion proceed on the view that by the order of the High court the question whether the complaint was justified or not was finally decided. there was nothing left to be done there after. There was no further proceeding in which the question whether the complaint was justified could be agitated. The position is quit different here. When the High court in a petition under Article 226 declines to enter into the questions in controversy between the parties on the ground that an adequate and efficacious alternative remedy is available it cannot be said that the controversy between the parties has come to an end. on the contrary, the decision of the High Court recognises that the controversy can be effectively disposed of in another jurisdiction. It recognises that the controversy remains alive and undetermined. No finality attaches to that controversy by the order dismissing the petitioner under Article 226. 15. Upon the aforesaid considerations, in our Judgment the order of this Court dismissing the petitions under Article 226 is not a judgment or final order within the meaning of clause (1) of Article 133 of the Constitution. The Petitions are rejected. Petitions rejected.