JUDGMENT 1. THIS rule was issued at the instance of the petitioner inter alia for quashing an order of reversion of the petitioner to-Ms substantive post. The facts set out by the petitioner are substantially as follows : - 2. THE petitioner while working as an Assistant in the scale of pay of Rs. 130-300/- in the office of the Chief inspector of Explosives in India, Department of Explosives, Government of India at Nagpore was selected to a post of Higher Grade Clerk (Steno-typist on deputation under the andaman and Nicobar Islands Administration on certain terms and conditions contained in a memorandum dated 29th April, 1964 (marked as annexure A to the petition). One of such terms was that the deputation was to last for a period of 3 years. By an office order dated 22nd April, 1964 the petitioner was relieved of his duties in the office of the Chief Inspector of Explosives with effect from the afternoon of 22nd April, 1964. The petitioner eventually joined the said post of Higher Grade clerk|steno-typist at Andaman on. 12th may, 1964. Then by another office order dated 9th June, 1964 issued by the Assistant Secretary to the Chief commissioner, Andaman and Nicobar islands terms of the employment of the petitioner on deputation were set out which inter alia provided that deputation period would be for a period of 3 years in the first instance; with effect from the forenoon of 23-4-64. Soon after the petitioner joined the said post he was elected as President of non-Gazetted Government Officers association, Andaman and Nicobar islands, recognised by the Government of India. The respondents, it is alleged, did not like the activities f the association as it was bringing to the notice of the Government of India many cases of injustice done to the non-Gazetted Government Servants by the local Administration. This Association took up certain issues regarding special pay, leave for passage and other benefits of the employees and decided to file a suit in this Court. The petitioner pursuant to such decision of the association applied fon leave on llth September, 1964 to the respondent No. 3. This Association took up certain issues regarding special pay, leave for passage and other benefits of the employees and decided to file a suit in this Court. The petitioner pursuant to such decision of the association applied fon leave on llth September, 1964 to the respondent No. 3. Almost immediately thereafter the respondent No. 2 by an order dated 14th September, 1964 suddenly reverted the petitioner to his substantive post in the office of the chief Inspector of Explosives at Nagpur with effect from the date of his sailing by M. V. Andamans ex-port Blair on or about 25-9-1964. Thereafter, in spite of repeated representation and appeals this order was not withdrawn and the leave asked for was also not granted. The petitioner in obedience to this order had to hand over the charge and leave Andaman on 2nd October, 1964. That is how the petitioner felt aggrieved and came up to this Court and obtained a rule. Although several grounds were taken but the order of, reversion was challenged by Mr. Arun Prokash Chatterjee, learned Advocate for the petitioner, before me on twofold grounds. First is that since the petitioner was employed on deputation for a period of three years he could not have been reverted to the substantive post in breach of such terms. The other ground is that the order of reversion was made by way of punishment without complying with the provisions of the article 311 (2) of the Constitution of India and, therefore, such order was totally invalid and ineffective, Before i take up these grounds for consideration it is noticed that the period of petitioner's employment on deputation was only to last for three years under the terms and conditions of such employment with effect from 23-4-64. So, after the expiry of that period it cannot be said that the petitioner had any right to continue in that post on deputation at Andaman. The only consequence is that even assuming, that there is any substance in the ground taken by the petitioner, the writ he has sought for from this Court would be ineffective due to the expiry of the stipulated period of his employment. It is well settled that it is not the practice of this Court in writ jurisdiction to issue a futile writ. It is well settled that it is not the practice of this Court in writ jurisdiction to issue a futile writ. See the case of (1) Guruswami v. State of Mysore, reported in A. I. R. 1954 S. C., 592. In this rule there was no interim injunction given to the petitioner restraining the respondents from giving effect to the impugned order. Since, therefore, no relief can be granted to the petitioner, this rule has become infructuous. In the above view of the matter, it is unnecessary to enter into the above two grounds taken by the petitioner. Even so, I will deal with them on merits. 3. IN support of the first ground Mr. Chatterjee contended that the respondents had no power to terminate the petitioner's employment on deputation at least before the expiry of the period of three years under the terms and conditions of the employment. So, there was clearly breach of terms of the petitioner's employment committed by the respondents and, therefore, he was liable to be reinstated and this Court will compel such reinstatement of the petitioner by issue of an appropriate writ. I cannot agree. Whether or not the petitioner's service on deputation was liable to be terminated before the expiry of the stipulated period related at best to a contractual power. So if there was breach of such a contract the petitioner might have other remedies either in specific performance of contract or of damages. For, it is well settled that no writ will lie to compel performance or enforcement of the contract. This view finds support in one of the earliest decision of the Supreme Court reported in (2)A. I. R. 1953 S. C., 250, Satish Ch. v. Union of India. While dealing with the identical question relating to employment of Civil Service on the basis of the Special Contract for a certain term Bose J. who delivered the judgmemt of the court observed inter alia at page 252) paragraph 10 of the report as follows : "there was no compulsion on the petitioner to enter into the contract he did. He was as free under the law as any other person to accept or to reject the offer which was made to him. He was as free under the law as any other person to accept or to reject the offer which was made to him. Having accepted, he still has open to him all the rights and remedies available to other persons similarly situated to enforce any rights under his contract which have been denied to him, assuming there are any, and to pursue in the ordinary Courts of the land such remedies for a breach as are open to him to exactly the same extent as other persons similarly situated. He has not been discriminated against and he has not been denied the protection of any laws which others similarly situated coruld claim. The remedy of a writ is misconceived". 4. MR. Chatterjee alternatively argued that the impugned order of reversion had the effect of termination of service of the petitioner on deputation before the expiry of the contractual period and, therefore, such reversion was a reduction in rank within the meaning of Art. 311 (2) of the Constitution and since such reduction in rank was brought about without compliance with the provisions of this article, the order of reversion must be set aside. In the instant case, it is more so, as evidently the petitioner was sent back to his office at Nagpur as he took active part in the agitation of the non-Gezetted Staff of the Andaman Administration and therefore, the motive operating in the Government was clear. This argument, it seems to me, is also misconceived. If a Civil Servant's employment under a contract is terminated on the basis of purported exercise of a contractual right that by itself will not constitute dismissal, removal or reduction in rank within the meaning of Art. 311 (2) of the Constitution. Even though it may be, the motive behind such termination was to punish a Civil Servant for misconduct, negligence or inefficiency. See the case of (2) Satish Ch. (Supra) and (3). Puru-shottamlal Dhingra v. Union of India, a. I. R. 1958 S. C. 36. That being so, I do not find any substance in the first ground raised by the petitioner. In support of the second ground Mr. See the case of (2) Satish Ch. (Supra) and (3). Puru-shottamlal Dhingra v. Union of India, a. I. R. 1958 S. C. 36. That being so, I do not find any substance in the first ground raised by the petitioner. In support of the second ground Mr. Chatterjee contended that by such order of reversion the petitioner was visited with penal consequences by way of forfeiture of pay, allowances or right to his seniority or promotions and, therefore, such reversion was made by way of punishment without complying with the provisions of Art. 311(2) of the Constitution. In support of this contention Mr. Chatterjee relied an the decision of Dhingra's case (supra) and drew my attention to paragraph 28 of the report, (3) A. I. R. 1958 S. C. 36 to show that a reduction in rank may be by way of punishment. If the Government servant has right to a particular rank then the reduction from that rank will operate as a penalty for he will lose the emoluments and privileges of that rank. In other words, Mr. Chatterjee wanted to say that since the petitioner was sent on deputation for a period of three years he had a right to the rank and as he was reverted to his substantive post before the expdry of contractual period of his employment his reversion will operate as a penalty. This argument, I think, is not again, well conceived. The petitioner in the instant case was merely sent on deputation for a limited period; so he had no right to that post and reversion from such post will not normally operate as a punishment. 5. MR. Chatterjee then argued that even assuming that this petitioner had no right to that post then also this order of reversion entailed forfeiture of his pay and allowances and loss of seniority in his substantive rank and, therefore, the petitioner must be deemed to have been punished and such a. punishment was inflicted without complying with the provision of Art. 311 (2) of the constitution. In support of this branch of argument reliance was placed on a decision reported in A. I. R. 1965 S. C. 868 and it was contended that a person on deputation would be regarded as still working in parent department and by order of reversion he would lose pay and allowances and such order of reversion would entail loss of his seniority. I fail to see how this case is of any assistance to the petitioner. What happened in this case was that the petitioner who was substantively appointed as a junior assistant in the political department, while so working, was transferred on deputation to the office of Controller of rationing, Bombay to work as a Senior assistant in the newly started rationing department which was a temporary department. On successive promotions there at the material time he was drawing a pay of Rs. 468/- in the grade of Rs. 350-30-650. as Rationing Officer. With the abolition of that department in March 1954 he was reverted to parent department namely the political department. The petitioner's complaint was that he was entitled to be posted as an Assistant Secretary at the material time had he not been deputed to the department of Civil Supplies on 17th September, 1943 but this post was given to one Nadkarni who was next below him superseding his claim on seniority cum merit basis rule of mysore Government. So, while dealing with this point on interpretation of rule 50 (b) of the service rules it was held inter alia that the service of an officer is treated by the rule as equivalent to service in the parent department and, therefore, so long as the service of the employee in the new department was satisfactory he was obtaining the increment and promotion of that department. It stood to reason that he actually filled in (sic) should be deemed to be rendered in the parent department also so as to enable him to promotions which are open on seniority cum merit basis. In the instant case the facts are totally different. It is not the case of the petitioner that some body else below him in the parent department was promoted nor any relevant rule regarding such promotions was placed before me. Therefore, the above decision of the Supreme court has no manner of application to the facts of the present case. Mr. It is not the case of the petitioner that some body else below him in the parent department was promoted nor any relevant rule regarding such promotions was placed before me. Therefore, the above decision of the Supreme court has no manner of application to the facts of the present case. Mr. Chatterjee next relied on a decision of this Court of B. C. Mitter, J. reported in (4) 1968 Lab. I. C. Calcutta 320 (Bikash Chatterjee v. Director General of Health Services and ors.) also in support of the above contention but this case, as appears, is also besides the point involved in the case under consideration before me, because in this case also the loss of seniority complained of was in the parent department. 6. THEN again, there cannot be any question of loss of pay and allowances or future chances of promotions because the petitioner was sent on deputation to work temporarily, may be for a particular period, in a temporary post and he had no right to hold that post :for all times. Therefore, even if, the petitioner is reverted in the substantive post in the parent department from a higher officiating post that by itself would not indicate that the reversion was made by way of punishment even though it may be that the Government servant lost the benefit of the appointment to the higher rank and necessarily loss of some higher pay or allowances or even of promotion. This view finds support in a decision of Supreme court in (5) State of Bombay v. F. A. Ebraham reported in A. I. R. 1962 S. C. 794. In a Bench decision of this Court in (6) State of West Bengal v. Dhajadhari Dutta, reported in A. I. R. 1966 cal. 402 same view was taken relying on the above decision of the Supreme court. That being the position in law, it cannot be said that reversion of the petitioner to his substantive post in the instant case was made by way of punishment. I, therefore, do not find any substance in these grounds even on merits. The result is, the petition fails. The rule is discharged but there will be no order as to costs.