ORDER M.H. Beg, J. - This writ petition was filed by Mandir Shivji Maharaj acting through Parmal Singh, a resident of village Biralsi Pargana Charthwal, in the district of Muzaffarnagar. The Petitioner is alleged to be the bhumidhar of khata No. 112 in the village in question and was recorded as the "Dholidar"(rent free grantee) in the settlement khatauni of 1296 F. It is alleged that Nanu, the father of opposite parties 2 and 3, who are Goshains by caste and the managers of the property of the petitioning temple, originally cultivated the land in dispute as a manager and in that very capacity, the Petitioners cultivated the land after Nanu's death. In proceedings u/s 8 of the UP Consolidation of Holdings Act (hereinafter called the Act), after an inquiry into the correctness of entries in the revenue records, the opposite parties, Tara Chand and Chamela sons of Nanu, were recorded as managers of the land in dispute and the petitioning temple was recorded as its bhumidhar in the basic year. The correctness of this assertion made in para. 4 of the petition is admitted in para. 6 of the counter affidavit filed on behalf of the contesting opposite parties. It is also admitted by the contesting opposite parties that they first set up a case as bhumidhars and after that, changed the case into one of sirdari rights only in proceedings u/s 9 of the Act. 2. In proceedings u/s 9 of the Act, the Consolidation Officer held that no evidence had been produced on behalf of the temple although residents of the village Biralsi had filed an application that the opposite parties are the managers of the temple. It was found that the land had been entered, in the past, as the khudkasht of the opposite parties 2 and 3, Tara Chand and Chamela, which is also significant inasmuch as the possession of the opposite parties was thus assumed to be that of the zamindar. The contesting opposite parties were not alleged by anybody to be the descendants or successors-in-interest of a zamindar. The Consolidation Officer, however, did not appear to have appreciated the significance of the entries of the names of the contesting opposite parties, Tara Chand and Chamela, as cultivators of khudkasht land. The contesting opposite parties were not alleged by anybody to be the descendants or successors-in-interest of a zamindar. The Consolidation Officer, however, did not appear to have appreciated the significance of the entries of the names of the contesting opposite parties, Tara Chand and Chamela, as cultivators of khudkasht land. The Consolidation Officer accepted the objections of Tara Chand and Chamela and ordered the land to be recorded as the sirdari of the contesting opposite parties. 3. An appeal was then filed on behalf of the Mandir against the decision of the Consolidation Officer. The Settlement Officer also observed that there was no evidence on record to show that the opposite parties or their predecessors-in-interest worked as managers. He dismissed the appeal filed on behalf of the temple. Upon a second appeal, the Deputy Director held, on 23-12-1962, that the contesting opposite parties were in possession of the plots in dispute as managers of the Mandir and therefore, the land should be recorded in the name of Mandir Shivji Maharaj. The contesting opposite parties then went up in revision u/s 48 of the UP Consolidation of Holdings Act. The Joint Director set aside the order of the Deputy Director and restored that of the Settlement Officer on the ground that there was no evidence on the record to support the finding that the contesting opposite parties, Tara Chand and Chamela, were managers of the petitioning temple. 4. The question which arises for consideration is whether the entries made u/s 8 of the Act for the basic year after due inquiry can be considered as evidence upon the record at all. It is contended on behalf of the contesting opposite parties that the entries made u/s 8 of the Act were the subject matter of dispute in proceedings Under Sections 9 and 10 of the Act so that the Joint Director was right in excluding them as pieces of evidence and holding that there was no evidence on record to prove that the contesting opposite parties were managers on behalf of the temple. I am afraid I am unable to accept this view of the matter. The entries u/s 8 of the Act are made in proceedings for the revision of the field book and the current annual register. They are made after field to field partal and after the current entries have been tested and verified. I am afraid I am unable to accept this view of the matter. The entries u/s 8 of the Act are made in proceedings for the revision of the field book and the current annual register. They are made after field to field partal and after the current entries have been tested and verified. Notices are sent u/s 9 when mistakes and disputes u/s 8 of the Act are discovered in the current annual register calling upon persons affected to file objections. The objections to be filed u/s 9 must show that the entries made u/s 8 are incorrect. In other words, the entries made u/s 8 of the Act are presumed to be correct until the contrary is proved. If entries made u/s 8 are sufficient to raise a presumption of correctness no other meaning can be given to them except that they are to be treated as evidence in a case for correction of records u/s 9 of the Act. Therefore, the views taken by the Joint Director and the Settlement Officer and the Consolidation Officer were patently erroneous. 5. In addition, there was a settlement entry showing that the temple was the owner of the land and there was also the unexplained entry of khudkasht in the names of the contesting opposite parties. The khudkasht entries could only be explained on the assumption that the contesting opposite parties Tara Chand and Chamela had been cultivating on behalf of the real owner. They constituted circumstantial evidence to prove that the capacity in which the contesting opposite parties cultivated could only be that of trustees and managers on behalf of the temple. Such trustees and managers cannot carve out separate interests in conflict with those of the institution on whose behalf they manage properties in their actual occupation. It is also evident that the villagers had filed an application before the Consolidation Officer stating that the contesting opposite parties were only managers although nobody either gave evidence or was called upon to depose after taking an oath. 6. The Joint Director seems to have taken much too technical a view in ignoring all this evidence. Even if the strict rules of the Evidence Act were to be applied in proceedings under the Consolidation of Holdings Act the correct procedure to be followed was to take evidence on oath if the evidence was insufficient. 6. The Joint Director seems to have taken much too technical a view in ignoring all this evidence. Even if the strict rules of the Evidence Act were to be applied in proceedings under the Consolidation of Holdings Act the correct procedure to be followed was to take evidence on oath if the evidence was insufficient. The Consolidation authorities functioning under the Act have a duty to make correct entries. In the performance of that duty, they can take evidence suo moto independently of steps taken by the parties to the proceedings. The Joint Director, therefore, also erred patently in holding that no fresh evidence could be taken by the Deputy Director of Consolidation without recording reasons as required by Order 41, Rule 27 Code of Civil Procedure. The provisions of the CPC do not apply to the proceedings under the Consolidation of Holdings Act and so far as the evidence taken before these authorities is concerned, the scope of it seems to be wider than that of evidence strictly permitted under the Evidence Act. Therefore, the view that there was no evidence before the Consolidation authorities could not be said to be correct. As the findings given by the Deputy Director were supported by what can be deemed to be evidence on record, the Joint Director had no jurisdiction to interfere with these findings of fact in exercise of his jurisdiction u/s 48 of the Act as it stood before its amendment in 1963. 7. I, therefore, quash the order of the Joint Director and restore that of the Deputy Director. The Petitioner is entitled to costs from the contesting opposite parties.