JUDGMENT R.B. Misra, J. - This appeal by the judgment-debtors is directed against the order of the Civil Judge, Kanpur, dated 19-11-1957, dismissing their objection u/s 47 of the Code of Civil Procedure. 2. The Appellants' father Shyam Lal had executed two mortgages; one dated 16-2-1925 and the other dated 31-3-1927, in respect of his zamindari share in village Umari, in favour of the Respondents. The Respondents filed Suit No. 23 of 1925 on the basis of the said mortgages and obtained a preliminary decree for sale for a sum of Rs. 40,000 and odd. Both the parties were dissatisfied with the decree and so both of them came up in appeal to this Court. The appeal of the Respondents was allowed in part; but the appeal filed by the Appellants was dismissed with costs on 12-8-1954. The costs came to the tune of Rs. 3,388/2/- . It may be noted that the appellate decree did not specify how the decree for costs was to be realized. The decree simply said, "The appeal is dismissed with costs." 3. The Respondents applied for execution of the said appellate decree for costs, The Appellants filed an objection u/s 47 of the CPC on two grounds. The first ground was that the suit, having been filed on the basis of the mortgage, the costs could be recovered from the mortgaged property itself and they could not be recovered from the person and other property of the Appellants. The second ground was that the amount of costs awarded by the appellate Court should be reduced in accordance with the provisions of Section 3 of Zamindars' Debt Redemption Act. The learned Civil Judge rejected the objection. He said: In my opinion the costs can be realised from the person and property of the Respondents. The execution Court cannot go behind the decree. The decree, as I have quoted above, does not make any provision that these costs are to be realized from the property mortgaged. Had it been so, a decree under Order XXXIV, would have been passed. I am, therefore, unable to agree with the Learned Counsel for the objector that the costs cannot be realized from the person and the property of the J.Ds. The Appellants have, therefore, come up in appeal. Before us only the first ground has been pressed and we are not concerned with the second ground in this appeal. I am, therefore, unable to agree with the Learned Counsel for the objector that the costs cannot be realized from the person and the property of the J.Ds. The Appellants have, therefore, come up in appeal. Before us only the first ground has been pressed and we are not concerned with the second ground in this appeal. 4. Sri B.R. Avasthi for the Appellants contends that costs awarded to the Respondents form part of the mortgage decree and thus it can be recovered from the mortgaged property itself and not from them personally. In support of his contention he relies on (i) Maqbul Fatima v. Lalta Prasad ILR 20 All. 523; (ii) Mohammad Iftikhar Ullah v. Banke Lal 45 ILR All. 630; (iii) Wahid Ali Vs. Durga Shankar and Others ; (iv) Shri Chand v. Puttu Lal AIR 1935 Oudh 452; and (v) Aziz Ahmad and Others Vs. Riaz-ul Hasan and Others . 5. It appears that these cases were not cited before the Court below, as we find no mention of any of them in its order. However, all these cases are distinguishable from the instant case in one material respect, which we shall point out presently. 6. But before we deal with the cases it is necessary to refer to certain provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure. 7. Section 35 of the Code gives very wide discretion to the court in awarding costs against a party to a suit and it pertinently reads: (1) Subject to such conditions and limitations as may be prescribed and to the provisions of any law for the time being in force, the costs of and incident to all suits shall be in the discretion of the Court and the Court shall have full power to determine by whom or out of what property and to what extent such costs are to be paid and to give all necessary directions for the purposes aforesaid. The fact that the Court has no jurisdiction to try the suit shall be no bar to the exercise of such powers. (2).............. 8. The term "prescribed" in the section is a defined term. Section 2(16) of the Code defines it thus: 'Prescribed' means prescribed by rules. Rules have been provided in the First Schedule of the Code, 9. The fact that the Court has no jurisdiction to try the suit shall be no bar to the exercise of such powers. (2).............. 8. The term "prescribed" in the section is a defined term. Section 2(16) of the Code defines it thus: 'Prescribed' means prescribed by rules. Rules have been provided in the First Schedule of the Code, 9. Now we have to examine whether any limitation or condition has been provided either in the rules of the First Schedule or in any other law for the time being in force. 10. Rule 10 of Order XXXIV, CPC provides a limitation. It reads thus: In finally adjusting the amount to be paid to a mortgagee in case of a foreclosure, sale or redemption, the Court shall, unless in the case of costs of the suit the conduct of the mortgagee has been such as to disentitle him thereto, add to the mortgage-money such costs of the suit and other costs, charges and expenses as have been properly incurred by him since the date of the preliminary decree for foreclosure, sale or redemption up to the time of actual payment. Rules 2 and 4 of Order XXXIV refer to decrees for foreclosure and sale respectively and both thee rules provide for awarding costs. The relevant portion of Rules 2 reads: In a suit for foreclosure, if the Plaintiff succeeds, the Court shall pass a preliminary decree-- (a) ordering that an account be taken of what was due to the Plaintiff at the date of such decree for-- (i) principal and interest on the mortgage, (ii) the costs of suit, if any, awarded to him, and (iii) other costs, charges and expenses properly incurred by him up to that date in respect of his mortgage-security, together with interest thereon; or.... Rule 4 of Order XXXIV, providing for the passing of a decree in a suit for sale reads thus: In a suit for sale, if the Plaintiff succeeds, the Court shall pass a preliminary decree to the effect mentioned in Clause (a), (b) and (c)(i) of Sub-rule (1) of Rule 2 and further directing that, in default of the Defendant paying as therein mentioned, the Plaintiff shall be entitled to apply for a final decree directing that the mortgaged property or a sufficient part thereof be sold, and the proceeds of the sale (after deduction therefrom of the expenses of the sale) be paid into Cohort and applied in payment of what has been found or declared under or by the preliminary decree due to the Plaintiff, together with such amount as may have been adjudged due in respect of subsequent costs, charges, expenses and interest and the balance, if any, be paid to the Defendant or other persons entitled to receive the same (emphasis ours). 11. A perusal of these two rules makes it clear that, in passing a decree for sale, the Court can award costs just as in a suit for foreclosure. Rule 4 further provides that if the Defendant defaults in paying the amount, the Plaintiff can apply for a final decree directing that the mortgaged property or a sufficient part thereof be sold. Rule 10 of Order XXXIV, as quoted earlier, requires that the costs should be added to the mortgage-money. 12. This is the only limitation provided by the rules. We are not aware of any condition or limitation in any other law and none has been shown to us. 13. We have already noted that Section 35 of the Code gives very wide power to the Court in matters of costs; but this is subject to Order XXXIV, Rules 4 and 10 of the Code. The appellate Court should, therefore, pass a decree in strict accordance with Order XXXIV, Rules 4 and 10. In the instant case the appellate Court, however, did not specify the manner in which the costs were to be realized. In fact no decree was drawn up in accordance with Order XXXIV Rules 4 Code of Civil Procedure. Accordingly the question of interpreting the decree arises in this case. 14. In the instant case the appellate Court, however, did not specify the manner in which the costs were to be realized. In fact no decree was drawn up in accordance with Order XXXIV Rules 4 Code of Civil Procedure. Accordingly the question of interpreting the decree arises in this case. 14. As a matter of fact the execution Court is concerned with the decree as it is and not as it ought to be. The decree as it stands does not specify that the costs should be realized only from the mortgaged property. The terms of the decree suggest that the costs may be recovered either from the person or from other property of the Appellants. Now the question arises whether the decree should be given a wide or a narrow interpretation. 15. It is to be remembered that the mortgaged property was zamindari share in village Umari. It had vested in the State u/s 6 of the UP ZA and LR Act, 1951 and was not available on the date of the appellate decree in question. this Court, therefore, could not have intended to pass a decree for costs to be recovered from the mortgaged property which had already vested in the State. Rule 4 of Order XXXIV, CPC provides for passing a final decree directing the mortgaged property or a sufficient part thereof to be sold. When the mortgaged property had vested in the State, the Court could not have intended to pass a decree in strict accordance with Order XXXIV, Rule 4, Code of Civil Procedure. 16. We may now deal with the cases cited on behalf of the Appellants. As already pointed out, these cases are all distinguishable from the instant case in one material respect. It is this. In all these cases the mortgaged property was in existence on the date of the decree and therefore the court was justified in interpreting the decree in the light of the provisions of Order XXXIV, Rules 4 and 10, Code of Civil Procedure. But in the instant case the mortgaged property was not available on the date of the decree and the court could not pass a decree for costs to be recoverable from such mortgaged property. 17. The first case cited is Maqbul Fatima v. Lalta Prasad ILR 20 All. 523. It is a Full Bench decision. But in the instant case the mortgaged property was not available on the date of the decree and the court could not pass a decree for costs to be recoverable from such mortgaged property. 17. The first case cited is Maqbul Fatima v. Lalta Prasad ILR 20 All. 523. It is a Full Bench decision. In that case a preliminary decree u/s 88 of the Transfer of Property Act (which has now been repealed and replaced by Order XXXIV, Rule 4 CPC was passed on the basis of mortgage, which was confirmed by this Court on appeal. The decree thus confirmed was drawn up in strict accordance with the terms of Section 88 of the Transfer of Property Act, but in addition to the matters provided for by that section it contained a further direction to the effect that "the Defendants aforesaid do pay to the Plaintiffs aforesaid a sum of Rs. 876/8/0". The decree holders applied for execution of the decree for costs and it was held by the Full Bench that the amount of costs could be recovered only from the mortgaged property and not from the person or other property of the judgment-debtors. 18. It is clear from the judgment of the Full Bench that the mortgaged property in that case was available at the time of the passing of the decree both by the trial court as well as the appellate court. The Full Bench, therefore, held that the costs awarded by the appellate Court formed part of the mortgage decree and as such, they could be recovered only from the mortgaged property itself. In the instant case, however, we know it for certain that the mortgaged property had vested in the State long before the passing of the decree. 19. The other cases cited by the Learned Counsel for the Appellants are also distinguishable on the same ground and no useful purpose would be served by dealing with those cases separately. 20. Sri S.N. Verma, Learned Counsel for the Respondents, on the other hand, has relied upon Bans Gopal Singh v. Roop Narain Singh 19 IG 384 and Sheodarahan Singh Vs. Beni Chaudhari and Others, AIR 1925 All 492 . In the first case the Plaintiffs obtained a decree in a mortgage suit for sale of the mortgaged property. 20. Sri S.N. Verma, Learned Counsel for the Respondents, on the other hand, has relied upon Bans Gopal Singh v. Roop Narain Singh 19 IG 384 and Sheodarahan Singh Vs. Beni Chaudhari and Others, AIR 1925 All 492 . In the first case the Plaintiffs obtained a decree in a mortgage suit for sale of the mortgaged property. On appeal the appellate Court confirmed the decree of the trial Court and ordered that the Appellants should pay the costs of the appeal to the Respondents. When the decree-holders applied for execution of the decree for costs, an objection was raised by the judgment-debtors that the costs could be recovered only from the mortgaged property. It was held in that case that the decree as to costs in appeal was a personal decree against the judgment debtors. In the other case a decree for redemption was obtained, on the basis of mortgage and there also the decree was confirmed by the appellate Court and a similar order regarding costs was passed by the appellate court. It was held in that case that it was open to the appellate Court either to pass a personal decree against the unsuccessful party or to make the costs payable out of the mortgaged property. Where the decree did not specify as to how was the amount of costs to be realized, it was a matter of interpretation. 21. On an analysis of the cases cited on behalf of the two parties the ratio decidendi of all these cases seems to be that in a case where the decree does not specify as to how the costs were to be realized, it is a matter for the court to interpret as to what was intended by the court. 22. In the circumstances of the instant case we find ourselves unable to interpret the decree of the appellate Court to mean a decree in accordance with Order XXXIV, Rule 4. The circumstances of the case warrant the inference that the Court did not and could not intend to pass a decree in terms of Order XXXIV, Rule 4, CPC because the mortgaged property had already vested in the State. Order XXXIV, Rule 4 clearly contemplates that the amount could be recovered by sale of the mortgaged property. The circumstances of the case warrant the inference that the Court did not and could not intend to pass a decree in terms of Order XXXIV, Rule 4, CPC because the mortgaged property had already vested in the State. Order XXXIV, Rule 4 clearly contemplates that the amount could be recovered by sale of the mortgaged property. The amount of costs, which becomes a part of the mortgage decree can be recovered by sale of the mortgaged property or a sufficient part thereof. On a strict interpretation of the terms "mortgaged property or a sufficient part thereof" used in Order XXXIV, Rule 4, CPC will mean only the mortgaged property and nothing else. 23. Lastly, Shri Awasthi pointed out that the Respondents had once applied for passing a personal decree in respect of costs. That application was dismissed on the ground of limitation. It is said that the dismissal will operate as res judicata and the Respondents cannot recover costs from the person and property of the Appellants. We are unable to accept this argument as well. In our opinion the Respondents' application was misconceived. We have already held that the decree passed by this Court was wide enough to include a personal decree and as a matter of fact the appellate court could not possibly have intended to make costs a charge on the mortgaged property. 24. For the reasons given above the appeal cannot succeed. It is accordingly dismissed with costs.