JUDGMENT : Misra, C.J. This reference to the Full Bench has arisen in the following circumstances. The plaintiff-appellant in stituted a suit for a declaration that defendant no. 7, Musammat Etwaria, had no right, title or interest in the properties described in schedules nos. 2 to 4 of the plaint, and that she was not competent to execute the two deeds of sale in respect of these properties in favour of defendants nos. 1 to 4 or a deed of gift in favour of defendants nos. 5 and 6. The following genealogy may be set out here to explain the legal stand of the plaintiff with regard to the properties in suit: Nepal Hajam Lalji Hajam Deo Hajam = widow Harbasia. = widow Etwaria (D. 7) Motijhari. Pan Kuer. Bhageran (plaintiff) The case of the plaintiff was that Lalji Hajam and Deo Hajam, the two brothers, were members of a joint Hindu family. Lalji died about 26 years ago, leaving him behind Harbasia, his widow, and Deo Hajam died 22 years prior to the date of the suit, survived by his daughters, Motijhari and Pan Kuer, and his son, the plaintiff, as also his widow, Etwaria. The properties were acquired by Deo Hajam either by purchase or by exchange. The plaintiff's mother, Musammat Etwaria, was under the influence of her son-in-law, the husband of Pan Kuer, and was not a clever woman. Defendants nos. 1 to 4 as also Jattu Hajam, the husband of Pan Kuer, persuaded her to execute a sale deed in favour of defendants nos. 1 to 3 and another in favour of defendant no. 4 and a deed of gift in favour of defendants nos. 5 and 6 on the 27th of June, 1958, Defendant no, 7, being a widow, was only entitled to maintenance out of the properties of her husband, and she had no legal right to execute deeds of transfer in respect of these properties in favour of defendants nos. 1 to 6. Besides the sale deeds having been executed without consideration, defendants nos. 1 to 4 acquired no manner of title under these documents. 2. In defence, defendants nos. 1 to 4 pleaded, in a common written statement, that the plaintiff was not the son of Deo Hajam but of Lalji Hajam, Deo Hajam died leaving behind defendant no. 7, Musammat Etwaria (his widow), and his daughter Pan Kuer. Defendant no. 1 to 4 acquired no manner of title under these documents. 2. In defence, defendants nos. 1 to 4 pleaded, in a common written statement, that the plaintiff was not the son of Deo Hajam but of Lalji Hajam, Deo Hajam died leaving behind defendant no. 7, Musammat Etwaria (his widow), and his daughter Pan Kuer. Defendant no. 5, Pan Kuer, was the daughter of Deo Hajam, and defendant no. 6 was the son of Pan Kuer and grandson of Deo Hajam. Motijhari was not the daughter of Deo Hajam, but a sister of the plaintiff himself. Deo Hajam died not 22 years ago, as alleged by the plaintiff, which would put the date of his death some time in 1937; but he died some time in 1944.45, the suit having been instituted in 1959. The plaintiff was trying to overreach Musammat Etwaria, defendant no. 7, by getting the rental of the land assessed in his name, taking advantage of the fact that Musammat Etwaria was getting all her business transacted through the plaintiff. Defendant no. 7 was a clever lady, and she sold the property after receiving full consideration. 3. On a consideration of the evidence led by the parties, the learned Munsif decreed the suit holding that the plaintiff was the son of Deo Hajam, and that Deo Hajam died 25 years before the institution of the suit, and, as such, Etwaria acquired no title to the properties in the name of her husband under the Hindu Women's Right to Property Act, 1937, as it did not come into operation on that date. He held further that Musammat Etwaria had no legal necessity to sell her property. The recital of legal necessity in Exhibit B-1, the sale deed, was not substantiated, and the sale deed executed by her would not bind the plaintiff. It may be added that the suit was compromised between the plaintiff and defendants nos. 5 to 7, and hence the Munsif decreed the suit on the terms of compromise against defendants nos. 5 to 7 and on contest against defendants nos. 1 to 4. 4. On appeal, the learned Additional Subordinate Judge, 2nd Court, Gaya, affirmed the finding of the learned Munsif that the plaintiff was the son of Deo Hajam, but allowed the appeal and dismissed the snit on the ground that. 5 to 7 and on contest against defendants nos. 1 to 4. 4. On appeal, the learned Additional Subordinate Judge, 2nd Court, Gaya, affirmed the finding of the learned Munsif that the plaintiff was the son of Deo Hajam, but allowed the appeal and dismissed the snit on the ground that. Musammat Etwaria was entitled to transfer the properties mentioned in Schedules nos. 2 to 4 of the plaint as her husband died in 1944-45, as alleged by the defendants, and, in that view of the matter, she must be deemed to have stepped into the shoes of her husband. He followed the Division Bench decision of this Court in (1) Rup Raut V. Basudeo Raut (1962 B.L.J.R. 540), holding that Section 14 of the Hindu Succession Act, conferring absolute title upon a Hindu woman, would apply to properties acquired by a Hindu woman under the Hindu Women's Right to Property Act. The document executed by Musammat Etwaria, therefore, conveying her interest in the scheduled properties to the extent of her share, must be held to be a valid transfer, and it could not be successfully challenged by the plaintiff in the present suit. The plaintiff has preferred this second appeal from the JUDGMENT : of the learned Additional Subordinate Judge. 5. The question which was raised before the Division Bench, to which the case was referred by the learned Single Judge, was that the court of appeal below was in error in holding that the plaintiff's suit could not be decreed because the land in dispute belonged to a Hajam family, and, as such, it could not be transferred except as provided under Chapter VIIA of the Bihar Tenancy Act which came to be inserted in it by Section 4 of the• Bihar Tenancy (Amendment) Act, 1955 (Bihar Act XIX of 1955). It was not denied on either side that "Hajam" has been included in the notification by the Government of Bihar published on the 22nd of February, 1956, under Section 49B of the amending Act, the notification being No. A/T 1015/55-1091 R, dated the 7th February, 1956, published at page 572 of Part II of the Bihar Gazette. It was not denied on either side that "Hajam" has been included in the notification by the Government of Bihar published on the 22nd of February, 1956, under Section 49B of the amending Act, the notification being No. A/T 1015/55-1091 R, dated the 7th February, 1956, published at page 572 of Part II of the Bihar Gazette. This Act could be invoked in determining the rights of the parties, the plaintiff undoubtedly being a protected tenant, as land could be transferred under Section 49G only on an application filed to the Collector of the district for permission, and on such permission being granted. Section 49G runs thus: "Application to Collector for transfer in certain cases.-(1) If in any case - (a) a protected tenant is unable to lease his land as provided in Section 49D or to sub-let his holding as provided in Section 49E or to mortgage his land as provided in Sub-section (1) of Section 49F, or (b) a protected tenant desires to transfer his land, or any portion thereof, by private sale, gift or will to any person, he may apply to the Collector for permission, in case (a), to transfer the same to a person who is not a member of the scheduled tribes, scheduled castes, or backward classes, or in case (b), to transfer the same by private sale, gift or will to any person, and the Collector may pass such ORDER :on the application as he thinks fit. (2) Every such transfer shall be made by registered deed, and before the deed is registered and the land transferred, the written consent of the Collector shall be obtained to the terms of the deed and to the transfer. (3) The Collector shall not give his written consent under Sub-section (2) to a transfer by a raiyat who is a member of the scheduled tribes, scheduled castes, or the backward classes of an occupancy holding or portion thereof until the transferee has deposited with the Collector the landlord's transfer fee payable under the provisions of this Act. (3) The Collector shall not give his written consent under Sub-section (2) to a transfer by a raiyat who is a member of the scheduled tribes, scheduled castes, or the backward classes of an occupancy holding or portion thereof until the transferee has deposited with the Collector the landlord's transfer fee payable under the provisions of this Act. (4) Nothing in this section shall validate a transfer of any land or portion thereof which, by the terms upon which it-is held, or by any law or local custom, would not be transferable if this section had not been enacted." Section 49K, which confers power on the Collector to set aside an improper transfer by a tenure-holder, raiyat or under-raiyat, also may be usefully quoted: “Power to Collector to set aside improper transfers by tenure-holder, raiyat, or under-raiyat. (1) If a transfer of a tenure, holding or tenancy or any portion thereof is made by a protected tenant in contravention of the provisions of Section 49C, or if a transferee has continued or is in possession in contravention of the provisions of Sub-section (1) of Section 49F or Section 49G, as the case may be, the Collector may, of his own motion or on application made in that behalf, after recording and ORDER :in writing, eject the transferee from such tenure, holding, tenancy or portion: provided that- (a) the transferee whom it is proposed to eject has not been in continuous possession in contravention of this Act for twelve years, and (b) he is given an opportunity of showing cause against the ORDER :of ejectment. (2) (a) When the Collector has passed an ORDER :under Sub-section (1), he shall pass a further ORDER :restoring the transferred land to the protected tenant or to his heir or legal representative. (b) If such tenant or his heir or legal representative cannot be found within six months from the date of the ORDER :of restoration passed under Clause (a), or is unwilling to take possession of the land the Collector may declare that the right of settlement is vested in the landlord subject to the provisions of Section 49L. (b) If such tenant or his heir or legal representative cannot be found within six months from the date of the ORDER :of restoration passed under Clause (a), or is unwilling to take possession of the land the Collector may declare that the right of settlement is vested in the landlord subject to the provisions of Section 49L. Provided that if the right of settlement is not exercised within one year, the Collector may, on the expiry of that period, settle the land on behalf of the landlord on such terms as he deems fit with a member of the scheduled tribes, scheduled castes or backward classes and, if the Collector is unable to make such settlement within a period of six months, an unrestricted right of settlement shall vest in the landlord." It may be stated that, corresponding to Section 49C, which puts restriction on the power of the protected tenant to transfer by private sale, gift, will, mortgage, lease or any contract or agreement his right in tenure, holding or tenancy or in any portion thereof, under Section 49M restriction has been provided on sale of tenant's right under ORDER :of Court to the effect that no decree or ORDER :shall be passed by any Court for the sale of the right of a protected tenant in his tenure or tenancy or in any portion thereof nor shall any such right be sold in execution of any decree except decree for arrears of rent which has accrued in respect of the tenure or tenancy. Under Clause (b), provision is made that no decree or ORDER :shall be passed by any Court for the sale of the right of a raiyat, who is a protected tenant, in his holding or in any portion thereof, nor shall such a right be sold in execution of any decree except as provided in Subsection (2). It is not necessary to refer to the other clauses of Section 49M. 6. Learned counsel for the appellant urged, accordingly, that, in view of the restrictive provisions in regard to the transferability of the tenancy of a protected tenant, to which category the appellant belongs, the transfer made by defendant no. 7 by sale in favour of defendants nos. 1 to 4 as also by way of gift in favour of defendants nos. 5 and 6 must be struck down as invalid. 7 by sale in favour of defendants nos. 1 to 4 as also by way of gift in favour of defendants nos. 5 and 6 must be struck down as invalid. Learned counsel also drew our attention to a Full Bench decision of this Court in (2) Chahit Ram V. Sikandar Chaudhary (1968 B.L.J.R. 103), consisting of three Judges, before whom the question of the validity of this restrictive provision under Section 49M was raised but who held that Section 49M was a valid provision. He urged that, in view of this clear pronouncement of a Full Bench of this Court, the present transfers also, made by defendant no. 7, must be held to be invalid as being in contravention of the provisions of Section 49C of the Act relating, as it does, to right of transfer by private conveyance by a member of the scheduled tribes, scheduled castes or backward classes as notified under Section 49B of the Act. The point was canvassed at some length, and it was urged at the Bar that the soundness of the view of the Full Bench in the case of (2) Chahit Ram V. Sikandar Chaudhary (1968 B.L.J.R. 103) may be re-examined because this case proceeds substantially upon Article 15(4) of the Constitution of India, and has not referred to the effect of Article 19 (1) (f) of the Constitution which is the real relevant Article to consider, in view of the nature of the right involved if this case which is the right to hold, acquire and dispose of property. Though a passing reference has been made to Article 19(1)(f) of the Constitution in the above JUDGMENT :, yet the real implication of the provisions of this Article has not been gone into in that JUDGMENT :. Accordingly, the Division Bench thought it proper to refer the point for reconsideration by a larger Bench. Though a passing reference has been made to Article 19(1)(f) of the Constitution in the above JUDGMENT :, yet the real implication of the provisions of this Article has not been gone into in that JUDGMENT :. Accordingly, the Division Bench thought it proper to refer the point for reconsideration by a larger Bench. The question was formulated as follows:- "Whether the provision of Section 49C of the Bihar Tenancy Act, putting a restriction upon the sale of right of a tenure-holder, raiyat or under raiyat...of backward classes, as specified by the Government under Section 49B (3) of the said Act, even as a similar restriction put under Section 49M, both of which go together, can be upheld as valid in view of Article 19(1)(f) of the Constitution of India." This Bench is called upon to reexamine the position in the light of the provisions of Article 19 (1)(f) of the Constitution. 7. Article 19(1)(f) provides that all citizens shall have the right to acquire, hold and dispose of property, and Clause (5) lays down that nothing in Sub-clauses (d), (e) and (f) of the said clause shall affect the operation of any existing laws in so far as it imposes, or prevents the State from making any law imposing, reasonable restrictions on the exercise of any of the rights conferred by the said sub• clauses either in the interest of the general public or for the protection of the interests of any scheduled tribe. It has been urged on behalf of the respondents that Article 19(1)(f), being a fundamental right on the question of property right, confers on the citizens of India an unrestricted right to acquire, hold and dispose of property, and the only restriction which can be imposed upon such right and which, therefore, has the effect of curtailing such right, is when the restriction has been imposed in terms of Clause (5) in the interest of the general public or for the protection of the interest of any scheduled tribe. Beyond curtailment on these two grounds, no other restriction can be imposed on the citizens to acquire, hold and dispose of property excepting what is again provided in Article 31 of the Constitution which obviously is intended for safeguarding the property right of the citizens as against the sovereign right of the State to acquire it under the doctrine of police power or eminent domain. So far as the protection on the ground of belonging to a well-recognized stratum of society is concerned, an exception has been made in Clause (5) only in regard to scheduled tribes. It is obviously so because scheduled tribes, on account of their peculiar situation in the Indian body politic are in a distinct category owing to their lagging behind in acquiring civilised habits by the common standard. Scheduled tribes therefore were put in a distinct category requiring different treatment in regard to their property rights even under the British Government which passed several legislations suited to the peculiar conditions of life among the scheduled tribes; but the backward classes to which this provision has been sought to be applied under Chapter VIIA apart from the scheduled tribes and scheduled castes even if as a class they might be economically not as prosperous as some other sections of the community in India were not treated on a different footing in respect of their economic life. The Constitution makers also conferred therefore special preferential treatment in respect of the provisions of Section 19(1)(f) only on the scheduled tribes. The Bihar Legislature however oblivious of the limited restriction under Clause (5) lumped together scheduled tribes, scheduled castes and backward classes under Chapter VIIA of the Bihar Tenancy Act and applied the restrictive provisions of Section 49C and 49M to backward classes also. If the Constituent Assembly intended that backward classes also should be put on the same footing as the scheduled tribes under Article 19(1)(f), there was nothing to prevent the makers of the Constitution from incorporating the expression "backward classes" also with "scheduled tribes", as has been done in several Articles, such as Articles 15 and 16. Clause (4) of Article 15 provides thus: "Nothing in this Article or in Clause (2) of Article 29 shall prevent the State from making any special provision for the advancement of any socially and educationally backward classes of citizens or for the Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes." Thus, the expression "scheduled tribes", "scheduled castes" and "backward classes" specifically mentioned because the Constitution makers were aware of the fact that the expressions “scheduled tribes” and "scheduled castes", which have been referred to in the various schedules to the Constitution, could not be extended to cover other backward classes of citizens. It has been the scheme of the Indian Constitution, therefore, to treat these classes separately, although there may be one common element in so far as social and educational backwardness may be common to all the three classes. In spite of this common element the three classes, however, differ in their general social outlook, and, as such, they have been given three distinct nomenclatures. Clause (4) of Article 16 also provides that nothing in this Article shall prevent the State from making any provision for the reservation of appointments or posts in favour of any backward class of citizens which, in the opinion of the State, is not adequately represented in the services under the State. The expression "backward classes of citizens" may, no doubt, include scheduled castes and scheduled tribes as well because they must come within the category of backward classes; but the converse is not true, and scheduled tribes, or for the matter of that, scheduled castes cannot be stretched to include backward classes. Attention may be drawn also to Article 330 and onwards in Part XVI of the Constitution which covers special provisions relating to certain classes. Article 330 refers to reservation of seats in the House of the people for the scheduled castes and the scheduled tribes, and the scheduled tribes in the autonomous districts of Assam, but this Chapter does not refer to backward classes at all. Mr. K.D. Chatterji who appears on behalf of the appellant, being aware of the difficulty, has thought it proper not to press for the validity of Section 49C on the ground that Clause (5) of Article 19, in so far as it relates to scheduled tribes, extends it to all backward classes, and he, accordingly, confined his argument to supporting the validity of this provision under the first part of Clause (5) which relates to a provision to be made by an Act for reasonable restrictions being imposed on the exercise of the rights conferred by the said sub-clauses in the interests of the general public. 8. Mr. 8. Mr. Chatterji has contended that since the castes, which have been specifically mentioned in the Bihar Government notification under Section 49B (3) of the Tenancy Act, are socially and educationally backward, the restriction imposed by the Legislature so that the tenancy right of a member of the backward classes also may not be sold without the permission of the Collector or at a Court sale must be construed to be a restriction in the interest of the general public. What is conducive to the interest of a section of the community as a whole, inhabiting a country with a common Government, must be taken to be a restriction in the interests of the public of that country, although the benefits sought to be conferred may be confined only to a section of the community. In support of this proposition he has drawn our attention to the following cases, (3) Jagdish Vastralaya V. State of Bihar (A.I.R. 1964 Patna 180), (4) Jagdish Pandey V. The Chancellor, University of Bihar (A.I.R. 1968 Supreme Court 353), (5) Ram Sarup V. Munshi (A.I.R. 1963 Supreme Court 553), (6) M.R. Balaji V. The State of Mysore (A.I.R. 1963 Supreme Court 649), (7) Iswari Prasad V. N.R. Sen (A.I.R. 1952 Calcutta 273), (8) Mohd. Hanif Quareshi V. State of Bihar (A.I.R. 1958 Supreme Court 731), (9) Karanpura Development Co. Ltd. V. Kamakshya Narain Singh (A.I.R. 1956 Supreme Court 446) and (10) Hughes and Vale Proprietory Ltd. V. State of New South Wales (1955 Appeal Cases 24 at 249). Of all these cases, one which appears to be the most relevant, and to which our attention has also been invited, is the decision of the Supreme Court in (6) Balaji's case (A.I.R. 1963 Supreme Court (49). This is a case on which both parties have sought to place reliance. Mr. Chatterji has contended that this well-known decision of the Supreme Court, referring to Article 15 (4) of the Constitution, lays down the test of reasonable restriction in the interest of the backward classes. Mr. This is a case on which both parties have sought to place reliance. Mr. Chatterji has contended that this well-known decision of the Supreme Court, referring to Article 15 (4) of the Constitution, lays down the test of reasonable restriction in the interest of the backward classes. Mr. J.C. Sinha for the respondents has, however, contended that this very decision makes it clear that the restriction, which may be imposed in the interest of backward classes, apart from other matters, must be a restriction in the interest of a class which is both socially and educationally backward, and then the privilege, which can be granted to a member of the backward classes, must be one which is intended to remove the social and educational backwardness by providing more opportunities for the educational uplift of the backward classes. As has been observed in this JUDGMENT : at page 658. "The backwardness under Article 15(4) must be social and educational. It is not either social or educational, but it is both social and educational. Hence, Article 15 (4) cannot be made applicable to the case of any economic privilege having the effect of curtailing the right under Article 19(1)(f) sought to be conferred upon the backward classes by any law passed I by the State Legislature. This case has got no bearing therefore, on the question of economic backwardness. In fact, there is not a single decision of the Supreme Court or of any High Court in India which has laid down that any special provision may be made for removing economic backwardness by granting more privileges to the members of the backward classes in the matter of acquiring, holding or disposing of property. In fact, if such a provision were intended to be made, the entire object of Article 19(1)(f) would be defeated, and this would not be the protection of fundamental right of the citizens, but Clause (5) read with Article 19(1)(f), interpreted in this manner, would have the effect of putting innumerable restrictions upon the right which is conferred under Article 19(1)(f). To my mind, the contention urged on behalf of the respondents appears to be well-founded. To my mind, the contention urged on behalf of the respondents appears to be well-founded. Since the decision in the case of (2) Chahit Ram V. Sikandar Choudhary (1968 B.L.J.R 103), referred to above, did not refer to this aspect of the matter and went upon a ground under Article 15 (4) of the Constitution, which refers only to matters appertaining to social and educational advancement put together, that provision cannot be extended to cover any right or restriction which is covered by Article 19(1)(f) Mr. Sinha has also contended that the real meaning of Article 15(4) can also be gathered with reference to the date when it was incorporated in the Indian Constitution, inasmuch this Article did not find place in the Constitution as it was originally adopted but it was brought in by way of an amendment, being the first amendment, in 1951. This was done to remove any doubt in regard to Article 29 (2) which also refers to the fact that no citizen shall be denied admission into any educational institution managed by the State or receiving aid out of State funds on grounds only of religion, race, caste, language or any of them. Article 29 (2) might preclude any provision in any educational institution for seats being reserved for backward classes which might work hardship on that section of the community which is not able to pull up and keep pace with some other sections which have the benefit of the education for sometime prior to these sections, and which gave an advantageous position to the upward classes. It was with a view to obviate this difficulty that Clause (4) was provided in Article 15. This also would show that Article 15(4) relates only to social backwardness in so far as it relates also to educational backwardness, as was the view of the Supreme Court in (6) Balaji's case (A.I.R. 1963 Supreme Court 649). Any reference to that provision, therefore, is not of any assistance in determining the implications of Article 19(1)(f). It is relevant to refer to (11) The State of Madras V. Sm. Any reference to that provision, therefore, is not of any assistance in determining the implications of Article 19(1)(f). It is relevant to refer to (11) The State of Madras V. Sm. Champakam Dorairajan (A.I.R. 1951 Supreme Court 226), in which it has been held that any measure for the amelioration of the condition of the weaker sections of the people, both economic and educational, may be taken by the State in accordance with the directive principle contained in Article 46; but this must be subject to any fundamental right of a citizen which is justiciable, and, if it is infringed, Article 46, dealing with the directive principle of social policy, cannot be held up to support its validity. The advantages open to a member of backward classes which are not available to other members of the community are confined to reservation of seats in educational institutions and public employment to a reasonable extent and no other advantage. Even in the case of (8) Md. Hanif Quareshi V. State of Bihar (A.I.R. 1958 Supreme Court 731). the Supreme Court, while dealing with the scope of the implementation of the directive principle confronted with fundamental rights, has observed that, even in pursuance of the directive principle, the State should certainly implement the directive principle; but it must do so in such a way that its laws do not take away or abridge the fundamental right for, otherwise, the directive provisions of Chapter III will be a mere rope of sand. 9. Mr. Chatterji's contention that whatever is done in the interest of a section of the community must be taken to be in the interest of the community as a whole, if there is any reasonable authority behind it, cannot be taken to be consistent with the provision in Clause (5) that reasonable restriction may be imposed in the interest of the general public. Any restriction which is imposed in the interest of only some solidified social stratum, as is the case of a caste in India, cannot be regarded as restriction in the interest of the general public because, even assuming that it can be argued that such a step may be in public interest in ORDER :to enable the weaker section of the community to advance economically, that cannot be taken to be in the interest of the general public. A distinction must be made between merely public interest and in the interest of the general public. Where the emphasis is on the words "general public", a 'large number of cases decided by the Courts in the United States of America or England or by our own Supreme Court, upholding the validity of legislations restricting the property right of the owner of any property are legislations in the interest of the general public in the sense that the category, which is intended to be the beneficiary under such legislations, may include, in one situation or another, any member of the public. For instance, when legislation has been passed putting restriction upon the right of the landlord to realise the rent according to his own sweet will and a criterion has been laid down for fixation of rent by some Government authority, it is a case in which any person may happen to become a tenant at one stage or another, so that such a restriction can well be regarded as a restriction in the interest of the general public unlike a caste-wise distinction, as has been done in the notification referred to above. Similar instances have been found in regard to the legislation of agrarian reform by way of reduction of rent, settlement of fair and equitable rent, relief of indebtedness, fixing a ceiling on long holdings, restriction on the user or management of a property in ORDER :to supply commodity essential to the community or to prevent unemployment against a section of the people, taking steps for the prevention of adulteration of food, assuming the management of the property of disqualified and extravagant persons, regulating the construction of buildings in municipal areas, taking steps for the removal, repairs or protection of property which is a nuisance, controlling the management of private forest, requiring the registration of religious endowments and imposing restrictions upon the grant of sanction for the supply of an essential commodity, refusing import licences, prohibiting the wilful destruction or insult to objects of national honour etc. 10. In the case of (12) Bhau Ram V. Baij Nath Singh (A.I.R. 1962 Supreme Court 1476 at 1481), while dealing with vicinage in Mahomedan Law on the question of preemption, their Lordships of the Supreme Court had to consider indirectly what is in the interest of general public. The following observation is pertinent. 10. In the case of (12) Bhau Ram V. Baij Nath Singh (A.I.R. 1962 Supreme Court 1476 at 1481), while dealing with vicinage in Mahomedan Law on the question of preemption, their Lordships of the Supreme Court had to consider indirectly what is in the interest of general public. The following observation is pertinent. "Though therefore the ostensible reason for pre-emption may be vicinage, the real reason behind the law was to prevent a stranger from "acquiring property in any area which had been populated by a particular fraternity or class of people. In effect, therefore, the law of pre-emption based on vicinage was really meant to prevent strangers i.e. people belonging to different religion, race or caste from acquiring property. Such division of society now into groups and exclusion ~f strangers from any locality cannot be considered reasonable, and the main reason therefore which sustained the law of preemption based on vicinage in previous times can have no force now and the law must be held to impose an unreasonable restriction on the right to acquire, hold and dispose of property as now guaranteed under Article 19(1)(f); for it is impossible to see such restrictions as reasonable and in the interests of the general public in the state of society in the present day." It may be stated that this is subject to an exception made in favour of scheduled tribes. 11. In the case of (13) Ramhari Mandal V. Nilmoni Das (A.I.R. 1952 Calcutta 184), the restriction on the right to hold land put by Section 5(1) of the Bargadar Act was held to be reasonable restriction in the interest of the general public because the preservation of land for agricultural purposes, being the ultimate source of food for the State, was considered to be a concern which certainly involves the interest of the general public in every sense. This also fortifies the conclusion at which I have arrived. Relevant observations are also to be found in (14) A.K. Gopalan V. The State of Madras (1950 Supreme Court Reports 88 at 105) and (15) Rulia Ram V. Sadh Ram (A.I.R. 1952 PEPSU 190-F.B.). This also fortifies the conclusion at which I have arrived. Relevant observations are also to be found in (14) A.K. Gopalan V. The State of Madras (1950 Supreme Court Reports 88 at 105) and (15) Rulia Ram V. Sadh Ram (A.I.R. 1952 PEPSU 190-F.B.). Particular stress was laid by learned counsel for the appellant on the following observation of the Supreme Court in the case of (16) Kavalappara Kottarathil Kochuni Moopil Nayar V. States of Madras and Kerala (A.I.R. 1960 Supreme Court 1080) : "Another condition for the application of Clause (5) of Article 19 is that the restrictions should be in the interests of the general public. We assume for the purpose of this case that there are sthanams with characteristics similar to those of the petitioner's sthanam and that the Act confers title on the junior members of tar wad in properties of such sthanams and that they form a defined section of the public. If so, a question arises whether a section of the public is 'general public' within the meaning of Article 19(5). This fell to be considered by a Full Bench of the Ca1cutta High Court in (7) Iswari Prasad V. N.R. Sen, A.I.R. 1952 Calcutta 273. “It was contended before the Full Bench of the said High Court that the words 'in the interests of general public' mean 'in the interests of the public of the whole of the Republic of India'. Negativing this contention, Haries, C.J. observed at page 278 thus: The phrase 'in the interests of the general public' means, I think, nothing more than, 'in the public interest', and it may well be that legislation affecting a limited class of persons or a limited area might well be legislation in the public interests, though the public of other parts of India might not be directly affected by such legislation. If they are indirectly affected, such would be quite sufficient to make such legislation in the public interest. Legislation affecting a particular class or a particular area would only directly affect the members of that class or the inhabitants of that particular area. But the removal of some serious abuse or grievance or discontent is a matter indirectly affecting the public generally. It is not in the interests of the general public to allow any class of persons to the labour under some grievance and to be genuinely discontented. But the removal of some serious abuse or grievance or discontent is a matter indirectly affecting the public generally. It is not in the interests of the general public to allow any class of persons to the labour under some grievance and to be genuinely discontented. It is in the interests of the general public or in the public interest that all classes of the citizens of India are content and that their grievances should be removed. A festering sore on the human body may eventually affect the whole body though at first its effect is located. Grievances or discontent in some particular area or in some State or in some class of persons may eventually affect the whole Republic of India, though originally the effect might be limited. The removal of any grievance, abuse or discontent is a matter not only where the discontent or grievance is genuine it may well be in the public interest to remove such, though the public in other parts of India may not be directly affected. It is in the public interest that persons should be governed justly and well and removal of hardship and grievances of a particular class is, I think, clearly a matter of public interest." It is clear, however, that the distinction made in the case under consideration before the Supreme Court did not refer to any caste structure) and even in the Calcutta case, reference was made to tenancy legislation. That too, therefore, was a matter not of solidified caste structure but status of a tenant which might be available to any member of the public, who happens to occupy a house on rent under a landlord, although it was only the class of tenants and not the public as a whole. This case too, therefore, is distinguishable. It may be stated that, in (16) Kochuni's case (A.I.R. 1960 Supreme Court 1080), referred to above, the impugned law was struck down as invalid. Not a single case has been brought to our notice by Mr. Chatterji in support of his contention that privilege conferred only upon a rigid section of the society represented by caste structure can be brought within the ambit of interest of the general public. Reference may also be made in support of this view to the case of (17) State of Andhra Pradesh V. P. Sagar (A.I.R. 1968 Supreme Court 1379). Chatterji in support of his contention that privilege conferred only upon a rigid section of the society represented by caste structure can be brought within the ambit of interest of the general public. Reference may also be made in support of this view to the case of (17) State of Andhra Pradesh V. P. Sagar (A.I.R. 1968 Supreme Court 1379). The meaning of the word "public" and "general" has been considered in a series of decisions in the United States of America and Commonwealth countries and it has been held that they refer to the people as a whole, although they may refer in some contexts to a class or community. Some distinction has been drawn between the meaning of these words inter se also; but it is clear that, when these two words were put together, the Constitution makers left no manner of doubt that what was intended to be comprehended was the people as a whole or a flexible part of it, into which any citizen might be admitted in one economic situation or another, such as, landlord and tenant and similar other relationships. If, for example, any restrictions were imposed by the State that land of a person, holding any areas less than a certain minimum, shall not be saleable or transferable except with the permission of the Collector, and a proper machinery were provided as to the circumstances in which such permission would be granted, they should undoubtedly be regarded as restrictions in the interest of the general public, because, in that case, any caste or community might well come within the ambit of the minimum areas which a person holds at a particular moment. But, as I have said above, the provision under consideration does not refer to that matter at all, and it may very well be that a member of the castes mentioned in the list, owing huge areas of land, also will be under the disability, of not being able to transfer his land without the permission of the Collector, and anyone, taking such a transfer per chance without the sanction of the Collector, will run the risk of having his interest defeated by the Collector Sou motu taking notice of such a transfer or anyone bringing the matter to his notice irrespective of whether the person aggrieved makes any grievance of it or not. 12. 12. In regard to the procedural matter, it is also noticeable that the period during which such a transfer may be set aside has been made to be twelve years from the date of the transfer, which, in itself, is a sufficiently long period during which title acquired may well be taken to be secured by the transferee, but one fine morning, even at the end of 11 years 11 months 29 days, he may be disturbed because the Collector gave him notice that he had purchased the land without the sanction of the Collector. It is still more remarkable that just when the property is to be put back in the possession of a transferor even without the obligation to refunding the amount which he may have received and the transferor is entitled to get back his property like this, it is obviously unreasonable, and would be an encouragement to many dishonest transferors to entrap innocent transferees and to deprive them of the consideration which they have paid. The procedural part of it, even on this ground, is an unreasonable piece of legislation, and cannot be upheld. 13. Mr. Sinha has contended, in the next place, that the provisions of Chapter VIIA of the Bihar Tenancy Act are bad not only on account of the restriction they have placed upon the right to acquire, hold and dispose of property but the provisions are bad for other reasons as well in so far as they are unreasonable also for the procedural part of the provisions in other respects as well. Reference has been made in this connection to the fact that, under Section 49G, quoted above, unfettered power has been conferred on the Collector, on an application being filed by a protected tenant for permission to transfer his right by private sale or gift to any person, either to grant the permission or not to grant it without any guidance being given in the Act itself as to how the Collector shall exercise his power. It is true no doubt that, under Section 49-C of the Act, an appeal may be presented within thirty days from the date of the ORDER :appealed against from any ORDER :made under Section 49G, 49H, 49K, 49L or 49M. It is true no doubt that, under Section 49-C of the Act, an appeal may be presented within thirty days from the date of the ORDER :appealed against from any ORDER :made under Section 49G, 49H, 49K, 49L or 49M. Since no criterion has been laid down by which the Collector's discretion is to be exercised, it is difficult to be positive how the Court of appeal shall uphold or set aside the ORDER :of the Collector. If, for instance, it was provided in the Act itself that the Collector shall satisfy himself as to the existence of any legal necessity for the sate, the genuineness of transfer, adequacy of consideration, etc., as has been done in similar provisions under Sections 40 and 112A - appeal being provided under Section 112B in the latter case and under Clause (6) of Section 40 in regard to the former, the procedural defect would not initiate the provision. It may be stated that, in regard to the principle of commutation under Section 40, Subsection (4) provides the criterion by which the Collector is to be guided in m;)king the determination of the amount of the rent on commutation, and Section 112A provides, in detail, in various classes how remission-entire or partial of rent can be ORDER :ed. In such cases therefore, the appellate authority will be in a position to judge the correctness of the ORDER :passed by the authority, whose ORDER :has been made the subject to appeal before the appellate authority. Not so in the case of Section 49G, wherein no provision has been made to guide the Collector as to the circumstances in which he can grant or refuse permission to the applicant to transfer his tenancy right. Reference has been made to a number of decisions by Mr. Sinha, appearing for the respondents, that, where power has been conferred upon a non-judicial authority to come to a decision without any criterion being laid down, it has been struck down as invalid. The cases are; (18) Dr. N.R Khare V. The State of Delhi (A.I.R 1950 Supreme Court 211), (19) Sri Jagannath Ramanuj Das V. State of Orissa (A.I.R. 1954 Supreme Court 400 at 402), (20) Narendra Kumar V. The Union of India (A.I.R. 1960 Supreme Court 430 at 436) and (21) Mineral Development Ltd. V. The State of Bihar (A.I.R. 1960 Supreme Court 468). N.R Khare V. The State of Delhi (A.I.R 1950 Supreme Court 211), (19) Sri Jagannath Ramanuj Das V. State of Orissa (A.I.R. 1954 Supreme Court 400 at 402), (20) Narendra Kumar V. The Union of India (A.I.R. 1960 Supreme Court 430 at 436) and (21) Mineral Development Ltd. V. The State of Bihar (A.I.R. 1960 Supreme Court 468). He has also relied upon the proposition that reasonable restriction is a mixed question of law and fact, and referred to (22) the State of Madras V. V.G. Row (A.I.R. 1952 Supreme Court 196), (23) State of West Bengal V. Subodh Gopal Bose (A.I.R. 1954 Supreme Court 92 at 104) and (24) Rao Shiv Bahadur Singh V. State of Vindhya Pradesh (A.I.R. 1954 Supreme Court 322). The contention of Mr. Sinha is well grounded even in respect of this point. 14. Mr. Sinha has further contended that the only policy which the Legislature can be taken to have contemplated in putting. restriction upon the right of a protected tenant to transfer his land to anyone may have been to save such person from being overreached or otherwise duped by a clever person to part with his holding; but, assuming that there be something in that policy, the very wide terms, in which provision has been made that a protected tenant cannot transfer his right in the tenure, holding or tenancy by way of will or gift, which can well be imagined to be made in favour of a person for whom he has love and affection cannot be justified even from the point of view of saving the interest of such a person from being defeated by scheming outsiders. In fact, if a restriction is placed upon the right of even making a gift or will by such a person, it may leave his property to be grabbed by undesirable' persons for whom the protected tenant may have no love or affection; but the latter may defeat his desire if such a transfer has been made by the protected tenant by way of gift or will. It has been contended that there is no absolute prohibition on such a right in so far as the protected tenant can certainly apply to the Collector for permission, and the permission may well be granted to the tenant. It has been contended that there is no absolute prohibition on such a right in so far as the protected tenant can certainly apply to the Collector for permission, and the permission may well be granted to the tenant. But the question is that permission may also not be granted, and, more so, when no criterion has been laid down as to the circumstances in which permission is to be granted or refused. Mr. Sinha has contended that the possibility of refusal by error of JUDGMENT : on the part of the collector itself may be taken to be unreasonable restriction upon the power of a protected tenant to dispose of his property in any manner which he considers desirable for himself, and such a restriction, therefore, must be struck down as invalid in law, there being no support for it. 15. It has been urged on behalf of the appellant that to hold the view that a special legislation for strengthening the economic status or raising the standard of living of the backward classes is not permissible in view of Article 19(1)(f) of the Constitution will run counter to a number of legislations which have been passed in various States of India with this object in view. Learned counsel was, accordingly, requested to bring to the notice of the Court any legislation of any other State in India which may be held to be analogous to the provisions of Chapter VIIA of the Bihar Tenancy Act in so far as they put the transfer of the tenancy right of a member of the backward class on a footing different from that of the rights of other classes of tenants. On examination of some of the legislations, however, it appears that there is no parallel provision in any other statute regarding the tenancy right of a person in any other State. For instance in the United Provinces Tenancy Act (U.P. Act XVII of 1939), the only provision which declares transfer by tenants void or voidable is incorporated in Section 44, which runs thus: "(1) Every transfer, other than asublease, made by a tenant in contravention of the provisions of this Act, and every sublease made by a tenant of sir, or by a subtenant in contravention of the provision of Sub-section (2) of Section 39, shall be void. (2) Every sub-lease made by a tenant in contravention of the provisions of this Act, other than a sub-lease which is void under Sub-section (1) shall be voidable at the option of the landholder." Sub section (2) of Section 39 provides that no tenant of sir and no sub-tenant shall sub-let the whole or any part of his holding. It is thus clear that no restriction has been imposed on the right of any class of tenants excepting in regard to letting out by a tenant of sir land and letting out by a sub-tenant and to sublease made by a tenant in contravention of the provisions of this Act. Thus, there is complete absence of any provision in the U.P. Tenancy Act. Section 32 of the Act provides that the interest of a permanent tenure-holder and of a fixed-rate tenant is both heritable and transferable. It is thus clear that no distinction has been made between one class of tenants and another in regard to the tenants' right to the land as to transfer or other incidents. In the Bombay Tenancy Act (LXVII of 1948), Section 32 provides for what will amount to purchase of land by tenants with reference to the fixed day described as "the tillers day", and Section 32-0 provides for what will amount to conferring the right of tenant on a person whose tenancy is created after the tillers' day; but there is no provision anywhere in the Act putting any class of the tenants on a special, footing. No such provision has been brought to our notice even in regard to the West Bengal Tenancy Act except in regard to aboriginals. The contention, therefore, that such legislations for improving the economic condition of the backward classes have been passed in other parts of India also is not borne out by the legislations brought to our notice. 16. For the reasons stated above, I am satisfied that Section 49C of the Bihar Tenancy Act, in so far as it relates to the interest of members of the backward classes, is not in consonance with Article 19(1)(f) of the Constitution, and is not protected by Clause (5) of that Article, and must be struck down as invalid. 16. For the reasons stated above, I am satisfied that Section 49C of the Bihar Tenancy Act, in so far as it relates to the interest of members of the backward classes, is not in consonance with Article 19(1)(f) of the Constitution, and is not protected by Clause (5) of that Article, and must be struck down as invalid. As a logical corollary, absolute prohibition against sale contained in Section 49M by a Court in execution of a decree or passing a decree to that effect, relating not merely to a raiyati right but all classes of tenancy, is still more unreasonable, and must be held to be ultra vires Article 19(1)(f). It may be added that there is an apparent contradiction between the policy of the Legislature in regard to Section 49C, in which the transfer of land has been allowed, although under certain restricted conditions and Section 49M in which, so far as the law court is concerned, the transfer cannot be ORDER :ed by the Court in execution of a decree or even for sale which is an absolute bar to the transfer of title in land. Upon the same matter of transfer of title in tenancy land, such contradictory policy cannot be held to be reasonable, and, even upon this ground, Section 49M cannot be regarded as a piece of valid legislation. The question formulated must be answered to the effect that the restriction imposed both under Section 49C and 49M is inconsistent with Article 19(1)(f) and hence illegal and invalid. 17. Mr. Sinha has contended further that, since the appeal has been referred for disposal by the Full Bench, he may be permitted to urge that the question as to whether permission was obtained or not cannot be allowed to be raised on behalf of the appellant, because it was never his case that, before the transfer in favour of defendants nos. 1 to 4 and 5 and 6, permission was not obtained by them for defendant no. 7. If this point had been raised in the trial court, the defendants would have given evidence as to whether permission was obtained or not. It is not open to the appellant, therefore, to raise the question of permission at this stage in second appeal. 7. If this point had been raised in the trial court, the defendants would have given evidence as to whether permission was obtained or not. It is not open to the appellant, therefore, to raise the question of permission at this stage in second appeal. Even this point of the learned counsel appears to be well founded because it is patently unfair that surprise should be sprung on the respondents by the appellant by raising a question of fact which could have been investigated if it were raised timely in the trial court. Mr. Sinha has also raised the question as to whether there was any justification for according Hajam and others, as has been shown or specified in the Government notification, as backward classes, and whether Government were right in not taking into account factors which the Supreme Court has laid down in (6) Balaji's case (A.I.R. 1963 Supreme Court 649). This too is a question of some interest; but, in view of the fact that the reference has been answered in favour of the respondent, it is not necessary to go into these matters. 18. It may also be mentioned that the Legislature has provided a special machinery in Section 49K for setting aside a transfer by a protected tenant without the permission of the Collector under Section 49G, and it is not open to the plaintiff to raise that question before a Civil Court. The contention is Prima Facie well founded, and is supported by the authority in the case of (25) Rai Brij Raj Krishna V. Messrs S.K. Shaw & Brothers (A.I.R. 1951 Supreme Court 115) wherein the Supreme Court has held that, since the Bihar Building (Lease, Rent and Eviction) Control Act, 1947, laid down a special machinery for determination of fair rent by the Rent Controller, it was not open to the Civil Court to go into that question as was sought to be done in that case. In view, however, of the answer to the reference in favour of the respondents, this point need not be elaborated. 19. In the result, the appeal fails, and is dismissed with costs. U.N. Sinha, J. 20. In view, however, of the answer to the reference in favour of the respondents, this point need not be elaborated. 19. In the result, the appeal fails, and is dismissed with costs. U.N. Sinha, J. 20. The ORDER :of reference has stated that the question to be considered by the Full Bench would be "whether the provision of Section 49C of the Bihar Tenancy Act putting a restriction upon the sale of right of a tenure-holder, raiyat or under-raiyat... ...of backward classes, as specified by the Government under Section 49B (3) of the said Act, even as a similar restriction put under Section 49M both of which go together, can be upheld as valid in view of Article 19(1)(f) of the Constitution of India" Sections 49C and 49M of Bihar Tenancy Act run as follows :- Section 490. "Restriction on transfer of tenant's right. No transfer by a protected tenant of his right in his tenure, holding or tenancy, or in any portion thereof, by private sale, gift, will, mortgage, lease or any contract or agreement, shall be valid to any extent except as provided in this Chapter." [Tenants who are members of scheduled castes, scheduled tribes or backward classes are called "protected tenants" under Section 49B of the Act and the explanation incorporated in this section gives the meaning of scheduled castes, scheduled tribes and backward classes]. Section 49-M. "Restrictions on sale of tenant's rights under ORDER :of Court.- (1) Notwithstanding anything in this Act (a) No decree or ORDER :shall be passed by any Court for the sale of the right of a tenure-holder or under-raiyat, who is a member of the scheduled tribes, scheduled castes or backward classes, in his tenure or tenancy, or in any portion thereof, nor shall any such right be sold in execution of any decree or ORDER :, except a decree for an arrear of rent which has accrued in respect of the tenure or tenancy; (b) no decree or ORDER :shall be passed by any Court for the sale of the right of a raiyat, who is a member of the scheduled tribes, scheduled castes or backward classes, in his holding or in any portion thereof nor shall such right be sold in execution of any decree except as provided in Sub-section (2). (2) (a) When a decree for any arrear of rent which has accrued in respect of the holding of a raiyat, who is a member of the scheduled tribes, scheduled castes or backward classes has been passed, the Court shall send the case to the Collector for execution of the said decree and the Collector in execution of the said decree, may, in his discretion, sell the holding or a portion thereof, or eject the said raiyat and settle the holding or a portion thereof with another raiyat on payment of the decretal amount, or place the landlord in possession of the said holding or a portion thereof for a period not exceeding seven years. If the Collector places the landlord in possession for any period, the decree shall, at the end of such period, be deemed to have been satisfied in full and the Collector may then restore the holding or portion to the said raiyat or his heirs, or may settle it with another person, who is a member of the scheduled tribes, scheduled castes or backward classes. (b) Before restoring or settling the holding under Clause (a) of this sub-section, the Collector may, if he is satisfied that the rent of the holding has been illegally enhanced or is substantially in excess of the rent payable by tenants of the same class for lands of a similar description and with similar advantages in the vicinity, pass an ORDER :altering the amount of the rent of the holding to an amount he considers which to be fair. (3) Nothing in this section shall affect any right to execute a decree for the sale of any tenure, holding or tenancy, of a protected tenant, or the terms or conditions of any contract relating thereof if such decree was passed, or such con• tract registered- (a) in the case of the Santhals, in those portions of the districts of Monghyr, Bhagalpur and Saharsa which lie south of the Ganges, before the first of January, 1934; (b) in the case of the Santhals in the district of Purnea and in any portion of the districts of Monghyr, Bhagalpur and Saharsa which lie north of the Ganges and Koras, Bhuias, Kols, Mal Paharis (including Navas and Pujahars), Sauria Paharias, Mundas and Oraons, in the whole or any part of the districts of Monghyr, Bhagalpur, Purnea and Saharsa, and Tharus and Oraon in the whole or any part of the district of Champaran and Kharwars in the whole of any part of the districts of Monghyr, Bhagalpur, Purnea and Shahabad, before the date of the publication by the State Government of a declaration of its intention to issue a notification with respect to these castes or tribes under Sub-section (2) of Section 49B before the commencement of the Bihar Tenancy (Amendment) Act, 1955; or (c) in the case of the other protected tenants, before the commencement of the Bihar Tenancy (Amendment) Act, 1955. (4) Nothing in this section shall affect any right for the sale of any dues which are recoverable as public demands". As Section 49C restricts transfer of certain rights of protected tenants to any extent, except as provided in Chapter VIIA of the Act, I am of the opinion that this section is invalid, as the restrictions imposed by Chapter VIIA do not satisfy the reasonableness of the procedural part of law. Under Section 49G an application has to be made to the Collector in certain cases, for permission to transfer and that section states that the Collector may pass such ORDER :on the application as he thinks fit. Sub-section (2) of that section states that before a deed of transfer mentioned in Sub-section (1) of that section is registered, written consent of the Collector must be obtained to the terms of deed also, apart from obtaining written consent of the Collector to the transfer itself. Sub-section (2) of that section states that before a deed of transfer mentioned in Sub-section (1) of that section is registered, written consent of the Collector must be obtained to the terms of deed also, apart from obtaining written consent of the Collector to the transfer itself. The Legislature has not laid down any guidance for the Collector to follow in passing ORDER :s under Section 49G. It is difficult to hold that such uncanalised power can be upheld in support of legislation restricting the rights of transfer. Moreover, one can understand the will of the Legislature to empower the Collector to allow or disallow a particular transaction, without approving of the arbitrary power, but it is difficult to ascertain even the basis of the power given to the Collector to interfere with the terms of the deed also. No doubt under Section 49C, appeals and revisions lie from the original ORDER :s to the authorities mentioned in that section, namely to the Collector or to the Commissioner, but when the first authority has been given an unguided discretion, it is not enough, in my opinion, to provide for appeals or revisions to any other higher executive authority. If the first authority passes an ORDER :without giving any adequate reason, a higher authority may superimpose its own arbitrary ORDER :upon that of the first authority. It may be noted that under Section 49P no suit lies in a Civil Court to vary or set aside any ORDER :passed by any of the officer so in any proceeding under Chapter VIIA, except on the ground of fraud or want of jurisdiction. It may also be noted that under Section 49K the Collector may eject a transferee, on his own motion, if a transfer or tenure, holding or tenancy or any portion thereof is made by a protected tenant in contravention of the provisions of Section 49-C, or if transferee has continued or is in possession in contravention of the provisions of Sub-section (1) of Section 49-F or Section 49-G, as the case may be [I am leaving out of consideration the proviso to Section 49-K(1)]. In the case of (18) Dr. In the case of (18) Dr. N.B. Khare V. The State of Delhi, reported in A.I.R. 1950 Supreme Court 211, a majority of the learned Judges of the Supreme Court expressed the view that both the substantive and the procedural aspects of the impugned restrictive law may be examined from the point of view of reasonableness mentioned in Article 19(5) of the Constitution of India. Reiterating this view, their Lordships of the Supreme Court stated in the case of (22) The State of Madras V. V.G. Row, reported in A.I.R. 1952 Supreme Court 196, thus:- "This Court has occasion in 'DR. N.B. KHARE V. STATE OF DELHI' (1950) SCR. 519 to define the scope of the judicial review under CL (5) of Art. 19 where the phrase 'imposing reasonable restrictions on the exercise of the right' also occurs, and four out of the five Judges participating in the decision expressed the view (the other Judge leaving the question open) that both the substantive and the procedural aspects of the impugned restrictive law should be examined from the point of view of reasonableness; that is to say, the Court should consider not only factors such as duration and the extent of the restrictions, but also the circumstances under which and the manner in which their imposition has been authorised." In my opinion, the manner in which the restrictions to transfer have been laid down in Chapter VII-A of the Bihar Tenancy Act, the test of reasonableness of Section 49-C is not satisfied. Apart from giving an arbitrary power to the Collector by Section 49G of the Act, the power given to him under Section 49K will enable him to discriminate between persons in similar situations. In the case of one transfer he may eject the transferee suo motu and in the case of a similar transfer by another person he may refuse to eject the transferee. Such power of discrimination can hardly be said to be reasonable. The point mentioned in the ORDER :of reference is of a very limited scope and so the answer to the point is that Section 49C of the Bihar Tenancy Act is void so far as it enacts that no sale by a member of backward classes of his right in his tenure, holding or .tenancy is va1icl to any extent except as provided in Chapter VIIA. 21. 21. I do not think that in this case, the validity or otherwise of Section 49M requires consideration. 22. So far as the merit of the present appeal is concerned, I agree with the learned Chief Justice that the appeal should be dismissed with costs. Tarkeshwar Nath, J. 23. I had the advantage of perusing the leading JUDGMENT : of my Lord the Chief Justice and the JUDGMENT : of U.N. Sinha, J. The relevant provisions of the Bihar Tenancy Act, the validity of which is in question, have been already quoted in the two JUDGMENT :s and it is not necessary to recapitulate them. There can be no doubt that restriction was imposed by the provisions of Section 49C of the Bihar Tenancy Act with regard to the right of transfer by a protected tenant of his interest. Article 19(1)(f) provides that all citizens shall have the right to acquire, hold and dispose of property, but this fundamental right has been curtailed by Section 49C of the Bihar Tenancy Act. Clause (5) of Article 19 of the Constitution of India authorises the State to impose reasonable restriction on the exercise of the right of property-(i) in the interests of general public; (ii) for the protection of the interest of any Scheduled Tribe. The law which provides reasonable restriction on the exercise of the fundamental rights conferred by Article 19 may contain substantive provisions as well as procedural provisions. It is thus open to the Court to consider the question of reasonableness of the procedural part of the law. Although a restriction may be reasonable in substance, the method of imposing the restriction may not be reasonable. Section 49G of the Bihar Tenancy Act does not lay down any basis on which a Collector has to grant the permission to a protected tenant to transfer his land or refuse it. The power given to the Collector is absolutely uncontrolled, unguided and unfettered. The position thus is that the law in question (49G) has not laid down any criterion by which the exercise of the power by the Collector can be guided. In that view of the matter, the answer to the point formulated in the ORDER :of reference should be (leaving out of consideration the validity of any restriction under Section 49M of the said Act) in the negative. 24. In that view of the matter, the answer to the point formulated in the ORDER :of reference should be (leaving out of consideration the validity of any restriction under Section 49M of the said Act) in the negative. 24. It is not necessary to express any opinion about the reasonableness of the substantive part of the impugned provisions, as the appeal can be disposed of on the ground indicated above. On the same ground, the validity or otherwise of the provisions of Section 49M, Bihar Tenancy Act, need not be considered in the present case. I agree that the appeal should be dismissed with costs. G.N. Prasad, J. 25. I agree with my Lord the Chief Justice and have nothing further to add. A.B.N. Sinha, J. 26. This appeal has come before us upon a reference under Rule 2 of Chapter V of the High Court Rules. 27. The only point which was urged in support of this appeal and which has given rise to this reference is that in view of the provisions of Section 49C of Chapter VIIA of the Bihar Tenancy Act, 1885 (hereinafter referred to as the Act) the transfers by way of sales and gift made by Mosammat Etawaria, defendant no. 7, were invalid and did not confer any title on the transferees. On behalf of the respondents the above argument was sought to be repelled on the ground that the provisions of Section 49C of the Act which imposed restrictions on the right of disposal of property by a member of the backward classes was ultra vires the Constitution as infringing Article 19(1)(f) of the Constitution and was not saved under Clause (5) of that Article. 28. Before dealing with the point at issue certain relevant sections may be briefly referred to. Section 49-B of the Act makes Chapter VIIA applicable to all categories of tenants belonging to scheduled castes, scheduled tribes and backward classes, defined in Explanation (1), (2) and (3) respectively to that section, and all such tenants are called "protected tenants". 28. Before dealing with the point at issue certain relevant sections may be briefly referred to. Section 49-B of the Act makes Chapter VIIA applicable to all categories of tenants belonging to scheduled castes, scheduled tribes and backward classes, defined in Explanation (1), (2) and (3) respectively to that section, and all such tenants are called "protected tenants". Section 49C which is relevant for our purpose may be usefully set out: "No transfer by a protected tenant of his right in his tenure, holding or tenancy, or in any portion thereof, by private sale, gift, will, mortgage, lease or any contract or agreement shall be valid to any extent except as provided in this Chapter." Subsection (1) of Section 49G inter alia provides for the procedure for effectuating a valid transfer by sale, gift or will by a protected tenant to any person. It says that, in any case, if a protected tenant desires to make any such transfer he may apply to the Collector for permission to make the intended transfer and it is for the Collector to pass "such ORDER :on the application as he thinks fit," Subsection (2) provides that every such transfer shall be made by a registered instrument but before the document is registered and transfer is made the written consent of the Collector to the terms of the deed as also to the transfer must be obtained, otherwise the consequences mentioned in Section 49J will ensure and neither the transfer deed will be registered nor will the transfer be recognised as valid by any court acting in whatever jurisdiction. 29. It will appear from the above summary of the relevant provisions that no member of a backward class, declared as such by a notification issued by State Government under Section 49B (3) of the Act has power to transfer any interest in the tenure or the holding as the case may be, unless he has obtained prior written consent of the Collector to the terms of the proposed transfer and to the transfer itself. The Collector being authorised to pass "such ORDER :" on the tenant's application as "he thinks fit" may withhold his consent to either the terms proposed or to the transfer itself. The Collector being authorised to pass "such ORDER :" on the tenant's application as "he thinks fit" may withhold his consent to either the terms proposed or to the transfer itself. In either case, the effect will be more or less the same because in the first case as well the transferees may not agree to the terms suggested by the Collector and will back out. In either case the intended transfer will not be effected. Thus, there can be no doubt that the provisions of Section 49C read with Section 49G of the Act impose restrictions on the right to dispose of one's property, and indeed, it has not been disputed that the relevant provisions are in the nature of restrictions on the fundamental rights enshrined in Article 19(1)(f) of the Constitution, and the question is whether they are saved under Clause (5) of Article 19 or not, other words, whether the restriction imposed by Section 49C of the Act can be said to be reasonable and in the interests• of the general public. 30. Article 19(1)(f) of the Constitution guarantees the fundamental right of the citizens to acquire, hold and dispose of property. This right is, however, subject to Article 19(5) which says that nothing in Article 19(1)(f) shall affect the operation of any existing law in so far as it imposes or prevents the State from making any law imposing reasonable restrictions either in the "interests of the general public" or for the protection of the interests of any scheduled tribe. It is obvious that the adjective "reasonable" is predicated of the restriction that might be imposed by the impugned provision. It follows that before the restriction can be said to be saved under Clause (5) of Article 19 it must satisfy two tests, viz., (1) it must be reasonable, and (2) it was in the interest of general public, or was for the protection of the interest of any scheduled tribe. There may be a restriction which though reasonable in itself is not or cannot be said to be in the interests of the general public or vice versa. There may be a restriction which though reasonable in itself is not or cannot be said to be in the interests of the general public or vice versa. It is also well settled that the restriction must be found to be reasonable from the substantive as well as procedural aspect, and the Court has to take into consideration not only the nature and content of the restriction but also the manner of their imposition or the mode of putting it into practice. This is so even though it is not always easy to dissociate the actual content of the restriction from the manner or mode of its imposition. In (18) N.B. Khare V. The State of Delhi (A.I.R. 1952 S.C. 196), the Supreme Court while holding that "reasonableness" must be determined by applying an objective standard, the standard of the "average prudent man", it went on to say that the Court must examine not only the substantive but also the procedural provisions of the impugned law, i.e., not only the nature of the restrictions but also the manner in which they were to be enforced. 31. Upon the above analysis of Article 19(1)(f) and Clause (5) thereof, three questions arise: (1) Is the restriction imposed by Section 49C of the Act on the fundamental right of a member of the backward class to dispose of his rights in his tenure or holding as the case might be reasonable in itself? (2) Can the said restriction be said to be in the interests of the general public ? and (3) Is the said restriction reasonable from the procedural standpoint? 32. I have had the advantage of perusing the opinions of my Lord the Chief Justice and of Tarkeshwar Nath J. and I am happy to say that I am in respectful agreement with the view expressed therein in regard to the third question enunciated above, and in the circumstances it will be useless to dilate on that point. 32. I have had the advantage of perusing the opinions of my Lord the Chief Justice and of Tarkeshwar Nath J. and I am happy to say that I am in respectful agreement with the view expressed therein in regard to the third question enunciated above, and in the circumstances it will be useless to dilate on that point. It may suffice to mention that I find it difficult to reconcile the intended protection or promotion of the interests of the backward classes with the conferment of unfettered and absolute discretion on an executive authority in the instant case, on the Collector or an officer below the rank of the Collector exercising the powers of the Collector to grant or withhold permission as he thinks fit for a particular transfer to be effected. The exercise of discretion by the Collector is wholly uncontrolled and no safeguards or guidance have been provided. The provision for an appeal or revision against the discretionary ORDER :passed on the tenant's application to merely a higher executive functionary does not in any way improve the position. The dismissal of this appeal can well be rested on this ground alone, but in view of the fact that the other two questions as well have been canvassed at length at the Bar and arise within the limits of the controversy, it is necessary to refer to them briefly. 33. In regard to the first question, viz., whether the restriction was reasonable in itself, I am satisfied that the answer must be in the negative. It should be remembered that it is impossible to lay down an abstract standard or any general pattern applicable to all cases, rather each impugned law must be considered separately, and the Court should have regard amongst several other factors, to the underlying purpose of the restriction and it must also consider whether the restriction is disproportionate to the evil sought to be remedied, in other words, whether the remedy is worse than the disease. Now it is permissible to assume that the restriction has been imposed with the laudable purpose of protecting or promoting the economic interests of the backward classes. Applying the standard of the "average prudent man" as was approved of by the Supreme Court in (18) Dr. Now it is permissible to assume that the restriction has been imposed with the laudable purpose of protecting or promoting the economic interests of the backward classes. Applying the standard of the "average prudent man" as was approved of by the Supreme Court in (18) Dr. Khare's case referred to above, I fail to see any reasonable justification for making a distinction between lease under Section 49D, sub-letting under Section 49E and usufructuary mortgage also known as "complete usufructuary mortgage" under Section 49F on the one hand and sale, gift and will under Section 49G on the other. Between members of the same class for the purposes of executing a lease by a tenure-holder or for the purposes of sub-letting of raiyati holding or for the purpose of executing an usufructuary mortgage by all classes of tenants no permission prior or otherwise of any outside authority is necessary, but for effecting a sale, gift or will between members of the same class (sic) well prior written consent of the Collector is absolutely necessary. In my opinion, there is no proximate or even a forseeable connection between the restriction as implsed and the interests of the backward classes sought to be protected. There is no reason to suppose that the real beneficiary in the cases of sales, gift and will made or executed in favour of a member of the backward class itself will be an outsider, and, thus for inter se transactions of all types the protected tenant needed no protection. On the contrary, it is well known tint at least gifts and wills are generally executed for love and affection and the beneficiaries are invariably either a close relation or some one for whom the executants has some obligations to discharge. The restriction from this point of view is clearly disproportionate to the evil sought to be remedied. Further, the restriction is unrelated to the quantity or extent of the land that a particular member of the backward class might be in possession of and entitled to. A person with just a few acres, the irreducible minimum, clearly stands in a different position than a person with several acres; the former might reasonably be protected against himself and against unscrupulous persons inclined to profit from his poverty but the latter surely does not need any such protection. A person with just a few acres, the irreducible minimum, clearly stands in a different position than a person with several acres; the former might reasonably be protected against himself and against unscrupulous persons inclined to profit from his poverty but the latter surely does not need any such protection. The restriction is so far as it overlooks this difference is clearly unreasonable. Excessive restriction cannot be said to be a reasonable restriction. 34. In regard to the question whether imposition of limitation on the power of disposal of property by a member of the backward class can be said to be "in the interests of the general public", it appears to me that the underlying purpose behind the imposition being the protection or promotion of the interests of a weaker section of the general public, the imposition itself was in public interest. The phrase "in the interests of the general public", in short, means nothing more than 'in the public interest' (vide) (16) Kochuni V. State of Kerala, (A.I.R. 1960 S.C. 1080 (1104) and Glass Chatons Association V. Union of India, A.I.R. 1961 S.C. 1514 (1516). In my opinion, the terms "general public" is comprehensive enough to include a part of the public, and any class or classes of citizens, if found socially and educationally backward in relation to a certain norm might qualify for being declared as backward class or classes, and, in that sense the fluidity is apparent. Of the two tests of backwardness as indicated in Article 15(4) of the Constitution, social and educational, the former, it is now accepted, is, in the ultimate analysis, the result of poverty, and poverty cannot be said to be the monopoly of any particular class or caste. It is no doubt an accident of history that caste considerations generally tend to aggravate social backwardness but those considerations, it must be admitted, are fast dissipating, and, in any case, it is well settled that classification of backwardness can no longer be made solely on the basis of caste. Accordingly, I do not see any difficulty in holding that the limitations imposed on a section of the public can in the context of the purpose underlying the same be held to be in the interests of the general public. Accordingly, I do not see any difficulty in holding that the limitations imposed on a section of the public can in the context of the purpose underlying the same be held to be in the interests of the general public. In view, however, of what I have held above that the restriction as imposed under Section 49C of the Act cannot be said to be reasonable in itself, it is unnecessary to pursue this question any further. 35. For the reasons discussed above, the answer to the point formulated in the ORDER :of reference, minus the question of the validity or otherwise of Section 49M of the Act in regard to which no opinion need be expressed as it does not come within the limits of the controversy arising in the instant case, should be in the negative, and, Section 49C of the Act be held to be ultra vires the Constitution as infringing the fundamental right enshrined in Article 19(1)(f) of the Constitution, and, thus void. 36. The only point raised on behalf of the plaintiff-appellant in support of this appeal having thus failed, I agree that the appeal be dismissed with costs. 37. The provision of Section 49C of the Bihar Tenancy Act, putting a restriction upon the sale of right of a tenure-holder, raiyat or under-raiyat...of backward classes, as specified by the Government under Section 49B(3) of the said Act, is invalid, and must be struck down. As to Section 49 M, however, it is not necessary to enter into the validity of that provision of law. The appeal fails, and must be dismissed with costs. Reference answered in negative - appeal dismissed.