JUDGMENT Gyanendera Kumar J. - These six appeals are directed against the common judgment of G.C. Mathur, J., dated 12th May, 1967 in six Civil Miscellaneous connected writ petitions. Rajendra Kumar, deceased, was married to one Sarla Gupta. They both filed suits against each other under Section 13 of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 (hereinafter called the Act) for dissolution of their marriage, in the court of the Civil Judge, Moradabad. The suits were decreed on April 8, 1963. On May 25, 1963, Rajendra Kumar aforesaid married Lila Gupta, who is appellant in all these cases. About two years later Rajendra Kumar died on May 7, 1965. The deceased was a bhumidhar of certain plots and land. After his death dispute arose in consolidation proceedings between Lila Gupta (appellant) on the one hand, who claims to have inherited the bhumidhari property as the widow of her deceased husband, and Rajendra Kumar's brothers and brothers' sons on the other (respondents) , who claim the property as heirs. Their contention is that Lila Gupta, appellant, and Rajendra Kumar were not legally married, inasmuch as no marriage could have taken place between them on 25th May, 1963, as alleged by her, because it was within one year of the decree of dissolution of his earlier marriage with Sarla Gupta, which was prohibited by Section 15 of the Act. The. Consolidation Officer held that no marriage had taken place between Rajendra Kumar and Lila Gupta either in fact or in law, as claimed by the appellant. Aggrieved by the findings of the Consolidation Officer, Lila Gupta went up in appeal before the Settlement Officer (Consolidation) who held that the marriage of Lila Gupta with Rajendra Kumar on 25th May, 1963 had been established by evidence on record. He further held that the legality of the appellant's marriage with Rajendra Kumar could not be challenged by the respondents as the same had not been specifically pleaded. In the result he allowed the appeals of Lila Gupta and ordered her name to be entered on the bhumidhari plots in question. The orders of the Settlement Officer (Consolidation) were challenged in revisions before the Deputy Director of Consolidation, who also found that Rajendra Kumar and Lila Gupta had been married on May 25, 1963. In the result he allowed the appeals of Lila Gupta and ordered her name to be entered on the bhumidhari plots in question. The orders of the Settlement Officer (Consolidation) were challenged in revisions before the Deputy Director of Consolidation, who also found that Rajendra Kumar and Lila Gupta had been married on May 25, 1963. However, he disagreed with the findings of the Settlement Officer (Consolidation) that the question of legality of their marriage could not be raised by the respondents. He further held that the marriage of Rajendra Kumar and Lila Gupta, though solemnised in contravention of the provisions of Section 15 of the Act, was neither void nor voidable. In this view of the matter he dismissed the revisions and held that Lila Gupta who was the widow of Rajendra Kumar, was entitled to succeed to his bhumidhari properties. The contesting respondents challenged the aforesaid orders of the Deputy Director of Consolidation by way of writs to this Court which were allowed by G. C. 1 Mathur, J. by his judgment dated 12th May, 1967, quashing the orders of the Deputy Director of Consolidation dated 19th October, 1966 and those of the Settlement Officer (Consolidation) dated 7th June, 1966. It was under those circumstances that Lila Gupta instituted these special appeals. In these appeals, the learned counsel for the contesting respondents does not challenge the factum of marriage of Rajendra Kumar with Lila Gupta (appellant) on 25th of May, 1963. His only contention is that the said marriage was in violation of the provisions of Section 15 of the Act and was, therefore, void; as such the appellant could not inherit, as a widow, the bhumidhari land of Rajendra Kumar, deceased. Section 15 of the Hindu Marriage Act is in these terms : "15. His only contention is that the said marriage was in violation of the provisions of Section 15 of the Act and was, therefore, void; as such the appellant could not inherit, as a widow, the bhumidhari land of Rajendra Kumar, deceased. Section 15 of the Hindu Marriage Act is in these terms : "15. When a marriage has been dis-solved by a decree of divorce and either there is no right of appeal against the decree or, if there is such a right of appeal, the time for appealing has expired without an appeal having been presented, or an appeal has been presented but has been dismissed, it shall be lawful for either party to the marriage to marry again : Provided that it shall not be lawful for the respective parties to marry again unless at the date of such marriage at least one year has elapsed from the date of the decree in the Court of the first instance". There can be no doubt that the proviso to Section 15 is in imperative terms and is mandatory in nature. In the instant case, the decree of dissolution of the marriage of Rajendra Kumar with his previous wife was passed on April 8, 1963; while his marriage with the appellant was solemnised on May 25, 1963, well within the one year of the date of the decree for dissolution of his previous marriage. It is, therefore, clearly hit by the proviso to Section 15 of the Act. Sec. 5 (i) of the Hindu Marriage Act provides that a marriage may be solemnised between any two Hindus if "neither party has a spouse living at the time of marriage". In other words if the previous spouse of any of the parties marrying again is living, his or her subsequent marriage would be null and void. Sec. 11 of the Act lays down that marriage solemnised after the commencement of the Act shall be null and void, if, inter alia, it contravenes the conditions specified in clause (i) of Section 5. It is true that Section 11 contemplates a petition by either spouse for obtaining a declaration by a decree of nullity, if the marriage contravenes any of the conditions specified in clauses (i), (iv) and (v) of Section 5. It is true that Section 11 contemplates a petition by either spouse for obtaining a declaration by a decree of nullity, if the marriage contravenes any of the conditions specified in clauses (i), (iv) and (v) of Section 5. The contention of the learned Advocate General, appearing for the appellant is that the proviso to Section 15 is merely directive in nature and the marriage performed in violation thereof will not be void. According to him only those marriages are void which are declared as such, by a declaratory decree obtained by any of the spouses under Section 11 of the Act. The argument is that in the instant case none of the spouses has obtained a decree of nullity in terms of Section 11, so it is not open to the contesting respondents to challenge the legality of the appellant's marriage with Rajendra Kumar. It is true that a decree declaring the appellant's marriage with Rajendra Kumar void, has not been obtained by any of the spouses. But to us it appears that obtaining such a declaratory decree of nullity of the marriage in terms of Section 11 of the Act was not necessary, because the language of the proviso to Section 15 is by itself imperative and mandatory. The marriage contracted in contravention of the proviso to Section 15 would not be merely voidable but void ab initio, and would not be dependent upon obtaining a declaratory decree in terms of Section 11 of the Act. The Advocate General has next contended that the decree dated April 8, 1963 for dissolution of Rajendra Kumar's marriage with his previous wife Sarla was not a decree nisi but was an absolute decree, snapping the marriage ties for good. He has, however, been unable to cite any authority in support of his contention. On the other hand, the learned counsel for the contesting respondents has drawn our attention to the various rulings quoted in the judgment of the learned Single Judge. It is true that the said rulings (which will be discussed instantly) are not on Section 15 of the Hindu Marriage Act but relate to Section 57 of the Indian Divorce Act (or its corresponding provision contained in Section 30 of the Special Marriage Act). But there also six months waiting period has been provided for, even after the final decree confirming the decree nisi has been passed. But there also six months waiting period has been provided for, even after the final decree confirming the decree nisi has been passed. As already stated above, the provisions of Section 15 of the Hindu Marriage Act are analogous to those of Section 57 of the Indian Divorce Act, which may be reproduced with advantage : "57. When six months after the date of an order of a High Court confirming the decree for a dissolution of marriage made by a District Judge have expired, or when six months after the date of any decree of a High Court dissolving a marriage have expired, and no appeal has been presented against such decree to the High Court in its appellate jurisdiction, or when any such appeal has been dismissed, or when in the result of any such appeal any marriage is declared to be dissolved, but not sooner, it shall be lawful for the respective parties to the marriage to marry again, as if the prior marriage had been dissolved by death; provided that no appeal to the Supreme Court has been presented against any such order or decree. When such appeal has been dismissed, or when in the result thereof the marriage is declared to be dissolved, but not sooner, it shall be lawful for the respective parties to the marriage to marry again as if the prior marriage had been dissolved by death". It is noteworthy that in Section 57 a six months period of waiting has been provided for even after the decree for dissolution of marriage has been confirmed and such decree has become absolute. In the rulings relating to the interpretation of Section 30 of the Special Marriage Act or Section 57 of the Indian Divorce Act, it was held that in spite of the final decree for dissolution of marriage having been passed, the erstwhile spouse would be deemed to be living for the limited purposes of re-marriage, rendering the subsequent marriage void, if the same was contracted within the period of waiting. In Water v. Warier, (1890) LR 15 PD 152, the question was whether the marriage of Mrs. Tayloe, against whom a decree absolute for dissolution was passed on November 27, 1879, with Warter on February 2, 1880 (i.e. within the period of waiting) was legal or not. It was held : "Mrs. In Water v. Warier, (1890) LR 15 PD 152, the question was whether the marriage of Mrs. Tayloe, against whom a decree absolute for dissolution was passed on November 27, 1879, with Warter on February 2, 1880 (i.e. within the period of waiting) was legal or not. It was held : "Mrs. Tayloe was subject to the Indian Law of divorce, and she could only contract a valid second marriage by showing that the incapacity arising from her previous marriage has been effectually removed by the proceedings taken under that law. This could not be done, as the Indian law, like our own, does not completely dissolve the tie of triage until the lapse of a specified time after the decree. This is an integral part of the proceedings by which alone' both the parties can be released from their incapacity to contract a fresh marriage". Water's case was followed by Chamier, J. in Jackson v. Jackson, ILR 34 Alld. 203; while both the above decisions were followed by Madras High Court in Battie v. Brown, A.I.R. 1916 Mad. 847 (2), where it was observed : ".....the former marriage is to be considered still in force at any rate to the extent of preventing a subsequent marriage during the lifetime of the other party to such marriage until the prohibition resulting from the survival of such other party is removed by virtue of the section. Now the prohibition is not removed by virtue of the section till the lapse of six months, or the happening of the other event therein mentioned. Consequently, I hold that not only was this marriage void on the date when it was solemnised but also that the previous marriage was still 'in force' within the meaning of Section 19 (4) , so as to give me jurisdiction under Section 19 to pronounce a decree of nullity". The Calcutta High Court also followed the case of Warier v. Warter in Turner v. Turner, AIR 1921 Calcutta 517. In that case the impugned marriage, performed about 18 years ago, was annulled at the instance of the husband on the ground that it had taken place within the period of waiting. The Calcutta High Court also followed the case of Warier v. Warter in Turner v. Turner, AIR 1921 Calcutta 517. In that case the impugned marriage, performed about 18 years ago, was annulled at the instance of the husband on the ground that it had taken place within the period of waiting. This is how Sanderson, J. expressed himself on the points : "The circumstances of the case, as at present before us, are such as to create a great hardship upon the respondent, who has my sincere sympathy, but that cannot induce me to disregard the plain provisions of the Act". From the above weighty pronouncements, it is abundantly clear that the previous marriage does not come to an end for all purposes even on the passing of a final decree for dissolution. At least for he purposes of remarriage, the former marriage is deemed in force till the expiry )f the period of waiting. Hence a remarriage performed during the period of waiting is void ab initio. The learned single Judge rightly held the appellant's marriage with Rajendra Kumar, within the prohibited waiting period of one year, to be void. Therefore, the appellant cannot be treated to be the widow of Rajendra Kumar deceased so as to entitle her to inherit his bhumdhari property. Consequently the appeals fail and arc dismissed but the appellant shall be liable for only one set of costs in special appeal No. 37 L 1967 Appeal dismissed.