JUDGMENT M.H. Beg, J. - These are seven connected writ petitions in each of which the petitioner is a partnership firm which is registered and licensed as a dealer under Section 3-E of the U.P. Sales' Tax Act (hereinafter referred to as 'the Act') . Each petitioner is a dealer in food grains purchasing large quantities of pulses from Dal manufacturers every year. The manufacturers are alleged to have purchased these as 'unbroken seeds' and converted them into Dal, by putting them through a process which is described as 'manufacture', before selling it to petitioners. According to the petitioners, the process through which the unbroken seeds were put by the manufacturers did not involve a change in the chemical composition or the commercial character of the produce but put the pulses into a state fit for consumption by braking up the seeds and cleaning the raw product. The petitioners allege that they are, therefore, not first purchasers of Dal liable to pay purchase tax. Each petitioner has also questioned the constitutional validity of Section 3-D of the U.P. Sales Tax Act as well as of the exercise of the powers vested in the State Government in issuing the notifications against food grain dealers making them liable to Purchase Tax. The petitioners also allege that there is no procedure provided under the Act for the assessment of purchase tax. 2. M/s. Laxmi Dal Mills, the petitioner in Civil Misc. Writ No. 817 of 1967, has questioned the assessment order dated 25-10-1966 relating to the assessment year 196566. M/s. Deep Chand Shyam Sunder, the petitioner in Civil Misc. Writ No. 34 of 1967, has questioned the assessment order dated 29-11-1966 relating to the assessment year 1964-65. Ails. Laxmi Narain Vishnu Prasad, the petitioner in Civil Misc. Writ No. 36 of 1967, has questioned the assessment order dated 29-11-1966 relating to the assessment year 1964-65. M/s. Trilok Chand Parsan Kumar, the petitioners in Civil Misc. Writ No. 455 of 1967, has questioned the assessment order dated 26-9-1966 relating to the assessment year 1965-66. M/s. Ram Narain Chandi Prasad, the petitioner in Civil Misc. Writ No. 638 of 1967, has challenged the assessment order dated 20-91966 relating to the assessment year 1966-67. 3. M/s. Vijai Singh Chandan Mal, the petitioner in Civil Misc. Writ No. 4673 of 1965, and Mls. Jauhari Mal Gaja Nand, the petitioner in Civil Misc. M/s. Ram Narain Chandi Prasad, the petitioner in Civil Misc. Writ No. 638 of 1967, has challenged the assessment order dated 20-91966 relating to the assessment year 1966-67. 3. M/s. Vijai Singh Chandan Mal, the petitioner in Civil Misc. Writ No. 4673 of 1965, and Mls. Jauhari Mal Gaja Nand, the petitioner in Civil Misc. Writ No. 4674 of 1965, have assailed pending assessment proceedings for the assessment years 1964-65 and 1965-66 and have asked for writs of prohibition. 4. Four common questions of law which arise are: firstly, whether Section 3-D of the U.P. Sales Tax Act is constitutionally valid; secondly; whether the powers vested in the state Government under Section 3-D of the Act had been so exercised by various notifications issued under it as to discriminate against food grain dealers as compared with the dealers of other commodities; thirdly, whether there is any machinery under the Act for the assessment of purchase Tax, and fourthly, whether any of the purchases made by the petitioners were first purchases of a new commercial commodity 'manufactured' by the vendors of second purchases of a commercial commodity which retained its commercial character even though it was put through some process described as "manufacture" in the hands of the vendors. 5. The grounds upon which Section 3-D of the Act is alleged to be invalid are: that, Section 3-D of the Act amounts to excessive and unconstitutional delegation of essential legislative power to the State Government; that, Section 3-D of the Act does not provide any guiding principle for the State Government to select commodities for the exemption of purchase tax or for fixation of rates for such taxes so that rights conferred by Articles 14 and 19 of the Constitution are liable to be infringed by notifications issued by the State Government. 6. So far as the questions relating to the validity of Section 3-D of the Act are concerned, we find that they were considered in detail by one of us (Pathak, J.) in the course of a judgment given on 27-10-1966, in writ petition No. 4615 of 1965, connected with a large number of other writ petitions. 6. So far as the questions relating to the validity of Section 3-D of the Act are concerned, we find that they were considered in detail by one of us (Pathak, J.) in the course of a judgment given on 27-10-1966, in writ petition No. 4615 of 1965, connected with a large number of other writ petitions. It was also pointed out there, inter alia, that the validity of Section 3-D of the Act had been upheld by a Division Bench of this Court in Sri Kamla Dal Mills v. State of Uttar Pradesh, Writ Petition No. 3521 of 1965, reported in 18 Sales Tax Cases (1966) 204. It was held by the Division Bench of this court, after considering the very contentions now advanced before us, that Section 3-D of the Act could not be challenged on the ground of unconstitutionality or excessive delegation of legislative power. It was also held there that the provision of this Sec. did not violate article 14 of the Constitution. If the vesting of power to levy tax by notifications of the State Government issued under S. 3-D of the Act does not offend against principles contained in Article 14 of the Constitution, it is difficult to see how Article 19 of the Constitution could be contravened. No separate reason was advanced for supporting the contention that the provisions of Section 3-D of the Act authorise or impose unreasonable restrictions on the fundamental right to carry on trade. We, therefore, uphold the validity of Section 3-D of the Act without giving elaborate reasons which have already been given by this court in the decisions mentioned above and which need not, therefore, be repeated. 7. The second contention was that the State Government had used its power to issuing notifications in such a way as to actually discriminate against the food grain dealers as compared with dealers in other commodities. It is a well established principle that taxing authorities are given a wide latitude to select commodities for taxation and to graduate taxation in order to carry out the fiscal policy of the State at any time. In Messrs East India Tobacco Co. v. State of Andhra, A.I.R. 1962 SC 1733, the Supreme Court observed: "It is not in dispute that taxation laws must also pass the test of Article 14. In Messrs East India Tobacco Co. v. State of Andhra, A.I.R. 1962 SC 1733, the Supreme Court observed: "It is not in dispute that taxation laws must also pass the test of Article 14. That has been laid down recently by this court in Kunnathat Thathunni Moopil Nair v. State of Kerala, A.I.R. 1961 SC 552. But, in deciding whether a taxation law is discriminatory or not it is necessary to bear in mind that the State has a wide discretion in selecting the persons or objects it will tax, and that a statute is not open to attach on the ground that it taxes some persons or objects and not others. It is only when within the range of its selection, the law operates unequally, and that cannot be justified on the basis of any valid classification, that it would be violative of Article 14". 8. In the cases before us nothing has been referred to which could enable us to decide that the food grains dealers suffered from any unjustifiable discrimination as compared with other dealers. We cannot possibly accept such an argument on the materials before us. 9. The third contention was that the Sales' Tax Act does not provide machinery for the assessment and collection of purchase tax in view of the definition of "turnover" given in it. The definition of "turnover", so far as relevant for the purpose of this argument found in Section 2 after the U.P. Sales' Tax (2nd. amendment) Act No. XXII of 1964, reads as follows : "(i) 'turnover' means the aggregate amount for which goods are supplied or distributed by way of sale or (are sold, or the aggregate amount for which goods are bought whichever is greater) by a dealer either directly or through another, on his account or on account of others whether for cash or deferred payment or other valuable consideration;" 10. The definition of "turnover of purchases" is given as follows : " (ii) (Turnover of purchases with its cognate expressions) means the aggregate of the amounts of purchase price paid Of payable by a dealer in respect of purchase of goods made by or through him after deducting the amount, if any, refunded to the dealer by the seller in respect of any goods returned to such seller within such period as may be prescribed." 11. Sec. 3-D of the Act, which authorises a form of tax on sales viewed from the angle of purchases, reads as follows after the amendments made by the U.P. Act XXII of 1961. "3-D. Levy of purchase of sales tax on certain goods: (1) Except as provided in sub-sec. (2) , there shall be levied and paid, for each assessment year or part thereof, a tax on the turnover, to be determined in such manner as may be prescribed, of first purchases made by a dealer or through a dealer acting as a purchasing agent in respect of such goods or class of goods, and at such rates, not exceeding two paisa per rupee in the case food grains, including cereals and pulses and five paisa per rupee in the case of other goods and with effect from such date, as may, from time to time, be notified by the State Government in this behalf." 12. It is evident that the tax on purchases is to be paid on "the turnover" of first purchases. Hence, for purposes of this particular kind of tax, the word 'turn over' must necessarily mean the turnover of purchases. "The turnover" of any dealer, taxed under Section 3-D of the Act, can be assessed as a turnover of first purchases only. Such turnover cannot cease to be turnover simply because it is the turnover of purchases. 13. Before the U.P. Sales' Tax (Second Amendment) Act XXII of 1964 was passed, there was Explanation 1 to Section 2 (i) which said : "Subject to the provisions of Section 3-D and 3-E, the word 'turnover' shall, in respect of a dealer in goods notified under sub-sec. (1) of Section 3-D, be deemed to in-dude turnover of purchases also." As a result of changes made in the definitions of 'turnover' and 'turnover of purchases' by the U.P. Act XXII of 1964, the explanation, which was considered unnecessary, was deleted. Evidently, the reason for this was that the definition given of "turnover" includes both sales and purchases. It may be that these changes, instead of clarifying the position, as appears to have been the intention behind the amendments, only expressed the intention in more involved language. There could, however, not be the least doubt that Section 3-D, with which we an here concerned authorised levy of tax on first purchases. 14. It may be that these changes, instead of clarifying the position, as appears to have been the intention behind the amendments, only expressed the intention in more involved language. There could, however, not be the least doubt that Section 3-D, with which we an here concerned authorised levy of tax on first purchases. 14. Although there were alterations made by the U.P. Act XXII of 1964 in the definitions of "turnover" and "turnover of purchases", Section 7 (1) of the Act, which was obviously meant to cover returns and assessments of turnover of every kind, stood unchanged and read as follows : "7. Determination of turnover and assessment of tax : (1) Every dealer who is liable to pay tax under this Act shall submit such return or returns of his turnover at such intervals, within such period, in such form and verified in such manner, as may be prescribed, but the assessing authority may in its discretion, for reasons to be recorded, extend the date for the submission of the return by any person or class of persons. (1A) Before submitting the return under sub-Sec. (1) , or along with such return the dealer shall deposit in such manner as may be prescribed, the amount of tax due on the turnover shown in such return. (2) If the assessing authority, after such enquiry, as he considers necessary, is satisfied that any returns submitted under sub-Sec. (1) are correct and complete he shall assess the tax on the basis thereof, (3) If no return is submitted by the dealer under sub-Sec. (I) within the period prescribed in that behalf, or if the return submitted by him appears to the assessing authority to be incorrect or incomplete, the assessing authority shall, after making such inquiry as he considers necessary, determine the turnover of the dealer to the best of his judgment and assess the tax on the basis thereof. 15. Provided that before taking action under this sub-Section the dealer shall be given a reasonable opportunity of proving the correctness and completeness of any return submitted by him". 16. Sec. 7, set out above, is obviously not meant to define or specify the kinds of turnover under the Act as this has been done elsewhere in the definitions given. 15. Provided that before taking action under this sub-Section the dealer shall be given a reasonable opportunity of proving the correctness and completeness of any return submitted by him". 16. Sec. 7, set out above, is obviously not meant to define or specify the kinds of turnover under the Act as this has been done elsewhere in the definitions given. It only provides machinery for making such returns of ''his turnover" by a dealer as the dealer may be required to make and for its assessment. The definition of the term "dealer" in Section 2 (c) of the Act includes both buyers and sellers of goods in Uttar Pradesh. Rule 41 of the Rules under the Act imposes an obligation upon every dealer who is liable to pay tax under the Act to submit to the Sales Tax Officer a quarterly return of "his gross turnover" in Form IV. Although form. IV mentions only sales under the heading "turnover", this would not, in our opinion, absolve a dealer from the duty to make such returns of "his gross turnover" as he may be capable of making or reasonably required to make. The failure of the rule making authority to prescribe an appropriate form for making a return of turnover of purchases could not either invalidate the duly authorised levy of tax or its assessment under Section 7 of the Act. 17. If the imposition and assessment of the purchase tax are warranted by the Act, as they clearly are, the doctrine of implied powers can be invoked to enable Sales' Tax Officers to require appropriate returns from dealers for purposes of assessment under Section 7 of the purchase tax imposed by Section 3-D of the Act. This well known doctrine is thus stated in Maxwell's "Interpretation of Statutes" (9th edition, page 360) : "Where an Act confers a jurisdiction, it impliedly also grants the power of doing all such acts, or employing such means, as are essentially necessary to its execution." And, the following passage from Craies' "Statute Law (5th ed. This well known doctrine is thus stated in Maxwell's "Interpretation of Statutes" (9th edition, page 360) : "Where an Act confers a jurisdiction, it impliedly also grants the power of doing all such acts, or employing such means, as are essentially necessary to its execution." And, the following passage from Craies' "Statute Law (5th ed. p. 105) " also explains the principle : "If a statute is passed for the purpose of enabling something to be done, but omits to mention in terms some detail which is of great importance (if not actually essential) to the proper and effectual performance of the work which the statute has in contemplation, the courts are at liberty to infer that the statute by implication empowers that detail to be carried out." 18. Hence, the difficulties to which our attention was directed could not operate as insurmountable obstacles in assessment and collection of the tax. No difficulty in making any return under Section 7 of the Act was experienced by any of the petitioners. For purposes of making returns of first purchases, Section 7 must be deemed to refer to turnover of first purchases. The petitioners cannot take shelter behind any ambiguity in the provisions intended either to enable or impose duties upon assesses to make returns when there is no doubt about the liability created by the taxing provision. The provisions intended for enabling returns and assessments to be made have to be so interpreted, if possible, as to give effect to the legislative intent. In our opinion, they can be so interpreted here without unduly stretching the meaning of the term "turnover" as used in Section 7 of the Act. 19. The fourth and last contention advanced on behalf of the petitioners raises a question which we have already decided in Bharjatia Traders' Hathras v. Sales Tax Officer, Hathras, Civil Misc. Writ No. 27 of 1967 decided on 30.11.1967, and connected cases. We have held there that 'arhar dal' would not be a different commercial commodity merely because some process of cleaning or breaking up was gone through. Writ No. 27 of 1967 decided on 30.11.1967, and connected cases. We have held there that 'arhar dal' would not be a different commercial commodity merely because some process of cleaning or breaking up was gone through. There, we relied upon Tungabhadra Industries v. Commercial Tax Officer, A.I.R. 1961 SC 412 and held that the exact process through which pulses were put must be examined upon the evidence to be taken on the matter so as to determine whether a new product has merged which could be regarded as a separate commercial commodity. We allowed the writ petitions and sent back the cases to the Sales' Tax Officer for a determination of the question, after examination of all the evidence in the light of the matters stated there by us, whether a new commercial commodity had come into existence in the hands of the vendors so as to constitute first purchases so far as the assessment of purchases before us were concerned. We propose to follow the same course in the writ petitions before us. 20. We, therefore, quash the assessment orders challenged by writ petitions Nos. 817 and 34 and 36 and 455 and 638 of 1967 so that the assessment proceedings will be deemed to be pending. We direct that the Sales' Tax Officer will take evidence and consider it from a legally correct angle and pass fresh assessment orders containing the necessary findings. So far as writ petitions Nos. 4673 and 4674 of 1965 are concerned, no assessment has so far taken place. Therefore, we are unable to issue any writ of prohibition or to quash the notification complained off. We, however, issue a direction to the Sales' Tax Officer to proceed to assess the petitioners in accordance with the tests laid down by us in the judgment already mentioned in the case of Bharjatia Traders' Hathras. The result is that we partly allow all the writ petitions. The parties will bear their own costs. 21. Pathak, J. - I agree with my brother Beg in his conclusions on the question raised before us, but in respect of the contention that there is no machinery under the U.P. Sales Tax Act for assessment and collection of purchase tax, I would like to state my reasons. 22. The parties will bear their own costs. 21. Pathak, J. - I agree with my brother Beg in his conclusions on the question raised before us, but in respect of the contention that there is no machinery under the U.P. Sales Tax Act for assessment and collection of purchase tax, I would like to state my reasons. 22. It is contended by the petitioners that if regard be had to the separate definitions of "turnover" and "turnover of purchases", Section 7 of the U.P. Sales Tax Act and rule 41 of the U.P. Sales Tax Rules cannot be pressed into service for an assessment of purchase tax. It is pointed out that Section 7 and rule 41 speak of "turnover" which, it is said, is not the same thing as "turnover of purchases". Consequently, when Section 7 and rule 41 require a dealer to file returns of his turnover and empower the assessing authority to determine the turnover and assess the tax on the basis thereof, the returns and the assessment contemplated are not intended to treat with the turnover of purchase and the assessment of purchase tax. In my judgment, the contention is without force. 23. It has long been settled that to appreciate the scope and intention of a provision in the statute it is necessary to examine the object underlying its enactment, the several related provisions of the statute indicating how the object is to be fulfilled and the context( in which the provisions under consideration occurs. It is no longer permissible to take up a single provision in the statute and to construe it by reference to its language alone and in isolation from the considerations to which I have adverted. It must be presumed that there is a central principle around which the statute moves and that full effect must be given, to the extent it is reasonably possible, to every provision of the statute so that the principle is fully sub served. Not to do so would be to negative or stultify the object with which the statute has been enacted. The courts, however, will not be justified in stretching or straining the language in an endeavour to fill in an existing lacuna in the statute.. That would clearly be an example of impermissible legislation. Not to do so would be to negative or stultify the object with which the statute has been enacted. The courts, however, will not be justified in stretching or straining the language in an endeavour to fill in an existing lacuna in the statute.. That would clearly be an example of impermissible legislation. The limits are set by the language employed by the Legislature, which language must be construed so far as the letter of the statute and the principles of statutory construction will allow. 24. The U.P. Sales Tax Act was enacted in 1948. At the' outset it was marked by a simplicity generally unknown to taxation statutes. Section 3 was the charging provision and charged the turnover of a dealer for each assessment year. The turnover liable to assessment was the aggregate of the proceeds of sale by a dealer. With changes in the economic and fiscal policies of the State and the attempt to strengthen the net to prevent evasion of tax the Act was amended from time to time. But the tax continued to be a tax on sales. In 1958 Section 3-D was added, providing for the levy of purchase tax. It was replaced in 1964 by a more exhaustive provision brought in by Section 4 of the U.P. Sales Tax (second Amendment) Act, 1964 (numbered as U.P. Act XXII of 1964). To give full effect to the new Section 3-D, changes were also made in other parts of the statute with corresponding changes in the Rules. The result is that the U.P. Sales Tax Act today contemplates a charge to tax under Section 3 and a separate charge to tax under Sec S.D. They are two distinct and independent charging provisions, each operating to effectuate its object through a complete code. To the extent that the language permits, some of the provisions of the Act are capable of being employed for the purpose of either charging provision. Such common provisions constitute the area over which the two codes overlap. But where the language of the provision is restricted to the charge levied by Section 3, the Legislature found it necessary to enact separate, and generally corresponding, provisions for the purposes of the charge levied under Section 3-D. 25. Such common provisions constitute the area over which the two codes overlap. But where the language of the provision is restricted to the charge levied by Section 3, the Legislature found it necessary to enact separate, and generally corresponding, provisions for the purposes of the charge levied under Section 3-D. 25. To the code already existing in the Act for the purpose of effectuating the levy created under Section 3, it was apparent to the Legislature that only a few additions and amendments were necessary for the purpose of bringing into existence a complete code to give effect to the levy created under Section 3-D. Those additions and alterations are set out in the U.P. Act No. XXII of 1964. If they are compared with the corresponding provisions existing earlier, it will be evident that they were made only where the language of the existing provisions was such as to preclude their application for the purposes of the charge under Section 3-D, being either in terms or by necessary implication capable of application only for the purposes of the charge under Section 3. 26. Under Section 3-D (1) the tax levied is a tax on the turnover of first purchases. The tax is to be determined in such manner as may be prescribed. Section 3-D (1), therefore, contemplates the determination of the turnover of first purchases and the assessment of purchase tax. Section 3-D (2) levies a tax on the turnover of sales in certain specified circumstances. The turnover of such sales is to be determined in such manner as may be prescribed. It will be noticed that Section 3-D levies a tax on first purchases by virtue of sub-sec. (1) and a tax on sales by virtue of sub-sec. (2) . 27. The relevant provisions for the determination of the turnover and the assessment of tax may now be considered. 28. Sec. 7 deals with the determination of turnover and the assessment of tax. Sub-sec. (1) requires every dealer, who is liable to pay tax under the Act, to submit a return or returns of his turnover. Sub-sec. (1-A) requires the dealer, when submitting a return, to deposit the amount of tax due on the turnover shown in such return. Sub-sec. (2) empowers the assessing authority, if satisfied that the return submitted is correct and complete, to assess the tax on the basis thereof. Sub-sec. Sub-sec. (1-A) requires the dealer, when submitting a return, to deposit the amount of tax due on the turnover shown in such return. Sub-sec. (2) empowers the assessing authority, if satisfied that the return submitted is correct and complete, to assess the tax on the basis thereof. Sub-sec. (3) provides that if no return is submitted by the dealer within the period prescribed in that behalf, or if the return submitted by him appears to the assessing authority to be incorrect or incomplete, the assessing authority is authorised to determine the turnover to the best of his judgment and assess the tax on the basis thereof. Section 7-A is a special provision empowering the State Government to require any dealer to submit a return of his turnover of a portion of the assessment year and authorising the assessing authority to make a provisional assessment thereof. Rule 41 makes detailed provision for the submission of returns and assessment. It requires the dealer to file returns of his turnover for each quarter in the year and provides how such returns will be dealt with by the Sales Tax Officer for the purpose of making an assessment to tax. If the dealer does not file a return or does not pay the tax admittedly due at the time of filing his return the Sales Tax Officer is empowered to determine the turnover to the best of his judgment and make a provisional assessment to tax. 29. It is clear that if the word 'turnover' can refer to the turnover of sales and equally to the turnover of purchases, Section 7 and rule 41 can be employed for making an assessment of the turnover of sales as well as an assessment of the turnover of purchases. The terms in which they are couched enable their application whether the assessment to be made is of sales tax or of purchase tax. 30. The terms in which they are couched enable their application whether the assessment to be made is of sales tax or of purchase tax. 30. "Turnover" has been defined by Section 2 (i) as "the aggregate amount for which goods are supplied by way of sale or are sold, or the aggregate amount for which goods are bought which ever is greater, by a dealer " And "turnover of purchases" has been defined in Section 2 (ii) as "the aggregate of the amounts of purchase price paid or payable by a dealer in respect of purchase of goods made by or through him after deducting the amount refunded to the dealer by the seller in respect of any goods returned to such seller within such period as may be prescribed." The word "turnover", it will be noticed, is not confined to the aggregate amount for which goods are sold. It may, by the very terms of the definition, mean also the aggregate amount for which goods are bought. Therefore, the definition of "turnover" is also called into play when purchases are taxed. The expression "turnover of purchases" has been specially defined in order to indicate how the aggregate of the amounts of purchase price is to be ascertained. It is such aggregate minus the amount, if any, refunded to the dealer by the seller in respect of goods returned to such seller within a prescribed period. 31. If, as is clear, the definition of "turnover" refers also to the aggregate amount for which goods are bought, then for the purpose of determining the turnover of purchases there can be no legitimate objection to availing of Section 7 and rule 41 for the purpose of determining such turnover and assessing the tax levied thereon. Section 7 and rule 41 do not specifically refer to the turnover of sales. There is no reason why they should be construed as if they do. 32. A perusal of Sections 2 (i) and 2 (ii) will show that the definitions of "turnover" and "turnover of purchases" do not specifically mention either Section 3 or Section 3-D. I have also pointed out that Section 3-D contemplates the determination of the turnover of first purchases as also the turnover of sales depending on whether the case falls under sub-sec. (1) or sub-sec. (2) . 33. (1) or sub-sec. (2) . 33. It is pointed out by the petitioners that the special terms in which "turnover" has been defined the aggregate amount for which goods are sold or the aggregate amount for which goods are bought, whichever is greater makes the provisions of Section 7 and rule 41 unavailable for assessing the turnover contemplated by Section 3-D. That, in my opinion, amounts to putting on unnecessarily restricted meaning upon the word "turnover" as used in Section 7 and rule 41. It must be remembered that both Section 7 and rule 41 are machinery provisions, and capable of a wider construction than is possible in the case of provision creating liability. There is it seems to me, this distinction that whereas a provision creating liability must be strictly construed, provisions creating machinery for giving effect to the object of the statute are susceptible of a more liberal construction. Upon that view of the matter, there is no reason why the word "turnover" in Section 7 and rule 41 must be confined to the turnover of sales. 34. I would say, therefore, that Section 7 and rule 41 provide machinery for determining the turnover of first purchases within the contemplation of Section 3-D (1) . Complementary provisions appear in Section 3 (c), Section 3 (ee), Section 3 (ggg), Section 3 (v) (i), Section 3-E, Section 7-A, Section 7-E, Section 8-A, Section 14 and Section 24 as amended by U.P. Act XXII of 1964, and R. 44-A which applies to the computation of tax under Section 3-D (1) principles analogous to those embodied in rule 44 relating to the computation of tax under Section 3. 35. Upon the aforesaid considerations I have no hesitation in holding that the U.P. Sales Tax Act contains adequate machinery for determining the turnover of first purchases and assessing the purchase tax charged thereon. 36. By The Court. - The writ petitions are partly allowed. The assessment orders challenged by writ petitions Nos. 34, 36, 455, 638 and 817 of 1967 are quashed. The assessment proceedings will be deemed to be pending before the Sales Tax Officer. The Sales Tax Officer is directed to take evidence and make fresh assessment orders in accordance with law. As regards the proceedings challenged in writ petitions Nos. The assessment orders challenged by writ petitions Nos. 34, 36, 455, 638 and 817 of 1967 are quashed. The assessment proceedings will be deemed to be pending before the Sales Tax Officer. The Sales Tax Officer is directed to take evidence and make fresh assessment orders in accordance with law. As regards the proceedings challenged in writ petitions Nos. 4673 and 4674 of 1965 the Sales Tax Officer is directed to take assessment proceedings against the petitioners in accordance with , The parties shall bear their costs.