ORDER S.D. Singh, J. - This is an application in revision against an order passed by a Canal Magistrate, District Etawah, convicting the Applicants u/s 70(1) of the Northern India Canal and Drainage Act, 1873, sentencing each one of them to a fine of Rule 15/- . They went up in appeal to the Sessions Judge but the conviction and sentences of the Appellants were maintained. Hence this application in revision by them. 2. The case arose out of a complaint filed by one Raghubar that he had a right to get his field irrigated by making use of canal water through a watercourse which ran along the western mend of the field of Ram Charan and Jagannath and that this water course was demolished by them. 3. The Applicants denied the existence of any water course and consequently also the demolition of any such watercourse by them. 4. On an appraisal of the evidence produced in the case and also on the basis of the local inspection, the Magistrate came to the conclusion that a water course did exist along the western mend of the present Applicants and that it was demolished. On these findings the Applicants were convicted and sentenced as aforesaid. 5. The law relating to the existence of a water-course is rather ambiguous. The provisions relating to the same are contained in the Northern India Canal and Drainage Act (Act VIII) of 1873. This was placed on the statute book at a time when probably no body thought of challenging the validity of any order passed either by the Executive Government or quasi-judicial authorities. Water-course is defined in Sub-section (2) of Section 3 of the aforesaid Act as-- 'Water course' means any channel which is supplied with water from a canal, but which is not maintained at the cost of the State Government and all subsidiary works belonging to any such channel. 6. The definition does not say as to how a particular watercourse is to come into existence or what is the sanction behind any particular watercourse. If a particular watercourse is not maintained at the cost of the State Govt., in some cases it may not given belong to the State Government. 6. The definition does not say as to how a particular watercourse is to come into existence or what is the sanction behind any particular watercourse. If a particular watercourse is not maintained at the cost of the State Govt., in some cases it may not given belong to the State Government. If it exists on private property and is Used only by the owner of that property, the question of its demolition by that owner of the property does not arise as it is for him to have the water-course or; not to have it at all. But if the watercourse is to be used say by 'A', but it runs through the land of 'B', a question may arise what right has A to use the intercourse running through the land of B unless it has some sanction behind lit. The definition of 'water course' referred to above does not carry such sanction, though Clause (1) of Section 70 punishes a person found damaging or obstructing a water course, which work is included for purposes of the Act in the word 'canal'. Section 21 refers to new water courses coming into existence. Section 20 of the Act has also something to say about the use of intervening water-courses but does not go beyond it. All the same any channel which is supplied with water from a canal, but which is not maintained at the cost of the State Government and all subsidiary works belonging to such channel, is a water-course as defined in the Act. Such a water-course is also included in the expression 'canal' and as has been mentioned earlier, damage, alteration or obstruction to or in such a canal is punishable u/s 70(1) of the Act. The obvious inference is, as has been mentioned by the Sessions Judge, that the water course must at least not have been constructed over the land of another by force or against his consent. If the water-course has been established with the consent of the person through whose land it runs, then he would not have a right to demolish it or to obstruct the flow of water through it. 7. A question similar to it came up before this Court in Kanhaiya Singh v. Rex ILR 1950 All. 781. In that case the particular watercourse was in existence for not more than six or seven months. 7. A question similar to it came up before this Court in Kanhaiya Singh v. Rex ILR 1950 All. 781. In that case the particular watercourse was in existence for not more than six or seven months. The water-course having been demolished, a prosecution was launched against the person responsible for the same, but the accused was held not guilty on the ground that in the absence of sufficient evidence or a clear finding that it was a well recognised channel through which the people of the locality had a right to take water, it could not be said to be a water-course. 8. Malik, C.J. who decided that case agreed that the water-course need not have existed for twenty years before any right to take water through it night be established. Even so conviction in the case was set aside because it was thought that the water-course must be in existence for sufficiently long period, even though not 20 years, before any rights can be acquired to take water through it. This is what the learned Chief Justice observed: I do not mean that it should have existed for twenty years to enable others to acquire rights of easement, but it should have existed for sufficiently long period or it should have been so generally used by the people of the locality as of right that it could be said that the channel was a well recognised "watercourse" for the purposes of irrigation. 9. In this particular case it was urged on behalf of the Applicants themselves that the water course runs through the land of the Applicants. As the Sessions Judge has pointed out this is in evidence also. The watercourse runs along the western mend. That being so, it is impossible to believe that the watercourse would come into existence without their express or implied consent. If any arrangement was made to take water through a newly constructed watercourse along the western mend of the Applicants' plots without their consent, there would have been immediate protest by them, even exchange of notices and institution of some proceedings either civil or criminal. But that did not happen. It is in evidence, which has been referred to by both the courts, that the complainant Raghubar was irrigating his field by taking water through this water channel for at least three preceding years before the mend was demolished. But that did not happen. It is in evidence, which has been referred to by both the courts, that the complainant Raghubar was irrigating his field by taking water through this water channel for at least three preceding years before the mend was demolished. If that was so and that too without any protest or objection by the Applicants, then it must be held that there has been a water course in existence for a sufficiently long period even within the meaning of the observations of Malik, C.J. in Kanhaiya Singh v. Rex (supra). 10. So far as the demolition of the water course is concerned the Magistrate, when he inspected the site, found evidence on the spot that watercourse had been demolished. Both the courts have believed the evidence on that point. The finding in this respect is a finding of fact, which is based on evidence and must be accepted in revision. 11. That being so, there is no force in this revision which is consequently dismissed.