JUDGMENT Jagdish Sahai, J. - This is a Defendants' second appeal which arises out of suit No. 85 of 1955 of the Court of Munsif, Faizabad (hereinafter referred to as the suit). The Respondents Smt. Kamla Narain, Smt. Madhu Saigal and Sumer Mal filed the suit for the recovery of Rs. 224/- as arrears of rent and damages for use and occupation of house No. 820 situated in mohalla Khuwaspura in the City of Faizabad against Bahraichi, the father of Budhoo and Sannoo, the Appellants. Bahraichi died during the pendency of the suit and on his death the present Appellants were impleaded as Defendants. The relief included a prayer for the decree for a sum of money as damages for use and occupation pendente lite and future. 2. The learned Munsif framed the following two issues on the basis of the pleadings of the parties: (1) Whether the Plaintiff duly served notice of demand and the notice u/s 106, T.P. Act? If so are they legal and valid? (2) Plaintiffs' ralief, if any? 3. On 2-2-1966 the learned Munsif decreed the suit in part by passing a decree, only for the recovery of Rs. 224/- as arrears of rent. He dismissed the suit with regard to other reliefs and directed the parties to bear their own costs. 4. Dissatisfied with the decree of the learned Munsif the Plaintiffs appealed to the learned District Judge, Faizabad, who transferred the appeal to Sri J.N. Bansal, Additional Civil Judge for hearing. On 17-5-1966 Sri Bansal allowed the appeal, modified the decree passed by the learned Munsif, by decreeing the suit for ejectment of the Defendants from the house in dispute. He also awarded costs to the Plaintiffs of his own court as also that of the learned Munisf. He decreed the suit also for pendente lite and future damages for use and occupation of the house, at the rate of Rs. 20/- per month on the condition that the Plaintiffs paid the necessary court fee in respect of this item in the execution court before executing the decree. 5. As already said above, the Defendants have filed the instant second appeal. 6. 20/- per month on the condition that the Plaintiffs paid the necessary court fee in respect of this item in the execution court before executing the decree. 5. As already said above, the Defendants have filed the instant second appeal. 6. The main question that was canvassed in the Courts below was whether the notice dated 2-1-1965 sent under the provisions of Section 106, T.P. Act and Section 3 of the UP (Temporary) Control of Rent and Eviction Act was a valid notice. 7. When the second appeal came up for hearing before Asthana, J. he referred the case to a larger Bench. That is how the matter has come before us. 8. The notice was delivered to the accepting post office on 2-1-1965 and it appears that a postman from the delivery post office took it to the residence of Bahraichi for delivery to him on 4-1-1965. 9. Admittedly the notice was not delivered. It bears an endorsement 'Inkari Wapas Hai The learned Munsif held that the notice had not been served on Bahraichi. The learned Additional Civil Judge in appeal came to the conclusion that it would be deemed to have been served on Bahraichi. 10. Several authorities have been cited before us by the Learned Counsel for the parties in support of their respective contentions. But before we advert to the authorities we would like to consider the case on first principles. Section 114 of the Indian Evidence Act reads: The Court may presume the existence of any fact which it thinks likely to have happened, regard being had to the common course of natural events, human conduct and public and private business, in their relation to facts of the particular case. (Italicised by us) Illustrations (e) and (f) to this section reads: (e) that judicial and official acts have been regularly performed; (f) that the common course of business has been followed in particular cases. Section 114 of the Evidence Act deals with presumption of facts. Presumption of facts are no more than logical inference of the existence of one fact drawn from other proved or known facts without the help of any artificial rules of law and they are always rebuttable. Section 114 of the Evidence Act deals with presumption of facts. Presumption of facts are no more than logical inference of the existence of one fact drawn from other proved or known facts without the help of any artificial rules of law and they are always rebuttable. As was pointed out by Holmes, J. in Greer v. U.S. 245 U.S.R. 559 "a presumption upon a matter of fact, when it is not merely a disguise for some other principle, means that common experience shows the fact to be so generally true that courts may notice the truth." Presumptions are drawn on the basis of law, experience in the conduct of human affairs and in the official acts being regularly and properly performed. 11. When a registered article or a registered letter is handed over to an accepting or receiving post office, it is the official duty of the Postal Department to make delivery of it to the addressee. Human experience shows that except in a few exceptional cases, letters or articles received by the post office are duly, regularly and properly served to the addressees. Consequently, as a proposition it cannot be disputed that when a letter is delivered to the receiving or accepting post office, it is reasonably expected that, in the normal course, it would deliver it to the addressee. That is the official and the normal function of the post-office. 12. In our opinion, therefore, the first appellate court was justified in falling back upon the presumption that the letter had been tendered to Bahraichi for being accepted. It is true that Section 114 of the Evidence Act gives a discretion to the Court to make or not to make a presumption and clearly no party as of right can claim such a presumption being raised by a court. But in view of what we have said above and because of the circumstance that in the persent case, the postal authorities had no interest to derelict from their duty and there were no abnormal circumstances suggesting the departure from the normal, in our opinion, a presumtion could safely be drawn that the post office had done its duty by tendering the notice dated 2-1-1965 to Bahraichi for his acceptance. Section 16 of the Indian Evidence Act reads: When there is a question whether a particular act was done, the existence of any course of business, according to which it naturally would have been done, is a relevant fact. Illustrations (a) and (b) to this section read: (a) The question is, whether a particular letter was despatched. The facts that it was the ordinary course of business for all letters put in a certain place to be carried to the post and that that particular letter was put in that place, are relevant. (b) The question is, whether a particular letter reached A. The facts that it was posted in due course and was not returned through the Dead Letter Office, are relevant. Support can also be had from Section 16 of the Evidence Act for the view that we are taking. The endorsement on the notice 'Inkari Wapas Hai', strengthens the presumption that an attempt was made to deliver the notice to Bahraichi. But like all presumptions of fact this presumption is also rebuttable. 13. Sri Ambika Prasad has placed reliance upon four decisions of Dhavan, J. for the proposition that once a notice or communication is sent by post there is a presumption that it was duly tendered and delivered and if the communication is returned by the post office with the endorsement 'refused', the presumption will be that it was tendered by the postal authorities in their ordinary course of business to the addressee who refused it. In Wasu Ram v. R.L. Sethi 1963 AWR 472 Dhavan, J., has not laid down that such a presumption is not rebuttable. Actually he has said that "the strength of the presumption will vary according to the fact of each case, being strong in the case of registered letters and strongest in the case of money orders and insured articles the delivery of which cannot be made without observing certain precautions which are prescribed." 14. Mr. Ambika Prasad, Learned Counsel for the Respondents placed reliance upon the following passage in the report: The question is always one of fact, though a denial which is not only bare but bare-faced and made by a person who stood to profit by his denial and therefore, had all the motive in the world to deny, will not ordinarily weaken the presumption. We do not wish to categorise as to under what circumstances a presumption of fact in a case like this would stand rebutted. It varies from case to case and each case has to be decided on its own facts. In fact it will be noticed that Section 114 of the Indian Evidence Act itself uses the words "in their relation to facts of the particular case". (We have already italicised these words earlier). 15. The other three cases relied upon by Mr. Ambika Prasad are: Salik Ram Sahu v. Bindeshwari Ram Rauniyar 1965 AWR 580 , Mohammad Husain v. Lala Shyam Sunder 1966 AWR 185, Asa Ram v. Ravi Prakash 1966 AWR 135 . In these three cases Dhavan, J. has only reiterated the view that he had taken in Wasu Ram v. R.L. Sethi (supra). In Asa Ram v. Ravi Prakash (supra) he observed as follows: Mr. Sinha contends that after the Appellant had denied receipt of notice, the presumption was rebutted. I cannot agree. The Appellant's denial was not sufficient to rebut the presumption unless he was believed by the Court, but he was not. This question was considered at length in Wasu Ram v. R.L. Sethi 1963 All. W.R. (HC) 472. Even this case does not go to the extent to which Mr. Ambika Prasad wants to take it. It is not an authority for the proposition that mere denial of receipt of notice served by post will in no case be sufficient to rebut the presumption. 16. As we have already pointed out it would vary from case to case and would depend upon the credit that the court gives to the testimony of the Defendant who denies service of the notice. 17. Mr. Ambika Prasad next relied upon the decision of a Division Bench of this Court in Bhagwan Radha Kishen Vs. Commissioner of Income Tax, AIR 1952 All 857 . This was a decision in a reference made under the provisions of Section 66 of the Indian Income Tax Act, 1922. The Assessee had filed an appeal before the Appellate Tribunal in which 22-4-1948 was the first date fixed for hearing. Notice of this application sent to the Assessee read: Take notice that the above appeal has been fixed for hearing at 23-A Thorn-hill Road, Allahabad, at 10.30 a.m. on 22-4-1948. The Assessee had filed an appeal before the Appellate Tribunal in which 22-4-1948 was the first date fixed for hearing. Notice of this application sent to the Assessee read: Take notice that the above appeal has been fixed for hearing at 23-A Thorn-hill Road, Allahabad, at 10.30 a.m. on 22-4-1948. The notice came back unserved with an endorsement by the postal authorities' "not claimed". A fresh notice was then issued by the Tribunal by registered post fixing 28-7-1948. The question before this Court was whether in view of the two endorsements mentioned above there was sufficient notice of the hearing of the appeal to the Assessee. The learned Judges relied upon the provisions of Order 5, Rule 20-A (added by this Court), upon Section 27 of the Central General Clauses Act and upon a decision of this Court in M.X. de Nornha and Sons Vs. Commissioner of Income Tax, AIR 1952 All 137 . for holding that there was a presumption of proper service on the Assessee and the burden of rebutting that presumption lay upon the Assessee. This case is sought to be distinguished firstly on the ground that at the time when the suit giving rise to this appeal was filed Rule 20 A had not been added to Order 5 of the CPC by this Court and for that reason it was not applicable to the facts of the present case and secondly, because the notice in that case was a notice for the hearing of an appeal and was not a composite notice u/s 106, T.P. Act and Section 3 of the UP (Temporary) Control of Rent and Eviction Act. A similar point arose in Radha Kishan v. State of UP 1963 AWR 304 SC where their Lordships observed as follows: As regards the other point, that is based on the fact that there were acknowledgements in respect of three letters in the post office we may point out that the existence of these acknowledgements would no more than raise a presumption that those articles were delivered to the addressees. Their Lordships have clearly held that the presumption, is rebuttable and have observed as follows: The addressees have been examined in this case and they have deposed that the letters in question were not received by them. Their evidence has been believed by the High Court, and therefore, there is an end to the matter. Their Lordships have clearly held that the presumption, is rebuttable and have observed as follows: The addressees have been examined in this case and they have deposed that the letters in question were not received by them. Their evidence has been believed by the High Court, and therefore, there is an end to the matter. A similar question also engaged the attention of the judicial Committee of the Privy Council in Harihar Banerji and Ors. v. Ramsashi Roy and Ors. 45 IA 222 where their Lordships observed as follows: S. 106 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882 only requires that such a notice should be tendered or delivered to the party intended to be bound by it either personally or to one of his family or servants at his residence, or, if such tender or delivery be not practicable, affixed to a conspicuous part of the property. The personal tender or delivery may take place anywhere the vicarious tender or delivery must take place at the residence of the person intended to be bound by the notice. The latest, clearest and most conclusive authority upon the question of the sufficiency of the service or delivery of a notice to quit by post probably is the case of Gresham House Estate Company v. Rossa Grande Gold Mining Company (1870) WN 119. There the Defendants, who were sued for rent, contended that they had, before the rent accrued due, terminated their tenancy by a notice to quit enclosed in a letter which they had put into the post correctly addressed to the Plaintiffs and which, if delivered in due course, would have been received in time to determine the tenancy. The learned Judge presiding at the trial directed the jury that a notice to quit enclosed in a letter sent through the post was prima facie evidence that it had been received and left to the jury the question whether it had, in fact, been received or not. The jury found it had been received. Section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act, so far as relevant for our purposes, reads: ... ... ... ... The jury found it had been received. Section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act, so far as relevant for our purposes, reads: ... ... ... ... Every notice under this section must be in writing signed by or on behalf of the person giving it and either be sent by post to the party who is intended to be bound by it or be tendered or delivered personally to such party or to one of his family members or servants at his residence, or if such tender or delivery is not practicable affixed to a conspicuous part of the property. 18. As is clear from the language of Section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act and as pointed out by their Lordships the requirement of that provision is that the notice should either be tendered or delivered. It would be enough if it is tendered, though not actually delivered. 19. Two rules contained in the Post Office Guide, Part I, June 1965, that is, Rules 35 and 36 which are reproduced below are also relevant and important for our purposes. 35. No registered article will be delivered to the addressee unless and until he or his agent authorised in writing has signed a receipt for it, in the prescribed form which will be presented to him for signature by the postman who delivers the registered article. 36. If the addressee, while refusing to take delivery on presentation of the registered article to him, makes an application in writing to the post office of delivery for the detention of the article or if the addressee is not found at the address given on the article, the article shall be detained in the post office for a period not exceeding seven days from the date of its presentation to the addressee or from the date it is last sent out for delivery as the case may be. If the addressee fails to take delivery of the article from the post office within the said period of seven days, the article will be returned to the office of posting for delivery to the sender. 20. It is clear front Rule 35 that no registered article (which includes a registered letter) can be delivered to anyone except the addressee or his authorised agent. 20. It is clear front Rule 35 that no registered article (which includes a registered letter) can be delivered to anyone except the addressee or his authorised agent. If an addressee refuses to take delivery of a registered letter or article the postman cannot leave it at his residence nor can he deliver it to anyone else at his residence except his authorised agent. He has no option but to bring back the registered letter or article to the post office and lodge it there. The delivery post office retains it for a period of seven days during which time the addressee can take it from the post office concerned. If no delivery is taken the registered Article is returned to the office of posting for its delivery to the sender. In view of these rules there is all the more reason to draw a presumption that the notice was tendered Bahraichi. The endorsement 'Inkari Wapas Hai' suggests that the addressee refused to take it. 21. The Plaintiffs sent the notice by registered post and thus complied with the provisions of Section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act. of the various modes mentioned in Section 106, T.P. Act the safest was to send it by registered post for in that case the sender will have in his possession a receipt issued by a public Officer (Post Master) acknowledging the receipt of a notice for service on the addressee. The other modes, that is of tendering it personally to the party or affixing it at a conspicuous part of the property were not so safe because there being no receipt by a public authority, delivery of the letter for service could always be questioned. In our opinion the correct view to take would be to hold that once a registered letter is handed over to the accepting post office for delivery to the addressee and a postman from the delivery post office takes it to the residence of the addressee and makes an endorsement that it has been refused, the presumption Would be that the notice has been served on the addressee. But as already said earner like all other presumptions of fact this presumption is rebuttable. In the present case the learned Civil Judge was of the opinion that the presumption had not been rebutted. But as already said earner like all other presumptions of fact this presumption is rebuttable. In the present case the learned Civil Judge was of the opinion that the presumption had not been rebutted. He observed: It is true that the said presumption was rebuttable but the evidence on record shows that it was never, in fact, rebutted on behalf of the Defendants. The only witness examined on behalf of the latter before the trial court was one of them, namely, Sannu, who had alleged that no notice was offered to Bahraichi and that it would wrong to say that he had refused any notice. Obviously this allegation of a person who was not himself the addressee was hearsay and nothing but an interested allegation made by a party to the suit. However, from his own statement it was clear that his said allegation was even baseless as he was not even in a position to depose about the said point at all. It was his own version that Bahraichi had been ill for 3-3.1/4 years preceding his death and that during this period, he used to remain confined to bed inside house whereas he himself used to sit at his shop. It clearly indicates that he was not in a position to say if any notice like Ex. 2 addressed to Bahraichi to his house address was in fact offered to him by the postman at the house or not or if it was refused by Bahraihei or not when he himself was, sitting at the shop. Nay since Sannu had further conceded that he even used to remain absent from his shop for purchasing some domestic articles, he was not in a position to say what happened at the house in his absence. Under these circumstances the negative evidence of Sannu Defendant about the service of the notice on Bahraichi was absolutely unreliable and was too insufficient to rebut the said presumption under law. These being the circumstances of the present case, in our opinion, the view taken by the learned Civil Judge that the presumption that was raised stood unrebutted, is correct. 22. Mr. G.P. Bhargava relied upon Gobinda Chandra Saha v. Dwarka Nath Patita AIR 1915 Cal. 313. In that case Mookerjee and Walmsley, JJ. These being the circumstances of the present case, in our opinion, the view taken by the learned Civil Judge that the presumption that was raised stood unrebutted, is correct. 22. Mr. G.P. Bhargava relied upon Gobinda Chandra Saha v. Dwarka Nath Patita AIR 1915 Cal. 313. In that case Mookerjee and Walmsley, JJ. observed as follows: The endorsement is not singed, but it is urged that it must have been made by the peon, No. 5, who was probably entrusted with the delivery of the letter to the addressee. Assuming the endorsement to be genuine, but still there remains the question whether it is admissible in proof of the fact recited therein, namely that the cover had been tendered to the addressee on 29th April, 1911 and had been refused by him. This plainly is at best a record of a statement by the peon. Such a statement would have been admissible u/s 32(2), Evidence Act, if it had been proved that the peon was dead or could not be found or had become incapable of giving evidence or that his attendance could not be procured without an unreasonable amount of dealy or expense. 23. This case is no authority for the proposition that no presumption can be drawn on the basis of an endorsement. Actually the learned Judges in the aforesaid case have themselves held that the "postmark, when proved or assumed to be genuine, implies an assertion that the date on the mark is the date of affixing it" and that there would be a presumption that it was delivered to the addressee in due course though there could be no presumption as on what date it was tendered. This case, therefore, does not militate against the view that we are taking in the present case. 24. No other case has been cited before us. 25. For the reasons given above we are of the opinion that the view taken by the learned Additional Civil Judge that the presumption was not rebutted by evidence on record, is correct. No other point is involved or has been canvassed, before us. 26. In the result we dismiss this appeal, but direct the parties to bear their own costs of this Court.