Nayudu C. J- This is an application for the admission of additional evidence in these second appeals under O. 4J, R. 27, Civil Pro­cedure Code, read with the corresponding rule under O. 42, C.P.C., which makes the provision of O. 41 applicable to the second appeal! under O. 42, R. 1, Civil Procedure Code. (2) The point that arose for determination in these proceedings was whether the plaintiff was senior to the defendants Nos 2 to 15. The case of the plaintiff in his plaint was that he is entitled to seniority over the defendants by virtue of his service and also by reason of the date of confirmation. The defendants affected contended that they were senior in service to the plaintiff, that they were also senior to the plaintiff because they had been confirmed earlier and that consequently the plaintiff is not en­titled to a declaration in regard to his seniority asked for in the plaint and also for the other reliefs. A number of documents would appear to have been placed before the trial Court by the plaintiff in support of his stand. The de­fendants also had produced some documents, but they were not able to place their hand on a document marked 'XX by the lower Appel­late Court for identification-a letter dated 28th August 1951, which according to them clinched the question of seniority and established that the defendants Nos 2 to 15 were senior to the plaintiff, having been confirmed earlier than the plaintiff (3) It is also pointed out in the petition that the document 'XX' was sought to be put in as additional evidence under O. 41 R 27, Civil Procedure Code, by the Government Pleader appearing for the Union of India defendant No. 1 in the First Appeals. But apparently he did not press his application for a decision on the ground that the document \X makes re­ference to two other documents viz.. But apparently he did not press his application for a decision on the ground that the document \X makes re­ference to two other documents viz.. letter No. Fin/8108/8 Apptt/C dated the 8th August 1951 and letter No 11/35/T ET/51/19368 dated the 25th July 1951 and that in the ab­sence of these two documents, it was not worth­while pressing for receiving .as additional evi­dence the document marked XX The matter ended there The defendants appellants now claim that not only is the document marked XX' important in this case in teaching the decision in the matter but the other two documents re­ferred to in this document have since been traced and a copy thereof has been produced by the appellants Accordingly, they pray that these documents may now be received as addi­tional evidence and taken into consideration in deciding the issue in the case, namely that the plaintiff is entitled to seniority The appellant have also filed other documents in support of their stand claiming that these documents were also not available to them and so could not be produced (4) The question that now falls to be con­sidered in this petition is whether at this stage we should exercise our discretion under O, 41, R. 27. Civil Procedure Code in receiving these documents as additional evidence in the case. (5) Before we proceed further it would be useful to refer to O. 41, R. 27, Civil Procedure Code, which it as follows:- " 27. Production of additional evidence in Appellate Court.-(1) The parties to an appeal hall not be entitled to produce additional evi­dence, whether oral or documentary, in the Ap­pellate Court. But if- (a) the Court from whose decree the appeal is preferred has refused to admit evidence which ought to have been admitted, or (b) the Appellate Court requires any document to be produced or any witness to be examined to enable it to pronounce judgment. 03 for any other substantial cause, the Appellate Court may allow such evidence or document to be produced, or witness to be examined." (6) Mr. Ghose, the learned counsel for the appellants in support of his application placed reliance on the case of 'K. Venkataramiah v A Seetharama Reddy, AIR 1963 SC 1526 . 03 for any other substantial cause, the Appellate Court may allow such evidence or document to be produced, or witness to be examined." (6) Mr. Ghose, the learned counsel for the appellants in support of his application placed reliance on the case of 'K. Venkataramiah v A Seetharama Reddy, AIR 1963 SC 1526 . Dealing with the scope and application of O. 41, R, 27, Civil Procedure Code, their Lordships of the Supreme Court in this case made the fol­lowing observations which are pertinent and may be quoted with advantage: "It was vehemently urged by the learned counsel for the appellant that there was such a volume of evidence before the High Court that It would not be seriously suggested that the Court required any additional evidence 'to enable it to pronounce judgment The require­ment, it has to be remembered, was the requirement of the High Court, and it will not be right for us to examine the evidence to find out whether we would have required such additional evidence to enable 'us to pronounce judgment. Apart from this, it is well to remember that the Appellate Court has the power to allow additional evidence not only if it requires such evi­dence 'to enable it to pronounce judgment but also for 'any other substantial cause There may well be cases where even though the Court finds that it is able to pronounce judgment on the state of the record as it is, and so, it cannot strictly say that it requires additional evidence 'to enable it to pronounce judgment' it still considers that in the interest of justice something which remains obscure should be filled up so that it can pronounce its judgment in a more satis­factory manner Such a case will be one for allowing additional evidence 'for any other substantial cause' under R. 27 (1) (b) of the Code.' (7) In the instant case the main and prac­tically the only point that requires to be considered and decided is whether the plaintiff can claim to be more senior to defendants Nos 2 to 15. If certain documents are available and re­quired to be looked into, which would throw light on this issue, it would only be proper that these documents should be received in evidence and considered, so that the Court may more satisfactorily pronounce judgment in deciding the case. That apart, we fee! If certain documents are available and re­quired to be looked into, which would throw light on this issue, it would only be proper that these documents should be received in evidence and considered, so that the Court may more satisfactorily pronounce judgment in deciding the case. That apart, we fee! that as this is an important point that falls for decision, a proper judgment on the issue cannot be given unless all the documents having a bearing in the issue are considered by the Court deciding the mat­ter. Having thus looked at the documents now sought to be put in, we feel that these docu­ment! should be taken into evidence far they are worth and considered on the merits and; taken alongside the other evidence in the casa. We accordingly feel that this is a case where we will be justified in allowing additional evidence to be received in the case. This does not neces­sarily mean that we are giving a finding on the relevance or otherwise of all the documents that have been put in. All that we can say is that at least some of these are important and have material bearing on the case, these documents should be received and opportunities must neces­sarily be given to the petitioner to prove these documents in accordance with law and similar opportunity in fairness and justice be allowed t« the plaintiff to rebut this evidence, if any. (8) Mr Chaudhuri, the learned counsel for the plaintiff respondent contended that these documents were in the possession of the Unions of India and they had all along had the custody of these documents and it is for the defendants to produce these documents and ask for any additional evidence, if any, on the basis of these documents. But Mr, Ghose, the learned coun­sel for the defendants appellants, contended that his clients are directly affected in the matter and it is the rights of his clients that are to be considered. The question as to whether they have the seniority claimed by them or the plain­tiff has the seniority is a matter which directly affects their rights, and, therefore, he is en­titled to bring those documents in, so that the Court may be in a position to give an effective, proper and satisfactory judgment in the case. The question as to whether they have the seniority claimed by them or the plain­tiff has the seniority is a matter which directly affects their rights, and, therefore, he is en­titled to bring those documents in, so that the Court may be in a position to give an effective, proper and satisfactory judgment in the case. In this connection it may be pointed out that the learned Advocate-General aid not question the genuineness of these documents and in fact his stand is that he supports this application j and that these documents are genuine. The question of genuineness and authenticity of these documents will have to be examined at the time they are put in evidence. (9) In the light of our decision, the ques­tion arises whether it will be proper for the Court to receive the evidence in Ads case, or whether the matter should be sent back to the Court below for appropriate steps being taken in this behalf. We find that not only docu­mentary evidence would have to be received, but there is a possibility of oral evidence being adduced on behalf of the plaintiff to rebut the claim that the documents are genuine. Oral evidence may also have to be adduced in order to prove the documents as genuine. Hence, we hold that this matter should go back to the lower Appellate Court for recording the evi­dence adduced by both sides in regard to the additional documents now ordered to be re­ceived in evidence. (10) Mr Chaudhuri raised at the outset a preliminary point that only defendants Nos 3 and 10 appealed to the District fudge whereas the other defendants did not appeal, although they figured as respondents Mr, Chaudhuri points out that not having preferred an appeal to first Appellate Court, they have no right to come to the High Court directly and prefer an appeal jointly with the other defendants. In support of this contention he placed reliance on a decision of the Privy Council in the case of Muhammad Khaleef Shirazi and Sons v. Les Tanneries Lyonnaises (AIR 1926 PC 34). In support of this contention he placed reliance on a decision of the Privy Council in the case of Muhammad Khaleef Shirazi and Sons v. Les Tanneries Lyonnaises (AIR 1926 PC 34). That was a case where a suit was filed against A, and B as agent of A. The trial Judge (the Original Side of the High Court) passed a decree against A but by his decree dismissed the suit against B but decreed that B should pay to the plaintiffs taxed costs and interest thereon. The plaintiffs did not appeal to the High Court against the decree of the trial Judge dismissing the suit against B. A and B jointly appealed to the High Court against the decree which had been made against them. On that appeal the High Court found that A was not liable to pay anything in respect of one of the suit contracts and modified the decree in respect of their lia­bility under the other suit contract with certain costs and dismissed the suit against A and B. Against that decree of the High Court the plain­tiffs appealed to the Privy Council. The Privy Council held that the appeal to His Majesty in-Council, in so far as B was concerned was in effect, an appeal direct to His Majesty-in-Council from the decree of the trial Judge, which is not allowable under the Code of Civil Proce­dure, or under the Letters Patent of the High Court, and that O. 41, R. 33 is not intended to apply to such an appeal and accordingly the appeal so far as B was concerned should be dismissed (11) This case differs materially from the facts of the instant case. That was a case where the plaintiff who had not received the full benefit of the prayer made by them in the plaint questioned whether they could prefer an appeal, directly to His Majesty-in-Council, taking advantage of an appeal preferred by the defen­dants before the High Court. That was a case where the plaintiff who had not received the full benefit of the prayer made by them in the plaint questioned whether they could prefer an appeal, directly to His Majesty-in-Council, taking advantage of an appeal preferred by the defen­dants before the High Court. In the instant case where a number of non-appealing defen­dants were impleaded as respondents in the ap­peal before the first Appellate Court, any dis­posal of the appeal affects the respondents de­pending on the nature of the decree, and O. 41, R. 4, as well as O. 41, R. 33, Civil Procedure Code, are provisions intended to safeguard the interests of non-appealing parties who figure as respondents to the appeal, where some common grounds of defence or attack or claim are in­volved in the proceedings. In the instant case all the defendants have common ground against plaintiff, namely, that they all claim that they were senior to the plaintiff and the plaintiff again makes a common ground of attack against the defendants claiming that he is senior to the defendants Nos. 2 to 15. This being the case, the mere fact that only the defendants Nos. 3 and 10 appealed to the lower Appellate Court, would not make any difference. The other de­fendants also continued to be parties and thus they have equal rights to question the ultimate decision that is made. We, therefore, see no force in the preliminary objection raised by Mr. Chaudhuri and we find that the appeal as filed is competent and properly filed. (12) The result of the foregoing discussion is that the appeal is remanded to the lower Ap­pellate Court for recording the evidence and then deciding the matter in the light of the direction given above. (13) The same order governs Second Ap­peal No. 73 of 1965. (14) In the result, the appeals are allowed, but there will be no order as to costs. Appeals allowed.