ORDER : M. Madhavan Nair, J. 1. This is a motion under Article 228 of the Constitution to withdraw O.S. No. 26 of 1965 on the file of the Subordinate Judge's Court, Ottapalam, wherein one of the issues raised is. "Is the section 7 (3) of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956 ultra vires of the Constitution?". 2. Article 228 of the Constitution commands: "If the High Court is satisfied that a case pending in a court subordinate to it involves a substantial question of law as to the interpretation of this Constitution the determination of which is necessary for the disposal of the case, it shall withdraw the case...”. Obviously it leaves little scope for a discretion in the matter of withdrawal of the suit to this Court if a substantial question of law as to the interpretation of the Constitution is raised therein and is necessary for its disposal. Counsel contends that on the expression of the issue No. 19 (quoted above) a substantial question of law does arise in the suit which is one for partition of properties of a Sthanam under sub-section (3) of section 7 of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956, and has therefore to fail if the said sub-section is void. Counsel for the plaintiff-respondent opposes the motion on the ground that the vires of the sub-section has been considered by this Court in Moopil Nayar v. Union of India 1963 K.L.T. 1089 and been held constitutional and valid and that on the dictum therein that an heir-apparent to a sthanam has only a spes successionis the present challenge to the subsection as unconstitutional is palpably unsustainable and therefore the issue concerned does not involve a substantial question of law to attract Article 228 of the Constitution. The question therefore is whether the suit moved to be withdrawn involves a substantial question of law. 3. In Chunilal Mehta v. C. S. and M. Co. The question therefore is whether the suit moved to be withdrawn involves a substantial question of law. 3. In Chunilal Mehta v. C. S. and M. Co. Ltd., A.I.R. 1962 S.C. 1314 the Supreme Court has defined a substantial question of law in these terms: "The proper test for determining whether a question of law raised in the case is substantial would be whether it is of general public importance or whether it directly and substantially affects the rights of the parties and if so whether it is either an open question in the sense that it is not finally settled by this Court or by the Privy Council or by the Federal Court or is not free from difficulty or calls for discussion of alternative views. If the question is settled by the highest Court or the general principles to be applied in determining the question are well settled and there is a mere question of applying those principles or that the plea raised is palpably absurd the question would not be a substantial question of law." Though this definition was delivered in relation to Article 133 of the Constitution, it applied well, in my view, to the identical expression occurring in Article 228 too. 4. Counsel for petitioner urges that the sub-section (3) of section 7 of the Hindu Succession Act deprives the petitioner, who is the senior male member of the family, of his birthright to assume the sthanam by survivorship and thereby affects a vested right of his and also violates his right "to acquire property" guaranteed under Article 19 (1) (f) of the Constitution and that on account of these features the sub-section is void and that is a substantial question of law. Citing Assistant Controller v. Balakrishna Menon 1967 K.L.T. 148 counsel argues that the sub-section (3) comes to operation only when a Sthani dies; but the moment the Sthani breathes his last the right of the next senior male member of the family to take the estate by survivorship takes place and the sthanam vests in him and therefore the sub-section affects vested right. But, it has been held categorically by the Supreme Court in Kochunni v. States of Madras and Kerala A.I.R. 1960 S.C. 1080 which concerned the instant sthanam, that the right of an heir apparent to take the sthanam on the death of a Sthani is only a spes successionis and not a proprietary interest at all. Mr. Justice Subba Rao, who spoke for a majority of 4 in the Constitution Bench, observed: "It is true that whatever may by the origin of the sthanam, ordinarily the senior-most member of a tarwad succeeds to that position; but once he succeed, he ceases to have any proprietary interest in the tarwad. So too, the members of the tarwad have absolutely no proprietary interest in the sthanam property. Thereafter, they continue to be only "blood relations" with perhaps a right of succession to the property of each other on the happening of some contingency. The said right is nothing more than a spes successionis; the tarwad may supply future sthanees". Mr. Justice A. K. Sarkar, who delivered the minority judgment also observed. "When a member of the tarwad becomes the sthani he loses his interest in the tarwad properties…….The members of the tarwad in their turn have no interest in the sthanam lands……….The important point to note.... is that the sthani for the time being is alone entitled to the lands of his sthanam and the members of his tarwad are not entitled to them…………". In the light of these dicta of their Lordships of the Supreme Court, it cannot be contended that the so called right of the heir apparent to the sthanam is a birthright or a vested right or anything more than a spes successionis. 5. Referring to an observation of the Privy Council that the instant sthanam was an impartible estate vide Kochunni Moopil Nayar v. Kuttunni Nayar A.I.R. 1948 P.C. 47 referred to in paragraph 46 of Kochunni v. States of Madras and Kerala A.I.R. 1960 S.C. 1080 counsel read page 83 of Mayne's Hindu Law (1953 edition) relating to impartible estates thus: “Though the other rights which a coparcener acquirs by birth in joint family property no longer exist, the birth-right of the senior member to take by survivorship still remains. Nor is this right a "mere spes successionis similar to that of a reversioner succeeding on the death of a Hindu widow to her husband's estate.” and contended that the right of the next senior member of the family to take the sthanam on the death of the existing sthani is not a spes successidnis, and that the dictum to the contrary in paragraph 48 of Kochunni v. States of Madras and Kerala A.I.R. 1960 S.C. 1080 might require reconsideration. Even if that be so, it does not amount to a substantial question of law to be considered by this Court under Article 228, particularly in the light of the clear expression of the Supreme Court that a question once decided by it would no more be a substantial question of law for the High Court. 6. It is then contended that the challenge to the vires of sub-section (3) of section 7 of the Hindu Succession Act as violative of the guarantee to the right to acquire property embodied in Article 19 (1) (f) of the Constitution raises a substantial question of law that would attract Article 228. The contention implies that the assumption of the sthanam by the senior member of the family in succession to a sthani is acquisition of property within the meaning of Article 19 (1) (f). I am afraid that the contention is prima facie unsustainable and therefore cannot be said to raise a substantial question of law as defined by the Supreme Court in the passage cited supra. A substantial question must appear to bear substance. Of course, inheritance is a mode of acquisition of property. But in the context of Article 19 of the Constitution, which concerns fundamental rights of a citizen, the word "acquire" would not include an inheritance. Heirship or spes successionis is not anybody's right. It is a provision of law as to who shall take the undisposed properties of a dead person. It may be open to a proprietor to make a gift of his property either by an instrument inter vivos or by a testament; but if he has not done that in his life it is for the law and law only to provide for its devolution. It may be open to a proprietor to make a gift of his property either by an instrument inter vivos or by a testament; but if he has not done that in his life it is for the law and law only to provide for its devolution. Of course, the customary law before 1956 was in regard to the instant sthanam, that on the death of a sthani, the next senior male member of the family to which the sthani belonged would take the sthanam. When the Parliament enacted the Hindu Succession Act and provided in sub-section (3) of its section 7 that "when a sthanamdar dies after the commencement of the Act, the sthanam property held by him shall devolve upon the members, of the family to which the sthanamdar belonged and the heirs of the sthanamdar …………….." the law has changed and thereafter no claim can be made for an inheritance under the abrogated prior law. It follows that when the Sthani of Kavalappara died in 1964 — the Hindu Succession Act came into force on 17th June 1956—the devolution of the sthanam by succession can only be as provided in the Act, and no question of deprivation of a vested right of the heir apparent under the prior law can be said to arise then. The very argument that the sub-section (3) violates the petitioner's right to acquire property implies a concession that he had no vested right when the succession opened. No citizen has a fundamental right to have the law of succession to his advantage and the expression of Article 19 (1) (f) of the Constitution cannot be construed to lend colour to such a claim. Law must represent the will of the society expressed through its representatives in the Legislature in a democracy or through the leader of the society in a monarchical or totalitarian society. A citizen cannot claim to have the law in a particular way against the will of the society so expressed unless it affects a recognised fundamental right of his. As a provision for succession is a pure mandate of the law, the words "to acquire property" in the context of Article 19 (1) (f) can only mean acquisition otherwise than by succession. As a provision for succession is a pure mandate of the law, the words "to acquire property" in the context of Article 19 (1) (f) can only mean acquisition otherwise than by succession. Counsel for the plaintiff-respondent drew my attention to the observation of the Supreme Court in Amar Singh v. Custodian E. P A.I.R. 1957 S.C. 599 Para 23, which indicates that a statutory grant to a specified class of persons is not an acquisition of property within the meaning of Article 19 (1) (f) of the Constitution. Though the facts of that case were not parallel to those in the instant case, that observation appears pertinent that an expectation to get property under a mandate of the law is not a fundamental right within the meaning of Article 19 (1) (f) of the Constitution. In the light of the clear and express observation of the Supreme Court that "the members of the tarwad have absolutely no proprietary interest in the sthanam property" and that their right of succession "is nothing more than a spes successionis" the present contention does not appear to bear any substance even seemingly. 7. Counsel for petitioner submitted that the said observation as to spes successionis might require reconsideration. Even if that be so, it does not arise here as this is not a hearing in the suit: this is only a collateral proceeding under Article 228. Even if the suit is withdrawn, this Court would not be competent to reconsider the observation of the Supreme Court, nor can this Court refer the case to the Supreme Court for a reconsideration of its dictum under any provision of law. Certainly Article 228 does not contemplate such a reference. It will be open to the party to challenge that observation of the Supreme Court at the appropriate stage in appropriate proceedings in the suit, if so advised. What is pertinent here is the observation of the Supreme Court that a question that has been decided once by the Supreme Court or a question that involves only an application of a dictum of the Supreme Court, is not a "substantial question of law". It would not then attract Article 228 of the Constitution. 8. In the result, I hold that the conditions laid in Article 228 of the Constitution are not satisfied by the present motion, which must therefore fail. It is accordingly dismissed. 9. It would not then attract Article 228 of the Constitution. 8. In the result, I hold that the conditions laid in Article 228 of the Constitution are not satisfied by the present motion, which must therefore fail. It is accordingly dismissed. 9. I make no order as to costs here.