JUDGMENT : G.K. Misra, J. - The Appellant has been convicted u/s 302, Indian Penal Code and sentenced to imprisonment for life. 2. The prosecution case may be stated in brief. Sambaru Sallra (p.w. 10) had two wives. Sombari (the deceased) was the first wife and Suki (p.w. 4) is the second wife. On 1-7-1966 the deceased and p.w. 4 had been to the Bagada of p.w. 10 for doing certain agricultural operations. The Appellant went to that Bagada with a Kati. He dragged the deceased to have illicit intercourse with her. She refused and ran away. The Appellant cased her and assaulted her with the Kati, as a result of which she died. P.w. 4 protested, but was threatened with (sic) consequences. She returned home. P.w. 10 was working in the Bagada of one Lakia. P.w. 4 narrated the incident to her hasholld in the evening when he returned from the Bagada. Next morning p.w. 10, p.w. 4 and some others went to the spot and found the deceased near a stone. There was another stone by her side also. On 2-7-1966 p.w. 10 went to the Police Station and lodged the F.I.R. (Ext. 6). The defence was that on the date of occurrence the deceased, p.w. 4, p.w. 10, the Appellant and some others had been to the Bagada. The deceased fell into a ditch. Other persons present there offered liquor to the Appellant which he took. After he was drunk, others asked him to burn the deceased. He was dissuaded from going to the police. A meeting was held in the village in which it was decided to falsely implicate the Appellant. The learned Sessions Judge held that the death was homicidal and that the Appellant, killed the deceased. 3. The Doctor (p.w. 3) held the post-mortem examination at 7 A.M. on 4-7-1966. The body bad been decomposed. Epidermis had come off and maggots were found an over the body. He found the following external injuries: (1) One incised looking wound 1" x ?" x bone deep on the right side of frontal region of head, 3?' above the right eye and 3?' above and in front of right ear. (2) One incised looking wound 4" x 1' x bone deep horizontally situated on the occipital region of head just below the external occipital protuberance. (2) One incised looking wound 4" x 1' x bone deep horizontally situated on the occipital region of head just below the external occipital protuberance. (3) Two incised looking wounds 1" x ?' x bone deep each on the occipital region of head 1' above the injury mentioned above. On dissection he found crack fracture of the left part of the occipital bone and the posterior part of left parietal bone. As the dead body was highly decomposed, the wounds on the head could not be definitely classified whether they were incised or lacerated even though they looked like incised wounds. Death, according to him, was due to fracture of the skull and consequent sheck and haemorrhage from external wounds. The injuries were ante-mortem. He was however clearly of opinion that the injuries, whether incised or lacerated, could he caused by a Kati like M.O.I. On the evidence of the Doctor, there can be hardly any doubt that the death was homicidal. Even though the body had been highly decomposed, he was positive that the injuries looked like incised wounds and in any case they were the outcome of attack on the body of the deceased as a result of which she died. 4. The only question for consideration is whether the Appellant killed the deceased. The only evidence available on this point is that of p.w. 4. She deposed that on the date of occurrence the deceased went to this Bagada to work there and her hushalld p.w. 10 was working in the Bagada of one Lakia Soura. After finishing the bath of her child, p.w. 4 also went to the Bagada. They were uprooting grass. The Appellant came with a Kati there and dragged the hand of the deceased and wanted to have illicit intercourse with her. The deceased refused and ran away. The Appellant assaulted the deceased on the neck and the head. On p.w. 4 protesting the Appellant threatened to kill her and her child. When the hushalld returned to the house in the evening, she narrated to him. She was put to severe cross-examination. Nothing substantial was elicited to discredit her testimony. The only contradiction brought out in her evidence is that she deposed in Court that she saw the incident from a distance of 5 to 10 feet, while before the police she bad stated that it was from a distance of 400 yards. She was put to severe cross-examination. Nothing substantial was elicited to discredit her testimony. The only contradiction brought out in her evidence is that she deposed in Court that she saw the incident from a distance of 5 to 10 feet, while before the police she bad stated that it was from a distance of 400 yards. This discrepancy does not in any way affect her credibility. The murder took place in the midday in the month of July, and even if she were at a distance of 400 yards the entire occurrence would be visible. Placing reliance on Vemireddy Satyanarayan Reddy and Others Vs. The State of Hyderabad Mr. Jena contends that p.w. 4 is a solitary witness and was analogous to that of an accomplice, and on her sole testimony the conviction should not be based. There can hardly be any dispute that if a witness if either an accomplice or of a character analogous to an accomplice, his evidence must be corroborated in material particulars. There is nothing in this case to show that p.w. 4 comes in the aforesaid category. Her evidence cannot also be discarded merely because she is uncorroborated and is the sole witness who saw the occurrence. Section 134 of the Evidence Act clearly says down that no particular number of witnesses shall in any case be required for the proof of any fact. If a single witness is reliable, a conviction can be based on his evidence. If, on the other hand, the witnesses is not wholly reliable, corroboration may be Bought in the facts and circumstances of a particular case. This does not involve any question of law, but one of prudence. It is for the Court of fact to be alive to the position that if a witness is unreliable on certain matters, that evidence should not be accepted on other matters unless there is corroboration in material particulars. The aforesaid Supreme Court decision was considered in Vadivelu Thevar Vs. The State of Madras. In paragraph 10 this Lordships laid down certain propositions as having been finally established. Those are: (1) As a general rule, a Court can and may act on the testimony of a single witness though uncorroborated. One credible witness outweighs the testimony of anum her of other witnesses of indifferent character. The State of Madras. In paragraph 10 this Lordships laid down certain propositions as having been finally established. Those are: (1) As a general rule, a Court can and may act on the testimony of a single witness though uncorroborated. One credible witness outweighs the testimony of anum her of other witnesses of indifferent character. (2) Unless corroboration is insisted upon by statute Courts should not insist on corroboration except in cases where the nature of the testimony of the single witness itself requires as a rule of prudence, that corroboration should be insisted upon, for example in the case of a child witness, or of a witness whose evidence is that of an accomplice or of an analogous character. (3) Whether corroboration of the testimony of a single, witness is or is not necessary, must depend upon facts and circumstances of each case and no general rule can be laid down in a matter like this and much depends upon the judicial discretion of the Judge before whom the case comes. On close examination of the evidence of p.w. 4, we are satisfied that she is reliable. Despite repeated questions to Mr. Jena he was not able to satisfy us why p.w. 4 would falsely implicate the Appellant. There is no suggestion of enmity or any litigation in between the Appellant and p.w. 10. Moreover the very peculiar nature of the story that the Appellant dragged the deceased for sexual intercourse near about noon inspires confidence in the intrinsic truth of the matter. 5. The evidence of p.w. 4 was attacked on the further ground that in the F.I.R., p.w. 10 did not mention the name of the Appellant as the assailant. On the other hand, he stated that the deceased did not return from the field till evening and some unknown assailant had killed her. In the morning of 2-7-1966 he visited the Bagada in the company of p.w. 9 and Rome others, and found that the dead body of the deceased had fallen near a ditch. There were some injuries on the head and near the ear. In Court, p.w. 10 however supported p.w. 4 in saying that the latter had disclosed to him that the Appellant was the murderer when he came back home in the evening of the date of occurrence. There were some injuries on the head and near the ear. In Court, p.w. 10 however supported p.w. 4 in saying that the latter had disclosed to him that the Appellant was the murderer when he came back home in the evening of the date of occurrence. Clearly there is serious contradiction between the evidence of p.w. 10 in Court, and his version given in the F.I.R. The F.I.R. cannot, however be used to contradict p.w. 4 who is not the maker thereof. P.w. 10 however furnished an explanation to the effect that the Appellant was generally feared by all the villagers, and as he was going also to the Police Station when p.w. 10 in the company of p.w. 9 and others were going he was afraid lest the Appellant would kill him, and did not accordingly disclose his name. From the evidence of the I.O. (p.w. 11) it appears that the F.I.R. was lodged at about 2 P.M. on 2-7-1966 and he saw the Appellant at the Police Station at about 2-10. P.M. In view of the fact that the Appellant had been to the Police Station, the explanation of p.w. 10, that he, did not disclose the name of the Appellant in the F.I.R. out of fear that he might be killed, appears to be reasonable. This explanation was accepted by the learned Sessions Judge and we are in agreement with him. The statement of p.w. 10 in Court that p.w. 4 had disclosed the name of the assailant to him is acceptable and this amounts to corrohoration of the evidence of p.w. 4. 6. It is to be noted that in his statement u/s 342 Code of Criminal Procedure the Appellant admits to have been at the Bagada in the company of p.w. 4 and the deceased. He further admits that the deceased died there which he had seen. He had advanced a positive case that the deceased died as a result of fall into a ditch and that he was falsely implicated. The other part of the story given by him is falsified by the prosecution evidence. The admitted presence of the Appellant at the time of the death of the deceased in the Bagada partly corroborates the evidence of p.w. 4. 7. For reasons already discussed, we are clearly of opinion that the Appellant killed the deceased and that the prosecution version is true. The admitted presence of the Appellant at the time of the death of the deceased in the Bagada partly corroborates the evidence of p.w. 4. 7. For reasons already discussed, we are clearly of opinion that the Appellant killed the deceased and that the prosecution version is true. The appeal fails and is dismissed. Acharya, J. 8. I agree. Final Result : Dismissed