Judgment :- 1. The defendant in S. C.12 of 1965 on the file of the Munsiff Court, Cochin is the revision petitioner. The main question raised in this revision petition is whether S.14 of the Limitation Act could be applied in a suit for damages filed under the Carriage of Goods by Sea Act (shortly stated the Act). 2. The plaintiff in this suit is one Thanulingom Pillay, Proprietor, Messrs. K. S. T. Subbiah Pillay and Bros., Hardware merchants, Chalai, Trivandrum, and the defendant is the Merchant Steam Navigation Company (Private) Limited, represented by their agent Bhangee Jeevath Khona, Bazaar Road, Cochin. The suit was laid in the District Munsiff 's Court, Trivandrum in the first instance for recovery of damages to the extent of Rs. 266.83 Ps. for short delivery of two bundles of copper wire despatched to the plaintiff from Bombay by the steam ship s. s. Victoria Marie belonging to the defendant. The suit was filed on 13-11-63. The Munsiff of Trivandrum holding that he has no jurisdiction to entertain the suit, returned the plaint on 23-12-64 for presentation before the proper court. In the order returning the plaint, the learned Munsiff had given time limit till 17-1-65 for its re-presentation; the suit was represented on 14 165 in the Munsiff court of Cochin. The plaintiff claimed exclusion under S.14 of the Limitation Act (Act 36 of 1963) of the period of pendency of the suit in the Trivandrum Munsiff 's court in computing the period of limitation for the suit and that has been allowed by the Munsiff Another point raised against the maintainability of the suit, viz., that the defendant being mere agents of the company the suit cannot be maintained against them, has also been found against the defendant. 3. On the first point, the learned counsel argued that the Indian Limitation Act has no application to a suit filed under the Act and that the period of one year prescribed in R.6 of Art III under the Schedule to the Act, is inscrutable and has to be applied irrespective of the rules of exclusion provided in the Law of Limitation. On the authority of East and West Steamship Co. Madras v. Ramalingam Chettiar (AIR. 1960 SC. On the authority of East and West Steamship Co. Madras v. Ramalingam Chettiar (AIR. 1960 SC. 1058) it was argued by the learned counsel for the petitioner that R.6 of Art. III of the Act which runs: "....In any event the carrier and the ship shall be discharged from all liability in respect of loss or damage unless suit is brought within one year after delivery of the goods or the date when the goods should have been delivered" does not prescribe a rule of limitation; but provides for the extinction of the right to compensation and therefore the Limitation Act has no application. That was a case where an extension of the period of limitation was claimed on the ground of acknowledgment of the liability. The suit itself was filed beyond the period prescribed in cl. (3) of R.6 of Art. III of the Act, and also that no claim was made within the period of one month from the date of arrival of the vessel as stipulated in the Bill of Lading. It was held in that case that since the suit was not brought within one year as provided in R.6 of Art. III of the Act, the right itself was extinguished. In other words, the suit having not been brought within the time specified, the company was discharged from all liability irrespective of the loss. Interpreting the expression 'discharged from liability" the learned judges have held that it means a total extinction of the liability following upon an extinction of the right. The learned judges would observe : Rules of limitation are likely to vary from country to country. Provisions for extension of periods prescribed for limitation would similarly vary. We should be slow therefore to put on the words "discharged from liability" an interpretation which would produce results varying in different countries and thus keeping the position uncertain for both the shipper and the ship owner. We find it difficult to draw any reasonable distinction between the words "absolved from liability" and "discharged from liability" and think that these words "discharged from liability" were intended to mean and do mean that the liability has totally disappeared and not only that the remedy as regards the liability has disappeared .... The distinction between the extinction of a right and the extinction of a remedy for the enforcement of that right, though fine, is of great importance. The distinction between the extinction of a right and the extinction of a remedy for the enforcement of that right, though fine, is of great importance. The Legislature could not but have been conscious of this distinction when using the words "discharged from all liability" in any Article purporting to prescribe rights and immunities of the shipowners. The words are apt to express an intention of total extinction of the liability and should, specially in view of the intentional character of the legislation, be construed in that sense. It is hardly necessary to add that once the liability is extinguished under this clause, there is no scops of any acknowledgement of liability thereafter." 4. It is difficult to cull out from the above observation that the Law of Limitation has no application at all to cases arising from the Act. It is significant to note that in the above case no suit was Sled within the one year prescribed in R.6 of Art. III and it is under that circumstance that the court had to hold that the right was extinct and when the right is extinct the liability is also extinct. But the position in the instant case is different. Here the suit was filed within the period of one year prescribed by the Act, though in a wrong court. The right survives the moment the suit is instituted within the prescribed time. The question then would be whether the pendency of the proceeding in the wrong court would save limitation. S.14 of the Limitation Act provides that: "In computing the period of limitation for any suit the time during which the plaintiff has been prosecuting with due diligence another civil proceeding, whether in a court of first instance or of appeal or revision, against the defendant shall be excluded, where the proceeding relates to the same matter in issue and is prosecuted in good faith in a court which, from defect of jurisdiction or other cause of a like nature, is unable to entertain it..." The Act does not exclude either by express words or by necessary implication, the applicability of the Limitation Act. When a suit is filed in any of the courts in India the maintainability of the action will depend upon the rules provided by the Limitation Act. When a suit is filed in any of the courts in India the maintainability of the action will depend upon the rules provided by the Limitation Act. The suit will be regulated by the Law of Limitation as laid down in the Indian Limitation Act. 5. The suit in question was instituted in the Trivandrum court within time. The cause of action arose on 29-12-62 and a suit filed within one year of that date would be well within time. The suit was filed on 13-11-63 and that is within time. It was returned for want of jurisdiction on 23-12-64 and it was re-presented in the court of the Munsiff, Cochin on 14-1-65. When the period of pendency of the suit in the Trivandrum Court, i. e., between 13-11-63 and 23-12-64 is excluded under S.14 of the Limitation Act, the suit is within time. The suit in the first instance was filed, as already stated, on 13-11-63, i. e., about 46 days earlier to the last day of limitation, and those 46 days can be availed of by the plaintiff in calculating the period from 23-12-64 and when that is taken into account, it was enough if the suit had been represented on or before 7-2-1965. But it was already instituted on 14-1-65. The learned Munsiff of Trivandrum in returning the plaint has, however, given the direction that it should be re-presented on or before 17-1-65. It was pointed out that this direction is without jurisdiction. In support of that position, a Single Bench decision of this court in Parameswara Kurup v. Vasudeva Kurup (1964 KLT.145) was also cited before me. There it has been held that: "It is not open to a court, when it returns a plaint on the grounds mentioned in S.14 of the Limitation Act, to give a reasonable time to the plaintiff for the purpose of re-presentation of the plaint in the proper court." In that case the order of the Munsiff in returning the plaint was, "Time for representation, one month". It was that direction that was found without jurisdiction. But in the present case even if the direction of the Munsiff that the suit should be filed on or before 17-1-65 is ignored the plaintiff's right is not affected. It was that direction that was found without jurisdiction. But in the present case even if the direction of the Munsiff that the suit should be filed on or before 17-1-65 is ignored the plaintiff's right is not affected. For the application of S.14 of the Limitation Act, it is necessary that the suit in the first court should have been prosecuted in good faith. Learned counsel was not heard arguing that the suit was filed in the Trivandrum Court with a malafide purpose. The plaintiff, in such circumstances, is entitled as of right, to exclude the period spent in a proceeding which was infructuous. The test of good faith in such circumstances is the real and bona fide belief of the plaintiff that he could institute the proceedings in the court where he first instituted it. I must hold in the circumstances, that the suit was instituted in the Trivandrum court and it was prosecuted there, in good faith and as such the plaintiff is entitled to the exclusion of the period of the pendency of the suit there. 6. It was also argued in this connection that the Limitation Act of 1963 cannot apply to the facts of the present case since that Act has come into force only subsequent to the date when the cause of action arose. But the date to be counted is the date of the institution of the suit. The suit must be deemed to have been instituted on 14-1-65 when it was instituted in the proper court. In the 1964 KLT. case (cited supra) the learned judge has found that the second suit cannot be regarded as a continuation of the first. That means that the second suit should be treated as independent in itself. In that case the Limitation Act that applies is the new Limitation Act of 1963 which came into force from the 1st January, 1964. So the suit has to be governed by the new Limitation Act of 1963. 7. Learned counsel for the petitioner invited my attention to an English decision, Campania Colombiana De Seguros v. Pacific Steam Navigation Co. ((1964) 1 All E. R.216) in support of the position that institution of a suit in a wrong court will not save limitation in a matter arising under the Act. 7. Learned counsel for the petitioner invited my attention to an English decision, Campania Colombiana De Seguros v. Pacific Steam Navigation Co. ((1964) 1 All E. R.216) in support of the position that institution of a suit in a wrong court will not save limitation in a matter arising under the Act. There, by a bill of lading, which provided that it should be governed by English law, shipowners acknowledged shipment of goods for carriage from England to Colombia. On the voyage, part of the goods suffered a particular average loss. The consignees recovered from their insurers, to whom, by two documents, they had assigned their right of action against the shipowners. Within the one year the period of limitation prescribed by Art. III, R.6 of the Hague Rules as enacted in the schedule to the Act of 1924, the insurers brought an action in the State of New York against the shipowners. The New York Court held that it had no jurisdiction to hear the action. After the one year period of limitation had expired, both the insurers and the consignees commenced actions in England against the shipowners. It was held that the action could not be maintained. The points to be noted in this decision are: (i) the first suit was instituted by the wrong party; and (ii) the suit was instituted in an entirely foreign state. On the first point, it is worthy of note that the insurers had no right to bring the proceedings in New York, because they had not given notice of assignment before the proceedings were begun; accordingly the proceedings were brought by the wrong party. In respect of the second point, it was argued before the learned judges that, if the suit is brought within a year in one jurisdiction, that should be sufficient to satisfy the paragraph and would justify the goods owners succeeding in a suit started after a year in another jurisdiction. In rejecting this contention the learned judges observed: "Even if the construction of the rule is right, the earlier suit must at least be brought in a court which had jurisdiction over the defendants to award damages for the loss or damage to the goods in question." It was also observed: "The earlier suit must, because of the exclusive English jurisdiction, have been brought in England. Both these alternative arguments are open to the defendants if necessary, in a higher court." Neither of the above contingencies exists in the present case. Here, the suit has been instituted by the correct party and it has been instituted within the State though in a wrong court. The observations quoted above, therefore, have no application. 8. Another contention put forward was that the defendant is only an agent and he cannot be made liable for the loss alleged to have been sustained by the plaintiff. In other words, the suit, according to him, should have been brought against his master the Merchant Steam Navigation Company. This argument proceeds from an apparent misconception. The suit, as a matter of fact, has been instituted against the Merchant Steam Navigation Company. The defendant is described in the suit as the Merchant Steam Navigation Company (Private) Limited, represented by their agent Bhangee Jeevath Khona, Bazaar Road, Cochin. The defendant is, therefore, the company and not the agent. So the contention cannot be supported. It was also hinted by the learned counsel, in the course of the argument, that the Bill of Lading exempts the company from such lessor damage; but on a reading of the exceptions and conditions in Ex-Dl, I do not see any such exemption inferable therefrom. 9. No other point arises. The revision petition, in the circumstances, is dismissed; but in the nature of the question of law argued I order no costs. Dismissed.