JUDGMENT T.C. Raghavan, J. 1. A person who is sought to be assessed to sales tax for 1959-60 under the General Sales Tax Act of 1125 seeks to quash Ext. P5, a preassessment notice issued by the Sales Tax Officer, Badagara. 2. The petitioner and five others constituted a firm under the firm name Madeena Oil Mills and Industries; and the firm was assessed to sales tax for 1959-60 in February 1961. The turnover was worked out from the quantity of electric current consumed by the mill for crushing copra. The firm filed O.P. No. 1176 of 1961 questioning the correctness of this; and the writ petition was allowed by this Court (vide Ext. P2) holding that the basis adopted was wrong and that the Sales Tax Officer should have effected a test crushing to find out the quantity of electric energy consumed for crushin one ton of copra. Though the petition was disposed of on 28th June 1962, the Sales Tax Officer did not take any steps for effecting a reassessment until he issued Ext. P3 on 5th September 1966 calling upon the firm to remit Rs. 80/- towards the expenses of a test crushing. The petitioner replied under Ext. P4 that a test crushing after such long lapse of time would not give a correct idea regarding the consumption of electric current during the relevant year (1959-60), since the machinery became very old. He also stated that in December 1963 the firm was dissolved by a deed of dissolution and another firm was constituted by the petitioner and two others; and that in 1965 one of the three partners died and thus the second partnership also got dissolved. The further allegation in Ext. P4 was that the petitioner and the remaining partner assigned their rights to a third party, who was thereafter running the concern as the sole proprietor thereof. There were one or two other objections also in Ext. P4 like that the assessment became barred, etc. Ext. P4 was dated 15th September 1966 within ten days of Ext. P3. The Sales Tax Officer remained silent for about two years more, and on 24th August 1968 issued Ext. P5, the preassessment notice now sought to be quashed. In the notice nothing was stated about the dissolution of the firm or the transfer of the business to a third party. Ext. P3. The Sales Tax Officer remained silent for about two years more, and on 24th August 1968 issued Ext. P5, the preassessment notice now sought to be quashed. In the notice nothing was stated about the dissolution of the firm or the transfer of the business to a third party. Ext. P5 dealt with only the question as to how far the accounts submitted by the petitioner could be relied upon for making the assessment. The Sales Tax Officer rejected the accounts and said that he proposed to make a best of judgment assessment as indicated in Ext. P5. The papers produced before me show that the petitioner filed another objection to Ext. P5 as well. 3. The contention seriously urged before me is that the Sales Tax Officer has no power to assess a firm after it is dissolved, as there is no provision in the General Sales Tax Act of 1125 authorising such a levy. The Government Pleader opposes this contention saying that under Ext. P5 the Sales Tax Officer has asked the petitioner to file his objections, if any, to the proposals contained in Ext. P5, so that this Court need not interfere under Art.226 of the Constitution at this stage. The answer of the counsel of the petitioner is that, if the firm as such is not in existence the same having been dissolved and if under the Sales Tax Act the Sales Tax Officer has no jurisdiction to assess a dissolved firm, this Court need not wait for the assessment to be completed, because the lack of jurisdiction of the Sales Tax Officer goes to the very root of the assessment and this Court may, in such a case, quash even the preassessment notice. If, as contended by the petitioner's counsel, the firm has already been dissolved and in such a case the Sales Tax Officer has no power to assess the dissolved firm, there is no point in allowing the assessment to be completed and asking the petitioner to come by way of another writ petition, when alone this Court will exercise its jurisdiction under Art.226. Therefore, the only questions to be considered in this case are whether the original partnership which existed during the relevant time (1959-60) exists now when the assessment is sought to be completed; and whether under the General Sales Tax Act there is power vested in the Sales Tax Officer to assess a dissolved partnership. 4. As I have already stated, Ext. P5 is silent regarding the question whether the partnership was dissolved. In spite of the petitioner's averment in Ext. P4 that the partnership was dissolved under a deed of dissolution in December 1963, that another partnership came into existence which itself got dissolved in 1965 and that thereafter, the assets of the second partnership were also transferred to a third party, the Sales Tax Officer discreetly or meaningfully kept quiet in Ext. P5 without making any reference to this question. The Government Pleader draws my attention to the counter affidavit filed on behalf of the Sales Tax Officer. It is stated therein that the petitioner did not intimate within the prescribed time the fact of the dissolution of the firm; that the constitution of a different firm and its subsequent dissolution by the death of one of the partners were also not intimated to the Sales Tax Officer; that the petitioner did not give the Sales tax officer any intimation of transfer of the mill within the time prescribed by law; and that the petitioner is sought to be assessed now in his individual capacity and not as a representative of the firm. These allegations in the counter affidavit speak for themselves: they are contradictory one to the other. In the earlier part of the counter affidavit it is stated that the dissolution of the original firm was not intimated to the Sales Tax Officer within the prescribed time. In the later part of the counter affidavit it is averred that the petitioner is now sought to be assessed in his individual capacity and not as a representative of the firm. If the firm is in existence, the petitioner need not be assessed in his individual capacity: this need be done only after the firm is dissolved. Again, Ext. P5 is quite clear that the proposed assessment is of the firm. If the firm is in existence, the petitioner need not be assessed in his individual capacity: this need be done only after the firm is dissolved. Again, Ext. P5 is quite clear that the proposed assessment is of the firm. The Government Pleader has gone even to the extent of stating at the bar that the averment that the proposed assessment is of the petitioner in his individual capacity might have been a mistake of the drafting counsel: "May be: but I need not go into that question, because the only question for me to decide is whether the existence or otherwise of the original firm. Firstly, the Sales Tax Officer did not advert at all to this aspect in Ext. P5. Secondly, even in the counter affidavit in its earlier portion the dissolution of the original firm has not been denied: the only allegation is that the dissolution was not intimated in time. Thirdly, even in the subsequent portion of the counter affidavit the dissolution has been tacitly admitted and it has been said that the proposed assessment is of the petitioner in his individual capacity. Thus, the irresistible conclusion is that the partnership was dissolved as claimed by the petitioner. 5. Then arises the next question regarding the power of the Sales Tax Officer to make an assessment in a case like this. The counsel of the petitioner has brought to my notice the decision of the Supreme Court in The State of Punjab v Jullundur Vegetables Syndicate (17 Sales Tax Cases 326). In that case, a similar Act, the East Punjab General Sales Tax Act of 1948, was considered by the Supreme Court; and Subba Rao J., speaking for the Court, has held that the Sales Tax Officer had no jurisdiction to make an assessment after a firm was dissolved. Subba Rao J. has also observed that it does not make any difference whether the assessment proceeding was started prior to the dissolution of the firm and closed after the dissolution or whether the assessment proceeding commenced only after the dissolution of the firm. The reasoning of the Supreme Court is that unless there is a specific provision for making an assessment, a taxing statute cannot be interpreted to widen its scope against the assessee, and, if necessary, the statute has to be interpreted in such a way as to benefit the tax payer. The reasoning of the Supreme Court is that unless there is a specific provision for making an assessment, a taxing statute cannot be interpreted to widen its scope against the assessee, and, if necessary, the statute has to be interpreted in such a way as to benefit the tax payer. In the later decision in Khushi Ram Behari Lal & Co. v. The Assessing Authority, Sangrur (19 Sales Tax Cases 381) the Supreme Court has affirmed its earlier decision and has made it clear that an assessment of a dissolved firm, whether the proceedings were initiated before or after the firm was dissolved, was unsustainable. 6. The Government Pleader seeks to distinguish the Punjab General Sales Tax Act from our General Sales Tax Act of 1125. But, he has not drawn my attention to any provision in the Act itself, by which the distinction sought to be drawn can be justified. He has referred to R.35 to 37 of the General Sales Tax Rules framed under the Act. The relevant rule in the East Punjab Act is R.40(1) which is quoted by Subba Rao J. in his judgment. It reads: "A dealer and his partner or partners shall be jointly and severally responsible for payment of the tax, penalty, or any amount due under the Act or these Rules." The relevant rule in our Act is R.35 which reads: "If a dealer or licensee enters into partnership in regard to his business, he shall report the fact to the assessing authority within 30 days of his entering into such partnership. The dealer or licensee and the partner shall jointly and severally be responsible for the payment of the tax leviable under the Act." The Government Pleader argues that the word used in R.35 is 'leviable', whereas the word used in R.40 of the Punjab Act is 'due'. I am not able to see any distinction between these two words, much less a distinction which indicates by necessary implication that a Sales Tax Officer can assess the erstwhile partnership after it is dissolved. As pointed out by Subba Rao J., a taxing law cannot be interpreted in such a way as to widen its scope and justify an assessment, unless there is specific provision in the law authorising such levy or such power can be gathered by necessary implication. As pointed out by Subba Rao J., a taxing law cannot be interpreted in such a way as to widen its scope and justify an assessment, unless there is specific provision in the law authorising such levy or such power can be gathered by necessary implication. R.35 of our Act does not indicate any such power by necessary implication. R.36 and 37 are also not helpful to support the argument of the Government Pleader. R.36 says that if a partnership is dissolved, every person who was a partner shall send a report of the dissolution to the assessing authority within 30 days of such dissolution. R.37 provides that if at any time, a dealer or licensee (a) discontinues or sells or otherwise disposes of the whole or any part of any business carried on by him, or (b) changes his place of business, or (c) changes the name of any business carried on by him, he shall notify the fact to the assessing or licensing authority concerned within 30 days thereafter. These rules also do not obviously imply any such power. No other provision in the Act or rules has been brought to my notice to justify the proposed assessment. 7. As pointed out by the Supreme Court, the absence of such a provision in the East Punjab Act was a lacuna which was later on filled up. The absence of such a provision appears to be a lacuna in our Act of 1125 too, which appears to have been set right by S.21 of the Kerala General Sales Tax Act of 1963. Therefore, under the earlier Act an assessment as proposed under Ext. P5 cannot be made. 8. The writ petition is allowed and Ext. P5 is quashed. Both parties are directed to bear their respective costs.