JUDGMENT D.S. Mathur, J. - This is a petition under Article 226 of the Constitution by Saheb Singh to challenge the orders of the Consolidation authorities, namely, the Deputy Director of Consolidation, the Settlement Officer, (Consolidation) and the Consolidation Officer, whereby his objection under Section 9 of the U. P. Consolidation of Holdings Act was rejected and the disputed plots were held to have vested in the Gram Samaj, respondent No. 5. The Consolidation authorities did not act upon the decision in the revenue suit on the ground that the Second Appeal was pending before the Board of Revenue and the decision of the Additional Commissioner could not act as res judicata. 2. The material facts of the case are that the petitioner had instituted a suit under Section 229-B of the U. P. Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act for declaration that he was the sirdar of the land in dispute. The suit was opposed by the Gram Samaj, but was decreed by the Sub-Divisional Magistrate, Koil under order dated 16-71960. The decree was confirmed in appeal by the Additional Commissioner under his judgment dated 10-4-1961. The Gram Samaj preferred a Second Appeal before the Board of Revenue. The date of the filing of the Second Appeal has not come on the record, but it must have been filed before the publication of the Notification under Section 4 of the U. P. Consolidation of Holdings Act on 30-9-1961. It was not brought to the notice of the Board of Revenue that the hearing of the Second Appeal stands stayed and the Second Appeal was dismissed summarily under Order 41, Rule 11, C. P. C. on 28-12-1961. 3. The questions that arise for consideration are: whether the dismissal under Order 41, Rule 11, C. P. C. of the Second Appeal is binding on the parties in the sense that it must be held that the Revenue Courts had finally adjudicated upon the rights of the parties and given a decision in favour of the petitioner. The second question is whether the Consolidation authorities were bound by this decision and had no power to disregard the decision of the Board of Revenue. In the alternative, it shall have to be considered whether the judgment of the Additional Commissioner was binding on the parties such that the Consolidation authorities must decide the matter on its basis. 4. The second question is whether the Consolidation authorities were bound by this decision and had no power to disregard the decision of the Board of Revenue. In the alternative, it shall have to be considered whether the judgment of the Additional Commissioner was binding on the parties such that the Consolidation authorities must decide the matter on its basis. 4. Under Section 5 of the U. P. Consolidation of Holdings Act, as it stood on 80-91961, all the pending appeals were to be stayed. Two points urged in this connection are: firstly, whether an appeal can be deemed to be pending before the hearing under Order 41, Rule 11 C. P. C.; and secondly, if the hearing of the Second Appeal is not stayed, and by mistake it is dismissed summarily under Order 41, Rule 11, C. P. C., is such an order without jurisdiction and hence a nullity ? 5. There exists some conflict in the decisions of this Court on the question whether the decree passed in an appeal which ought to have been stayed under Section 5, is a nullity such that it can be ignored by the parties in proceedings under the U. P. Consolidation of Holdings Act. A Division Bench of this Court has however, expressed the view in Lakhpat Singh v. Dal Singh, 1964 RD (HC) 426 that the decree is not without jurisdiction. With respect I am inclined to differ from this view. Considered from one angle it can be said that even though the hearing of the appeal is stayed, that Court has the jurisdiction to eventually pass a decree in accordance with the decision of the Consolidation authorities; but what Section 5 provides is, one may say, suspension of the jurisdiction of the Court. When the appeal cannot be heard, the Court cannot pass any order, all the more, a final order in the appeal. When the Court cannot pass any order, in substance, it has, for that period, no jurisdiction. When there is suspension of the jurisdiction of the Court, any final order passed within that period shall be an order without jurisdiction and it can be regarded as nullity. 6. A Division Bench decision is binding on me in the sense that if I differ I must make a reference to a larger Bench. When there is suspension of the jurisdiction of the Court, any final order passed within that period shall be an order without jurisdiction and it can be regarded as nullity. 6. A Division Bench decision is binding on me in the sense that if I differ I must make a reference to a larger Bench. For purposes of this writ petition I can accept the finding recorded in the above case, namely, that the decision is not a nullity and cannot on this ground be disregarded by the Consolidation authorities. Naturally, the proper procedure for them would have been to stay the hearing of the case or the appeal, as the case may be, for a specified period to enable the party to move the Board of Revenue, which had wrongly not stayed the hearing of the Second Appeal, and to have the the order of dismissal under Order 41, Rule 11, C. P. C. set aside. After the wrong order had been set aside, the Consolidation authorities could proceed according to law. 7. A similar procedure can, if necessary, be adopted by this Court. On finding that the Board of Revenue has passed a wrong order in ignorance of the pendency of the consolidation proceedings, this Court can stay the hearing of the writ petition for a few months to enable the Gram Samaj to move the Board of Revenue for setting aside the order of dismissal under Order 41, Rule 11, C. P. C. The order shall be set aside under Section 151, C. P. C. for which there is no limitation. Thereafter the writ petition can be decided as if the Second Appeal is still pending before the Board of Revenue. 8. No party can claim, as a matter of right, that the High Court must exercise its jurisdiction under Article 226. The High Court can, in suitable circumstances, decline to exercise such jurisdiction. By adopting the above procedure, the parties shall be put to unnecessary expenses and at the same time the time of this Court shall be wasted. It is a matter of common experience that when the hearing of a case is adjourned for months, the case has to be heard almost afresh and thereby whatever time was spent on the earlier days is wasted. It is a matter of common experience that when the hearing of a case is adjourned for months, the case has to be heard almost afresh and thereby whatever time was spent on the earlier days is wasted. To prevent the waste of time of this Court and to avoid the parties from unnecessary expenses and botheration, this Court can refuse to exercise the jurisdiction under Article 226. In order words, if the order of the Consolidation authorities cannot be interfered with after assuming that the order under Order 41, Rule 11, C.P.C. did not exist, this Court can decline to interfere with the order of the Consolidation authorities. 9. The order question is whether the Second Appeal preferred before the Board of Revenue could be deemed to be pending on 30-9-1961. It is contended on behalf of the petitioner that an appeal is pending only after it has been admitted under Order 41, Rule 11, C.P.C. Many Courts commit the error to regard the hearing under Order 41, Rule 11, C.P.C. as the stage of admission of the appeal; but when a technical question is being raised, the provisions of the law must be duly interpreted and one should not act by the words used by the laymen of at occasions used by the Courts of law. 10. Order 41 C.P.C. governs appeals form original decrees and by virtue of Order 42 these rules shall apply to Second Appeals also in so far as they may be applicable. Rules 1 and 2 govern the form of the Memorandum of Appeal. A Memorandum of Appeal not drawn up in the prescribed manner can be rejected under Rule 3 or can be returned for the purpose of being amended within a time to be fixed by the Court or be amended then and there. A Memorandum of Appeal drawn up in the prescribed manner is entertained and after admission under Rule9(1) and after an endorsement of the date of presentation has been made thereon, the appeal is entered in the Register of Appeals. It is thereafter that a date for hearing the appellant or his pleader under Order 41, Rule 11, C.P.C. is fixed. The word "admission" or "admit" has not been used in Rule 11. It has been used in Rule 9 only. It is thereafter that a date for hearing the appellant or his pleader under Order 41, Rule 11, C.P.C. is fixed. The word "admission" or "admit" has not been used in Rule 11. It has been used in Rule 9 only. in the words of the Code of Civil Procedure, an appeal is admitted automatically if not defective, and after admission is entered in the Register of Appeals, i.e., is registered under Order 41, Rule 11, C.P.C. or summary hearing under this rule, is the hearing of the appeal under order 41, Rule 11, C.P.C. 11. They are only pending appeals which can be heard and hence an appeal is pending even before it is listed for hearing under Order 41, Rule 11, C.P.C. For certain purpose the appeal shall be deemed to be pending after being entered in the Register of Appeals; but for others it can be deemed to be pending soon after its presentation. 12. Order 41, Rule 10, C.P.C. leads us to the same inference. It gives power to the appellate court to demand security for costs of the appeal from the appellant and such an order can be passed, either before or after the respondent is called upon to appear and answer. When an order for security for costs can be passed before the hearing under Order 41, Rule 11, C.P.C. in the eye of law, the appeal is pending before such hearing. 13. The learned Advocate for the petitioner relied upon the decision of the Board of revenue in Mst. Rewa v. Kehar Singh, 1959 RD (BR) 32 in support of his contention that an application or appeal cannot be deemed to be pending for hearing before its admission. The learned Member of the Board of Revenue did mot at all consider the provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure. Consequently, this view cannot apply to appeals governed by the Code of Civil Procedure. It is not necessary for me to express an opinion whether the rule laid down in this case can or cannot apply to appeals governed by the Revenue Court Manual to applications for review. 14. The learned Advocate also invited my attention to Krishanaji Shrinivas Jalvadi v. Madhusa Appansa Ladaba, A.I.R. 1934 Bom. 207, where the non-dismissal of the appeal under Order 41, Rule 11, C. P. C. was mentioned as admission of the appeal. 14. The learned Advocate also invited my attention to Krishanaji Shrinivas Jalvadi v. Madhusa Appansa Ladaba, A.I.R. 1934 Bom. 207, where the non-dismissal of the appeal under Order 41, Rule 11, C. P. C. was mentioned as admission of the appeal. Similarly in Ponnamma Pillai Lekshmikutty Pillai v. Padmanabha Pillai Velayudhan Pillai, A.I.R. 1953 Travancore-Cochin 247 the words used are "admission of the appeal under Order 41, Rule 11, C. P. C." The point under consideration in both these cases was different, whether at the stage of the hearing under Order 41, Rule 11, C. P. C. the appeal could be admitted in part and rejected for the rest. It was for this reason that the scope and meaning of Rules 9 and 11 read together were not considered. 15. Reliance was also placed, upon the case of Syud Jaffar Hussein v. Shaikh Mahomed Ameer, Sutherland Weekly Reporter, Volume 13 (1870) 351 in support of the contention that the registration of an appeal was a mere ministerial act and the appeal could be rejected even thereafter. Supposing that the office does not register an appeal even though it has crossed the stage of Order 41, Rule 11, C. P. C., it would still be an appeal which is pending. Whether an appeal has or has not been registered, shall not determine the pendency of the appeal, a question which must be decided on consideration of the provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure. Reference has already been made to the material provisions thereof. 16. I am thus of opinion that the Second Appeal preferred before the Board of Revenue was pending on the date of the publication of the notification under Section 4 of the U. P. Consolidation of Holdings Act, and hence under Section 5 thereof its hearing had to be stayed. 17. The next point for determination is whether the judgment of the Additional Commissioner was, for so long as it was not set aside by the Board of Revenue, binding on the parties such that it was necessary for the Consolidation authorities to decide the matter according to this judgment. This contention can be repelled on many grounds. The principle of res judicata applies only when there has been final adjudication of a matter in issue. This contention can be repelled on many grounds. The principle of res judicata applies only when there has been final adjudication of a matter in issue. While the Second Appeal is pending before the Board of Revenue, it cannot be known what view shall be taken in the Second Appeal. The decree or judgment of the Additional Commissioner is thus not final and can be set aside by the appellate Court. When the decree is not final, it shall not act as res judicata. Further, if the above contention is accepted, it shall lead to an anomalous situation. Even though the decree of the Additional Commissioner has not become final and can be set aside by the Board of Revenue in Second Appeal, the Consolidation authorities shall be bound to give effect to a decision which had not become final. Further, after the conclusion of the Consolidation proceedings it would be necessary for the Board of Revenue to give effect to the judgment of the Additional Commissioner which itself was challenged before it. When Section 5 of the Consolidation of Holdings Act provided for the decision of the appeal in accordance with the decision of the Consolidation authorities, the law naturally contemplated that the decision would not necessarily be the same as of the Additional Commissioner. If the decree or order of the subordinate Court was to be given effect to, the law would have provided for the dismissal of the pending appeals so that the decision, even if wrong, may become final and be binding on the parties. The legislature rightly made no such provision. It was simply provided that the appeal shall be decided in accordance with the decision of the Consolidation authorities; and under Section 5 as it now stands the suit out of which the appeal arises abates. 18. Reliance was also placed upon the case of B. Jitendra Mohan Singh v. Bindbasni Kuar, A.I.R. 1949 Oudh 1, where it was held that the mere fact that the landlord had filed an application for leave to appeal to the Privy Council in the case would not deprive the decision of its finality and would not render it sub judice. An application for leave to appeal does not stand in the same category as an appeal itself. In the former case there is no appeal till the grant of the special leave to appeal. An application for leave to appeal does not stand in the same category as an appeal itself. In the former case there is no appeal till the grant of the special leave to appeal. Prior to that it is simply an application for permission to prefer an appeal. In the other, the appeal is an appeal from the date of its presentation and such an appeal can be presented as a matter of right. The Oudh case can be of no help to the petitioner. 19. To sum up, the orders of the Consolidation authorities could be successfully challenged only if the order dismissing the Second Appeal under Order 41, Rule 11, C. P. C. was legal and binding on the parties. This order is not in accordance with the law. The Second Appeal was pending and had to be stayed under Section 5 of the U. P. Consolidation of Holdings Act. Even if the dismissal of the Second Appeal cannot be said to be without jurisdiction, the order is one which would be set aside in exercise of the inherent jurisdiction in the Board of Revenue being moved in the matter. If time is granted to the respondent to move the Board of Revenue for setting aside the order of dismissal of the Second Appeal, there would be unnecessary waste of time of this Court and the parties shall be put to unnecessary expenses and botheration. In the end, the orders of the Consolidation authorities shall be found to be such as cannot be interfered with. In the circumstances, this Court can refuse to exercise its jurisdiction under Article 226. 20. The writ petition is hereby dismissed. Costs easy, Stay order is vacated.