JUDGMENT Satish Chandra, J. - The petitioner was the President of the Mtnicipal Board, Muzaffarnagar. In this petition he seeks to quash the proceedings of the meeting of the Municipal Board held on 21st March, 1968, wherein a motion of no-confidence tabled against the petitioner was passed. 2. The Municipal Board of Muzaffarnagar consists of 25 elected members in addition to the President. A notice of an intention to move a motion of no-confidence against the President signed by 18 members of the Board was presented to the District Magistrate, Muzaffarnagar, on 19th February, 1968. The District Magistrate convened a meeting of the Board for 21st March, 1968, for the consideration of the motion of no-confidence. On 22nd February, 1968, the District Magistrate got notices of the proposed meeting sent to the members of the Board. The petitioner has alleged that such notices were sent to the 25 members of the Board, but no such notice was ever issued to him, who was the President. The respondents do not deny that, in fact, no such notice was sent to the President. 3. The meeting of the Board was held on 21st March, 1968. At the commencement of the meeting, Sri S.K. Sharma, a member of the Board filed an application raising an objection to the validity of the meeting on the ground, inter alia, that no notice was issued to the President of the Board. The Presiding Officer, has recorded in the minutes of the meeting that, in his opinion, there was nothing to indicate whether any notice had been sent or served upon the petitioner or not. He, therefore, held that there was no sufficient material to make him find that the District Magistrate had failed to give the required notice of the meeting. He ultimately found that he was unable to hold that the meeting was not legally constituted. At the meeting held on 21st March, 1968, 18 members of the Board were present, out of which 14 members voted for the motion of no-confidence. The Presiding Officer declared the motion to have been passed. The meeting, which commenced at 11 A.M. ended at about 1 P.M. 4. The resolution passing the motion of no-confidence has been challenged principally on the ground that the meeting convened for 21st March, 1968, was invalid. Consequently, the proceedings of that meeting were totally void and unenforceable. The Presiding Officer declared the motion to have been passed. The meeting, which commenced at 11 A.M. ended at about 1 P.M. 4. The resolution passing the motion of no-confidence has been challenged principally on the ground that the meeting convened for 21st March, 1968, was invalid. Consequently, the proceedings of that meeting were totally void and unenforceable. In Hari Datt Bahuguna v. State of U.P., Civil Misc. Writ No. 2427 of 1959 decided on November 19, 1959, by Mr. Justice Tandon and in Vishwanath Tripathi v. State of U.P., Civil Misc. Writ No. 1288 of 1966 decided on 27th January, 1967, by Mr. Justice Pathak, it has been held that if the notice required under Section 87-A (3) of the Municipalities Act was not sent to any member the meeting was not validly convened and the proceedings at such a meeting were wholly invalid. A corporation can act only at a meeting held according to the procedure laid down in the statute. The corporate acts of a corporation can be recognised by law only if they are done in accordance with the provisions of the relevant statute. The sending of notice to the members was a condition precedent to the exercise of the power of the District Magistrate to convene a meeting of the Board to consider a motion of no-confidence. The condition precedent not having been fulfilled, the exercise of power to convene the meeting was without jurisdiction. It could not be said that the meeting of the Municipal Board was, in the eye of law, convened on 21st March, 1968. The proceedings at that Meeting could not be recognised as the corporate act of the Municipal Board. They would be void and unenforceable. 5. Mr. Senior Standing Counsel, appearing for the respondents, submitted that though that was the legal position according to the decisions of our Court, yet the President, who is the petitioner in this case, is not entitled to any relief, because he was guilty of personally lying by so as to create an equity against himself. For could not devote time to his usual judicial this proposition, reliance was placed upon work because he had to preside over the Dr. B.N. Sarin v. State of U.P., 1967 ALJ 681, where meeting at a different place in a different after a consideration of certain decided town. For could not devote time to his usual judicial this proposition, reliance was placed upon work because he had to preside over the Dr. B.N. Sarin v. State of U.P., 1967 ALJ 681, where meeting at a different place in a different after a consideration of certain decided town. On a combined consideration of alt cases, it was observed: "The doctrine as to a personally lying was barred by the principles of estoppel by so as to create an equity against him by acquiescence and of want of good faith arises, if either he does something from In the present case, the facts are some which it can be reasonably inferred that what different. Here, an objection was he induced the other persons to think he actually taken at the very commencement would raise no objection to what they of the meeting on the ground that the were doing; or if he knows facts which are meeting was not validly convened because unknown to the other persons acting in notice had not been sent or served on the violation of the right which those facts give, and does not inform them about it, but lies by and lets them run into a trap." 6. This doctrine was sought to be applied in the instant case on the fact that the petitioner was aware of the convening of the meeting for considering the motion of no-confidence against him. He had been preparing for the meeting actively. It is alleged that he got some members abducted and removed from the town. He had also approached certain other members and requested them to support him at the meeting. It has been alleged that the case that the petitioner was not in the town for a number of weeks, prior to the date of the meeting till after the meeting, was not correct. The petitioner being aware of the convening of the meeting, was under a duty to inform the District Magistrate of the Lacuna in not sending the notice of the meeting to him. He not having so informed the District Magistrate, dis entitled himself to relief under the equitable jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution, because of the equity. arising against him. 7. Dr. He not having so informed the District Magistrate, dis entitled himself to relief under the equitable jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution, because of the equity. arising against him. 7. Dr. B.N. Sarin's case, 1967 A.L.J. 681 it had been found that the petitioner not only knew of the convening of the meeting, that he not only did not inform the District Magistrate of the defect in the convening: of the meeting, but that at the meeting also, he did not raise any objection to the continuance of the proceedings of the meeting on that ground. It was also held that a large Police force was employed to keep order. The Civil and Sessions Judge could not devote time to his usual judicial work because he had to preside over the meeting at a different place in a different town. On a combined consideration of all the facts, it was held that the petitioner was barred by the principles of estoppel by acquiescence and of want of good faith. 8. In the present case, the facts are somewhat different. Here, an objection was actually taken at the very commencement of the meeting on the ground that the meeting was not validly convened because notice had not been sent or served on the President. The objection was considered and over-ruled, and the meeting continued. It is true that the objection was taken by another member, because the petitioner was not present; but that would make no difference. The Presiding Officer as well as the participating members had been duly informed of the objection. All that could possibly be done at the meeting was, therefore, done in this regard. It could not be said that they continue with the meeting in ignorance of the illegality in the convening of the meeting. They, therefore, cannot say that they were led into a trap by the petitioner or that they would not have proceeded with the meeting if they were made aware of the defect in the convening of the meeting. The other distinguishing feature in this case is that there is no allegation that a large Police force was employed to maintain law and order at the meeting. It could not be said that a large amount of public money was invested at this meeting. 9. Mr. The other distinguishing feature in this case is that there is no allegation that a large Police force was employed to maintain law and order at the meeting. It could not be said that a large amount of public money was invested at this meeting. 9. Mr. Senior Standing Counsel laid great stress on the fact that the petitioner did not inform the District Magistrate of the defect. He urged that the petitioner was duty-bound to do so. In Dr. B. Ar. Sarin's case, the finding was that the District Magistrate was ignorant of the fact that no notice had been sent to the President, because he had directed the notice to be sent to all the members but by some mistake of the office, the notice could not be sent to the President. In the present case, that circumstance has not been established. According to the respondents, the difficulty arose because the President himself sent to the District Magistrate a list of 25 Members. In that list, he omitted his name. That is why no notice was sent to him. The District Magistrate knew who the President was. He could well be deemed to have known that the notice had to be sent to the President also under Section 87-A (3)of the Municipalities Act. I am therefore, not inclined to hold that the District Magistrate was led into some trap by the petitioner. There is o provision in the Municipalities Act or anywhere else casting a duty on the president or a member of the board to inform the District Magistrate of the lapse is not issuing a notice to him. 10. In Dr. B.N. Sarin's case, the learned Judge has distinguished the decision of Mr. Justice Tandon in Hari Datt Bahuguna's easel, on the ground that in that case a representation about the defect in the convening of the meeting had been made at the meeting and, under such circumstances, it could be held that the making of such a representation would lift the bar of the principle of estoppel by acquiescence or of want of good faith. In the present case also, an objection had been raised at the meeting. This feature would distinguish the present case from Dr. B.N. Sarin's case. The present case would be a case more like H.D. Bahuguna's easel. In the present case also, an objection had been raised at the meeting. This feature would distinguish the present case from Dr. B.N. Sarin's case. The present case would be a case more like H.D. Bahuguna's easel. In Bahuguna's easel, it was held that the President got a representation made at the meeting in respect of the defect in convening the meeting. In the present case also, a member who did not belong to the group which voted for the motion of no-confidence, had raised the objection. In paragraph 44 of the counter-affidavit of Sri Prabhakar Shastri, it has been stated that Sri S.K. Sharma, who raised the objection, was a staunch supporter of the petitioner. He raised the objection at the instance, and on behalf of the petitioner. The case is thus in line with Bahuguna's cases. 11. Mr. Senior Standing Counsel then urged that a direction be issued to the District Magistrate to convene a fresh meeting of the Board to consider the motion of no-confidence. He submitted that if this direction was not issued, the District because under Section 87-A (3) , a meeting could be convened on a date not less than 30 days and not later than 35 days from the date on which the notice was delivered to the District Magistrate. This period has long expired. Obviously, the motion that was lodged in February, 1968, has become in fructuous, because the meeting convened to consider it has been held to be illegal and the proceedings at that meeting are liable to be quashed; and further because the period during which a meeting to consider that motion could possibly be convened has expired. 12. Sub-Sec. (13) of Section 87-A bars the entertainment of subsequent notice of no-confidence in the same President for a period of 12 months from the date of the meeting convened to consider the previous motion of no-confidence, in two situations, namely if the motion is not carried by a majority or if the meeting cannot be held for want of quorum. None of these two situations arise in the present case. The motion originally lodged has become in fructuous for other reason - Consequently, sub-Sec. (13) would be no bar to the reception of another notice of a motion of no-confidence in the same President. None of these two situations arise in the present case. The motion originally lodged has become in fructuous for other reason - Consequently, sub-Sec. (13) would be no bar to the reception of another notice of a motion of no-confidence in the same President. In this view of the matter, it is not necessary or feasible to issue a direction to the District Magistrate to convene a meeting to consider the previous motion of no-confidence again. 13. In the result, the petition succeeds and is allowed. The proceedings of the meeting held on 21st March, 1968, are quashed. The petitioner would be entitled to his wet