ORDER A. P. Sen, J. By this application under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution the petitioner applies for a writ of certiorari for quashing an order of the Board of Revenue dated 25th November 1964, affirming the decisions of the authorities subordinate to it, whereby his application for conferral of bhumiswami rights, u/s 246 of the Madhya Pradesh Land Revenue Code, 1959 (20 of 1959), stands rejected. The facts leading to this petition, shortly stated, are these. The petitioner, who is the ex-proprietor of mouza Ramtala, had instituted Civil Suit No. 102-A of 1956 for possession of a site in abadi against one Bhikari alias Narayan Prasad. That suit was dismissed by the Court of the Civil Judge, Bilaspur, on 15th February 1958. On appeal, the dismissal of the suit was set aside and his claim was decreed by the Additional District Judge Bilaspur, in Civil Appeal No. 9-A of 1958, dated 18th November 1958. That decree was, however, eventually reversed by Pandey J. in Bhikari alias Narayanprasad v. Hemdutta S. A. No. 54/59, D/- 24-11-1960. This Court held that the site was an open abadi site and had thus vested in the State u/s 4 of the Madhya Pradesh Abolition of Proprietary Rights (Estates, Mahals, Alienated Lands) Act, 1950 (I of 1951), and therefore the petitioner had no title to the land. It appears that while this appeal was pending in this Court, the petitioner secured possession of the site on 4th January 1959, in execution of the decree passed by the Additional District Judge, Bilaspur. On the strength of such possession, the petitioner applied to the Tahsildar, Bilaspur, for being declared as a bhumiswami of the land, u/s 246 of the Madhya Pradesh Land Revenue Code, 1959. This application was rejected by the revenue authorities on the ground that the land having vested in the State, the petitioner could not be regarded as being "lawfully holding" the land, within the meaning of that section, on 2nd October 1959, when the Code of 1959 was brought into force. This application was rejected by the revenue authorities on the ground that the land having vested in the State, the petitioner could not be regarded as being "lawfully holding" the land, within the meaning of that section, on 2nd October 1959, when the Code of 1959 was brought into force. The learned counsel appearing on behalf of the petitioner assails the decision of the revenue authorities on the ground that the petitioner was not a trespasser but a person in lawful possession on 2nd October 1959, when the Code of 1959 came into force, having regard to the circumstance that he was placed in possession of the land in dispute, in execution of the appellate decree passed in Civil Appeal No. 9-A of 1958 dated 18th November 1958 from the Court of the Additional District Judge, Bilaspur. Thus, the learned counsel urges that the petitioner was "lawfully holding" the land, at the material date. In support of the contention, he places reliance on Surendra Lal Chowdhury and Others Vs. Sultan Ahmed and Others, , ; Raghunath v. Gangabai 1961 M P L J 398. and Dhansingh v. Natoo Prasad 1962 M P L J 741. Having heard the counsel, we are unable to accept the contention raised in support of the petition. It is manifest that section 246 of the Code of 1959 provides for conferral of bhumiswami rights on Lawful holders of land in abadi for house site. The expression ''lawfully holds", in the context in which it is used, must be interpreted to mean holding '-under some legal right or vestige of title" and not a mere physical possession. The construction suggested by the learned counsel does violence to the plain language of the section as it would extend its benefits even to a person holding land as a trespasser. The emphasis in the section is on the word "lawfully". The term 'lawful' no doubt has a wider meaning than the term 'legal'. 'Legal' is what is in conformity with the letter or rules of the law, as administered in the Courts; 'lawful1 is what is in conformity with (or frequently not opposed to) the principles or spirit of the law, whether moral or judicial. In ascertaining whether an act is 'lawfully' done for another, the test applied by Straight and Mahrnood JJ. in Chedi Lal v. Bhagwan Das (1889) 11 All. 234. In ascertaining whether an act is 'lawfully' done for another, the test applied by Straight and Mahrnood JJ. in Chedi Lal v. Bhagwan Das (1889) 11 All. 234. was : The Legislature intended something when it used the word 'lawfully' and that it had in contemplation cases in which a person held such a relation to another as either directly to create or by implication reasonably to justify an inference that by some act done for another person the party doing the act was entitled to look for compensation for it to the person for whom it was done. Their Lordships were dealing with the construction of section 70 of the Contract Act, 1872. While not accepting that this is the proper test in interpreting the term 'lawfully' in section 70 their Lordships of the Supreme Court in Stale of West Bangul v. B. K Mandal A I R 1962 S C 778. have now stated that "some lawful relationship must subsist" for that is the implication of the word 'lawfully' in section 70. If the said test is literally applied in interpreting section 246, then as between the petitioner claiming bhumiswami rights and the State of Madhya Pradesh against whom the right is claimed, some legal relationship must subsist for that is the implication of the word 'lawfully'. We would rather rest our decision on the meaning of the word 'lawfully' in the context in which it is used in section 246 of the Madhya Pradesh Land Revenue Code, 1959, rather than follow the meaning attached to that word in section 70 of the Contract Act. The interpretation of that word in Chedi Lal v. Bhagwan das (1889) 11 All. 234. and State of West Bangui v. B, K. Mandal A I R 1962 S C 778. was in a different context and their Lordships were also dealing with a statute not in pari materia. Now, words are primarily to be considered in their ordinary meaning or common or popular sense, unless such a construction would lead to a manifest and gross absurdity, or unless the context requires some special or particular meaning to be given to the words. In the context in which the word 'lawfully' is used in section 246, it must mean 'in law entitled'. In the context in which the word 'lawfully' is used in section 246, it must mean 'in law entitled'. Having regard to the circumstance that the abadi site had vested in the State u/s 4, the Deputy Commissioner would be deemed to have taken its possession on 31st March 1961. Thereafter, the possession of the petitioner would per se be wrongful vis-a-vis the State. The fact that the petitioner was placed in possession in execution of the appellate decree which was subsequently reversed would not take the matter any further. The petitioner was "not in law entitled" to the land and was, therefore, unlawfully holding the land against the State, although he may not have been a trespasser in the strict sense of the term [see, Surendra Lal Chowdhury and Others Vs. Sultan Ahmed and Others, . It must, accordingly, be held that the revenue authorities have rightly refused to confer any bhumiswami rights on the petitioner. The authorities relied upon by the learned counsel are really of no assistance to the interpretation of the expression 'lawfully holding', appearing in section 246. Keeping in view the special features of a legislation conferring protection to sub-tenants against their eviction, Krishnan J. held in Raghunath v. Gangabai 1961 MPLJ 398 that a ryotwari sub-lessee, who remained in possession despite a decree for ejectment on account of its execution being stayed, was a "sub-lessee", within the meaning of section 185(ii)(b), entitled to the rights of an occupancy tenant. That decision turned on a construction of the word 'holding' in that section. In Dhansingh v. Natoo Prasad 1962 M PL J 741. Shrivastava J., held that the expression 'sub-lessee' appearing in that section, should be liberally interpreted as to include a sub-lessee who had continued to hold the land by virtue of the provisions of the Madhya Bharat Ryotwari Sub-Lessee Protection Act, 1955, notwithstanding the fact that the sub-lease had come to an end u/s 75 of the Madhya Bharat Land Revenue and Tenancy Act. Their Lordships of the Supreme Court have also interpreted section 185(1)(ii)(b) ibid in a like manner in Rao Nihalkaran v. Ram Gopal 1966 M P L J 712 (S C). and Amar Singh v. Rana Balbahadur singh 1966 MPLJ 979 (SC) These decisions are not helpful in resolving the problem before us, as they deal with a different subject-matter. Their Lordships of the Supreme Court have also interpreted section 185(1)(ii)(b) ibid in a like manner in Rao Nihalkaran v. Ram Gopal 1966 M P L J 712 (S C). and Amar Singh v. Rana Balbahadur singh 1966 MPLJ 979 (SC) These decisions are not helpful in resolving the problem before us, as they deal with a different subject-matter. The meaning of the word 'holding' occurring in section 246 of the Code, 1959 is qualified by the word 'lawfully', and, therefore, the expression "lawfully holding" must in the context, have a limited legal connection. The result in that the petition fails and is dismissed. The petitioner shall bear his own costs and pay out of the security amount that incurred by the respondents. The remaining amount of security shall be refunded. Hearing fee Rs. 100, if certified. Final Result : Dismissed