JUDGMENT K.K. Mathew, J. 1. The 1st petitioner is a trade union registered under the Indian Trade Unions Act and the 2nd petitioner a Work Superintendent of the Kerala State Electricity Board, hereinafter referred to as the Board, and a member of the Union. The 1st petitioner represents the executive as well as the ministerial employees of the Board, who were borne on the work establishment of the Board, till 30th September 1966. 2. An industrial dispute arose between the Board and their executive employees represented by the Kerala State Electricity Board Executive Employees' Union, the 3rd respondent, over a charter of demands submitted by that Union on 30th April 1966 and since the parties could not arrive at a settlement, by an agreement, dated 9th December 1966 between the Board and the Kerala State Electricity Board Executive Employees' Union, the issues specified in the agreement were referred for arbitration of the 1st respondent under section 10A of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (Act XIV of 1947), hereinafter referred to as the Act. The issues referred were concerned with the pay revision and allowances and other terms and conditions of service of the executive employees of the Board (see Ext. P-5 agreement). By a notification dated 12th April 1967 issued under sub-section (3A) of section 10A of the Act, the Government of Kerala gave an opportunity to all workmen who were not parties to the agreement but concerned in the dispute to present their case before the Arbitrator. The 1st petitioner-Union filed an application dated 16th November 1967 before the Arbitrator under section 10A,(3A) read with section 18 of the Act seeking to get itself impleaded in the arbitration proceedings. The Board filed its objections to the application. The Arbitrator passed an order on 21st December 1967 disallowing the prayer of the 1st petitioners-Union to be impleaded in the proceedings. Ext. P-10 is a copy of that order. The writ petition is to quash this order. 3. The Board filed its objections to the application. The Arbitrator passed an order on 21st December 1967 disallowing the prayer of the 1st petitioners-Union to be impleaded in the proceedings. Ext. P-10 is a copy of that order. The writ petition is to quash this order. 3. In the order, the Arbitrator found that the 1st petitioner-Union only represented the workers of the work establishment, who have been absorbed into the regular establishment, but that those workers were kept as a separate unit and were not absorbed as regular executive employees of the Board, that the agreement of arbitration was concerned only with the dispute arising out of the demands submitted on behalf of the executive employees, that the 1st petitioner-Union or the workers represented by it were not concerned in the dispute, and so the 1st petitioner is not a necessary or proper party to the proceedings before him. 4. Counsel for the petitioners submitted that by virtue of Ext. P-1 and the subsequent orders passed by the Board, the workmen of the work establishment became regular executive employees of the Board, and that the award to be passed by the Arbitrator would be binding on them, and so the application for impleading should have been allowed. He further submitted that even if the workmen of the work establishment have not become executive employees of the Board, they were concerned in the dispute, and therefore, under section 10A (3 A) of the Act, the Arbitrator was bound to give an opportunity to the 1st petitioner-Union to present its case. 5. The finding of the Arbitrator, as already stated, is that the "workers of the work establishment section did not become the executive employees of the Board, although they were absorbed into the regular establishment. Ext. P-1, while abolishing the work establishment posts thereafter, only said that the existing work establishment personnel will be absorbed into regular establishment. By Ext. P-2 order passed "by the' Board on 6th July 1967, the Board ordered that work establishment personnel, would be absorbed into the regular establishment with effect from 30th September 1966, that even after absorption, the posts and the personnel will be kept as a separate unit, and will not be integrated with the same categories of posts or personnel in the regular establishment, and that no further recruitment against vacancies in that unit will be made from outside. In paragraph 16 of Ext. P-2 order it is stated: " In the dispute between the Board and the Executive Employees' Union now before Shri Salim Merchant, Arbitrator, for the issue whether 25% of the existing drivers should be placed in the higher grade stands referred for Arbitration. The award of the Arbitrator when published and implemented, will be made applicable to work establishment drivers also. " If the drivers in the work establishment unit have become executive employees by Exts. P-1 and P-2 orders, the award when passed would automatically and without anything more being done be binding on the Board and the executive employees including the drivers. But paragraph 16 of Ext. P-2 would indicate that a separate order by the Board would be necessary to extend the benefit of the award to the drivers of the work establishment unit. On 9th August 1967 the Board passed Ext.P-3 by which it was ordered that the work establishment staff on their absorption into regular establishment will be subject to the respective subordinate service rules within the unit in which they are placed. On 9th November 1967, the Board passed Ext. P-4 introducing revised scales of pay to the work establishment staff on the executive side on the basis of the award of the Industrial Tribunal in I.D. No. 45 of 1958. 6. The orders referred to above would show that the work establishment personnel, were kept as a separate unit, that the terms and conditions of their service were different, and that they have not been absorbed as executive employees of the Board. There was, therefore, enough materials before the Arbitrator for coming to the conclusion that they have not become executive employees of the Board. If that be so, I do not think that they would be bound by the award to be passed. But it was argued that there is only one establishment under the Board and that under section 18 (3) (d) all workmen employed in the establishment, irrespective of the question whether they are executive employees or not, would be bound by the award when passed, and therefore, the 1st petitioner-Union is a proper party to the proceedings. Section 18 of the Act reads: "18(1). A settlement arrived at by agreement between the employer and workman otherwise than in the course of conciliation proceeding shall be binding on the parties to the agreement. 2. Section 18 of the Act reads: "18(1). A settlement arrived at by agreement between the employer and workman otherwise than in the course of conciliation proceeding shall be binding on the parties to the agreement. 2. Subject to the provisions of sub-section (3), an arbitration award which has become enforceable shall be binding on the parties to the agreement who referred the dispute to arbitration. 3. A settlement arrived at in the course of conciliation proceedings under this Act or an arbitration award in a case where a notification has been issued under sub-section (3-A) of section 10-A or an award of a Labour Court, Tribunal or National Tribunal, which has become enforceable shall be binding, on” (a) all parties to the industrial dispute; (b) all other parties summoned to appear in the proceedings as parties to the dispute, unless the Board, arbitrator, Labour Court, Tribunal or National Tribunal, as the case may be, records the opinion that they were so summoned without proper cause; (c) where a party referred to in clause (a) or clause (b) is an employer, his-heirs, successors or assigns in respect of the establishment to which the dispute relates; (d) where a party referred to in clause (a) or clause (b) is composed of workmen; all persons who were employed in the establishment or part of the establishment, as the case may be, to which the dispute relates on the date of the dispute and all persons who subsequently become employed in that establishment or part." Counsel for the petitioners referred to the decision reported in Christopher v. Life Insurance Corporation of India A.I.R. 1958 Bombay 451 to support the contention that since the workmen of the work establishment unit were also employed in the establishment of the Board, they would be bound by the award when passed, and so the 1st petitioner is a proper party to the proceedings. In that case, the question was whether the Life Insurance Corporation, being the Successor in respect of the various establishments taken over by it, would be bound by the awards and settlements arrived at by virtue of the provisions of section 18 (3) (d) of the Act if the establishments taken over by the Corporation have continued to exist. In that case, the question was whether the Life Insurance Corporation, being the Successor in respect of the various establishments taken over by it, would be bound by the awards and settlements arrived at by virtue of the provisions of section 18 (3) (d) of the Act if the establishments taken over by the Corporation have continued to exist. The period, of operation of the said awards and the settlements has not come to an end, and the point for consideration was whether the establishments taken over by the Corporation have retained their individual character and existence or have been so integrated and merged in the Corporation that they could be said to have ceased to exist. The court said that the expression 'establishment' has nowhere been defined, and that from the use of the expression ' establishment' in the Act it seems to be fairly clear that the establishment' must exist in some definite and identifiable form. This case can throw no light on the question in controversy here. 7. The decision in Indian table Co. Ltd. v. Its Workmen, (1962) 1 L.L.J. 409 referred to by counsel has equally no application here. In that case, Venkatarama Ayyar, J. said. "Now what is an industrial establishment ? There is a definition of it given in the explanation to section 25A (2) but that is limited to section 25C, 25D and 25E. There being no definition of the expression in that Act applicable to Section 25G, we must construe it in its ordinary sense, guided by such indications as the context might furnish. In Prayat Kumar Kar v. W.T.C. Parker (1949-1 F.J.R. 245), Harris C. J., observed that the words 'industrial establishment the place at which the workmen were employed, and that accordingly section 23 of the Act which imposes a prohibition against strikes by any workman who is employed in any industrial establishment', ' could not cover a case of workmen in Bombay striking against an employer with whom employees in Calcutta have a dispute '. According to this view, it is of the essence of the concept of an industrial establishment that it is local in its set up. This is also implicit in the explanation to the definition of " lay-off " in section 2 (kkk) of the Act. According to this view, it is of the essence of the concept of an industrial establishment that it is local in its set up. This is also implicit in the explanation to the definition of " lay-off " in section 2 (kkk) of the Act. " The learned Judge after quoting section 2 (kkk) of the Act said that if this is the correct connotation of the words 'industrial establishment', then the branches of a company-located in different places must be held to be distinct ' industrial establishments for purposes of section 25G'. The question was considered by the Madras High, Court in India Tyre and Rubber Company v. Their Workmen (1957) 2 L.L.J. 506. In that case, a company whose business was to manufacture and sell tyres had its head office in Bombay and a branch office at Madras. There were sub-depots at Ernakulam, Bangalore and Vijayawada within the jurisdiction of the Madras Branch. The company retrenched some of the workmen at the Madras office as surplus, and on that a dispute was raised by them that as the retrenchment had been made without pooling all the depots as one unit, section 25G had been infringed. The tribunal accepted that contention and held that the retrenchment was bad. The correctness of this decision having beer questioned in a petition under Art. 226, the Madras High Court held on an examination of the scheme of the Act and on a review of the authorities, that if an industry had establishments located in different places each of them would be a separate Industrial establishment within section 25G of the Act and that accordingly the office at Madras was one industrial establishment and the sub-depots in the different States were separate industrial establishments. Counsel then referred to the decision in Tulsidas Khimji v. Jeejeebhoy (1961) 1 l.l.j. 42 at 47. There, the Bombay High Court considered the scope of the expression ' industrial establishment' occurring in section 25G. Counsel then referred to the decision in Tulsidas Khimji v. Jeejeebhoy (1961) 1 l.l.j. 42 at 47. There, the Bombay High Court considered the scope of the expression ' industrial establishment' occurring in section 25G. The Court observed that the expression 'industrial establishment' had not been defined in the Act, but there can be no doubt that an industrial undertaking or a business organization or a firm may have several different and distinct establishments and a single industrial establishment may also have different and distinct departments and the question whether in a given case there is a single industrial establishment or different industrial establishments will have, therefore, to be determined on considerations as in ordinary industrial or business sense determining the unity of an industrial establishment, bearing in mind, no doubt, the purpose and object of the provision of the Act in which the expression is used. Reliance was also placed by counsel upon the case of Associated Cement Companies Ltd. v. Their Workmen, (1960) 1 l.l.j. 1 where the Supreme Court had to consider the meaning of ' one industrial establishment' with reference to the provisions of section 25E (iii) relating to lay-off. The provision of section 25E (iii) provide that no compensation shall be paid to workmen, who have been laid off, if such lay-off is due to a strike or slowing down of the production on the part of the workmen in another part of the establishment and the question which Their Lordships had to consider was whether the Chaibhasa Cement Works at Jhinkpani and the Rajank Limestone Quarry at a cement works, both owned by the Associated Cement Companies Ltd., were parts or one establishment or different establishments for the purposes of the provisions of section 25E (iii). Their Lordships considered the tests, which would be relevant and helpful in determining the question. The facts considered as relevant by Their Lordships were, geographical proximity, unity of ownership, management and control, unity of employment and conditions of service, functional integrality and general unity of purpose etc. Their Lordships then pointed out that it would be impossible to lay down any one of the tests mentioned by them as an absolute and in-variable test in all cases. Which of the several tests will be important and material in determining the true relation between the parts, branches, units etc. Their Lordships then pointed out that it would be impossible to lay down any one of the tests mentioned by them as an absolute and in-variable test in all cases. Which of the several tests will be important and material in determining the true relation between the parts, branches, units etc. will depend upon the facts proved in each case, having regard to the scheme and object and the provisions of the statute, with reference to which the question has to be determined. 8. I do not know whether the connotation of the expression "industrial establishment " occurring in section 25E (iii) or 25G is the same as the connotation of the expression ' establishment' in section 18 (3) (d) of the Act. The expression 'establishment' or 'part of the establishment' occurring in section 18 (3) should be interpreted in a manner consistent with the object of the section. It is possible to raise an industrial dispute in respect of the terms and conditions of a particular category of workmen employed in an industry. In such a case, it is not necessary that all the workmen employed in the industry should sponsor the dispute in order that it may become an industrial dispute. 9. The question whether a section of the workmen employed in an establishment can raise an industrial dispute without the dispute being sponsored by all the workmen in the establishment came up for consideration in Buckingham & Carnatic Company v. B. & C. M. S. Union A.I.R. 1960 Madras 106. The court held that if an industrial establishment employs several workmen who fall into more or less well defined sections, having regard to the nature of their work, and if a dispute is raised by few of the workmen in one of such sections, and the dispute is taken up by a substantial number of persons employed in that section, whether organised as a union or not, then, it can be said that there is an industrial dispute within the meaning of that term as defined in the Act. It was also held that the view that it is only when a majority or a substantial number of workmen employed in all the sections of the establishment take up that dispute or espouse their case that an industrial dispute can be said to arise is not acceptable. It was also held that the view that it is only when a majority or a substantial number of workmen employed in all the sections of the establishment take up that dispute or espouse their case that an industrial dispute can be said to arise is not acceptable. Rajamannar, C. J. in the course of the judgment said : " There may be peculiar demands from workmen employed in the different sections of an establishment. Suppose there is a large industrial establishment carrying on the business of mining, there may be a large clerical section employed in the office of the establishment in a city, whereas there may be hundreds of workmen employed at the mines which may be even several miles away from the office of the establishment It seems most unreasonable to say that the grievances of persons employed in the mining section cannot give rise to an industrial dispute unless the majority of the employees in all the sections of the establishment takes up their grievances. Mr. Rajah Aiyar referred to certain provisions of the Industrial Disputes Act as impliedly supporting his view that the establishment must be considered as a single unit. On the other hand, a reference to several provisions rather suggests that the Act does contemplate there being several actions in an industrial establishment. Section 2 (n) defines public, utility service as including any section of an industrial establishment on the working of which the safety of the establishment of the workmen employed therein depends. " The above decision provides the key to the interpretation of the expression, 'establishment' or ' part of the establishment' ' occurring in. section - 18 (3) (d). Will a section of the workmen who have no community of interest with the section which raised the dispute be bound by an award, simply because they are also employed in the establishment? I should think not. The logical conclusion from this ruling must be that the operation and binding effect of the award must be confined to the section of workmen on whose behalf the dispute was raised. 10. I should think not. The logical conclusion from this ruling must be that the operation and binding effect of the award must be confined to the section of workmen on whose behalf the dispute was raised. 10. Counsel contended that whether or not the workmen of the work establishment have become the executive employees of the Board, since they are concerned in the dispute, and the Government have issued the notification, under section 10-A (3-A) of the Act, the Arbitrator was bound to give the 1st petitioner-Union an opportunity of presenting its case, on behalf of the workmen represented by it. Section 10-A (3-A) of the Act reads: "Where an industrial dispute has been referred to arbitration and the appropriate Government is satisfied that the persons making the reference represent the majority of each party, the appropriate Government may, within the time referred to in sub-section (3), issue a notification in such manner as may be prescribed ; and when any such notification is issued, the employers and the workmen who are not parties to the arbitration agreement but are concerned in the dispute shall be given an opportunity of presenting their case before the Arbitrator or Arbitrators." In other words, the argument was that the workmen of the work establishment unit were 'concerned in the dispute' even if they have not become executive employees of the Board and the award would not be binding on them, and therefore, the 1st petitioner-Union should have been given an opportunity of presenting its case. Reference was made to the decision of the Supreme Court in New India Motors v. K. T. Morris 1960-1 L.L.J 551. That decision was concerned with the interpretation of the expression ' a workman concerned in the dispute ', occurring in section 33 (1) (a) of the Act, and section 33 as amended by Act XXXVI of 1956. Reference was made to the decision of the Supreme Court in New India Motors v. K. T. Morris 1960-1 L.L.J 551. That decision was concerned with the interpretation of the expression ' a workman concerned in the dispute ', occurring in section 33 (1) (a) of the Act, and section 33 as amended by Act XXXVI of 1956. There it was held that before any dispute between an employer and his employee or employees can be said to be an industrial dispute under the Act, it must be sponsored by a number of workmen or by a union representing them, and that section 18 of the Act makes it clear that the award passed in an industrial dispute raised even by a minority union binds not only the parties to the dispute but all employees in the establishment or part of the establishment, as the case may be, at the date of the dispute and even those who may join the establishment or part of it subsequently, that the circle of persons bound by the award is very much wider than the parties to the industrial dispute, that it is not permissible to put a narrow construction on the material words used in section 33.(1) (a) as that would defeat the intention of the Legislature, and that the workmen concerned in the dispute cannot be only those who are directly or immediately concerned in the dispute. The court observed: "Therefore, we are not prepared to hold that the expression ' workmen concerned in such dispute ' can be limited only to such of the workmen who are directly concerned with the dispute in question. In our opinion, that expression includes all workmen on whose behalf the dispute has been raised as well as those who would be bound by the award which may be made in the said dispute. " Apply the test to the facts of this case. The 1st petitioner-Union or the workmen in the work establishment did not sponsor any industrial dispute. They never put forward any demands. No dispute was raised on their behalf. " Apply the test to the facts of this case. The 1st petitioner-Union or the workmen in the work establishment did not sponsor any industrial dispute. They never put forward any demands. No dispute was raised on their behalf. The demands on the basis of which the dispute arose and the agreement of arbitration was entered into, were concerned only with the pay revision and the terms and conditions of service of the executive employees of the Board, and if so, how are the workmen of the work establishment unit, who never put forward any demands and who did not sponsor any dispute, concerned in the dispute? In Digwadhi Colliery v. Ramji Singh 1964-2 L.L.J, 143, the ambit of the expression 'a workman concerned in the dispute' occurring in section 33 (2) (b) and section 33-A was considered by the Supreme Court. One Ramji Singh was in the service of the management of Digwadhi Colliery. His services were terminated. He contended that the termination of his services was in contravention of the provisions of section 33 (2) of the Act. The Tribunal upheld the contention and ordered the management to reinstate him; and the question was whether, the tribunal was right in so ordering. The Supreme Court considered the scope of the decision in New India Motors v. K. T. Morris and said that before it can be said that a workman is concerned in a dispute which is pending before an industrial tribunal, it is necessary to know the nature of the dispute. The Court further observed that the industrial dispute which was pending, namely, Reference No. 60 of 1959 was on behalf of the chaprasis and watchmen of Jamadoba and Digwadhi Collieries for withdrawal of their overtime wages; that Ramji Singh was a clerk, Grade III, and that before it could be said that he was a workman concerned in the dispute, Ramji Singh should have satisfied the Tribunal by proving the nature of dispute pending in Reference No. 60 of 1959, and that no finding in his favour under section 33 (2) could be made unless there is evidence as regard the nature of the dispute, and that in the absence of such evidence the Tribunal was not justified in holding that section 33 (2) applied. The decision would make it clear that it is the nature of the dispute that should be looked into for deciding the question whether a workman "is concerned in the dispute. So, if the dispute in this case was raised on behalf of the executive employees of the Board and was concerned only with the terms and conditions of service of the executive employees, how are these petitioners or the workmen of the work establishment concerned in the dispute? If the nature of the dispute is the paramount consideration for determining the question whether a workman is concerned in the dispute, it must follow that the work establishment personnel, who ex hypothesi have not become executive employees and who never put forward any demands or sponsored the dispute were hot 'concerned' in the dispute. In New India Sugar Mills v. Krishna A.I.R. 1967 Patna the question as to which is a ' workman concerned in such dispute ' within the meaning of section 33 came up for consideration and Narasimham, C. j., after a review of the decisions of the Supreme Court in New India Motors v. K.T. Morris , Tata Iron and Steel Co. Ltd. v. D. R. Singh 1965-2 L.L.J. 122 and Digwadhi Colliery v. Ramji Singh said that there must be some common feature in the nature of the disputes which would serve as a connecting link, thereby rendering the workmen in the later case also workmen concerned in the dispute in the earlier case, and the mere fact that the same Union had taken up the cause of two workmen or else that by virtue of section 18 (3) (d) of the Act all workmen may be bound by the award in the earlier dispute may not suffice, unless there is some other common feature in the two disputes. The learned Judge observed after referring to the decision of the Supreme Court in New India Motors v. K.T. Morris that: "This decision, however, does not clearly indicate as to whether there should be any common feature in the nature of the dispute in the two classes of cases. On the other hand, the facts of that case show that the workman concerned was Works Manager, whereas the pending reference was in respect of the dispute between the employer and some apprentices. On the other hand, the facts of that case show that the workman concerned was Works Manager, whereas the pending reference was in respect of the dispute between the employer and some apprentices. There is no observation in the judgment to show what was the nature of the dispute in the two cases. But in a later decision in the well-known Digwadhi Colliery case 1964-2 L.L.J. 143, Their Lordships pointed out: Unless it is known as to what was the nature of the dispute pending in the said reference, it would plainly be impossible to decide whether the respondent is a workman concerned within the meaning of section 33 (2)." This judgment may support the view of Mr. Prasad that apart from the fact that the two disputes were sponsored by the same Union and the award may be binding on all the workmen, nevertheless, to apply the liberal interpretation of the words ' workmen concerned in the dispute', the nature of the two disputes should also be carefully scrutinised. I think, the petitioners were not concerned in the dispute referred to the Arbitrator, and so the Arbitrator was not bound under section 10A (3A) of the Act to give an opportunity to them to present their case before him. 11. Mr. M. P. Menon argued that section 10A (3A) visualises the existence of workmen who are not parties to an agreement of arbitration, but who would be concerned in the dispute and so should be notified about the arbitration proceedings and an opportunity given to them to present their case, before the Arbitrator, and so the workmen represented by the 1st petitioner should have been given that opportunity. This argument has no substance. Section 10 A (3A) only requires an opportunity ,to be given to the workmen ' concerned in the dispute' but who are not parties to the agreement, of presenting their case. There might be workmen concerned in a dispute but who are not members of the Union, which alone is a party to the arbitration agreement, and it is to give an opportunity to those workmen to present their case that section 10A (3A) was enacted. It does not mean that workmen who are not concerned in the dispute should be given an opportunity of presenting their case. 12. It does not mean that workmen who are not concerned in the dispute should be given an opportunity of presenting their case. 12. Counsel for the petitioners contended that even if the workmen in the work establishment unit are not affected by the dispute they are interested in it and so the 1st petitioner-Union should have been impleaded. He said that there is a distinction between ' affected ' and ' interested ' and relied upon the decision in Workmen of Sri Ranga Vilas Motors v. S.R.V. Motors 1967-2 L.L.J. 12. In that case; the Supreme Court in dealing with section 10(1) (d) of the Act said: "The second reason given by the High Court, with respect, is erroneous because it seems to have equated the words ' interest' or ' affected '. 'It would be noticed that section 10 (1) use both the words interested' or 'affected '. Section 10 (5) also uses both the words ' interested ' or ' affected '. It seems to us that there is a difference in the import of the words ' interested ' or ' affected '. The Union which sponsors the cause Of an individual workman is interested in the dispute but the workmen who are the members of the union are not necessarily affected by the dispute ." Counsel also referred to the following observation of the Privy Council in R. v. Industrial Disputes Tribunal 1957-2 All E. R. 776 at 782: " We think that the answer to counsel's submission is that it does not follow in a matter of this sort, which is arbitration of a general character and not a strict legal proceeding, that the workers who are parties to the dispute must necessarily be workers to whom the award applies. We think that there is no reason why persons should not make themselves parties to a dispute although they are not workers to whom the award applies. For the reasons, which we have given, questions of general principle, matters of supporting or assisting a fellow worker, make them parties to the dispute although they are not people to whom the award is going to apply." I do not think that if the dispute was not raised on their behalf or sponsored by them, the workmen of the work establishment unit are interested in the dispute. I can visualise no reason why, if the award will not be binding on them, and if the dispute was not raised on their behalf or sponsored by them, they should be interested in the proceedings before the Arbitrator. 13. The agreement of arbitration determines the bounds of jurisdiction of an Arbitrator appointed under section 10A(3A) of the Act (See Engineering Mazdoor Sabha v. Hind Cycles 1962-2 L.L.J. 760 at 768. In Hochtief Gammon v. Industrial Tribunal 1964-2 L.L.J. 460 it was held that it is the reference order which determines the scope of the jurisdiction of an industrial tribunal, and that if a dispute between two parties is referred to the Tribunal, the Tribunal cannot enlarge the scope of the dispute by adding other parties to the proceedings. In Abraham v. Industrial Tribunal, 1958-2 L.L.J. 725 this Court held that the character of the dispute on the date of the reference should not be changed by adding additional parties. In Maharashtra State, Electricity Board v. I. T.1965-2 L.L.J. 458, 459 the Bombay High Court said: "The power of the Industrial Tribunal by implication under section 18 (3) (b) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, to implead parties to the dispute is not unlimited so as to enlarge the scope of the dispute or to alter its character. The industrial tribunal could implead only necessary and proper parties. If parties, who are not necessary or proper parties, are allowed to be summoned as parties to the dispute, the result will be that the scope of the dispute itself will be enlarged. It would not have been the intention of the Legislature that the Tribunal would be given the power to enlarge the scope of the dispute so as to make it a dispute between parties between whom no industrial dispute existed before ." I should think that the same principle must apply to an arbitration proceeding under section 10A of the Act. As already indicated, the scope of the dispute referred to the Arbitrator is determined by the agreement between the parties to it. And it cannot be enlarged so as to make it a dispute between parties between whom no industrial dispute existed before. 14. I think, the Arbitrator was right in dismissing the application of the 1st petitioner. I dismiss the petition, but without an order as to costs.