JUDGMENT K.B. Asthana, J. - The only question that arises for determination in this Second Appeal is whether a notice terminating the tenancy of the defendant appellant and asking him to quit on the expiry of thirty days from the receipt thereof was a valid notice. 2. The undisputed facts of the case are that the plaintiff respondent is the owner of a building in which the defendant appellant took on rent rooms in the ground floor including some machinery fitted therein for grinding wheat flour and Dals. A rent at the rate of Rs. 150/- per month was paid. The plaintiff served upon the defendant the notice in dispute terminating the tenancy and asking him to quit on the expiry of thirty days from the receipt thereof. Since the defendant did not comply with the terms of that notice hence the suit for ejectment, recovery of arrears of rent and mesne profits, which has given rise to this appeal. It was averred in the plaint that a deed of lease was executed stating the terms of the tenancy which was a monthly tenancy and was terminable by a month's notice. The plaintiff did file the said document as evidence in the suit but it was impounded as it did not bear the requisite stamp duty and the plaintiff declined to make good the deficiency together with the penalty. Thus the documentary evidence as to the terms of the lease was not available. The courts below, however, took into consideration the admission of the defendant to the effect that he was a tenant on a monthly rent of Rs. 150/- in the premises in suit. The learned Munsif on the question of the validity of the notice held that the lease being for manufacturing purpose would be deemed to be a lease from year to year terminable on six months' notice, hence one month's notice served upon the plaintiff was ineffective. The suit of the plaintiff thereupon for ejectment was dismissed but a decree for recovery of a certain sum was passed as arrears of rent. The plaintiff then appealed. The learned Judge of the court below who heard the appeal reversed the decree of the learned Munsif in so far as the relief for ejectment was concerned and decreed the plaintiff's suit. The plaintiff then appealed. The learned Judge of the court below who heard the appeal reversed the decree of the learned Munsif in so far as the relief for ejectment was concerned and decreed the plaintiff's suit. The learned Judge held that the admission of the defendant that a monthly rent was payable at the rate of Rs. 150/- proved that the duration of the tenancy was from month to month though the object of the tenancy was for manufacturing purpose; hence the notice in question terminating the tenancy and asking the defendant to quit ,on the expiry of period of thirty days was valid and effective. However, the learned Judge of the court below did not pass any decree for recovery of mesne profits. Thereafter a review application seems to have been made before the learned Judge for decreeing mesne profits but that application was rejected. The defendant has now come up in second appeal before this Court questioning the validity of the decree for his ejectment and the plaintiff has filed a cross objection in regard to his claim for mesne profits at the rate of Rs. 150/- per month. 3. I have heard Sarvasri Jagdish Swarup and K.M. Dayal, learned counsel for the defendant appellant and Sri V.K. Burman for the plaintiff respondent. 4. On behalf of the appellant it was contended that the document of lease in which the terms of the contract were reduced in writing having become inadmissible all oral evidence in regard to the proof of its terms was barred under Section 91 of the Evidence Act and the learned Judge of the court below legally erred in relying upon the so called admission of the defendant made in his statement before the court which was nothing but oral evidence in regard to the terms of the lease. The submission was that Section 91 of the Indian Evidence Act barred from consideration as evidence that part of the statement of the defendant wherein he said that a monthly rent of Rs. 150/- was paid which was inadmissible as evidence to support t he finding that the tenancy was monthly. The finding of the learned Judge of the court below that the tenancy was monthly was characterised by the learned counsel for the appellant as a finding not supported by any legal evidence on record. 150/- was paid which was inadmissible as evidence to support t he finding that the tenancy was monthly. The finding of the learned Judge of the court below that the tenancy was monthly was characterised by the learned counsel for the appellant as a finding not supported by any legal evidence on record. I do not find any substance in this line of argument. Technically it may be correct to say that even the admission of the defendant in his evidence before the court ought not to have been used as it related to a term of lease and Section 91 barred its admission yet the finding would be justified in view of the fact that in his written statement the defendant himself admitted that a monthly rent of Rs. 150/- was paid by him to the plaintiff for the premises in suit. Thus the factum of the payment of monthly rent of Rs. 150/-having been admitted by the defendant in his written statement the parties could not be at issue on that question and no occasion, therefore, arose for adducing any evidence to prove that fact. The courts are entitled to act upon that admission contained in paragraph 13 of the written statement. I do not find any legal basis not to hold that a monthly rent of Rs. 150/- was paid by the defendant to the plaintiff as has been canvassed for by the learned counsel for the appellant. When the defendant himself admitted that a rent of Rs. 150/- per month was paid and he admitted that there was a relationship of landlord and tenant between the parties and on the evidence it was established that the defendant as tenant was in possession and he paid a monthly rent to the plaintiff as landlord and which was 'accepted, even without taking recourse to the document of lease, a lease could be spelt out of which one of the terms was the payment of monthly rent of Rs. 150/-. As I have observed above the fate of the case actually turned on the pleadings rattier than on the evidence. To my mind it is not necessary to take notice of the statement of the defendant in the witness box as his plea raised in paragraph 13 the written statement itself established that a monthly rent of Rs. 150/- was payable by the defendant tenant to the plaintiff landlord. To my mind it is not necessary to take notice of the statement of the defendant in the witness box as his plea raised in paragraph 13 the written statement itself established that a monthly rent of Rs. 150/- was payable by the defendant tenant to the plaintiff landlord. 5. The question then arises whether the payment of monthly rent of Rs. 150/- for the premises in a suit would establish that the tenancy was monthly and a contract to the contrary could be made out for the purposes of Section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act and though the tenancy was for a manufacturing purpose yet it would be terminable on one months' notice ? 6. The Supreme Court in the case of Ram Kumar v. Jagdish Chandra, A.I.R. 1952 SC 23 had occasion to consider the provisions of Section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act. It was held that Section 106 laid down a rule of construction which was to be applied when there was no period agreed upon between the parties and in such cases the duration of the tenancy had to be determined by reference to the object of purpose for which the tenancy was created. It was further held that the rule of construction embodied in that section applied not only to express leases of uncertain duration but also to leases implied by law which may be inferred from possession and acceptance of rent and other circumstances. It was also held that the mode in which a rent was expressed to be payable afforded a presumption that the tenancy is of a character corresponding thereto. In the instant case although no express terms of the lease have been proved yet from the pleadings of the parties a lease of the premises together with the machinery fitted therein by the plaintiff in favour of the defendant is made out. For the termination of the lease in question the provisions of Section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act would apply. For the termination of the lease in question the provisions of Section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act would apply. Since the provisions of Section 106 lay down a rule of construction for finding out the duration of the lease if there were no other evidence and circumstance and the lease being for manufacturing purpose, then it would be deemed that the duration was from year to year and such a lease was terminable at six months' notice, but it may be pointed out that in the instant case there is an indication that the mode of payment of rent was monthly and it was argued for the plaintiff respondent that that would show that the tenancy in question was of a character corresponding thereto, that is, from month to month. The learned counsel for the defendant appellant contended that once it were found that the lease was for manufacturing purposes that fact would be conclusive of its duration and it would be deemed from year to year terminable at six months' notice. A reference has been made in this connection to my decision in the case of Balwant Singh v. Murari Lal, A.I.R. 1965 Alld. 187. In that case I held that once the purpose of the tenancy was to manufacture the fiction embodied in 106 of the Transfer of Property Act would apply and even if no registered agreement of deed of lease was executed as required by Section 107 of the Transfer of Property Act, the tenancy would still be deemed from year to year terminable at six months' notice. In that case no question had arisen for decision that there was material to the contrary on record showing that monthly rent was payable, though the tenancy was for manufacturing purpose. I think the learned counsel for the plaintiff respondent is right in submitting that the ratio of by decision in the case of Balwant Singh v. Murari La1, A.I.R. 1965 Alld. 187 does not apply to the facts of the instant case. Here I may observe that the learned Judge of the lower appellate court also noticed my decision in Balwant Singh's case and distinguished it for the same reason. 7. 187 does not apply to the facts of the instant case. Here I may observe that the learned Judge of the lower appellate court also noticed my decision in Balwant Singh's case and distinguished it for the same reason. 7. It was tried to be contended by the learned counsel for the defendant appellant that a presumption is nothing but a rule of evidence and since Section 91 of the Indian Evidence Act bars all kind of evidence to be adduced to prove a contract which admittedly had been reduced into writing even a presumption cannot be drawn as to the duration of the tenancy on the basis that monthly rent was payable as that would amount to an admission of evidence to prove one of the terms of the contract of lease. I am unable to accept such an extreme proposition as put forward by the learned counsel for the appellant. Moreover, in the instant case, as already observed above, it is not on any evidence that the presumption of the tenancy in question being monthly is being drawn but that presumption arises on the pleadings of the parties. The court acting upon the admitted pleading does not act upon evidence adduced in the case. When the defendant himself admitted in his written statement that he paid a monthly rent of Rs. 150/- for the premises in suit, it was open to the court to find out the duration of the tenancy for the purposes of Section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act in accordance with the rule of presumption so clearly laid down by the Supreme Court in the case of Ram Kumar v. Jagdish Chandra. I think the findings recorded by the learned Judge of the court below that the tenancy of the premises in dispute was only a monthly tenancy terminable on thirty days' notice were valid findings. I am supported in this view by a decision of the Assam High Court in the case of Jewan Singh v. Mandalal Agarwalla, A.I.R. 1955 Assam 102. I am supported in this view by a decision of the Assam High Court in the case of Jewan Singh v. Mandalal Agarwalla, A.I.R. 1955 Assam 102. In that case the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Ram Kumar v. Jagdish Chandra has been discussed and relied upon and it was held that ordinarily in the case of a tenancy for manufacturing purposes, it should be held to be a tenancy from year to year terminable by six months' notice to quit, but there was nothing in law to prevent the parties from coming to an agreement between themselves under which irrespective of the nature of the tenancy they treated the tenancy as a monthly tenancy and that in the absence of any specific denial one had to presume according to the rules of the pleadings that there was a contract according to which in spite of the nature of the tenancy the parties agreed that the tenancy should be a monthly tenancy for which a monthly rent was payable. The case before me is stranger as there is specific admission by the defendant that a monthly rent of Rs. 150/- was payable. The tenancy, therefore, in the instant case was from month to month and the parties by their conduct showed that it was from month to month as a monthly rent of Rs. 150/- was paid and received, although the purpose was one for manufacture. 8. Now coming to the cross objection, l think the court below when decreeing the suit for ejectment ought to have passed a decree for recovery of mesne profits as prayed. The plaintiff had not claimed a mesne profits at any higher rate than Rs. 150/- which was the admitted monthly rent of the premises in suit. Order 20, Rule 12 of the C. P. Code empowers the court in a suit for recovery of possession of immovable property to decree mesne profits when it decrees the suit for the possession of the property. I find no good reason why the plaintiff should be deprived of a decree for recovery of mense profits. I may observe that the learned counsel for the defendant appellant rightly did not oppose the cross-objection. 9. For the reasons given above I dismiss the appeal and allow the cross-objection. Let a decree for recovery of mesne profits as prayed for at the rate of Rs. I may observe that the learned counsel for the defendant appellant rightly did not oppose the cross-objection. 9. For the reasons given above I dismiss the appeal and allow the cross-objection. Let a decree for recovery of mesne profits as prayed for at the rate of Rs. 150/- per month be passed in favour of the plaintiff. The plaintiff respondent shall be entitled to the costs of the appeal. As the cross-objection was not opposed there would be no order as to costs in the cross-objection,