Judgment :- 1. These appeals arise out of O. S.385.of 1967 on the file of the Munsiff's Court, Badagara. The second plaintiff is the appellant in S. A. 349 of 1968, while defendants 1 and 2 are the appellants in A. S.183 of 1968. 2. The suit is by plaintiffs 1 to 4 to restrain defendants 1 to 3 from entering into the plaint schedule item cutting kuzhikoors and removing earth therefrom, from doing any permanent damage to the plaint property and for recovery of damages on account of waste already committed therein. 3. The facts of the case are as follows: The jenmi of the plaint property had created kanam-kuzhikanam right over the same, evidenced by Exs. BI to B3 and Al. It is admitted that the plaintiffs are the present owners of the suit property and that the kanam-kuzhikanam right is now vested in defendants 1 and 2. The earliest of the kanam-kuzhikanam documents is dated 12 91882 and Ex. BI is the marupat of the same. The last of the renewals was on 12 8 1921 and Ex. Al is the marupat thereof. Defendants 1 and 2 granted Ex. B5 sublease to the 3rd defendant on 317 1967 for a portion of the plaint property for commercial purposes. Since the 3rd defendant is taking steps to install petrol and diesel oil pumps in the plaint property after excavating the land and removing earth therefrom, the plaintiffs instituted the suit for the reliefs already mentioned. A sum of Rs. 2000/-is claimed from the defendants being the damage done on account of excavation and removal of earth from the plaint property. 4. The trial court decreed the plaintiff's claim for injunction against defendants 1 to 3 and decreed the plaintiff's claim for damages only against defendants 1 and 2 4. The 3rd defendant filed A. S.41 of 1968 in the Subordinate Judge's Court, Badagara, against the decree granting injunction, and the plaintiffs filed a memorandum of cross-objections claiming damages against the 3rd defendant as well. The learned Subordinate Judge allowed the appeal and vacated the decree for injunction against the 3rd defendant. The memorandum of cross-objections filed by the plaintiffs was dismissed. The suit thus stands dismissed against the 3rd defendant. S. A. 349 of 1968 is filed by the 2nd plaintiff against the decree and judgment of the learned Subordinate Judge. The learned Subordinate Judge allowed the appeal and vacated the decree for injunction against the 3rd defendant. The memorandum of cross-objections filed by the plaintiffs was dismissed. The suit thus stands dismissed against the 3rd defendant. S. A. 349 of 1968 is filed by the 2nd plaintiff against the decree and judgment of the learned Subordinate Judge. Defendants 1 and 2 filed A. S.141 of 1968 in the Subordinate Judge's Court, Badagara, against the decree of the trial court. It was transferred to this court to be heard along with the second appeal as the questions involved are the same. The appeal after transfer to this Court was re-numbered as A.S.183 of 1968. 5. The suit property has been in the possession of tenants from 12 9 1882 on the strength of Ex. BI and the subsequent renewals. Ex. Al. the last of the series, recites that the kuzhikoors in the property belong to the tenant and the only improvement belonging to the landlord is the well in the property. The suit property is in Badagara town and abuts the Calicut-Cannanore Trunk road. In Ex. B5 the purpose of the lease is stated as follows: The plaint property is only 30 cents in extent and it is described in Ex. Al as a garden land with a house and fruit bearing kuzhikkoors. The annual purappad payable to the jenmi is Rs. 14/ 6. The appellate judge found from the commissioner's report Ex. Cl that at the time of the suit all the kuzhikoors in plot A shown in the Commissioner's plan were cut and removed by the 3rd defendant. Plot A is the property comprised Ex. B5. 7. The claim of the plaintiffs is resisted by the defendants on the ground that removal of earth and the installation of the pumps in the plaint property will only increase its value and even if the act of the defendants amounts to waste it is only meliorative waste and the plantiffs are not entitled to the injunction. The further plea of the defendants is that in view of Act I of 1964 the only subsisting right of the plaintiffs in the plaint property is to get the fair rent or the contract rent, as the case may be, and the defendants are entitled to use the demise in any manner they want. 8. The further plea of the defendants is that in view of Act I of 1964 the only subsisting right of the plaintiffs in the plaint property is to get the fair rent or the contract rent, as the case may be, and the defendants are entitled to use the demise in any manner they want. 8. Normally it is open to a landlord to restrain his tenant from committing waste upon the property leased. A landlord, though he has parted with possession, has still an interest in the land which he has a right to protect. A tenant on account of the demise in his favour obtains only such dominion over the land as is consistent with the contract of lease. Even in the absence of an express covenant regarding the user of the land leased, an agreement will be implied between the landlord and the tenant that the land shall be retained by the tenant substantially in the same condition in which it was at the time of the demise, that it will be used only for the purpose for which it was leased and that there shall not be a complete change in the mode of enjoyment of the Property. In Venkayya v. Ramaswami ILR. 22 Madras 39 it was held that the relationship of landlord and tenant creates an implied obligation on the part of the tenant to use agricultural land in a husband-like manner according to the custom of the country where the premises are situated, unless the contract between the parties contains some express covenants inconsistent with such custom and sufficient to exclude it. The rights of the tenant under a lease governed by the Transfer of Property Act are laid down in S.108 (o) of that Act. The rights of the tenant under a lease governed by the Transfer of Property Act are laid down in S.108 (o) of that Act. S.108 (o) is in these terms: "The lessee may us the property and its products (if any) as a person of ordinary prudence would use them if they were his own; but he must not use, or permit another to use, the property for a purpose other than that for which it was leased, or fell or sell timber, pull down or damage buildings belonging to the lessor, or work mines or quarries not open when the lease was granted, or commit any other act which is destructive or permanently injurious thereto:" S.108 [p] of the Transfer of Property Act provides that the lessee must not, without the lessor's consent, erect on the property any permanent structure, except for agricultural purposes. Whether a particular act is destructive of or permanently injurious to the demise depends for decision upon the facts and circumstances of each case. A use for a purpose different from that for which the premises were let will be waste even though it does or does not involve any structural alterations. 9. Under the English Common Law the rights of a tenant under a lease in which mines and minerals are excluded are stated thus in Coke on Littleton 53 (b), Vol. 1. "Digging for gravel, lime, clay, brick, earth, stone, or the like, or for mines of metal, coal, or the like, hidden in the earth, and were not open when the tenant came in, is waste; but the tenant may dig for gravel or clay of the reparation of the house, as well as he may take convenient, timber trees." Latham, J. pointed out in In re Purmanandas Jeewandas ILR. 7 Bom.109 that the above rule is applicable to India also. A tenant therefore even apart from S.108 of the Transfer of Property Act, has no proprietory right in the soil or over anything which forms part of the soil and has only a reasonable right of user in the soil. The plea of the plaintiffs is that the plaint property has been demised only for agricultural purposes namely planting trees and the installation of petrol and diesel pumps after excavating and removing the earth from the property will be an act of waste. The plea of the plaintiffs is that the plaint property has been demised only for agricultural purposes namely planting trees and the installation of petrol and diesel pumps after excavating and removing the earth from the property will be an act of waste. The defendants would contend that the question of waste has to be decided on a consideration whether the acts attributed to them are injurious to the inheritance or not, and if the act complained of will only enhance the value of the property a court will not under such circumstances exercise its discretion in favour of granting injunction though the act complained of will be technically waste. 10. In Sankaran v. Sankaran Chamar 1959 KLT.1259 Vaidialingam, J. in considering a claim for improvement raised under Act 29 of 1958 held that the conversion of a double crop paddy land into a garden land, however desirable it may be from the point of view of the mortgagee or the tenant, is a substantial alteration of the character of the holding and it cannot certainly be considered to be an 'improvement' in any sense of the term. The same learned judge in Joseph v. Ramakrishna Pillai 1960. KLT. 346 in considering whether planting of rubber trees, notwithstanding the specific prohibition in the mortgage document, is an improvement within the meaning of Act 29 of 1958, observed thus: "The planting of rubber trees, notwithstanding the specific prohibition in the mortgage deed and also in view of the fact that the property was predominantly an agricultural land, planting of rubber cannot be considered to be 'suitable to it and consistent with the purpose for which the holding has been mortgaged" S.17 saves the right of the tenant to claim compensation in respect of improvements in accordance with the provisions of the Act and the term ‘improvement' occurring in S.17 must be read along with the definition of the said term as contained in S.2 (b). Therefore in order to claim an item as an 'improvement", it must be held 'to be suitable to and consistent with the purpose for which the ho Wing is let." 11. The above decisions can no doubt be distinguished because they are not cases dealing with the right of a landlord to restrict the user of the demise by the tenant. The above decisions can no doubt be distinguished because they are not cases dealing with the right of a landlord to restrict the user of the demise by the tenant. But they do decide the principle that the nature of the act considered in those cases caused substantial alteration to the character of the holding and the tenant cannot claim compensation under Act 29 of 1958. Even then it will not be sufficient to overrule the plea of the respondents that the above decisions are only helpful for the position that the landlord cannot be compelled to pay the cost of conversion at the time of redemption and they do not decide that the acts complained of amount to waste which can be prohibited by the issue of injunction. 12. In Halsbury's Laws of England, 3rd Edition, Volume 23, page 566, Para.1240, "waste" is defined thus: "Waste consists of any act or omission which causes a lasting alteration to the nature of the land in question to the prejudice of the person who has the reminder or reversion of the land. Waste is either voluntary or permissive. Voluntary waste implies the doing of some act which tends to the destruction of the premises, as by pulling down houses, or removing fixtures; or to the changing of their nature, as the conversion of pasture land into arable,or pulling down buildings and erecting new buildings,even though of greater value. Permissive waste implies an omission whereby damage results to the premises where, for instance, houses are suffered to fall into decay. Permissive waste implies an omission whereby damage results to the premises where, for instance, houses are suffered to fall into decay. "In order to constitute voluntary waste by destruction of the premises, the destruction must be wilful or negligent; it is not waste if the premises are destroyed in the course of reasonable user, and any user is reasonable if it is for a purpose for which the property was intended to be used, and if the mode and extent of the user is apparently proper, having ragarb to the nature of the property and what the tenant knows of it, and in the case of business premises, to what, as an ordinary business man, he ought to know of it." In Para.1241 at page 567 of the same volume the learned author observes: "Though changing the nature of the demised premises is technically waste, yet this is not so if the change has been expressly sanctioned by the landlord; and the mere change is not waste unless it is in fact injurious to the inheritance, either by diminishing the value of the estate, or by increasing the burden upon it, or by impairing the evidence of title. At any rate in the case of acts which may be technically waste, but in fact improve the inheritance, acts as they are termed, of meliorating waste, the court will not interfere to restrain them by injunction; nor-will they be a ground of forefeiure under a proviso for re-entry on commission of waste; nor, in general, can damages be recovered in respect of them. Apart, however, from acts done in exercise of statutory authority, a substantial alteration in the character of the demised premises will be treated as waste and restrained by injunction, notwithstanding that the value will be thereby increased, and the tenant is not entitled to pull down a house and build another which the landlord dislikes; or to convert a dwelling-house into a shop." 13. The learned counsel for the respondents besides placing before us the above passages relied on some English decisions to support his plea that the acts complained of are only acts of meliorating waste and cannot be prevented. 14. The learned counsel for the respondents besides placing before us the above passages relied on some English decisions to support his plea that the acts complained of are only acts of meliorating waste and cannot be prevented. 14. In Wood fall's Law of Landlord and Tenant (24th Edition, page 733) meliorating or ameliorating waste is explained as such voluntary waste as improves the demised premises, as where a tenant puts a new front to his house in respect of such waste, it seems that unless substantial damage be proved, the tenant will not be interfered with by injunction. In Jones v. Chappel Law Rep. 20 Eq. 539 Sir George Jessel M. R. observed: "As I understand the law, the erection of buildings upon land which improve the value of land is not waste. In order to prove waste 'you must prove an injury to the inheritance. I quite agree that it is not mere injury in the sense of value. You may prove an injury in the sense of destroying identity, by what is called destroying evidence of the owner's title, and that is a very peculiar head of the law, which has not been extended in modern times." In Doherty v. Allman (1378) 3 Appeal Cases 709 two leases were granted of pieces of land with some buildings thereon, one in 1798 for 999 years, and the other in 1824 for 988 years. There were no negative covenants in the leases preventing the lessee from changing the use of the premises, In each of the leases there was a covenant by the lessee that he will 'during the term preserve, uphold, support, maintain, and keep the said demised premises and all improvements made and to be made thereon, in good and sufficient order, repair, and condition; and at the end or sooner determination of this demise, shall and will so leave and deliver up the same unto, the lessor, his heirs, etc. The premises were used as corn stores for some years; and afterwards an artillery barracks, and dwellings for married soldiers. They fell into dis¬repair; and became necessary to repair them, and the lessee therefore thought of converting the store buildings into dwelling houses. The lessor filed a bill to restrain him. It was held that the waste alleged was meliorating waste and since it was not a case of enforcing a negative covenant the bill was refused. They fell into dis¬repair; and became necessary to repair them, and the lessee therefore thought of converting the store buildings into dwelling houses. The lessor filed a bill to restrain him. It was held that the waste alleged was meliorating waste and since it was not a case of enforcing a negative covenant the bill was refused. Lord Cairns, the Lord Chancellor, observed: "My Lords, if there had been a negative covenant. 1 apprehend, according to well settled practice, a court of equity would have no discretion to exercise. If parties, for valuable consideration, with their eyes open, contract that a particular thing shall not be done, all that a court of Equity has to do is to say, by way of injunction, that which the parties have already said by way of covenant, that the thing shall not be done; and in such case the injunction does nothing more than 'give the sanction of the process of the court to that which already is the contract between the parties. It is not then a question of the balance of convenience or inconvenience, or of the amount of damage or of injury it is the specific performance, by the court, of that negative bargain which the parties have made, with their eyes open, between themselves. But My Lords, if there be not a negative covenant but only an affirmative covenant, it appears to me that the case admits of a very different construction. I entirely admit that an affirmative covenant may be of such a character that a court of Equity, although it cannot enforce affirmatively the performance of the covenant, may, in special cases, interpose to prevent that being done which would be a departure from, and a violation of, the covenant. That is a well-settled and well-known jurisidiction of the court of Equity. But, in that case, My Lords, there appear to me to come in considerations which do not occur in the case of a negative covenant. It may be that a Court of Equity will see that, by interposing in a case of that kind, in place of leaving the parties to their remedy in damages, it would be doing mare harm than it could possibly do good, and there are, as we well know, different matters which the Court of Equity will, under those circumstances, take into its view. In the present case it appears to me to be extremely doubtful whether any jury could be found, who, after this work shall be a executed in the way that is proposed, would say that any damage had been done by the work to the inheritance. And I doubt, further, whether it must not be taken as clear from the evidence here that any jury, or any tribunal judging upon the question of fact, would not say that, if there be technically what in the eye of the common law is called waste, still it is that ameliorating waste which has been spoken of in several of the cases cited at the Bar. That which is done if it be technically waste and here again I will assume in favour of the appellant that it is technically according to the common law, waste yet it seems to me to be that ameliorating waste which so far from doing injury to the inheritance, improves the inheritance. Now, there again the course which the Court of Chancery ought undoubtedly to adopt would be to leave those who think they can obtain damages at common law to try what damages they can so obtain." Lord Blackburn observed: "But even supposing there was an injury and that there was something for which there might be damages recovered, is it obligatory upon a Court of Chancery to grant an injunction to prevent it under all circumstances I think not. I think it goes on much the same principles as have been mentioned before. I find in that case of Greene v. Cole (2 Wms Saund. 252) it is laid down that the Court of Equity would not interfere and grant an injunction to restrain waste where the damages are trivial. Lord Eldon in The Governors of Harrow School v. Alderton (2 B. & P. 86) mentioned the practice which the courts of Law have established, that they would not enter judgment for the defendant where the damages were very small. Blackstone says, 3 Corn. 228, twelve pence, but what the value of that twelve pence was you must go back to the days of King Richard to ascertain. I suppose it would be a larger sum than now, but still a small sum. " 15. We are of the view that the above decisions do not at all support the plea of the respondent. 228, twelve pence, but what the value of that twelve pence was you must go back to the days of King Richard to ascertain. I suppose it would be a larger sum than now, but still a small sum. " 15. We are of the view that the above decisions do not at all support the plea of the respondent. The act complained of in those cases did not alter the nature of the demise permanently. They were cases involving leases of buildings and there was only an alteration of the nature and the user of the buildings. They are not authorities to support the proposition that altering permanently an agricultural holding which is the subject matter of lease cannot be prevented by injunction. 16. On the other hand, Meux v. Cobley (1892) 2 Ch. 253 and West Ham Central Chanty Board v. East London Waterworks Company (1900) 1 Ch. 624 are authorities for the position that in the case of an agricultural lease an act done by the tenant should be consistent with the purpose for which the lands is demised. In Meux v. Cobley (1892) 2 Ch. 253 there was an agricultural lease of a farm land consisting of arable and pasture lands near London and the lessee converted part of the premises into a market garden, erecting glass houses thereon for the cultivation of hot-house produce for the London market. In an action by the lessor against the lessee for injunction it was found at the trial that the other farms in the neighbourhood of London had been so converted as they were found to be the best profitable mode of cultivation. Such conversion was therefore, held to be no breach of a covenant in the lease for management'in a good, proper, and husband like manner, according to the best rules of husbandry practised in the neighbourhood'. Kekewich, J. observed: "The question, then, is whether on such a lease as I have before me, being what is called an agricultural lease, a tenant is entitled to put up glass-houses for the production of such known agricultural produce as tomatoes, grapes, mushrooms, and other vegetables which may be grown out of doors, but have to be forced indoors for the purposes of an earlier market. It is to be observed that, although this is a lease of a farm, and is an agricultural lease, not only is there no negative covenant prohibiting the lessee from doing anything of this kind, but there is no provision for any rotation of crops nothing to indicate a four-course or any other system. So the lessee is left at large. He must do his best to cultivate, the only restriction on his discretion being that he is to do it in a good, proper, and husband like manner, according to the best rules of husbandry practised in the neighbourhood.' That is the restriction." 17. In West Ham Central Charity Board v. East London Water Works Company, (1900) 1 Ch) 624 twelve acres of land forming part of marshy land at West Ham were leased on 29th September 1830 for 99 years in favour of a company for the purpose of constructing a reservoir. The reservoir was not constructed, but the company used the land for grazing purposes in 1896. sub-leased the property for the rest of the term at an increased rent, for being used as a rubbish shoot. The sub-lessee took possession and stored rubbish of all kinds on the land, thereby raising its surface about 10 feet. The plaintiffs brought an action against the company and the sub-lessee, alleging that the acts of the sub-lessee constituted waste and had been done with the authority of the company, and prayed for an injunction restraining the lessee and the sub-lessee from committing waste. The injunction was granted. Buckley, J observed: "I am content to take the law from the case of Doe v. Earl of Burlington (1833) 5B. & Ad. 507; 39 R. R.549), and I will read from p. 517: 'Upon the whole, there is no authority for saying that any act can be waste which is not injurious to the inheritance, either, first, by diminishing the value of the estate, or, secondly, by increasing the burthen upon it, or thirdly, by impairing the evidence of title. And this law is distinctly laid down by Chief Justice Richardson in Barret v. Barret (1627) Het 34), cited at the bar from Hetley's Reports. And this law is distinctly laid down by Chief Justice Richardson in Barret v. Barret (1627) Het 34), cited at the bar from Hetley's Reports. If the permanent character of the property demised is not substantially altered, as for instance, by the conversion of the pasture land into plough land, by breaking up ancient meadows, or the like, I conceive that the law is that it is not now waste for the tenant to do things which within the covenants and conditions of his lease he is not precluded from doing. Within those covenants and conditions, he may use his holding as he pleases. And, as regards what is a dealing within the covenants and conditions of his lease, I may cite some words of Lord Eldon in Church v. Brown (1808) 15 Ves. 258;10 R. R.74), and I will read from P. 268, where Lord Eldon says this: "The safest rule for property is, that a person shall be taken to grant the interest in an estate, which he proposes to convey, or the lease he proposes to make; and that nothing, which flows out of that interest as an incident, is to be done away by loose expressions to be construed by facts more loose; that it is upon the party, who has forborne to insert a covenant for his own benefit, to shew his title to it." Here, therefore, it seems to me that what I have to investigate is, what is the nature of the property which was demised by the lease of 1830, and is the act which is being done by the defendants, or One of them because there is some difference in their two cases an act which alters the nature of the thing demiseda" 18. These decisions support the principle that it is not open to a lessee except on the basis of covenant, to substantially alter the permanent character of the property for a purpose other than the one for which it has been leased. These decisions support the principle that it is not open to a lessee except on the basis of covenant, to substantially alter the permanent character of the property for a purpose other than the one for which it has been leased. The learned Subordinate Judge would sum up his reasons for refusing the prayer of the plaintiffs thus: "The right of a landlord to compel a tenant to enjoy the property held under agricultural lease in a particular manner, when there was no express or implied covenant, is a right co-extant with the land lord's right of resumption and when admittedly that right is lost, other rights dependant on that also must vanish. In such circumstances, the prayer for injunction by a landlord can only be to satisfy his feudal vanity; and courts of law will not be justified in entertaining such claims; more so when it involves loss or hardship to a tenant In possession." We may say even at the outset that we are not prepared to subscribe ourselves to the above statement of law of the learned judge. 19. The learned Subordinate Judge has relied on the decision of Raghavan J. in Lakshmi Amma v. Kalliani Amma 1967 KLT. 589 and the decision in Baroda Prasad v. Bhupendra Nath AIR. 1924 Cal. 56 to support his conclusion. In the former case the landlord claimed damages against his kuzhikanom tenant having fixity of tenure for removal of some coconut trees belonging to the landlord from the property and also for the removal of earth from a portion of the holding and selling the same to a Panchayat. This court while dismissing the plaintiff's claim in reversal of the decree of the court below observed: "The Calcutta decision relied on by the counsel of the appellant appears to apply to the case before me; and that decision lays that so long as the tenant is willing and ready to pay the rent agreed upon, he can enjoy the property in any manner he likes without causing permanent damage to the holding. Of course, the tenant is bound to surrender the property to the landlord (when he surrenders) in the same state of condition in which he took it at the time of the lease. Of course, the tenant is bound to surrender the property to the landlord (when he surrenders) in the same state of condition in which he took it at the time of the lease. Therefore, if for some reason the landlord is to recover possession and he 'recovers possession and if the holding is not then in the same condition as it was when the tenancy was created,' the landlord is entitled to claim damages for restoring the property to its original state. Only their is the landlord entitled to claim damages for cutting and removing fruit-bearing trees or even retrieving earth from the holding." 20. The decision of the Travancore-Cochin High Court in Anthony Ouseph v. Neelakandan Namboodiri 1955 KLT. 549 was distinguished on the ground that it was concerned with a lease which was redeemable and the decision of the Madras High Court in Latifa Bibi v, Narayanachari 26 Indian Cases 271 was also held not to apply because it related to the cutting and removal of timber trees belonging to the landlord which did riot form the subject matter of the lease. The decision in Cheeru v. Omana S, A. 297 of 1963 also referred by Raghavan J, in our view does not furnish any guidance in resolving the dispute between the parties; In that case the appellants filed a statement before this court that the trees out of their plantations in the property may be treated as belonging to the landlord in compensation for the missing trees. In deposing of the Second Appeal on the basis of that statement Madhavan Nair, J., observed: "As there is no evidence that the tenants have committed active waste by felling or selling timber standing on the leasehold, I am inclined to accept that concession as good satisfaction of the plaintiff's claim If a tree that was part of the leasehold died or fell on account of natural causes, the only use that the tenant can have of that tree is to take it. The appellants have assured payment of the stipulated rent in future without demur. In these circumstances the tenants' appropriation of the dead or fallen trees cannot be held unlawful or mala fide, and therefore no question of present damages arises here. What would be the condition of the property when resumption becomes, if ever, possible in the unseen future cannot and need not be determined here." 21. In these circumstances the tenants' appropriation of the dead or fallen trees cannot be held unlawful or mala fide, and therefore no question of present damages arises here. What would be the condition of the property when resumption becomes, if ever, possible in the unseen future cannot and need not be determined here." 21. In our opinion the learned Munsiff was right in the view that he took that the decision in Lakshmi Amma v. Kalliani Amma 1967 KLT. 589 cannot apply to the case under appeal as the observations in the said case are expressly limited to cases where the damage caused is not of a permanent nature. Raghavan, J. observed: 'I may make it clear that the position may probably be different if the damage caused is of a permanent nature: however, I do not finally pronounce upon that question in this case". In Barada Prasad v. Bhupendra Nath AIR. 1924 Cal. 56 their Lordships of the Calcutta High Court observed: "There is nothing in the law which prevents tenants having permanent heritable rights at a fixed rent from using the land in any manner they think fit so long as there is no risk to right of the landlord to recover the rent payable, and, I think, it is now settled that unless there are any reservations, the landlord has no right in the case of such tenures other than the right to receive the stipulated rent. 22. The above dictum followed in Lakshmi Amma v, Kalliani Amma 1967 KLT. 589 is strongly relied on by the respondents. In Abhiram Goswami v. Shyama Charan Nandi ILR. 36 Cal. 1003, their Lordships of the Judicial Committee in overruling a contention that a mokurari lease is tantamount to a conveyance in fee simple and that the lessee should be treated as a purchaser within the meaning of the Limitation Act observed at pages 1014 and 1015: "Sir Robert Finlay, in his able agrument for the respondents, contended that a mokurari lease is tantamount to a conveyance in fee simple, and that the lessee must therefore be treated as a purchaser within the meaning of the Limitation Act. But the distinction between the two transactions has been well pointed out by Jenkins, J., in his judgment in the case of Kally Dass Ahiri v. Monmohini Dassee (1897 ILR. 24 Cal. 440, 447). But the distinction between the two transactions has been well pointed out by Jenkins, J., in his judgment in the case of Kally Dass Ahiri v. Monmohini Dassee (1897 ILR. 24 Cal. 440, 447). 'Because at the present day, says the learned judge, 'a conveyance in fee simple leaves nothing in the grantor, it does not follow that a lease in perpetuity here has any such result The law of this country does undoubtedly allow of a base in perpetuity... A man who, being owner of land, grants a lease in perpetuity carves a subordinate interest out of his own, and does not annihilate his own interest. This result is to be inferred by the use of the word lease, which implies an interest still remaining in the lessor'. He held, therefore, that, whether the Transfer of Property Act applied or not, such a lease is forfeitable, notwithstanding that it is permanent. In this opinion their Lordships concur, and it follows that they are unable to give to the Limitation Act the wider interpretation adopted by the High Court, and to treat the lessee as a purchaser under Art.134 of the Act." In Rajah Bejoy Singh v. Surendra AIR. 1928 PC. 234 a zamindar granted a lease described as 'a muffasil Patni Taluq lease according to the provisions of Bengal Patni Regulation.8 of 1819' in respect of his zamindari lands at an annual rent. The lease provided that the lessee should possess and enjoy the patni mahal in perpetuity on payment of the annual rent fixed. There was no stipulation in the lease to minerals or to the sub-soil or to the right to excavate for making bricks. The suit was instituted for permanent injunction to restrain the lessee from making excavation in the lands comprised in the lease for making bricks. In allowing the claim of the plaintiff, their Lordships of the Judicial Committee stated: "In their Lordships' opinion the intention of the parties as to what was the subject and extent of the lease must depend upon the true construction of the terms of the grant of 18th July 1853. It contains no reference to minerals or to the subsoil: or to the rights to excavate for making bricks. It contains no reference to minerals or to the subsoil: or to the rights to excavate for making bricks. There is nothing in the lease to suggest that the land included therein was to be put to any use, other than that to which the zamindari lands were subject at the time of the lease. On the other hand, the lease contains restrictive covenants relating to the cutting of trees and the excavation of the land for the purpose of a tank without a sanad signed by the zamindar, which are inconsistent with a grant of the lands with an unlimited and unrestricted power to the grantee to use the lands in any was which he desired, including the excavation of clay for brick-making and causing thereby substantial damage to the land. On a consideration of all the terms of the lease, their Lordships are of opinion that it was not intended by the parties that the grantee should be entitled to use the lands for the purpose of making bricks." In this connection it will be useful to refer to the decision of the Judicial Committee in Shashi Bhushan Misra v. Jyoti Prashad Singh Deo' (1916) ILR. 44 Cal. 585 where it was observed: "...when a grant is made by a zamindar of a tenure at the fixed rent, although the tenure may be permanent, heritable, and transferable, minerals will not be held to have formed part of the grant in the absence of express evidence to that effect." In Raj Kumar Thakur Giridhari Singh v. Megh Lal Pandey ILR 45. Cal. 87 Lord Shaw pointed out: "...the essential characteristics of a lease is that the subject is one which is occupied and enjoyed and the corpus of which does not in the nature of things and by reason of the user disappear." In the light of the principles stated by their Lordships of the Judicial Committee the decision in Sarada Prasad v Bhupendra Nath AIR. 1924 Cal. 56 cannot be considered to be good law. In Viswanath Iyer v. Kunju Ezhuthassan & Others 1968 KLT. 1924 Cal. 56 cannot be considered to be good law. In Viswanath Iyer v. Kunju Ezhuthassan & Others 1968 KLT. 732 the claim of the landlord for damages during the subsistence of the lease for removal of earth from the leasehold for manufacture of bricks was considered and Balakrishna Eradi, J. said thus: "...in the absence of any specific provision contained in the demise entitling the lessee to any rights in the sub-soil or a right of disposal over the surface soil apart from mere user thereof, the lessee is not entitled to excavate and remove earth or clay from the land and convert it to his own use or dispose it of by sale." 23. We concur with the above statement of law and hold that a tenant of an agricultural holding has no right to excavate the soil from the property for any purpose other than agricultural operation in the land demised. It is nobody's case that the kind of excavation resorted to is necessary for agricultural purposes. 24. It is also not possible to accept the plea of the defendants that the excavation of the land and the installation of petrol and diesel pumps in the plaint property will enhance its value and can therefore be classed only as ameliorating waste. When the character of the land is permanently altered, the lessee is liable to be interfered with by an order of injunction even if by the alteration the value of the property is enhanced. There was a strenuous attempt on behalf of the defendants to support the plea on the ground that in the developing town of Badagara it is unreasonable on the part of the landlord to insist that the demise should be retained only as an agricultural holding as it will retard the growth of the town and the question has to be decided in the light of the location of the property and the growth of Badagara as a commercial town. In Halsbury's Laws of England, Volume 23, page 567 it is stated: "Apart, however, from acts done in exercise of statutory authority, a substantial alteration in the character of demised premises will be treated as waste and restrained by injunction, notwithstanding that the value will be thereby increased." 25. In Halsbury's Laws of England, Volume 23, page 567 it is stated: "Apart, however, from acts done in exercise of statutory authority, a substantial alteration in the character of demised premises will be treated as waste and restrained by injunction, notwithstanding that the value will be thereby increased." 25. The plea that lowering the level of the land and the installation of petrol and diesel oil pumps in the demise will enhance the value of the land does not appeal to us. As a fuel station it may be useful to the public at large and it is difficult to comprehend that it will enhance the value of the land. The moment the contract with the oil suppliers is terminated the pumps cannot be made use of and they have to be removed, and on account of the excavation done the land cannot be used as an agricultural land and it cannot be used as a building site also except by levelling it up to a substantial extent. We are therefore of the opinion that the contention of the learned counsel for the respondents that the act attributed to the defendants is only waste in the technical sense cannot stand scrutiny. 26. The next submission made by the learned counsel for the defendants was that in view of the provisions of Act 1 of 1964 every right of the landlord in the demised land has disappeared excepting the right to receive rent. On this aspect the learned Subordinate Judge observed: "What is very important to be noted is that there is no provision anywhere in Act 1 of 1964 recognising any sub soil rights of the landlord or that in fixing the purchase price any such rights should be reckoned. Thus, the only right now extant is the right to recover the rent stipulated or the fair rent that might be determined, even ever is less. When even this shell of a right also can be purchased by the tenant at his option, on payment of the purchase money under S.53 of Kerala Act 1 of 1964 it seems to me quite unreasonable to hold that the tenant must be still at the mercy of the landlord to put the land to a more profitable user, consistent with the needs of a developing society." 27. We are afraid that the above observations are the result of a misunderstanding of the scope of Act 1 of 1964. In this connection we were taken through the several sections of Act 1 of 1964 and in our view it is not necessary to refer to all of them. S.127 of Act 1 of 1964 reads thus: "127. Act to override other laws, etc. The provisions of this Act shall have effect not withstanding anything to any other law or any custom or usage or in any contract, express or implied, inconsistent with the provisions of this Act." 28. If therefore the rights of a landlord over the property are not completely annihilated by any of the provisions in Act 1 of 1964 the provisions of the Transfer of Property Act and the general principles of law governing the relationship between landlord and tenant still hold good. It is no doubt true that the rights of a landlord as against the tenant have been abridged to a large extent. But we do not find any section in the Act by which the tenant is allowed to use the demise for a purpose totally inconsistent with the purpose for which the grant was made or is entitled to permanently alter the nature of the land. The following provisions in the Act namely S.2 sub-section (29) defining 'landlord', (30) defining 'landowner', [40] defining 'owner', S.53 to 64 dealing with the purchase of the landlord's right by tenants, S.14 to 22 dealing with resumption and provisions in Chapter III only establish that the ownership of the landlord over the land demised is not in any way affected. We are therefore of the view that there is nothing in the provisions of Act 1 of 1964 to compel us to uphold the plea of the defendants. 29. The transaction in the case before us is a kanom kuzhikanom lease. The purpose of the lease is therefore obvious. Both the courts below have found that considerable earth has been excavated from the property. We are therefore of the opinion that the act complained of amounts to waste. 30. 29. The transaction in the case before us is a kanom kuzhikanom lease. The purpose of the lease is therefore obvious. Both the courts below have found that considerable earth has been excavated from the property. We are therefore of the opinion that the act complained of amounts to waste. 30. It was argued that subsequent to the dismissal of the application for temporary injunction by the appellate court the 3rd defendant has completed the process of excavating the earth and what remains to be done is only the installation of pumps and no advantage will accrue to the plaintiffs by granting the injunction except to give them the satisfaction of having prevented the defendants from carrying on their commercial undertaking. It was pointed out that the earth excavated is stored in portion of the plaint property and has not been disposed of by the defendants. In our view, this argument cannot be countenanced. The effect of accepting the plea will be to allow the defendants to take advantage of their own breach of law during the pendency of the litigition. The order of the Subordinate Judge dismissing the application for temporary injunction was set aside in revision and if within that short interval, if the defendants are guilty of acts sought to be restrained that cannot form the basis of a contention to any relief in their favour. We therefore overrule that plea as well. 31. The only point to be decided is about the nature of the relief to be granted to the plaintiffs. In the plaint the plaintiffs have prayed to restrain the defendants from trespassing upon the property and from cutting and removing the trees. The plaintiffs are not entitled to get this relief because the property is admitted to be in the possession of defendants 1 to 3 on the basis of the lease and the sublease and the trees sought to be removed were planted by defendants 1 and 2. But the plaintiffs are entitled to a decree for injunction restraining defendants 1I to 3 from excavating the land and from doing anything for the installation of petrol and diesel pumps in the plaint property. It is open to the landlord to enforce the remedy for injunction against commission of waste against the sublessee also. 32. There was no dispute at the bar regarding the quantum of damages. It is open to the landlord to enforce the remedy for injunction against commission of waste against the sublessee also. 32. There was no dispute at the bar regarding the quantum of damages. The trial court made defendants land 2 alone liable for damages. The 3rd defendant was held to be not liable on the ground that there is no privity of contract between the plaintiffs and the 3rd defendant. Even in the absence of any privity of contract, it is open to a lessor to sustain an action for damages for acts injurious to the reversion even against strangers. The 3rd defendant is also liable for the damages claimed. 33. In the result we set aside the decrees of the courts below, and pass the following decree: 34. Defendants 1 to 3 are restrained by permanent injunction from excavating the plaint property and from taking any steps for the installation of petrol and diesel pumps in the plaint property. The plaintiffs are allowed to recover from defendants 1 to 3 the sum of Rs. 2,000/- towards damages for the loss sustained by the plaintiff. The plaintiffs will be entitled to interest at the rate of 6% per annum on the damages decreed from the date of the decree of this Court. The plaintiffs are entitled to one half of their costs throughout. The appeals are disposed of on the above terms. Allowed.